Next Issue
Previous Issue

Table of Contents

Games, Volume 2, Issue 3 (September 2011), Pages 235-411

  • Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
  • You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
  • PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Readerexternal link to open them.
View options order results:
result details:
Displaying articles 1-7
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

Open AccessArticle The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games
Games 2011, 2(3), 235-256; doi:10.3390/g2030235
Received: 18 February 2011 / Revised: 27 April 2011 / Accepted: 27 June 2011 / Published: 15 July 2011
Cited by 9 | PDF Full-text (439 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract We prove the existence of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games. Full article
Open AccessArticle A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
Games 2011, 2(3), 257-276; doi:10.3390/g2030257
Received: 14 March 2011 / Accepted: 5 July 2011 / Published: 25 July 2011
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (671 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games (http://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/): one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions
[...] Read more.
Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games (http://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/): one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of some baseline models. The best baseline model assumes that each choice is made based on one of several rules. The rules include: rational choice, level-1 reasoning, an attempt to maximize joint payoff, and an attempt to increase fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that the most popular rule is rational choice; it is used in about half the cases. To participate in the competitions, researchers are asked to email the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is 1 December 2011, the results of the competition experiment will not be revealed until that date. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competitions will be invited to write a paper that describes their model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Predicting Behavior in Games)
Open AccessArticle Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort
Games 2011, 2(3), 277-301; doi:10.3390/g2030277
Received: 21 June 2011 / Revised: 3 August 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 19 August 2011
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (1241 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration
[...] Read more.
We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less. Full article
Open AccessArticle The Price of Anarchy for Network Formation in an Adversary Model
Games 2011, 2(3), 302-332; doi:10.3390/g2030302
Received: 27 May 2011 / Revised: 18 July 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 23 August 2011
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (408 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We study network formation with n players and link cost α > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν
[...] Read more.
We study network formation with n players and link cost α > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on unilateral link formation and Nash equilibrium. We show existence of Nash equilibria and a price of stability of 1 + ο(1) under moderate assumptions on the adversary and n ≥ 9. We prove bounds on the price of anarchy for two special adversaries: one removes a link chosen uniformly at random, while the other removes a link that causes a maximum number of player pairs to be separated. We show an Ο(1) bound on the price of anarchy for both adversaries, the constant being bounded by 15 + ο(1) and 9 + ο(1), respectively. Full article
Open AccessArticle The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis
Games 2011, 2(3), 333-354; doi:10.3390/g2030333
Received: 2 March 2011 / Revised: 20 July 2011 / Accepted: 8 August 2011 / Published: 9 September 2011
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (315 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict
[...] Read more.
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize. Full article
Open AccessArticle Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics
Games 2011, 2(3), 355-364; doi:10.3390/g2030355
Received: 27 June 2011 / Revised: 2 September 2011 / Accepted: 2 September 2011 / Published: 14 September 2011
PDF Full-text (2188 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the widely used replicator dynamics, which appears in this framework as the extreme
[...] Read more.
The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the widely used replicator dynamics, which appears in this framework as the extreme case where replication is perfectly precise. This paper studies the influence of strictly dominated strategies on the location of the rest points of the replicator-mutator dynamics, at the limit where the mutation terms become arbitrarily small. It can be proved that such limit rest points for small mutation are Nash equilibria, so strictly dominated strategies do not occur at limit stationary points. However, we show through a simple case how strictly dominated strategies can have an influence on the location of the limit rest points for small mutation. Consequently, the characterization of the limit rest points of the replicator-mutator dynamics cannot in general proceed safely by readily eliminating strictly dominated strategies. Full article
Figures

Open AccessArticle Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions
Games 2011, 2(3), 365-411; doi:10.3390/g2030365
Received: 1 June 2011 / Revised: 18 July 2011 / Accepted: 30 August 2011 / Published: 16 September 2011
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (825 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences
[...] Read more.
The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending-bid auctions. The paper also presents experimental evidence broadly consistent with the model. In the complete information environment, lower value bidders overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not found in the incomplete information environment, consistent with the model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)

Journal Contact

MDPI AG
Games Editorial Office
St. Alban-Anlage 66, 4052 Basel, Switzerland
games@mdpi.com
Tel. +41 61 683 77 34
Fax: +41 61 302 89 18
Editorial Board
Contact Details Submit to Games
Back to Top