The Deployment of Low Carbon Technologies in Energy Intensive Industries: A Macroeconomic Analysis for Europe, China and India

Abstract

Industrial processes currently contribute 40% to global CO₂ emissions and therefore substantial increases in industrial energy efficiency are required for reaching the 2 °C target. We assess the macroeconomic effects of deploying low carbon technologies in six energy intensive industrial sectors (Petroleum, Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals, Paper and Pulp, Chemicals, and Electricity) in Europe, China and India in 2030. By combining the GAINS technology model with a macroeconomic computable general equilibrium model, we find that output in energy intensive industries declines in Europe by 6% in total, while output increases in China by 11% and in India by 13%. The opposite output effects emerge because low carbon technologies lead to cost savings in China and India but not in Europe. Consequently, the competitiveness of energy intensive industries is improved in China and India relative to Europe, leading to higher exports to Europe. In all regions, the decarbonization of electricity plays the dominant role for mitigation. We find a rebound effect in China and India, in the size of 42% and 34% CO₂ reduction, respectively, but not in Europe. Our results indicate that the range of considered low-carbon technology options is not competitive in the European industrial sectors. To foster breakthrough low carbon technologies and maintain industrial competitiveness, targeted technology policy is therefore needed to supplement carbon pricing.

1. Introduction

Industrial processes are highly energy-intensive, currently accounting for one-third of global energy use and industrial sectors for 40% of global CO₂ emissions worldwide [1]. In order to meet the 2 °C target, the International Energy Agency (IEA) [1] suggests that by 2050, direct emissions from industry need to be 24% lower than those in 2007. By the same time, demand for manufactured goods is expected to at least double [2]. Given the large disparity between growing demand and the requirement for reducing industrial carbon emissions, the adoption of low-carbon technologies in all energy intensive sectors is required, both in industrialized economies, such as the European Union, and in emerging countries, such as China and India.

To decarbonize energy intensive industries, several options are available such as an increase in energy efficiency; a switch from fuel combustion to electricity; a substitution of fossil fuels by renewables; a reduction in industrial process emissions by substituting raw material inputs or by a switch of the process itself; product innovations; or carbon sequestration and reuse (see e.g., [2,3,4]). An example of energy efficiency improvements are waste heat energy recovery technologies in iron and steel production, and an example of a fuel saving measure is increased production of blended cement by adding, e.g., fly ash as an additive [5,6]. An example for substituting fossil fuels are “plasma blast furnaces” processes in iron and steel production, in which hydrogen is used as a reducer instead of coal [7], or renewable electricity generation by wind or solar [8,9]. Finally, despite industrial activities varying across energy sectors, the implementation of cross-cutting technologies such as combined heat and power or carbon capture and storage (CCS) may offer alternatives to deal with the diversity in energy intensive sectors [4,10]. In this paper, we focus on energy efficiency improvements, technology shifts, as well as a number of other good practice procedures in energy intensive industries (including electricity generation), and for the electricity sector additional fuel switches; we do not consider integrated product innovations or cross-cutting technologies such as CCS.

Industrial sectors do not only differ in the technological options available for decarbonization: while some (sub)sectors, such as iron and steel or chemicals, are highly trade exposed and subject to carbon leakage, other sectors such as cement or electricity are less exposed to international competition [11,12]. For an analysis of decarbonization in industrial sectors, it is therefore of interest to have a closer look not only at the differences between industrialized countries and emerging economies but also at differences across energy intensive sectors.

In the existing literature, there is still a dichotomy between bottom-up and top-down models. Bottom-up models provide high technological detail for a specific industrial sector such as iron and steel [13,14,15] and cement [16,17], or the energy sector. Some technological models also consider the industrial sectors in total [2]. However, while these models distinguish for different technologies (best practice technology, best available technology, and breakthrough technology) in different sectors and different countries, sectoral output and energy demand are held constant or projected [16]. Macroeconomic feedback effects, which are triggered by changes in industrial structure, changes in industrial energy demand and carbon prices cannot be analyzed within bottom-up models [18].

On the other hand, top-down models, such as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, are based on an average technology for each economic sector and thereby provide much less technological detail. The standard approach in this strand of literature investigates the consequences of exogenous increases in energy efficiency (i.e., autonomous energy efficiency improvements by a certain percentage) to assess the rebound effect [19,20,21]. An alternative modeling approach focuses on technological improvements in a single sector such as iron and steel or electricity and therefore differentiates for a set of specific technologies within this sector [22,23,24,25,26].

Finally, hybrid approaches link bottom-up technologically-detailed models with top-down modeling. This linking has mostly been used for combining bottom-up energy system models with top-down macroeconomic models such as CGE [26,27,28,29]. This approach is state-of-the art in energy-economy-modeling for the energy sector, such as the linking of MARKet ALlocation and Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model (MARKAL-EPPA) [30] or the Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impact and MACROeconomic Module (MESSAGE-MACRO) [31]. However, while some hybrid modeling approaches include energy efficiency improvements in the industrial sector in total (see, e.g., the Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies-Supporting European Climate Policy (ADAM) project [32]), the present paper focuses on differences across industrial sectors by soft-linking sector-specific technologies derived from the Greenhouse gas-Air pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model [33] to a multi-regional multi-sectoral CGE model [22].

Sectors and countries differ in their previous efforts as well as in the scope of low carbon technologies. According to an IEA assessment for energy intensive industries, the deployment of best available technology in chemicals and iron and steel production would contribute about 70% of global industrial energy savings, whereas only 30% would be contributed by cement, pulp and paper, and aluminum industries [34]. Consequently, investment costs, fuel savings and unit costs respond differently when low carbon technologies are deployed across different industrial sectors. We therefore investigate not a single, but six energy intensive sectors (Petroleum, Electricity, Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals, Paper and Pulp, and Chemicals) simultaneously. The reason for including a rich set of energy intensive industries is that these sectors are interdependent along their supply chains as well as interact on the carbon market. Depending on whether a low carbon technology leads to cost reductions or cost increases and how trade exposed a sector is, relative prices of domestic to foreign products will change, leading to feedback via international trade and eventually to rebound effects across sectors and regions.

Regarding country differences, we compare the potential for low carbon technologies in Europe to those in China and India for the time period until 2030. Emerging economies are still heavily dependent on fossil fuels, and coal in particular [35,36] and a significant proportion of the capital stock is inefficient and outdated [4]. On the other hand, newly built equipment in these countries is often state-of-the-art [4] and energy efficiency is increasing more quickly than in developed countries [3]. It is therefore worthwhile to see how the availability of low carbon technologies has different economic consequences across these three major economic areas and how international trade contributes to the macroeconomic effects for these regions.

In this paper, we therefore compare the costs and uptake of low carbon technologies in six energy intensive sectors in China, India, and in Europe. We analyze how the costs of low carbon technologies in energy intensive sectors differ between Europe, China and India. By distinguishing different products for each industrial sector in the time period until 2030, we calculate reductions in fuel costs, investment costs and unit costs for each sector and region. By combining the technology details of an engineering model and the macroeconomic consistency of a computable general equilibrium model, we investigate how the sector-specific availability of low carbon technologies affects sectoral output, international trade flows and the carbon markets.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the methodological framework and technology costs are presented in Section 3. The macroeconomic results of different technology availabilities are presented in Section 4. A final section summarizes and concludes.

2. Methodology

In order to understand the consequences of the deployment of low carbon technologies in different world regions, it is useful to understand the differences in energy and carbon intensity for different industrial products across countries, and the potential and cost for improving the efficiency. While a fully-fledged computable general equilibrium (CGE) model by nature will not be able to represent details of individual technologies, the approach taken in this paper is to make some progress in including more technological detail without getting lost in the specifics and without sacrificing the basic modeling philosophy of a macroeconomic representation. Therefore, it is necessary to extract a reduced-form representation of complex sets of technological specifications and then usefully integrate them into the CGE model with minimal structural changes. One way to do this is to extract marginal cost curve information derived from model simulations of a more technology-oriented model, such as GAINS [37,38,39]. With this information, it will be possible to not only represent in a CGE model the changes in energy consumption and greenhouse gases (GHG) emission reduction, but also the changes in different categories of expenditures, i.e., investment versus operating costs (see Figure 1).

In the following, we first briefly describe the CGE model and how technological information is incorporated in GAINS. Section 2.3 describes the link between the two models and the model calibration and simulation. More details on the model specifics and model calibration are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. A sensitivity analysis testing the reliability of our modeling results is given in Appendix C.

2.1. Macroeconomic Framework

In the macroeconomic analysis of the low carbon technologies, we use a multi-sectoral multi-regional CGE model. This model of global trade, based on Bednar-Friedl et al. [40,41] and Schinko et al. [22] incorporates thirteen world regions listed in

Table 1. Regional aggregation in the CGE model.

No.	Aggregated Region	Model Code
1	Central EU 27 + Switzerland	CEU
2	Mediterranean EU 27	MEU
3	Northern EU 27 + Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland	NEU
4	China	CHN
5	India	IND
6	Southeastern and Rest of Europe	SROE
7	North America	NAM
8	Rest of industrialized countries	ROI
9	Other emerging economies	ECO
10	Latin America (w.o. Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela)	LAM
11	Oil and gas exporting countries	OIGA
12	Rest of South and South East Asia	RASI
13	Africa	AFR

.

Each region is characterized by the economic structure of its representative regional household, domestic production in several sectors, and international trade linkages to other regions. As shown in Figure 2, the regional household provides the primary factors labor (L), capital (K), and natural resources (R) for the domestic production and consumes commodities from the domestic supply. In the domestic production, these primary factors are used together with intermediate inputs from the domestic supply to provide their commodities to the domestic as well as foreign markets. The domestic supply integrates imports and domestic production for final and intermediate demand.

The production in each region is further differentiated in sixteen economic sectors (see

Table 2. Sectoral dimension of the CGE model. Source: GTAP8 [42].

Aggregated Sectors		Comprising GTAP8 Sectors (GTAP Sector-Number)	Model Code
Energy Intensive			EIS
1	Petroleum	manufacture of coke oven- and refined oil products (32)	P_C
2	Electricity	production, collection and distribution of electricity (43)	ELY
3	Iron and Steel	manufacture of basic iron and steel and casting (35)	I_S
4	Non-metallic Minerals	manufacture of cement, plaster, lime, gravel, concrete (34)	NMM
5	Paper and Pulp	manufacture of paper , pulp and paper products (31)	PPP
6	Chemicals	manufacture of basic chemicals, other chemical, rubber and plastics products (33)	CRP
Non-Energy Intensive			NEIS
7	Agriculture	all agriculture sectors (1–12)	AGRI
8	Food and Textile	textiles (27), wearing apparel (28), leather (29), wood products (30), all food processing sectors (19–26)	FTI
9	Coal	coal mining (15)	COA
10	Crude Oil	oil extraction (16)	OIL
11	Natural Gas	natural gas extraction (17), manufacture and distribution of gas, steam and hot water supply (44)	GAS
12	Other Extraction	other mining (18), forestry (13) and fishing (14)	EXT
13	Technology Industries	precious and non-ferrous metals (36), fabricated metal products (37), motor vehicles (38), transport equipment (39), communication equipment (40), machinery (41), other manufacturing and recycling (42)	TEC
14	Other Services	water (45), construction (46), wholesale and retail sale, hotels and restaurant (47), post and telecom (51), financial services (52), insurance (53), real estate and other business (54), Recreational and service activities (55), public administration (56), dwellings (57)	SERV
15	Transport	road, rail, pipeline and other transport (48), water transport (49), Air transport (50)	TRN
16	Capital Goods	capital goods	CGDS

) that are modeled by nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions with several nesting levels (for the nesting structures see Appendix A). This enables a specification of substitution possibilities between the primary factors, intermediate energy and material inputs, as well as substitutability between energy commodities (primary, such as coal, oil or gas, and secondary, such as electricity). The production functions used, however, represent one average technology for the whole sector. Model-endogenous changes in technology are therefore determined by the input quantities and substitution elasticities in the production functions and are only to some degree applicable for projections of technology development. A model link to a separate technology model, as introduced in the following, can compensate for this caveat of CGE models.

The information about monetized economic flows between the entities of the CGE model is generated from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 8 database [42] referring to the base year 2007. As in other modeling approaches, we implement combustion CO₂ emissions on the production and household level, as these data are also included in the GTAP8 database [43]. As a further step we also explicitly model process CO₂ emissions for relevant commodities such as steel as well as cement and chemical products in a Leontief fashion ([40] based on [44]).

2.2. Technology Framework

For the technology model, we use the input data and methodology of the GAINS model, which has been documented extensively elsewhere [33,37,38,39,45,46,47,48,49]. The GAINS model is both an integrated assessment model of air pollution and a model for calculating marginal abatement costs and potentials for greenhouse gas mitigation. The model makes use of technology characteristics, as well as baseline and mitigation scenarios from other models, such as the World Energy Outlook scenarios of the International Energy Agency, the Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System (PRIMES) [50] or the Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems (POLES) models [51]. In particular, for this study, we use: (i) activity projections derived from the World Energy Outlook in 2009 [52]; (ii) updated cost information for GHG mitigation options in the GAINS model; and (iii) the GAINS optimization module to identify cost-effective mitigation portfolios for a set of given carbon prices [38]. The considered mitigation options comprise energy efficiency improvements, technology shifts, and a number of other good practice procedures in all energy intensive industries, as well as fuel switches in the Electricity sector. These mitigation measures are represented as packages in GAINS, not individual technologies as such. For example, while technology analysis can identify several dozen specific measures to reduce the energy consumption of, say, an individual steel mill, GAINS aggregates such detailed information into three to four sets of measures that are represented by a uniform marginal cost and an aggregated potential for the reduction of energy consumption.

2.3. Model Link, Scenario Calibration and Simulation

To establish a model link between the technology and the macroeconomic framework in a consistent way, we use several model simulations that are calibrated to the World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2009 450 scenario [52] in 2030, as shown in Figure 3.

In the technology framework of the GAINS model, we generate for each of the industrial sectors, a set of four technology simulations reflecting an increase in the carbon price and calibrated to the energy consumption and fossil fuel price projections of the WEO 2009 450 scenario [52]: (1) a technology baseline simulation that replicates the energy consumption projections by the World Energy Outlook 2009 [52]; (2) a cost-optimal baseline simulation that identifies all measures that, under the assumptions of fuel prices and technology costs, would be cost-effective at a social planner’s discount rate (in GAINS: four percent). This energy savings potential is only visible in such a technology-oriented approach, in contrast to a CGE approach where the baseline is assumed to be equilibrium, i.e., no potential for further reductions without a price signal exist; (3) A 450 ppm simulation with an (exogenous) set of carbon prices (110 USD/tCO₂e for Annex I countries and 65 USD/tCO₂e for non-Annex I countries), which would be consistent with a long-term stabilization GHG concentrations of 450 ppm [52]; and (4) a maximum feasible reduction simulation in which all mitigation options are taken. This simulation is arrived at by setting a very high exogenous carbon price (>250 USD/tCO₂e). These simulations result in investment cost curves and fuel cost reduction curves, which depend on the carbon price for each of the industrial sectors and regions. Note that technology barriers are not taken into account of in the scenarios.

For the macroeconomic framework we also calibrate the CGE model to the WEO 2009 450 scenario [52] projections of fossil fuel prices and regional GDP growth. The carbon price in the economic baseline simulation is set at 110 USD/tCO₂e in Annex I and 65 USD/tCO₂e in non-Annex I countries in the form of an exogenous carbon tax. To ensure comparability between the economic baseline and the counterfactual 450 ppm low carbon technologies scenario in the macroeconomic framework, we fix total emissions in Annex I countries to the emission level in the economic baseline scenario, and likewise in non-Annex I countries, resulting in an endogenous carbon tax (at different levels in Annex I and non-Annex I countries). In the economic baseline simulation, we assume that the carbon price provides the only incentive to decarbonize the economy. In response to the carbon price, incremental changes in conventional technologies in all sectors are captured in the CGE model by endogenous substitution possibilities.

Regarding the 450 ppm low carbon technologies scenario, we integrate specific low carbon technologies in energy intensive industries. For that, investment and fuel cost information from the GAINS simulations derived from the relative change of the technology baseline simulation and the 450 ppm simulation (shown in Figure 5, Section 3) are used for each region. The technological detail of sector-specific low carbon technologies is added to the CGE model by adapting the input structure and unit costs for each energy intensive sector according to the GAINS simulations. As in the CGE model, technology options are represented in monetary values and we integrate investment cost information as well as the changes in physical inputs from the GAINS simulations as relative changes to the economic baseline simulation. More precisely, the relative changes in fossil fuel inputs (coal, oil, gas and petroleum) are applied to the unit cost functions of the corresponding sectors in the CGE model. This results in lower fossil fuel costs expenditures, which are (partly) compensated for by additional investment costs. Overall, unit costs by sectors therefore decrease or increase relative to the conventional technology in the CGE model, depending on sector and country (see Section 3, Figure 5, for details).

3. Low Carbon Technologies and Costs by Sector and Region

Figure 4a shows the additional investment requirements for energy efficiency measures in different industry sectors for each of the investigated regions. As the carbon price increases from left to right, more energy is saved by energy efficiency measures. These measures require more investment, and these investment needs are shown on the vertical axis. Note that this is the total additional investment, which could be converted into an annualized figure using standard annuity calculations. Note that there is also a limited potential for cost-effective energy savings in the absence of a carbon price. This is represented in Figure 4 by the fact that some curves consist of four rather than three points or do not begin at the origin (for example, the Iron and Steel sector in China, and the Paper and Pulp sector in India), so that even at a zero carbon price investment requirements are above zero.

As indicated above, energy efficiency measures do not only require additional investments, but they also result in lower fuel use and, by implication, lower fuel costs. Figure 4b shows the changes in fuel costs relative to the technology baseline for the three GAINS simulations described above. Displayed industrial sectors include Chemicals, Petroleum, Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals and Paper and Pulp. We exclude Electricity, as it is not an end-use sector in GAINS and would give a distorted picture. We further exclude a heterogeneous aggregate of other industries that cannot be attributed to the energy intensive industries in the macroeconomic framework.

When comparing the cost curves across regions, it is important to note that the potential for fuel cost reductions is generally influenced by industry size as well as sectoral energy consumption and potential efficiency gains. For Europe, the investment cost and fuel cost reduction curves are rather flat for a carbon price of 110 USD/tCO₂e, except for the Petroleum sector. The Petroleum sector shows the highest potential for energy efficiency improvements in Europe for lower and higher carbon prices. In the other industrial sectors in Europe, energy efficiency improvements lead to larger fuel cost savings only with a carbon price above 110 USD/tCO₂e for which the Iron and Steel sector shows the highest potential. The fossil fuel cost reductions for Europe can be realized with the corresponding investment costs shown in Figure 4a.

For China and India, the shape of the investment cost and fuel cost reduction curves are different. It turns out that most of the energy savings potential in these regions is economically viable at carbon prices below 65 USD/tCO₂e, above which only marginal improvements are realized. This reflects the fact that much of the technology assessment really occurs in ranges that correspond to relatively low carbon prices. For both countries the largest potential for cost-effective efficiency measures, even in the absence of a carbon price, lies in the Iron and Steel sector. The reason that in the Chemicals industry the investment and fuel cost actually decrease at very high carbon prices results from the fact that in ammonia production (Chemicals industry) the most efficient technology represented in GAINS has lower investment cost than the next most efficient one, and there are interactions with the power sector.

In the CGE model, the change in cost structures of energy intensive industries, when switching from an economic baseline to a 450 ppm low carbon technologies scenario, are illustrated in Figure 5. In this figure, the relative changes in input costs in the six energy intensive sectors, based on the GAINS technology simulations, are shown. In the Petroleum sector, relatively large fossil fuel reductions can be achieved compared to the other industrial sectors. At the same time, also large investments for these fuel reductions are needed, especially in the European region, leading to strong increases in unit costs. In China and India fuel reductions are relatively cheaper and therefore decrease relative costs in the Petroleum sector. Fossil fuel reductions in the Electricity sector in Europe are in the same range as in China and India, with only lower capital needs. However, considering the composition of fossil fuel reductions and absolute input shares, coal inputs in the Electricity sector are in China twice as high as in Europe. Europe at the same time has still further reduction potentials and renewable alternatives. In the sectors of Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals, and Paper and Pulp, the reduction potential of fossil fuel inputs are larger in China and India than in Europe, and, at the same time, only a lower investment is needed to install the low carbon technologies in these sectors leading to relative cost reductions. The largest potential in the Chemicals industry occurs in India, still requiring only little capital investment. India therefore faces unit cost reduction while costs in Europe and China are increasing.

4. Macroeconomic Effects of the Deployment of Low Carbon Technologies in Energy Intensive Sectors

To assess the differences in the deployment of low carbon technologies across energy intensive sectors and regions, we compare a 450 ppm low carbon technologies scenario with a calibrated economic baseline scenario, as described in Section 2.3. We investigate the consequences for output of energy intensive industry, macroeconomic effects and trade flows, and carbon markets within the macroeconomic framework.

4.1. Effects on Energy Intensive Industries

With Europe, India and China fostering a low carbon strategy in energy intensive sectors, sectoral output in Europe declines in each energy intensive sector, except for Electricity, which experiences an increase in output production (see Figure 6). To understand the sectoral differences in output effects, Figure 6 decomposes them into different channels by which sectoral output is affected (for decomposition see Appendix D).

Overall there is a reduction of output in all energy intensive sectors (EIS) in Europe of about 6% (Figure 6). This is the result of additional investment requirements in all industrial sectors combined with negligible fuel cost savings (Figure 3). The only exception is the Electricity sector where fuel cost savings emerge and therefore sectoral output increases by 4.1%. This effect is dominated by increased demand for Electricity (Δdom, see Figure 6). An opposite effect occurs in the Petroleum sector, for which the higher unit costs lead to a domestic decrease in demand (Δdom) as well as to increased imports (ΔIM) and reduced exports (ΔEX). The spillover effect from the deployment of low carbon technologies in other sectors (Δall tec) is also negative but relatively small. For the other energy intensive sectors of Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals, Paper and Pup, and Chemicals a negative output effect occurs. In Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals, and Paper and Pulp, the output reduction is mainly caused by reduced demand from other sectors because of the deployment of low carbon technologies. In Paper and Pulp, about half of the reduced output is due to decreased exports. The relevance of the trade channel for the Paper and Pulp sector reflects also the comparatively higher trade intensity in this sector.

With the implementation of low carbon technologies, India and China can increase sectoral output in all energy intensive sectors by 13% and 11%, respectively (Figure 6, EIS), again in line with sectoral fuel cost savings, required investments and reduced unit costs (Figure 3 and Figure 4). The positive output effects in India and China are mainly dominated by the channel of simultaneous deployment of low carbon technologies in all energy intensive sectors (Δall tec) except for the Electricity sector where changes in domestic demand dominate. Further exceptions are the Steel sector and to a lower degree the Petroleum and Chemicals sectors in India where changes in the trade balance (higher exports, less imports) also have a non-marginal impact on sectoral output.

Sectoral output increases (in percentage terms) are stronger in China than in India in the Petroleum, Electricity and Iron and Steel sector because unit cost savings are larger in these sectors in China than in India (Figure 6). In contrast, output increases less strongly in China than in India in the Paper and Pulp and the Chemicals sector. For Chemicals, unit cost savings are larger in India and therefore sectoral output increases more strongly in India than in China.

Despite relatively high investment needs and corresponding increases in unit costs in the Electricity sector, increased demand for Electricity input (Δdom) implies that output increases the most in the Electricity sector in China and India. In China also the substitution of coal by natural gas and petroleum leads to output increases of more than 15% in the Petroleum sector. Since decarbonization in China’s Petroleum sector requires less investment per unit of output than in India (Figure 5), output in the Petroleum sector increases more strongly in China than in India.

4.2. Effects on the Macroeconomy and International Trade

The above described output decline in energy intensive sectors (EIS) from the deployment of low carbon technologies in Europe propagates to the non-energy intensive sectors (NEIS) within the region, due to supply chain linkages as well as macroeconomic feedback effects (see Figure 7, Δdom). Europe is additionally confronted with a higher competitiveness of Chinese and Indian energy intensive sectors, leading to further decreases in energy intensive sector output and increases in non-energy intensive sector output (see Figure 7, Δall reg). Within NEIS sectors output declines strongest in Coal (−37%) and Oil (−11%) and declines slightly in the Transport sector (−4%), while Natural Gas increases slightly (+2%). Output effects in NEIS are therefore primarily reflecting the fuel switch and not potentially positive effects on suppliers of low carbon technologies, which are not captured in our model. Considering this limitation, we find an overall reduction of European output (aggregate of NEIS and EIS) and GDP compared to baseline by −1.4% and −0.8%, respectively.

In China and India, on the other hand, the output increase from the deployment of low carbon technologies in EIS spills over to the NEIS, enabling an increase in their output as well. It turns out that in China output in NEIS increases strongly because of cheaper intermediate inputs and therefore increases output mainly on the domestic market. In India, however, an increase in NEIS output is caused by technology deployment and therefore higher demand in other regions (NEIS Δall reg), while domestic low carbon technologies have a slightly negative output effect on NEIS (NEIS Δdom). The aggregate effect on total output in NEIS and EIS is +2.7% in China and +2.1% in India, and GDP increases of 3.0% in China and 3.2% in India.

Within NEIS, again fuel switches have a large impact: in India output of Coal (−23%), Oil (−5%) and Natural Gas (−9%) declines, whereas in China effects are qualitatively similar to the ones in Europe, i.e., output of Coal (−18%) and Oil (−2%) decline whereas Natural Gas (+19%) increases. In contrast to Europe, output in Transport and Other Services increase in China (+4% and +3%) and India (+6% and 0%); output in Technology Industries increases in China (+2%) but declines in India (−1%).

Again, it is important to consider which effects are included in our model and which are beyond the scope of our approach. In regard to output increases in China and India, the implicit assumption in general equilibrium models including ours is that supply and demand respond to price changes and that higher income is used on consumption and savings (constant expenditure shares). In reality, however, government spending might be driven by some political goal, as was the case for instance in China where major infrastructure investments were undertaken during the last decade [54]. It is therefore possible that demand does not increase as much in response to lower prices in energy intensive sectors and that, as a result, the overall output effect for China according to Figure 7 is too high in that regard.

In the rest of the world (ROW), output increases in both NEIS and EIS sectors because of substitution effects. Taking all regions of the world together, we find that overall output therefore increases by 0.7% as the consequence of the deployment of low carbon technologies.

To further analyze the effects on international trade patterns, we show in Figure 8 the changes in total export flows (both EIS and NEIS sectors) between the investigated regions of Europe, China and India as well as the rest of the world (ROW). Regarding Europe’s trade balance, we find larger imports from China and ROW but fewer imports from India, and at the same time a very strong reduction of European exports to ROW. Major trading partners of Europe such as North America (NAM) or other emerging economies (ECO) switch from European to Chinese products and domestically produced products. This impacts European trade more than twice as strongly than through the direct trade channel between Europe, China and India, and increases Europe’s net imports by overall 22%. China can strengthen its export position with increased flows to India, Europe and ROW. Still, imports to China especially from ROW strongly increase, resulting in a slight reduction of overall net exports of 5%. International trade in India is most strongly affected by the low carbon technology deployment. With the change in production structures, the domestic demand for Indian products goes up and thereby reduces exports to international trading partners, and above all to Europe. However, since India’s imports increase even more strongly than its exports, India turns from a net exporter to a net importer.

4.3. Effects on CO₂ Emission Balance

The utilization of low carbon technologies in all energy intensive sectors (EIS) in Europe reduces production based CO₂ emissions by about 750 Mt of CO₂e of European total emissions, relative to the baseline scenario (Figure 9). Attributing emission reductions again to different sources, we decompose the total effect into a technology effect (i.e., less use of fossil fuels) and an output effect (i.e., change in output level), and differentiate for effects in the energy intensive industry (EIS) and the non-energy intensive sector (NEIS) (Figure 9a). For Europe, we find that the lion’s share of CO₂ reductions comes from the technology switch in the energy intensive industry (EIS Tec). The emission reduction in EIS is reinforced by a much smaller output reduction in the EIS sector (EIS Output), as well as by a small output reduction in the NEIS sector (NEIS Output) and a spillover effect from the utilization of low carbon technologies in the EIS sectors to the NEIS sectors (NEIS Tec). For Europe, we therefore find no evidence of macroeconomic rebound effects, neither via other economic sectors (via the carbon market) nor via a positive scale effect in the EIS sectors. A decomposition of the overall CO₂ reductions into contributions by sector technologies (Figure 9b) shows a particular strong reduction by low carbon electricity technologies. More than 70% of the total CO₂ reductions in Europe originate from the utilization of low carbon technologies in this sector, while the other relevant reduction mainly comes from the Petroleum sector.

For China and India, the picture of CO₂ reductions in EIS and NEIS sectors is different. With the utilization of low carbon technologies in China and India, emissions strongly decline due to the technology effect in the energy intensive sectors (EIS Tec) in these regions. In contrast to Europe, the reduction is counterbalanced by an increase in CO₂ emissions in the non-energy intensive sectors (due to the output and technology effects) of about 25% in India and 30% in China (compared to baseline scenario) as well as a positive output effect in the EIS sectors (EIS Output) in China. Overall, we therefore find a combined macroeconomic and sectoral rebound effect equal to 34% in India and 42% in China. The rebound effect in China is found larger because fuel cost savings in energy intensive sectors are comparatively higher in China than in India and investment requirements are comparatively lower (Figure 3). Overall, there is therefore a stronger incentive to import energy intensive products from China and not from India (Figure 8). Regarding domestic demand, one of the reviewers remarked correctly that substantial investments in infrastructure have been realized in China during the last decade and that the scope for additional investments and therefore demand for e.g., cement might not emerge despite lower prices. However, stylized facts indicate that economic growth creates a pull for public infrastructure investment counteracting the reduced planned investment effect.

Sectoral contributions to the total CO₂ reductions in China show again a dominating role of low carbon technologies in the Electricity sector, equal to 83% of the total CO₂ reduction (Figure 9b). CO₂ reductions from low carbon technologies in the other industrial sectors in China come mainly from Iron and Steel, Non-metallic Minerals and Chemicals, and less from the Petroleum and Paper and Pulp sector. This finding is also consistent with a decomposition analysis of Chinese industrial emissions over the period 1997–2012 [55]. In India, sectoral contributions to CO₂ reductions are qualitatively similar to China.

Regarding emissions in the Rest of the World (ROW), it is important to recall that we fixed the total emissions in Annex I countries (representing an emission trading system in Annex I countries), which consequently allows for higher emissions in other Annex I regions outside the Europe. The same assumption was also taken for non-Annex I countries where emission reductions in China and India lead to excess supply of emission permits and therefore an emissions increase, e.g., in Oil and Gas Exporting Countries. Overall, therefore the carbon price falls by about 60% in Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Consequently, energy intensive production becomes relatively cheaper and emissions increase not only in North America, but also in other Emerging economies and especially in Oil and Gas Exporting countries (all captured in category Rest of the World).

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

The aim of this paper was to compare the deployment of low carbon technology options in energy intensive industries in Europe, China and India. In particular, we were interested in addressing the following questions: What are the effects of the implementation of comprehensive energy efficiency improvements in energy intensive industries on sectoral and macroeconomic output, trade and territorial CO₂ emission reductions for Europe, China and India? What do these effects imply for energy policy design?

We find that cost-effective mitigation options are available in all energy intensive industries for Europe, China and India in a 450 ppm scenario by 2030. However, marginal abatement costs differ across both sectors and regions, as demonstrated by cost differences between Europe, China and India. In general, the potential for low carbon technologies across energy intensive industries is larger for China and India relative to Europe because of larger fuel costs savings and smaller investment costs in these emerging economies. Across energy intensive industries, the potential for cost-effective measures is found to be largest in the Steel sector.

It is however insufficient to compare investment costs to fuel savings, and openness to international trade and substitution possibilities co-determine whether low carbon technologies translate into sectoral gains or losses. For Europe, we therefore find that the deployment of low carbon technologies leads to output declines in all energy intensive sectors except Electricity, a sector that is traditionally less trade exposed than manufacturing sectors. As our model investigates the medium to long-term effects of the availability of low carbon technologies, results do not include short term effects during the investment phase. In this phase, suppliers of low carbon technologies might experience positive effects, both in Europe and elsewhere.

In contrast, costs of low carbon technologies in most energy intensive sectors are considerably lower in China and India than in Europe, and often below those of conventional technologies, indicating extensive untapped energy efficiency improvements. Consequently, positive output effects emerge in almost all energy intensive sectors in China and India. Finally, the European trade balance is negatively affected both because of higher imports from China, and because of lower exports to other world regions, with this latter effect being more than two times stronger than the effect via trade flows to China and India.

In terms of carbon emissions, it is important to consider different channels: the technology channel, the output or scale effect, and the structural change from energy intensive to non-energy intensive sectors. We find that the availability of options for energy efficiency improvements in energy intensive sectors leads to considerable reductions in carbon emissions through all channels, at least in Europe. In contrast, in China and India, around a quarter of the emission reductions via the technology effect in the energy intensive sectors is lost due to more output in the energy intensive sector itself (sectoral rebound effect) and more fossil fuel use in non-energy intensive sectors (macroeconomic rebound effect). Analyses that stop at the changes in costs for a specific sector are therefore insufficient to assess the social costs of a low carbon transformation.

In all regions, the lion’s share of reductions in carbon emissions comes from the decarbonization of the Electricity sector (between 70% and 104% depending on region). This is due to two effects: first, fossil fuel savings are much higher relative to investment requirements in the Electricity sector, leading to considerable declines in unit cost and therefore to a strong uptake of decarbonization within this sector. Second, Electricity is a key input to all other industrial sectors and therefore a decarbonization of the Electricity sector also leads to reduced emissions via this channel. The decarbonization of the Electricity sector might therefore be a first fundamental step on the path to the achievement of the 2 °C target.

Our results have clear implications for energy policy design in emerging economies such as China and India, the two case study countries investigated here. Since deploying energy efficient technologies in energy intensive sectors, such as Iron and Steel, not only leads to reduced carbon emissions but also increases international competitiveness, countries with such low-cost options available are well advised to foster their implementation. This would require a mix of policy instruments to mobilize capital investments by reducing investment risks, including legislation on energy activities and energy use (e.g., efficiency standards), fiscal policies (subsidies for energy efficiency improvements or carbon taxes), clear long-term low-carbon energy policy roadmaps, and strengthening investment in research and development of low-carbon technology options. Moreover, improvements in energy efficiency will also have substantial positive implications for local air pollution in emerging and less developed economies [56,57].

Our results for Europe indicate that the range of considered low-carbon options are not cost effective compared to conventional technologies at a carbon price of 110 USD/CO₂e because the bulk of low-cost mitigation potentials have already been tapped in the past. Further investments in this domain could therefore lead to negative economic consequences in the medium to long term in terms of decreased international competitiveness, despite positive environmental effects in terms of reduced carbon emissions and reduced local air pollution. Investigating whether these conclusions also hold for process integrated mitigation technology options, as, e.g., considered in [32], might be an interesting topic for future research.

For energy policy in Europe, as a case in point for industrialized world regions, this would imply that emphasis has to be put on technology policy to supplement carbon pricing. As Schinko et al. [22] have demonstrated for the steel sector, targeted technology policy fostering the implementation of breakthrough low carbon technologies can have substantial positive environmental (in terms of reduced carbon emissions) as well as economic effects (improved international competitiveness) for forerunners. In light of the ambitious climate targets articulated in the Paris Agreement, Europe could strengthen its leading role in international climate policy while at the same time becoming a global market leader in low-carbon technologies and reducing the risk of generating stranded investments.