Games 2013, 4(3), 329-338; doi:10.3390/g4030329
Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information
1
CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
2
CEREC, Saint-Louis University, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 28 March 2013 / Revised: 27 May 2013 / Accepted: 13 June 2013 / Published: 27 June 2013
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Abstract
We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).
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MDPI and ACS Style
Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information. Games 2013, 4, 329-338.