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Games, Volume 7, Issue 4 (December 2016)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Simulating the Impact of Crossover Kidney Transplantation on the Nord Italia Transplant Program
Games 2016, 7(4), 30; doi:10.3390/g7040030
Received: 1 April 2016 / Revised: 19 September 2016 / Accepted: 12 October 2016 / Published: 20 October 2016
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Abstract
The increasing number of patients affected by chronic kidney disease makes it necessary to rely on living donors. However, a patient often cannot exploit her potential donor, due to blood or tissue incompatibility. Therefore, crossover transplantation programs have been developed in several countriesin
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The increasing number of patients affected by chronic kidney disease makes it necessary to rely on living donors. However, a patient often cannot exploit her potential donor, due to blood or tissue incompatibility. Therefore, crossover transplantation programs have been developed in several countriesin order to increase the number of people receiving a kidney from a living donor. After reviewing the essential medical facts needed for the subsequent results, we quickly introduce two known algorithms for crossover transplantation. Next, we consider a dataset provided by the Nord Italia Transplant program, and we apply the above algorithms in order to highlight the benefits of these efficient procedures. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Real World Applications of Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength and Decreasing Returns to Investment
Games 2016, 7(4), 40; doi:10.3390/g7040040
Received: 21 September 2016 / Revised: 24 November 2016 / Accepted: 5 December 2016 / Published: 8 December 2016
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Abstract
We study the formation of networks where agents choose how much to invest in each relationship. The benefit that an agent can derive from a network depends on the strength of the direct links between agents. We assume that the strength of the
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We study the formation of networks where agents choose how much to invest in each relationship. The benefit that an agent can derive from a network depends on the strength of the direct links between agents. We assume that the strength of the direct link between any pair of agents is a concave function of their investments towards each other. In comparison with some existing models of network formation where the strength technology is a convex function of investment, we find that (i) the symmetric complete network can dominate the star architecture in terms of total utility; (ii) a dominating symmetric complete network needs not be stable; and, (iii) star and complete networks can be dominated by small-world networks. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games
Games 2016, 7(4), 31; doi:10.3390/g7040031
Received: 9 June 2016 / Revised: 28 September 2016 / Accepted: 13 October 2016 / Published: 24 October 2016
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Abstract
We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may
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We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions
Games 2016, 7(4), 32; doi:10.3390/g7040032
Received: 9 August 2016 / Revised: 15 October 2016 / Accepted: 17 October 2016 / Published: 26 October 2016
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Abstract
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the
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In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best informed player” would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
Open AccessArticle Ignorance Is Bliss, But for Whom? The Persistent Effect of Good Will on Cooperation
Games 2016, 7(4), 33; doi:10.3390/g7040033
Received: 27 June 2016 / Revised: 12 October 2016 / Accepted: 17 October 2016 / Published: 26 October 2016
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Abstract
Who benefits from the ignorance of others? We address this question from the point of view of a policy maker who can induce some ignorance into a system of agents competing for resources. Evolutionary game theory shows that when unconditional cooperators or ignorant
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Who benefits from the ignorance of others? We address this question from the point of view of a policy maker who can induce some ignorance into a system of agents competing for resources. Evolutionary game theory shows that when unconditional cooperators or ignorant agents compete with defectors in two-strategy settings, unconditional cooperators get exploited and are rendered extinct. In contrast, conditional cooperators, by utilizing some kind of reciprocity, are able to survive and sustain cooperation when competing with defectors. We study how cooperation thrives in a three-strategy setting where there are unconditional cooperators, conditional cooperators and defectors. By means of simulation on various kinds of graphs, we show that conditional cooperators benefit from the existence of unconditional cooperators in the majority of cases. However, in worlds that make cooperation hard to evolve, defectors benefit. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Coevolution of Cooperation and Layer Selection Strategy in Multiplex Networks
Games 2016, 7(4), 34; doi:10.3390/g7040034
Received: 12 August 2016 / Revised: 19 October 2016 / Accepted: 24 October 2016 / Published: 1 November 2016
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Abstract
Recently, the emergent dynamics in multiplex networks, composed of layers of multiple networks, has been discussed extensively in network sciences. However, little is still known about whether and how the evolution of strategy for selecting a layer to participate in can contribute to
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Recently, the emergent dynamics in multiplex networks, composed of layers of multiple networks, has been discussed extensively in network sciences. However, little is still known about whether and how the evolution of strategy for selecting a layer to participate in can contribute to the emergence of cooperative behaviors in multiplex networks of social interactions. To investigate these issues, we constructed a coevolutionary model of cooperation and layer selection strategies in which each an individual selects one layer from multiple layers of social networks and plays the Prisoner’s Dilemma with neighbors in the selected layer. We found that the proportion of cooperative strategies increased with increasing the number of layers regardless of the degree of dilemma, and this increase occurred due to a cyclic coevolution process of game strategies and layer selection strategies. We also showed that the heterogeneity of links among layers is a key factor for multiplex networks to facilitate the evolution of cooperation, and such positive effects on cooperation were observed regardless of the difference in the stochastic properties of network topologies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Games and Statistical Physics of Social Networks)
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Open AccessArticle Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium
Games 2016, 7(4), 35; doi:10.3390/g7040035
Received: 9 August 2016 / Revised: 1 November 2016 / Accepted: 4 November 2016 / Published: 10 November 2016
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Abstract
In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strict refinement of PBE. In
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In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strict refinement of PBE. In (Bonanno, 2016), the notion of PBE was used to provide a characterization of SE in terms of a strengthening of the two defining components of PBE (besides sequential rationality), namely AGM consistency and Bayes consistency. In this paper we explore the gap between PBE and SE by identifying solution concepts that lie strictly between PBE and SE; these solution concepts embody a notion of “conservative” belief revision. Furthermore, we provide a method for determining if a plausibility order on the set of histories is choice measurable, which is a necessary condition for a PBE to be a SE. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
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Open AccessArticle Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals
Games 2016, 7(4), 36; doi:10.3390/g7040036
Received: 5 August 2016 / Revised: 2 November 2016 / Accepted: 9 November 2016 / Published: 16 November 2016
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Abstract
This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In
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This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the importance of counterfactuals in strategic interactions. In particular, the existence of rules does not reduce to observable behavioral patterns but also encompasses a range of counterfactual beliefs and behaviors. This feature was already at the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophical account of rule-following. On this basis, I consider the possibility that CBR may provide a rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
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Open AccessArticle Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets
Games 2016, 7(4), 37; doi:10.3390/g7040037
Received: 31 August 2016 / Revised: 16 November 2016 / Accepted: 17 November 2016 / Published: 25 November 2016
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Abstract
We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is
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We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian product Y of player type subsets with X as the associated set of best reply profiles such that the set Y i contains all player types that believe with sufficient probability that the others are of types in Y i and play best replies. This robustness concept provides epistemic foundations for set-valued generalizations of strict Nash equilibrium, applicable also to games without strict Nash equilibria. We relate our concept to closedness under rational behavior and thus to strategic stability and to the best reply property and thus to rationalizability. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
Open AccessArticle Probabilistic Unawareness
Games 2016, 7(4), 38; doi:10.3390/g7040038
Received: 9 September 2016 / Revised: 8 November 2016 / Accepted: 10 November 2016 / Published: 30 November 2016
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Abstract
The modeling of awareness and unawareness is a significant topic in the doxastic logic literature, where it is usually tackled in terms of full belief operators. The present paper aims at a treatment in terms of partial belief operators. It draws upon the
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The modeling of awareness and unawareness is a significant topic in the doxastic logic literature, where it is usually tackled in terms of full belief operators. The present paper aims at a treatment in terms of partial belief operators. It draws upon the modal probabilistic logic that was introduced by Aumann (1999) at the semantic level, and then axiomatized by Heifetz and Mongin (2001). The paper embodies in this framework those properties of unawareness that have been highlighted in the seminal paper by Modica and Rustichini (1999). Their paper deals with full belief, but we argue that the properties in question also apply to partial belief. Our main result is a (soundness and) completeness theorem that reunites the two strands—modal and probabilistic—of doxastic logic. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
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Open AccessArticle When Do Types Induce the Same Belief Hierarchy?
Games 2016, 7(4), 28; doi:10.3390/g7040028
Received: 22 August 2016 / Revised: 29 September 2016 / Accepted: 30 September 2016 / Published: 9 October 2016
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Abstract
Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if
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Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if and only if the former can be mapped into the other using a generalized type morphism. Hence, every generalized type morphism is a hierarchy morphism and vice versa. Importantly, generalized type morphisms do not make reference to belief hierarchies. We use our results to characterize the conditions under which types generate the same belief hierarchy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Logic)
Open AccessArticle What Goes Around, Comes Around: Experimental Evidence on Exposed Lies
Games 2016, 7(4), 29; doi:10.3390/g7040029
Received: 22 June 2016 / Revised: 23 September 2016 / Accepted: 12 October 2016 / Published: 20 October 2016
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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the optimal way to handle the uncovering of a noble lie, that is, a lie that supposedly is in the best interest of a given community. For this purpose, we analyze a public good game with feedback to group members
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We experimentally investigate the optimal way to handle the uncovering of a noble lie, that is, a lie that supposedly is in the best interest of a given community. For this purpose, we analyze a public good game with feedback to group members on the average contributions of the other group members. The computer program inflates the feedback and shows higher than real average contributions to the high contributors. As shown by earlier studies, the partial feedback inflation increases the total payoff of the public good as it avoids the feeling of being a sucker for above average contributors. The lie is then uncovered and we continue with different feedback modes on contributions, some inflated, some true. We find that players respond similarly to both feedback modes. However, with true feedback, initial contributions in the second stage are significantly higher than with inflated feedback. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Modeling Poker Challenges by Evolutionary Game Theory
Games 2016, 7(4), 39; doi:10.3390/g7040039
Received: 17 November 2016 / Revised: 28 November 2016 / Accepted: 1 December 2016 / Published: 7 December 2016
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Abstract
We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on statistical physics, showed that Poker
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We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on statistical physics, showed that Poker in some conditions can be considered as a skill game. In addition, preliminary investigations reported a neat difference between tournaments and ‘cash game’ challenges, i.e., between the two main configurations for playing Poker. Notably, these previous models analyzed populations composed of rational and irrational agents, identifying in the former those that play Poker by using a mathematical strategy, while in the latter those playing randomly. Remarkably, tournaments require very few rational agents to make Poker a skill game, while ‘cash game’ may require several rational agents for not being classified as gambling. In addition, when the agent interactions are based on the ‘cash game’ configuration, the population shows an interesting bistable behavior that deserves further attention. In the proposed model, we aim to study the evolutionary dynamics of Poker by using the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, in order to get further insights on its nature, and for better clarifying those points that remained open in the previous works (as the mentioned bistable behavior). In particular, we analyze the dynamics of an agent population composed of rational and irrational agents, that modify their behavior driven by two possible mechanisms: self-evaluation of the gained payoff, and social imitation. Results allow to identify a relation between the mechanisms for updating the agents’ behavior and the final equilibrium of the population. Moreover, the proposed model provides further details on the bistable behavior observed in the ‘cash game’ configuration. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Games and Statistical Physics of Social Networks)
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