Communication and Persuasion and Their Economic and Political Applications

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Applied Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 May 2024) | Viewed by 740

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
Department of Economics, Concordia University, Montreal, QC H3G 1M8, Canada
Interests: information economics; game theory; political economics

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Guest Editor
Département des Sciences Économiques, École des Sciences de la Gestion, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, QC H3C 3P8, Canada
Interests: political economy; applied game theory; public economics; experimental economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Many economic and political situations feature a divergence between information and decision-making power. In such situations, the informed party may, through a variety of channels and methods, convey information to the uninformed party, so as to influence the latter’s decision. In recent decades, economics has turned its attention to the formal analysis of strategic communication and persuasion. The focus is on the limits and potentials of communication and persuasion, as well as ways to enhance them so as to improve information transmission and decision-making. Both the theory and applications are making rapid advances.

In this Special Issue, we invite submissions that make theoretical, experimental, and other empirical contributions to the fundamental theory of strategic communication and persuasion, as well as those that explore applications of the theory to economic contexts like auctions, bargaining, consumer privacy, market competition, organizational design, price discrimination, and social and traditional media and political contexts such as electoral accountability, legislation, lobbying, political campaigns, and transparency.

Prof. Dr. Ming Li
Prof. Dr. Arianna Degan
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • communication
  • persuasion
  • cheap talk
  • information disclosure
  • information design
  • conflicts of interest
  • lobbying
  • transparency
  • experiments

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

20 pages, 485 KiB  
Article
Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer
by Jeahan Jung and Jeong Yoo Kim
Games 2024, 15(3), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15030020 (registering DOI) - 31 May 2024
Abstract
We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller’s preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in [...] Read more.
We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller’s preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in the choice(s) of the buyer regardless of the state of the world. We first show that if the buyer is completely uninformed, only the babbling equilibrium exists. Then, we obtain our main result that even if the buyer has the slightest information, full revelation can be supported by using the crosschecking strategy of the buyer if and only if the seller has a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility function unless the buyer has too much information. In this equilibrium, the buyer can punish the seller who sends a message far above the buyer’s information by ignoring the seller’s message. Paradoxically, no information and too much information of the buyer both eliminate the fully revealing equilibrium with the crosschecking strategy. We also obtain a counterintuitive result that the seller prefers a more informed buyer than a less informed buyer. Full article
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