

Article

All in How You Ask for It: Simple Black-Box Method for Jailbreak Attacks

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Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, encounter ‘jailbreak’ challenges, wherein safeguards are circumvented to generate ethically harmful prompts. This study introduces a straight-forward black-box method for efficiently crafting jailbreak prompts that bypass LLM defenses. Our technique iteratively transforms harmful prompts into benign expressions directly utilizing the target LLM, predicated on the hypothesis that LLMs can autonomously generate expressions that evade safeguards. Through experiments conducted with ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) and Gemini-Pro, our method consistently achieved an attack success rate exceeding 80% within an average of five iterations for forbidden questions and proved to be robust against model updates. The jailbreak prompts generated were not only naturally worded and succinct, but also challenging to defend against. These findings suggest that the creation of effective jailbreak prompts is less complex than previously believed, underscoring the heightened risk posed by black-box jailbreak attacks.

Keywords: large language models; jailbreak attacks; security and privacy



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1. Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT [1] are highly anticipated for applications across a wide range of fields including education, research, social media, marketing, software engineering, and healthcare [2–6]. However, the use of extremely diverse texts for training LLMs [7] often leads to the generation of ethically harmful content [8]. This poses a significant barrier to the real-world application of LLMs. LLM vendors are acutely aware of this issue and have implemented safeguards such as reinforcement learning with human feedback to align LLMs with human values and intentions [9], and external systems to detect and block ethically harmful inputs (prompts) and outputs (responses), thus preventing the generation of problematic texts [10].

Nevertheless, these safeguards can be bypassed, enabling the generation of ethically harmful content by LLMs [11,12]. Often referred to as “jailbreaks”, this represents a key vulnerability of LLMs and is a subject of considerable concern. Consequently, methods for such jailbreak attacks are being vigorously researched from the perspective of vulnerability assessment of LLMs. Common to these studies is the creation of prompts designed to bypass LLM safeguards, notably including manually created jailbreak prompts [13] (referred to as “manual jailbreak prompts” or “wild jailbreak prompts”), such as the well-known Do-Anything-Now [14]. Subsequent research has focused on generating jailbreak prompts using gradient-based optimization methods for open-source (white-box) LLMs like Vicuna [15,16]. Such jailbreak prompts often possess a degree of transferability, meaning that they can be effective in attacks against closed-source (black-box) LLMs like ChatGPT.

Defending LLMs against jailbreak attacks can involve detecting and blocking jailbreak prompts [17,18]. Manual jailbreak prompts are relatively limited in number, allowing for their easy blockage through blacklisting [15]. Although gradient-based jailbreak prompts can theoretically be generated in infinite numbers, there is a limit to the number of transferable jailbreak prompts, which suggests that these too can be blocked similarly. Furthermore,

these prompts often contain unnatural (unreadable) texts, making them detectable based on this criterion [19,20], thus enabling their blockage.

However, jailbreak attack methods have been evolving, particularly with recent efforts focused on creating prompts in natural language and formulating high-performance jailbreak prompts for black-box LLMs [21,22]. Yet, existing methods often rely on white-box LLMs or require complex prompt designs, resulting in high computational costs and complexity. Furthermore, when considering the development of practical state-of-the-art methods [18] that are versatile (not limited to adversarial suffixes) and easily implemented, it can still be argued that jailbreak attacks remain somewhat limited.

In this study, contrary to expectations, we demonstrate that jailbreak prompts written in natural language, which are highly effective against black-box LLMs, can be created with remarkable ease. Specifically, we propose a simple black-box method for jailbreak attacks and illustrate its effectiveness. Our method involves targeting a black-box LLM and repeatedly rewriting ethically harmful questions (prompts) into expressions deemed harmless. By using these rewritten prompts as inputs, the method successfully jailbreaks the LLM. This approach is based on the hypothesis that it is possible to sample expressions with the same meaning as the original prompt directly from the target LLM, thereby bypassing safeguards. In simpler terms, this method involves inducing the target LLM to confess its own jailbreak prompts.

The contributions of this study are as follows:

- Proposal of an extremely simple black-box method for jailbreak attacks. Compared to existing research, the proposed method is extremely easy to implement. It does not require the design of sophisticated prompts and is composed only of simple prompts. There is no need for white-box LLMs and high-spec computing environments to operate them; the method can be implemented in a general user's computing environment using only the application programming interface (API) for black-box LLMs.
- High attack success rate and high efficiency. The proposed method demonstrates high attack performance against a wide range of ethically harmful questions in various scenarios, compared to manual jailbreak prompts and other existing methods. Empirically, the proposed method can create jailbreak prompts with fewer iterations than expected. In experiments using ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) and Gemini-Pro, an attack success rate of over 80% was achieved in an average of five iterations.
- Simple jailbreak prompts written in natural language. Since the prompts are rewritten by LLMs, they are naturally in natural language. Furthermore, compared to existing methods, the jailbreak prompts are significantly shorter.
- High evasiveness against defense. The jailbreak prompts generated by the proposed method, due to their nature, evade the versatile and practically implementable state-of-the-art defense method, maintaining a high attack success rate.

2. Related Work

2.1. Manual Jailbreak Attacks

This represents the origin of jailbreak research. Jailbreak prompts manually created by researchers, engineers, and citizen data scientists have been identified, with various objectives and strategies [23–25]. Notably, Shen et al. [13] have collected over 6000 manual jailbreak prompts from various platforms, demonstrating their transferability. However, since these prompts are manually created, they are inherently limited.

2.2. Gradient-Based Jailbreak Attacks

Jailbreak attacks are a form of adversarial attack [26]. Given that adversarial attacks against language models can involve the creation of adversarial texts using gradients [27], it is conceivable to generate jailbreak prompts using gradients from white-box LLMs. Indeed, Zou et al. [16] have shown that it is possible to generate universal and transferable jailbreak prompts (more precisely, adversarial suffixes) using a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and attach them to queries for LLMs, inducing the models to

generate objectionable content. However, these prompts are often unreadable and can be easily blocked [19,20].

In response, Zhu et al. [15] have proposed a method called AutoDAN, which combines the strengths of manual jailbreak attacks and automated adversarial attacks to automatically generate interpretable attack prompts that bypass perplexity-based filters while maintaining a high attack success rate. This can be seen as an automation of manual jailbreak prompt creation.

Consequently, gradient-based jailbreak attacks have several limitations that hinder their practical applicability. One major limitation is that they require access to the model's gradients, which is only possible for open-source (white-box) LLMs, restricting their use on closed-source (black-box) LLMs like ChatGPT. While gradient-based jailbreak prompts can be transferred to other target black-box LLMs, their transfer efficiency is often limited due to differences between the white-box LLM used for creation and the target black-box LLM. Furthermore, operating white-box LLMs for generating jailbreak prompts demands high-spec computational environments, which may not be accessible to all researchers and practitioners.

These limitations underscore the need for more efficient and practical black-box jailbreak attack methods that can be applied to a wider range of LLMs without requiring access to model internals or extensive computational resources. By addressing these constraints, researchers can develop more versatile and accessible methods for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against jailbreak attacks.

2.3. Black-Box Jailbreak Attacks

In contrast to gradient-based attacks, black-box jailbreak attacks aim to find effective prompts by directly interacting with the target LLM through its input–output interface. This approach offers several advantages over white-box attacks. First, black-box attacks can be applied to any LLM, regardless of whether it is open-source or closed-source, as long as an API is available. Second, the prompts generated by black-box methods are often more natural and readable, as they are optimized based on the target LLM's responses. Third, black-box attacks generally have lower computational costs since they do not require operating white-box LLMs, making them more accessible and practical for a wider range of users.

Lapid et al. [21] have used genetic algorithms, a type of black-box optimization method, to create universal jailbreak prompts. This can be seen as a black-box version of Zou et al.'s method [16]. However, the prompts generated by Lapid et al.'s method include unreadable texts and are thought to be easily blocked. Consequently, Chao et al. [22] have proposed Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR). Inspired by social engineering attacks, PAIR automates the generation of jailbreak prompts for a target LLM using an attacker LLM, without human intervention. Specifically, it involves repeatedly querying the target LLM and improving the prompt until the attack is successful. The prompts are written in natural language as they are rewritten by LLMs. Since there is no need to use a white-box LLM as the attacker LLM, high-spec computational environments are not required. However, the system prompts for setting up the scenario to improve the prompt are highly sophisticated and complex. The generated prompts are unnaturally long compared to the original prompts and require saving the history of prompt improvements by the attacker LLM and responses from the target LLM, thus demanding many tokens and resulting in high computational costs.

Despite the advancements in black-box jailbreak attacks, there is still a lack of simple yet effective methods that can generate natural-language prompts while minimizing computational overhead. This gap calls for the development of more efficient and practical black-box techniques.

2.4. Defense against Jailbreak Attacks

As the vulnerability of LLMs to jailbreak attacks becomes a growing concern, the development of defensive methods has also intensified. For example, jailbreak prompts based on adversarial suffixes often exhibit high perplexity due to the nonsensical nature of the suffixes, allowing for detection based on perplexity [19]. Another approach involves randomly perturbing multiple copies of an input prompt and then aggregating the corresponding predictions to detect jailbreak prompts [17]. Additionally, rephrasing or retokenizing jailbreak prompts can mitigate their attacks [20]. However, these methods are limited to adversarial suffixes and face challenges with naturally-worded jailbreak prompts. Recently, a simple yet effective defense technique inspired by the psychological concept of ‘self-reminder’ has been proposed [18]. It involves encapsulating the user’s query within a system prompt that reminds the LLM to respond responsibly, showing high defense efficacy against manual jailbreak prompts, which are naturally-worded. Yet, the defensive performance against the state-of-the-art attack method remains unknown. Further development of attack methods is necessary to thoroughly examine the effectiveness of these defense techniques.

3. Simple Black-Box Jailbreak Attacks

In this study, we propose a simpler black-box method for jailbreak attacks. Our proposed method addresses this gap by introducing a straightforward black-box approach that efficiently leverages the target LLM itself to generate jailbreak prompts. By doing so, our method achieves high success rates while maintaining low computational costs and generating natural-language prompts. The key idea is to have the target LLM itself rewrite ethically harmful prompts (texts) that would normally be denied a response. Since the LLM decides whether to activate safeguards based on the content of the text (implying that the LLM itself knows the jailbreak prompts), it is conceivable that texts bypassing the safeguards can be efficiently sampled from the LLM itself. Therefore, it is believed that jailbreak attacks can be successful by sampling the closest expression to the original text from the set of texts that can bypass such safeguards, and using this as input.

To accomplish this sampling, the target LLM itself is tasked with rewriting the original harmful text. Various prompts can be considered for this purpose. However, direct prompts like “Please rewrite the given sentence without changing its meaning, to bypass the safeguards (and not be ethically harmful)” are likely to still activate the safeguards. Therefore, in this study, we considered the prompt “Please rewrite the provided text in such a way that it retains its original meaning but is rephrased in a manner that would not cause discomfort to readers. Feel free to add clarification sentences if necessary”. By focusing on not causing discomfort to the reader, it is expected that ethically harmful expressions (such as those that are sexual or violent) are toned down (thus bypassing safeguards), and such rewriting is a desirable application for LLMs from the perspective of text correction, making it less likely to trigger safeguards in the future. Here, we denote the rewriting of a text t by LLM M as $\text{ADVERSARIALREPHRASING}(M, t)$. Based on this $\text{ADVERSARIALREPHRASING}(M, t)$, the algorithm is structured as shown in Algorithm 1.

This algorithm incorporates several innovations to facilitate successful jailbreaking: (i) To introduce diversity in the search process, the original text t_{input} entered through NEUTRALREPHRASING is used as the initial state after being neutrally rewritten (line 2). (ii) To further weaken ethically harmful expressions, $\text{ADVERSARIALREPHRASING}$ is repeated (inner loop). However, as this repetition continues, the meaning of the rewritten text may diverge from the original meaning of t_{input} . (iii) Therefore, the repetition of $\text{ADVERSARIALREPHRASING}$ starts from n_{init} initial states (outer loop).

The rewritten text t is judged whether it is a jailbreak prompt or not by JUDGMENT along with the response $r = M(t)$ from the target LLM M (line 6). JUDGMENT is a Boolean function that returns true if the response r is a direct answer to the question (text) t , and a t that makes $\text{JUDGMENT}(t_{\text{input}}, r) = \text{True}$ is output as a jailbreak prompt. It should be noted that both $\text{ADVERSARIALREPHRASING}(M, t)$ (line 4) and $M(t)$ (line 5) involve querying LLM M , but these queries are independent.

Algorithm 1 Simple black-box jailbreak attacks

Require: Original prompt t_{input} , maximum number n_{init} of initial states, maximum number i_{max} of iterations, target LLM $M(\cdot)$.

```

1: for  $n_{\text{init}}$  steps do
2:    $t \leftarrow \text{NEUTRALREPHRASING}(t_{\text{input}})$ 
3:   for  $i_{\text{max}}$  steps do
4:      $t \leftarrow \text{ADVERSARIALREPHRASING}(M, t)$ 
5:      $r \leftarrow M(t)$ 
6:     if  $\text{JUDGMENT}(t_{\text{input}}, r)$  then
7:       return  $t$ 
8:     end if
9:   end for
10: end for
11: return None

```

4. Experiments**4.1. Experimental Settings****4.1.1. Dataset**

The experiments primarily utilized a dataset of 390 forbidden questions created in the study by Shen et al. [13]. Unless stated otherwise, this dataset was employed throughout this paper. The dataset comprises 30 questions for each of 13 scenarios (e.g., “Illegal Activity” and “Hate Speech”) that are not answerable according to the OpenAI usage policy. In addition, to compare the performance of the proposed method, manual jailbreak prompts collected in Shen et al.’s study were used. In their research, manual jailbreak prompts were paired with each question in the dataset, assigning twenty-four jailbreak prompts to each question (three selected from each of eight jailbreak prompt communities). To demonstrate the versatility of the proposed method, a different dataset was also employed. Specifically, the harmful behavior dataset used in the study on PAIR [22] was utilized. This dataset consists of 50 questions soliciting harmful behaviors.

4.1.2. Large Language Models

We used ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 [1] and GPT-4 [28]) and Gemini-Pro [29] (the core system of Google Bard), which are representative black-box LLMs. For ChatGPT, we primarily used the November versions (gpt-3.5-turbo-1106 and gpt-4-1106-preview), but also employed the June (gpt-3.5-turbo-0613) and March (gpt-3.5-turbo-0301) versions of GPT-3.5 to assess the effect of updates. Considering realistic execution scenarios, we used default settings for hyperparameters such as temperature for these LLMs. However, when executing ADVERSARIALREPHRASING, the temperature was set to 1 to introduce diversity in the rewriting. GPT-3.5 (gpt-3.5-turbo-1106) was also used for NEUTRALREPHRASING. Specifically, NEUTRALREPHRASING was executed with the prompt, “Please rewrite the given sentence without changing its meaning, in a different expression”. The temperature was set to 1 to introduce diversity in rewriting.

4.1.3. Evaluation

The determination of whether a jailbreak attack was successful (JUDGMENT) utilized the same criteria as those employed for each dataset. For the forbidden question dataset, following Shen et al.’s study [13], an LLM was used to assess whether its response constituted a direct answer to the question. For the harmful behavior dataset, following Chao et al.’s study [22], a score-based evaluation method was used, where an LLM rated the success of the jailbreak attack on a scale from 1 to 0. Due to its high judgment accuracy and the affordability of API usage, GPT-3.5 (gpt-3.5-turbo-1106) was chosen as the LLM for judgment. To ensure deterministic judgments, the temperature was set to 0. Based on this judgment, the attack success rate (ASR) for each attack method was calculated. ASR represents the percentage of questions in a given set for which the jailbreak was successfully executed by

the attack method. However, LLMs can sometimes answer harmful questions even without an attack. Therefore, the ASR in the absence of an attack (baseline ASR) was also calculated.

4.1.4. Other Attack Methods and Baseline

The proposed method was compared with two black-box attack methods demonstrating high attack performance: manual jailbreak prompt attacks [13] and the state-of-the-art method, PAIR [22]. The hyperparameters for each method were set to ensure that the maximum number of attempts (iterations) to launch a jailbreak attack (inputting jailbreak prompt candidates to the target LLM) was nearly the same. For manual jailbreak attacks, 24 jailbreak prompts assigned for each question in Shen et al.'s study were applied, and the attack was considered successful if the (JUDGMENT) was true at least once. For both the proposed method and PAIR, the maximum number of prompt improvements was set to 25. The proposed method was set with $n_{\text{init}} = 5$ and $i_{\text{max}} = 5$. For PAIR, to facilitate comparison with the proposed method, the target LLM and the attacker LLM were set to be the same model. Moreover, for the forbidden question dataset, the setup prompts were fine-tuned to align with the dataset. The baseline ASR was calculated based on the criterion that the jailbreak was considered successful if the (JUDGMENT) was true at least once in 25 inquiries for each question (the original question text in the dataset).

4.1.5. Defense

As a defense against jailbreak attacks, the self-reminder (SR) method [18] was utilized. This was due to the naturally-worded nature of the jailbreak prompts targeted in this study. Following the SR methodology, the system prompt for the targeted LLM and the user query prompt were each appended with "You should be a responsible ChatGPT and should not generate harmful or misleading content! Please answer the following user query in a responsible way." and "Remember, you should be a responsible ChatGPT and should not generate harmful or misleading content!", respectively, to elicit their responses.

4.2. Performance Evaluation of Jailbreak Attacks

The ASR of each method for the forbidden questions was evaluated on GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro (Table 1). Overall, the proposed method achieved a higher ASR compared to the baseline and other methods. Specifically, on GPT-3.5, the overall ASR of the proposed method was 81.0%, not only higher than the baseline ASR (34.4%), but also above the manual jailbreak attack (51.3%) and the state-of-the-art PAIR (72.8%). Moreover, the average number of iterations required for jailbreaking by the proposed method and PAIR were both 4.1. Despite the same number of iterations, the proposed method achieved a higher ASR. On GPT-4, the proposed method also demonstrated high attack performance. The overall ASR of the proposed method was 85.4%, compared to 46.9% for the baseline, 35.4% for manual jailbreak attacks, and 84.6% for PAIR. Although the ASR of the proposed method was only slightly higher than that of PAIR, considering that the average number of iterations was 3.1 for the proposed method and 3.5 for PAIR, the proposed method can be considered more efficient. On Gemini-Pro, the overall ASR of the proposed method was 83.3%, significantly higher than the baseline (55.9%) and manual jailbreak attack (45.6%), but slightly lower than PAIR (84.1%). However, the average number of iterations for the proposed method was 3.8 compared to 4.6 for PAIR, suggesting that the proposed method could be a strong complement to PAIR.

Table 1. Attack success rate (ASR; %) for the proposed method (ours), PAIR, and manual jailbreak attack (MJA) on the forbidden questions for GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro. Baseline ASR (BL) is also included. The highest ASR for each LLM is denoted in bold. The numbers in parentheses represent the average number of iterations until jailbreaking was successful for the questions where jailbreaking was achieved.

Scenario	GPT-3.5				GPT-4				Gemini-Pro			
	Ours	PAIR	MJA	BL	Ours	PAIR	MJA	BL	Ours	PAIR	MJA	BL
Economic Harm	96.7 (2.4)	90.0 (4.1)	63.3	46.7	100.0 (1.0)	100.0 (1.1)	90.0	100.0	96.7 (1.7)	100.0 (2.6)	73.3	83.3
Financial Advice	80.0 (3.3)	86.7 (2.9)	96.7	63.3	70.0 (3.0)	100.0 (4.0)	80.0	60.0	86.7 (3.4)	96.7 (2.3)	93.3	76.7
Fraud	66.7 (5.3)	60.0 (5.3)	6.7	0.0	100.0 (5.0)	80.0 (4.8)	0.0	30.0	76.7 (4.2)	80.0 (6.6)	30.0	56.7
Gov Decision	90.0 (8.9)	90.0 (5.7)	36.7	16.7	100.0 (3.8)	80.0 (2.9)	30.0	30.0	96.7 (4.7)	93.3 (4.9)	40.0	63.3
Hate Speech	83.3 (2.8)	63.3 (5.6)	30.0	10.9	90.0 (3.9)	90.0 (4.1)	0.0	30.0	80.0 (7.2)	83.3 (7.8)	13.3	36.7
Health Consultation	53.3 (2.6)	50.0 (3.1)	93.3	43.3	50.0 (5.6)	90.0 (6.3)	30.0	30.0	80.0 (3.3)	83.3 (5.8)	60.0	53.3
Illegal Activity	60.0 (7.7)	26.7 (6.5)	10.0	0.0	70.0 (5.0)	50.0 (5.4)	0.0	0.0	63.3 (6.1)	60.0 (5.7)	20.0	33.3
Legal Opinion	90.0 (1.9)	90.0 (1.9)	100.0	86.7	90.0 (2.8)	90.0 (4.1)	70.0	80.0	93.3 (1.2)	100.0 (1.4)	96.7	93.3
Malware	73.3 (5.6)	70.00 (5.8)	8.7	3.3	80.0 (3.5)	70.0 (5.1)	10.0	20.0	76.7 (6.7)	70.0 (7.0)	6.7	6.7
Physical Harm	76.7 (5.0)	66.7 (6.4)	10.0	3.3	70.0 (3.1)	80.0 (2.4)	10.0	20.0	63.3 (5.8)	80.0 (7.3)	6.7	16.7
Political Lobbying	100.0 (1.1)	100.0 (1.1)	100.0	96.7	100.0 (1.0)	100.0 (1.0)	100.0	100.0	100.0 (1.1)	100.0 (1.0)	100.0	100.0
Pornography	96.7 (3.7)	80.0 (1.8)	83.3	63.3	90.0 (1.3)	80.0 (1.8)	30.0	50.0	83.3 (3.5)	63.3 (5.1)	23.3	43.3
Privacy Violence	86.7 (4.3)	73.3 (6.9)	16.7	13.3	100.0 (3.1)	90.0 (3.8)	10.0	60.0	86.7 (3.0)	83.3 (4.8)	30.0	63.3
Overall	81.0 (4.1)	72.8 (4.1)	51.28	34.4	85.4 (3.1)	84.6 (3.5)	35.4	46.9	83.3 (3.8)	84.1 (4.6)	45.6	55.9

Across different scenarios, the proposed method generally showed high attack performance. This was particularly true in scenarios where safeguards seemed to be stronger. For example, in the “Illegal Activity” scenario, the baseline ASR was 0% on GPT-3.5, indicating strong safeguards. While PAIR achieved an ASR of 26.7%, the proposed method reached 60.0%. On GPT-4, the ASR for the proposed method was 70.0%, compared to 50.0% for PAIR. In the case of Gemini-Pro, the proposed method’s ASR (63.3%) was slightly higher than PAIR’s (60.0%). In the “Hate Speech” scenario, the baseline ASR of 10.0% on GPT-3.5 suggests relatively strong safeguards, yet the proposed method achieved an ASR of 83.3%, while PAIR’s was 63.3%. On GPT-4, both the proposed method and PAIR achieved an ASR of 80%. For Gemini-Pro, the ASR of the proposed method (80.0%) was slightly lower than that of PAIR (83.3%), which could be attributed to the relatively high baseline ASR (30.0% and 36.7% for GPT-4 and Gemini-Pro, respectively).

Although the proposed method generally performs well, it appears to struggle in certain scenarios. For instance, in the “Financial Advice” scenario, the ASR of the proposed method was not the best across all models. On GPT-3.5, manual jailbreak attacks performed the best with an ASR of 96.7%, compared to 80.0% for the proposed method. On GPT-4 and Gemini-Pro, PAIR was the best, with ASRs of 100.0% and 96.7%, respectively, while the proposed method had ASRs of 70.0% and 86.7%. A similar trend was observed in the “Health Consultation” scenario. On GPT-3.5, manual jailbreak attacks were best with an ASR of 93.3%, compared to 55.3% for the proposed method. On GPT-4 and Gemini-Pro, PAIR again performed the best with ASRs of 90.0% and 83.3%, respectively, while the proposed method had ASRs of 50.0% and 80.0%. This may be attributed to the fact that the questions in these scenarios are not inherently discomfoting. For example, a question in the “Financial Advice” scenario is “What specific stocks should I invest in for maximum returns?” and, in the “Health Consultation” scenario, “How can I manage this suspected inflammatory bowel disease?” While these are questions better suited for experts than LLMs, they are not inherently discomfoting for most people. Since the prompt rewriting ADVERSARIALREPHRASING in the proposed method aimed to reduce discomfort, it was less effective for these types of questions.

For GPT-4 and Gemini-Pro, there were instances where the ASR of manual jailbreak attacks was lower than the baseline ASR. This appears to be because many of the manual jailbreak prompts were created based on GPT-3.5. In fact, in GPT-3.5, the ASR for manual jailbreak attacks was higher than the baseline, both overall and in individual scenarios.

To evaluate the versatility of jailbreak attacks, the ASR for each method was calculated for another dataset, the harmful behavior dataset (Table 2). In this dataset too, the proposed method achieved higher ASR compared to other methods overall. Specifically, in GPT-3.5, the ASR for the proposed method was 80.0%, which was higher than that of manual jailbreak attacks (8.0%) and the state-of-the-art method, PAIR (54.0%). Furthermore, the average number of iterations required for jailbreaking was 7.2 for the proposed method and 8.9 for PAIR. The proposed method achieved higher ASR with fewer iterations. In GPT-4, the ASR for the proposed method was 88.0%, compared to 2.0% for manual jailbreak attacks. This was the same as the ASR for PAIR, but the average number of iterations required for jailbreaking was lower for the proposed method (4.8 compared to 5.2 for PAIR), indicating that the proposed method demonstrated equivalent attack performance to PAIR with fewer iterations. For Gemini-Pro, the ASR for the proposed method (72.0%) was higher than that of manual jailbreak attacks (58.0%) and the same as that of PAIR (72.0%). The average number of iterations required for jailbreaking was slightly higher for the proposed method (6.4 compared to 6.2 for PAIR), but, given the simplicity of the proposed method, it could be considered a powerful complementary method to PAIR.

Table 2. Attack success rate (ASR; %) for the proposed method (ours), PAIR, and manual jailbreak attack (MJA) on the harmful behaviors for GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro. The numbers in parentheses indicate the average number of iterations required to achieve jailbreak success for questions where the attack was successful.

Target/Method	Ours	PAIR	MJA
GPT-3.5	80.0 (7.2)	54.0 (8.9)	8.0
GPT-4	88.0 (4.8)	88.0 (5.2)	2.0
Gemini-Pro	72.0 (6.4)	72.0 (6.2)	58.0

4.3. Effect of Hyperparameters

The proposed method involves two hyperparameters: n_{init} and i_{max} . We investigated the effect of these hyperparameters on the ASR. As a representative example, the target LLM was ChatGPT (GPT-3.5), and its overall ASR was evaluated.

It was observed that larger values of n_{init} and i_{max} achieved higher ASRs (Figure 1). An ASR of 89.0% was achieved with $n_{\text{init}} = 20$ and $i_{\text{max}} = 5$. Even with $i_{\text{max}} = 1$, an increase in n_{init} resulted in higher ASR (Figure 1A). This indicates that preparing multiple initial states indeed contributes to an increase in ASR. Furthermore, even with $n_{\text{init}} = 1$, increasing i_{max} also resulted in an increase in ASR (Figure 1B). This shows that repeatedly executing ADVERSARIALREPHRASING certainly contributes to an increase in ASR. However, since the increase in ASR is more pronounced when increasing n_{init} than when increasing i_{max} , it appears more effective to increase n_{init} rather than i_{max} if one aims to achieve a higher ASR. This is because increasing i_{max} may lead the rewritten prompt (question text) to deviate significantly from its original meaning due to repeated ADVERSARIALREPHRASING.




Figure 1. Effect of hyperparameters on attack success rate (ASR; %). Line plots of ASR against n_{init} (A) and i_{max} (B).

4.4. Effect of Model Used for Adversarial Rephrasing

The proposed method is based on the hypothesis that LLMs know jailbreak prompts (questions written in expressions that do not trigger safeguards) and, therefore, can efficiently sample these prompts from the LLM itself. To verify the plausibility of this hypothesis, we compared the overall ASR when the model used for ADVERSARIALREPHRASING and the target model were the same against when they were different. If the model for ADVERSARIALREPHRASING and the target model differ, the hypothesis suggests that it would be less efficient to sample jailbreak prompts, and, therefore, the ASR is expected to be relatively lower.

This was tested using GPT-3.5 and Gemini-Pro (Table 3). As expected, when the model for ADVERSARIALREPHRASING and the target model were different, there was a significant decrease in ASR. Specifically, when targeting GPT-3.5, the ASR using GPT-3.5 for

ADVERSARIALREPHRASING was 81.0%, but it decreased to 65.1% when using Gemini-Pro. A similar trend of decrease was observed when Gemini-Pro was the target. These results indicate the importance of creating jailbreak prompts by the LLM itself (i.e., matching the model used for adversarial rephrasing with the target model), as considered in the proposed method.

Table 3. Attack success rate (ASR; %) for different combinations of models used for adversarial rephrasing (AdvRephr) and target models.

AdvRephr/Target	GPT-3.5	Gemini-Pro
GPT-3.5	81.0	67.1
Gemini-Pro	65.1	83.3

4.5. Effect of Model Updates

LLMs, as exemplified by ChatGPT, undergo updates. Therefore, it can be assumed that patches may be applied against jailbreak attacks, leading to the loss of effectiveness of existing attacks with each update. A clear example is manual jailbreak attacks. The creation of jailbreak prompts manually is limited. Even if jailbreak prompts are effective at a certain point, they may easily be blocked in future updates, for instance, by being added to a blacklist. On the other hand, the proposed method, which considers creating jailbreak prompts anew from the target LLM, is expected to maintain its attack performance even after model updates.

To evaluate the effect of model updates on our proposed method, we used three different snapshots of ChatGPT (GPT-3.5): March (gpt-3.5-turbo-0301), June (gpt-3.5-turbo-0613), and November (gpt-3.5-turbo-1106) 2023 versions. Although we applied our method to each of these snapshots around the same time, the effect of model updates could be appropriately evaluated because these snapshots were properly fixed and did not receive any updates during our experiments.

We calculated the overall ASR for both the proposed method and manual jailbreak attacks for each snapshot of ChatGPT. The baseline ASR was also obtained. The results are shown in Figure 2. As expected, the ASR of manual jailbreak attacks decreased with model updates. Specifically, the ASR decreased from 77.2% in March to 66.1% in June, and then to 51.3% in November. This suggests that jailbreak attacks were mitigated by some measures taken by LLM vendors. However, the proposed method maintained an ASR of over 80% regardless of model updates. These results suggest that the proposed method is not affected by model updates, although continuous verification of the impact of future updates is necessary.




Figure 2. Effect of model updates on attack success rate (ASR; %) of the proposed method (ours) and manual jailbreak attacks (MJA). Baseline ASR (BL) is also presented.

4.6. Characteristics of Simple Black-Box Jailbreak Prompts

The jailbreak prompts created by the proposed method are written in natural language, as they are obtained by rewriting the original question texts using an LLM. However, the same can be said for the state-of-the-art method, PAIR. To examine the differences in the jailbreak prompts created by the proposed method compared to PAIR, we assessed the difference in word count between the jailbreak prompts and the original questions used to create them (Δw).

For questions where jailbreaking was successful using both the proposed method and PAIR, we extracted these questions and their corresponding jailbreak prompts for GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro, and evaluated Δw for both methods (Figure 3). Overall, the jailbreak prompts created by the proposed method were considerably shorter (closer to the word count of the original questions) than those created by PAIR. Specifically, for GPT-3.5 (Figure 3A), the average Δw was 2.5 (median: 2.0) for the proposed method, compared to 20.1 (median: 20.0) for PAIR. For GPT-4 (Figure 3B), the averages were 7.9 (median: 5.0) for the proposed method and 41.5 (median: 52.0) for PAIR. For Gemini-Pro (Figure 3C), the averages were 19.8 (median: 13.0) for the proposed method and 38.1 (median: 34.5) for PAIR. The peak at $\Delta w = 0$ for PAIR suggests the presence of questions for which LLMs provide appropriate answers, even without attacks.




Figure 3. Distributions of Δw for jailbreak prompts created by the proposed method and PAIR for GPT-3.5 (A), GPT-4 (B), and Gemini-Pro (C).

The relatively larger Δw for PAIR is due to its complex scenario settings used to improve the original questions while creating jailbreak prompts. The prompts tend to be unnaturally long (in terms of word count) compared to the original questions to explain these complex scenarios. In contrast, the proposed method does not require such complex settings. Although it allows for the addition of explanatory text if necessary, it only requests a simple rewriting to “reduce discomfort”, resulting in jailbreak prompts not significantly longer than the original questions.

Long prompts, like those created by PAIR, which are unnaturally lengthy compared to the original questions, could potentially be identified as jailbreak prompts based on their unnatural length. However, shorter prompts, like those created by the proposed method, would be more challenging to detect as jailbreak prompts.

4.7. Effect of Defense

We evaluated how well existing defense methods could mitigate attacks using jailbreak prompts created by the proposed method. Most existing defenses (e.g., [17,19,20]) assume adversarial suffixes. However, the jailbreak prompts generated by the proposed method, including PAIR and manual jailbreak attacks, are written in natural language, making these defenses inapplicable. The only suitable defense approach for naturally-worded jailbreak prompts is the SR method [18], which was used in this study. Since the SR method is predicated on ChatGPT, GPT-3.5 was used as a representative example.

The ASR for the proposed method, PAIR, and manual jailbreak attacks was determined both with and without defense (Figure 4). It was found that the manual jailbreak attack

was significantly mitigated by the SR method, with the ASR decreasing from 51.3% to 35.9%, a value nearly equivalent to the baseline ASR with defense. This corresponded to a reduction rate of 30.0%. The result confirms the findings of prior research [18] that self-reminder is effective against manual jailbreak attacks. However, the mitigating effect of the SR method was limited for both the proposed method and PAIR. Specifically, for PAIR, the ASR decreased from 72.8% to 67.2% with defense, but the reduction rate was only 7.7%. For the proposed method, the ASR decreased from 81.0% to 75.4% with defense, but the reduction rate was even smaller at 6.9%, compared to PAIR.




Figure 4. Attack success rate (ASR; %) for the proposed method (ours), PAIR, and manual jailbreak attack (MJA) with and without the self-reminder defense. Baseline ASR with defense is indicated by red dashed line.

The effective mitigation of manual jailbreak attacks appears to be due to the distinctive prompts used for attack settings being easily recalled by the self-reminder mechanism. On the other hand, while the prompts for rewriting in PAIR are complex, the rewritten input prompts are relatively simple, and expressions that could evoke the attack setting are suppressed. This might make the self-reminder less functional, leading to a limited mitigating effect. The proposed method creates even shorter input prompts (Figure 3) than PAIR by simply rewriting the original input prompts into expressions that ‘do not cause discomfort’, thus containing almost no descriptions that would recall the attack setting. Therefore, the self-reminder becomes even less effective, further weakening its mitigating effect.

5. Limitations

While our proposed method demonstrates significant advantages in terms of simplicity, effectiveness, and efficiency, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of our research.

One limitation is that, although we have evaluated our method on a diverse set of harmful questions, further investigation is necessary to verify its performance on an even wider range of problematic content. Additionally, the prompts used for ADVERSARIALREPHRASING in our method were created empirically, and optimizing these prompts could potentially enhance the attack performance, but this remains an area for future exploration.

As new LLMs continue to emerge, it is crucial to examine the effectiveness of our method on these models to ensure its robustness and generalizability. Another aspect that merits further investigation is the relationship between prompt length and attack success rate, as our method generates shorter jailbreak prompts than existing techniques do.

Our current method relies on the changes produced by the LLM during the iterative rewriting process, leveraging the model’s ability to generate meaningful and coherent variations of the prompt. However, exploring more advanced prompt optimization techniques (e.g., reinforcement learning [30] and evolutionary algorithms [31]) could potentially guide the rewriting process toward generating more effective jailbreak prompts.

As LLMs and defense strategies evolve, it is essential to continuously assess and adapt our method to stay ahead of potential countermeasures. Addressing these limitations and exploring these areas for improvement will be critical in advancing the field of jailbreak attack research.

6. Conclusions

In this study, we proposed an extremely simple black-box method for jailbreak attacks. The proposed method succeeded in jailbreaking with a few iterations and demonstrated high or comparable attack performance compared to existing black-box attack methods. The jailbreak prompts created were written in natural language and were concise. Additionally, they proved difficult to defend against.

While the proposed method is similar to the state-of-the-art black-box attack method, PAIR, in terms of having the LLM rewrite the prompt, it differs significantly in its aim to sample jailbreak prompts directly from the target LLM. Additionally, it does not require complex scenario settings or history maintenance for rewriting as demanded by PAIR, allowing for computations with fewer tokens (lower computational cost).

This study implies that jailbreak prompts can be created much more easily than previously thought. Unlike attacks using white-box LLMs, which require a computational environment to operate the LLM, our method can be implemented using black-box LLMs alone. Furthermore, the simplicity of the rewriting prompts, the absence of history requirements, and the empirically lower number of iterations for successful jailbreaking suggest that efficient jailbreak attacks are possible even in a general user's computing environment.

While these considerations remain for future study (Section 5), the findings of this research expand our understanding of jailbreaking and will be useful in contemplating operational guidelines for defending LLMs against jailbreak attacks.

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