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Editorial

Editorial: Special Issue on Matching under Preferences

by
Péter Biró
1,† and
David F. Manlove
2,*,‡
1
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1112 Budaörsi út 45, Budapest, Hungary
2
School of Computing Science, Sir Alwyn Williams Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum Programme (LD-004/2010) and also by OTKA grant no. K108673.
Supported by grant EP/K010042/1 from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
Algorithms 2014, 7(2), 203-205; https://doi.org/10.3390/a7020203
Submission received: 14 March 2014 / Accepted: 14 March 2014 / Published: 8 April 2014
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Special Issue on Matching under Preferences)

Abstract

:
This special issue of Algorithms is devoted to the study of matching problems involving ordinal preferences from the standpoint of algorithms and complexity.

1. Introduction

Matching problems with preferences occur in widespread applications, such as the assignment of school-leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals, students to campus housing, children to schools, kidney transplant patients to donors and so on. The common thread is that individuals have ordinal preferences over the possible outcomes and the task is to find a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences. Due to the large numbers of agents typically involved in such applications, efficient algorithms are of paramount importance.
These types of problems can generally be categorized according to whether the problem is bipartite or non-bipartite. In the former case there are two disjoint sets of agents who seek to become matched to one another. Typical examples include the Stable Marriage, Hospitals/Residents and House Allocation problems, which have applications in school choice, for example. Non-bipartite matching problems involve a single set of agents seeking to become matched within themselves, and a typical problem in this category is the Stable Roommates problem, which has applications in kidney exchange, P2P networking and tournament design.

2. Special Issue

This special issue focuses on matching problems involving preferences from an algorithms and complexity point of view. The call for papers was issued following the workshop MATCH-UP 2012: the Second International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences, which took place in Budapest on 19–20 July 2012. Hence some of the papers appearing in this issue are fully revised and extended versions of papers that appeared in the informal workshop proceedings. However, submission to the special issue was not restricted to papers that appeared at this workshop.
In response to the call for papers, we received a total of 15 submissions. All submissions were reviewed by experts. We selected 11 submissions for the special issue, all of which are of high quality, reflecting the growing interest in the area of matching under preferences in the community. The final versions of these articles were published as [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11].

Acknowledgments

We would firstly like to thank the authors of all submitted papers for their contributions. In particular we thank the authors of accepted papers for their efforts in making revisions subject to the reviewers’ comments in a timely fashion. We would also like to express our gratitude to the reviewers for their detailed and helpful reports. Finally we would like to thank our colleagues connected with the journal, namely Kazuo Iwama, Editor-in-Chief, for suggesting that we put together this special issue, and also Chelly Cheng, Assistant Editor, for all her help and support with the editorial process.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

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  9. Fleiner, T. On Stable Matchings and Flows. Algorithms 2014, 7, 1–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
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Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Biró, P.; Manlove, D.F. Editorial: Special Issue on Matching under Preferences. Algorithms 2014, 7, 203-205. https://doi.org/10.3390/a7020203

AMA Style

Biró P, Manlove DF. Editorial: Special Issue on Matching under Preferences. Algorithms. 2014; 7(2):203-205. https://doi.org/10.3390/a7020203

Chicago/Turabian Style

Biró, Péter, and David F. Manlove. 2014. "Editorial: Special Issue on Matching under Preferences" Algorithms 7, no. 2: 203-205. https://doi.org/10.3390/a7020203

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