Games

1632 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

The Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence

by Ananish Chaudhuri, Tirnud Paichayontvijit and Erwann Sbai

Games 2016, 7(2), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020013 - 22 Jun 2016

Cited by 8 | Viewed by 7534

We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded [...] Read more.

We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a corrupt transaction, over and above any sentiments of inequity aversion or negative reciprocity However, showing subjects the history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. Full article

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479 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining

by Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló

Games 2016, 7(2), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020012 - 12 May 2016

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6137

Abstract

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate [...] Read more.

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)

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950 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Inequalities between Others Do Matter: Evidence from Multiplayer Dictator Games

by David Macro and Jeroen Weesie

Games 2016, 7(2), 11; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020011 - 12 Apr 2016

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 6721

Abstract

Social motives are frequently used to explain deviations from selfishness in non-strategic settings such as the Dictator Game. Previous research has mainly focused on two-player games; the workings of social motives in multiplayer Dictator Games are less well understood. A core feature of [...] Read more.

Social motives are frequently used to explain deviations from selfishness in non-strategic settings such as the Dictator Game. Previous research has mainly focused on two-player games; the workings of social motives in multiplayer Dictator Games are less well understood. A core feature of multiplayer games is that players can consider inequalities between others, in addition to outcomes that have two-player analogues, such as social efficiency and the inequality between self and others. We expect that existing models of social motives can be improved if players are allowed to consider the inequality between others. Results from two laboratory experiments confirm this: motives for the inequality between others were found, and these motives could not be reduced to motives with dyadic analogues. Explorative analyses show that our findings are robust to a number of potential misspecifications: motives for the inequality between others were also found when utility included non-linear evaluations of inequality, and when alternative types of self-other comparison mechanisms were modeled. Thus, to adequately capture social motives in multiplayer games, models should account for the complexities of the multiplayer setting. We speculate that our findings also hold for strategic games; but further research is needed to elucidate this. Full article

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396 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market

by Heinrich H. Nax and Bary S. R. Pradelski

Games 2016, 7(2), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020010 - 30 Mar 2016

Cited by 13 | Viewed by 6182

Abstract

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own [...] Read more.

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the alternative workers available on the job market. Workers bargain for better jobs; either individually or collectively as unions, adjusting wage demands upward/downward depending on whether they are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a bargaining solution such that (i) firms and workforce share total revenue according to relative bargaining strengths, and (ii) workers receive equal workforce shares above their individual outside options. These results bridge empirical evidence and provide a rich set of testable predictions. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)

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Games, Volume 7, Issue 2 (June 2016) – 4 articles

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