Article

Governing Migration through COVID-19? Dutch Political and Media Discourse in Times of a Pandemic

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Abstract: This article explores the political and media discourse in The Netherlands around COVID-19 and migration. In so doing, it asks to what extent the dynamics of 'governing COVID-19 through migration' are visible in this discourse. By asking this question, the article builds upon the theoretical frameworks of 'governing through crime' and 'governing through migration control'. Both theoretical frameworks place a strong emphasis on the role of discourse in framing certain social phenomena as a threat, concern or risk. By carrying out a discourse analysis on Dutch political and media debates around COVID-19 and migration in the period 1 January 2020–1 November 2021, the article illustrates that despite the linking of migration and crime not only being very visible but also seemingly normalized in this discourse, the links made between COVID-19 and migration were much more nuanced. Furthermore, although COVID-19 and migration were discussed together, the discourse does not show any evidence of governing COVID-19 through migration by using the pandemic to push for very restrictive migration laws targeting only 'vagabonds' while still allowing the mobility of 'tourists').

Keywords: governing through migration; COVID-19; crimmigration; The Netherlands; discourse

1. Introduction

In the acknowledgement of his seminal work "Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear" Jonathan Simon (2007) observes how 'crime and crime control have become one of the fundamental challenges to democratic governance that the developed world faces'. In his thesis Simon illustrates how crime has become the dominant frame through which a broad variety of social problems are presented, and therefore also seen. As he illustrates in 'Governing through Crime', this framing of, for instance, teen pregnancy as a possible future crime problem (as single mothers will most likely raise delinquent children), leads to the criminalization of behaviors that should not fall under the realm of the criminal law. A year after Simon's book was published, Bosworth and Guild (2008) used his 'governing through crime' thesis to call attention to what they called 'governing through migration control'. In their article, the authors illustrated how, in the context of the United Kingdom, discursive metaphors and practices of punishment have spilled over into public spheres beyond the criminal justice system, in particular into the realm of migration control (Bosworth and Guild 2008, p. 704). For instance, they note how there has been a growing tendency to lump together quite disparate groups of non-citizens in media and political discourse, from asylum seekers to so-called 'economic migrants' to foreign nationals in prison, effectively erasing differences between them (Bosworth 2008, 2016). Whereas much has been written about the criminalization and securitization of migration, the authors move beyond this dominant angle that had characterized much of the criminological analysis of border control until then, and instead highlight the governmental role of boundary reinforcement during insecure times. Apart from highlighting the preferred use by the UK government of highly flexible administrative processes in dealing with migration matters, the authors call

attention to the discourse that is being used to frame and build support for the development of a fine-grained system of migration control and boundary making. By taking the case of The Netherlands, a country that is often portrayed as 'tolerant' and very 'open', as a focal point in this article, we aim to shed light on the question of to what extent Dutch political and media discourse seems to imply a link between COVID-19 and migration and therefore seems to imply the necessity of border-tightening in response to potentially sick or virus-spreading migrants. In other words, we want to analyse whether the political and media discourse in The Netherlands is using COVID-19 in such a way that it might be setting up the introduction of repressive migration and border control measures like the 'fine-grained' system that Bosworth and Guild (2008) talked about.

2. A Quick Glance at the Wider Discourse on COVID-19 in Europe

The image of the migrant as a threat to public health is not new; the narrative that migrant populations around the globe carry a wide array of communicable diseases, and therefore pose a threat to public health in destination communities, is a strong one and tends to resurface in moments of crisis. In 2018 the World Health Organization published the report 'No Public Health Without Refugee and Migrant Health' to counter this narrative in the context of the European continent (WHO 2018). Yet, the COVID-19 crisis has illustrated that the urge for scapegoats in times of global turmoil caused by a pandemic trumps scientific reports and more nuanced debates. According to Hungarian President Victor Orbán it is "(. . .) primarily foreigners who brought in the disease, and that it is spreading among foreigners."[1] Poland's prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, furthermore stated that most cases of COVID-19 in Europe are "imported, in the strict sense of the word," either by foreigners or by Poles returning from abroad. His message is that the Polish nation is clean and pure, and would not experience the current crisis if it were less involved in freedom of movement.[2] Greece's nationalist New Democracy government, meanwhile, has cited the risk of coronavirus infection as a reason for pressing ahead with its controversial plan to build "closed" camps—detention centres, in other words—for asylum seekers trapped by European policies on the Aegean islands of Lesbos and Chios. In France, Marine Le Pen has used the spread of the coronavirus to make a renewed call to close France's frontier with Italy, effectively suspending the Schengen agreement on open borders. Leaders of far-right parties in Germany and Spain have echoed the sentiment.[3] Furthermore, populist Eurosceptic Nigel Farage, whom many credit with making Brexit happen, tweeted about a "Covid crisis in Dover," baselessly claiming that a boat carrying migrants had landed in southeast England, "with 12 on board and they all tested positive for the virus."[4] These and other developments led the UN Secretary General in May 2020 to issue a public statement in which he warned of the fact that the 'pandemic continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering'. In order to counter this, he calls on political leaders 'to show solidarity with all members of their societies and build and reinforce social cohesion' and on the media 'to do much more to flag and, in line with international human rights law, remove racist, misogynist and other harmful content'.[5]

Looking at these responses to the spread of the pandemic by various political figures in the European Union, they seem to fit in with a larger trend of anti-immigration and pro-nationalist sentiment on the continent that became especially visible in response to the so-called 2015 migration crisis. In that year, large numbers of refugees made their way to Europe in response to the Syrian war and the violence that erupted as a result. Scholars of border criminology have discussed how national responses to the so-called European migration crisis have also shown how some of the world's most seemingly open and wealthy societies feel the need to restrict mobility and, as Barker states, in so doing '"undo their own historical, albeit complex, trajectories towards equality, democratization and individual liberty'" (Barker 2017, p. 442). This urge to restrict mobility is reflected by a growing nationalist public and political discourse in which asylum seekers in partic-ular, but definitely not exclusively, are being portrayed as dangerous and 'crimmigrant' others whose presence will threaten the national identity and the cultural fabric of soci-

ety. As a result, there has been an increased focus all throughout Europe on developing mechanisms that can distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' mobilities, or what Bauman terms 'tourists' and 'vagabonds' (Bauman 1998; also see Weber and Bowling 2008). This development—that only seems to have been amplified and intensified by the pandemic— puts the right of free movement for all who are inside the European Union to the test (Van Der Woude et al. 2017).

3. A Closer Look at Simon's 'Governing through Crime' Thesis

As mentioned in the introduction, in his work, Simon points out the connection between discourse—understood as the language beyond the sentence and thus including power dynamics—and policy. Both influence each other: discourse can spark policy change and vice versa. Without wanting to unravel the complex relation between the two, Simon highlights the problems of, as he sees it, an institutional tendency to approach societal issues through a military lens. This is problematic, he contends, because the rhetoric of securitization conflates societal issues with matters of national security. Since a central government and its institutions are the sole legitimate actors to respond to threats to national security, a state maintains and extends its own purpose by securitizing complex societal challenges. One of the ways in which this dynamic manifests is through discourse. In an earlier publication, Simon notes that the use of military language in non-military policy domains can be indicative of governing through crime (Simon 2001). To illustrate this, one might think of expressions like 'The fight or battle against COVID-19', 'Nurses and doctors at the frontline', and 'Healthcare workers as frontline workers'. This is exactly what Simon is talking about: military language (visible in words like fight and frontline) moving from one domain (namely, a military domain) to another policy domain (namely, public healthcare). This is not to say that anyone who has used such statements falsely treats COVID-19 as a matter of national security. Rather, it shows that language can be indicative of wider dispositions towards securitization.

Moreover, since our discourse analysis will be concerned with the dynamics of governing *through* crime (and migration), it becomes equally important to demarcate this from (simply) governing crime. Simon offers two points of departure for this differentiation, namely, proximity and proportionality (Simon 2007, p. 5). To start with proportionality, governing through crime often manifests in policy responses that are disproportionate to the harms they seek to address. In turn, such disproportionality raises questions about whether a certain policy response is aimed to mitigate or solve a certain harm, or whether it serves ulterior motives. As Simon also notes: "we can expect people to deploy the category of crime to legitimate interventions that have other motivations" (Simon 2007, p. 4). This tendency has also been described by Garland in the context of what he calls the political strategy of 'acting out': The act of showing force in response to complex and difficult-to-manage security problems by using strong language and far-reaching measures in order to give the impression that the problem is taken seriously, while knowing that the proposed measures will most likely not actually lead to a proper solution to the problem as they do not address its root cause(s) (Garland 2001).

Besides proportionality, there is the notion of proximity. This refers to whether a given societal issue is sufficiently related to (national) security to approach it as such, and more generally whether it is reasonable to connect two given policy domains to one another. Although the Dutch language does not distinguish between safety and security—an interesting observation in itself—this distinction does have an effect in policy. Security incidents, by definition, are purposefully caused or facilitated by mal-intended people (e.g., theft or terrorism). Contrary to this, safety incidents take place without anyone being fully responsible for them (e.g., earthquakes or unintended accidents). This difference demonstrates why securitization tends to come with scapegoats; indeed, there is no securitization without someone or some group to blame for it. In other words, proximity reminds us that when two policy areas are linked (both in discourse and in policy), the relationship between them should be judged for logical consistency and desirability. Together with

proportionality, these notions can also be employed to differentiate between governing migration and governing *through* migration.

To concretize this with an example, on 20 April 2021, a plenary debate on minors that went missing after entry into The Netherlands took place. Several members of the Dutch parliament critiqued the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Justice and Security for her lack of effort to trace these missing children. One member of parliament suggested the following: "We cannot imagine the miseries these children have experienced. If the Secretary of State truly wishes to protect these children, she must close the borders. She must close our borders and she should not let those children in here anymore."[6] While it is true that closing the borders may decrease the numbers of unaccompanied minors that go missing in the long term, this policy measure is neither proximate nor proportionate; the policy proposed (closing the borders) is not straightforwardly connected to the harm that is discussed (missing unaccompanied alien children). Consequently, it is questionable whether such a proposal is in fact aimed at resolving this harm, or if the harm is used to justify and operationalize underlying sentiments such as xenophobia.

To also illustrate a counterexample, we do *not* consider the following statements to be 'governing through migration and/or crime': During the pandemic it has been frequently discussed whether refugee camps on the islands of Lesbos and Chios should receive (additional) humanitarian support from, among others, the Dutch government. There were fears of outbreaks of COVID-19 and of its consequences for the already appalling conditions in the camps. In this case, a discourse is forming that indeed links migrant groups such as refugees on the one hand and the potential outbreak of COVID-19 on the other. Nevertheless, the connection is correct in this context; (the living conditions in) refugee camps are causally related to the risk of spread. All in all, the distinction between 'governing' and 'governing through' is facilitated by Simon's proximity and proportionality principle, but it is fair to say that discourses always have borderline cases—a caveat that we will explain further when explaining the research method for discourse data collection and interpretation.

4. The Netherlands: A Beacon of Tolerance Gone Dim?

Several countries in Northern Europe have the international reputation of being leading examples on inclusion, equality and tolerance. With strong welfare systems in place, countries such as Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands, are seen as countries that in general are taking good care of their citizens. Besides the aspect of social welfare, having relatively mild and humane penal climates also seems to be part of this grand narrative of hospitality and inclusion. Dutch criminal justice polices have long been characterized as "tolerant", lenient and liberal: permissive towards many vices, foreigner-friendly and blessed with a mild penal climate, and generally perceived to be a beacon of moderation (Downes 1988). The centrality of tolerance and humanity in matters of criminal justice in The Netherlands seems to coincide with a strong emphasis on human rights. With Norway and Sweden, The Netherlands is often depicted as a so-called gidsland ("guiding country") and thus seen as the 'conscience of the world' by setting moral standards in international relations and guiding other countries in the proper direction (Dahl 2006; Engh 2009; Herman 2006). The Netherlands is an interesting case as the country is historically known to be a 'gidsland'—a guiding country—for the implementation of human rights and often praised for its tolerance (Franko et al. 2019). Yet, more recent history has shown a different face of The Netherlands as a country where, upon taking a closer look, immigration law and criminal law are becoming increasingly intertwined (Van Der Woude et al. 2014) and in which political parties that actively and openly claim to be anti-Islam and racist are gaining a foothold (Van Der Woude 2020). The tweet by Geert Wilders, party leader of the anti-Islam and Euro-sceptic right wing party "Party for Freedom" (PVV) in response to the COVID-19 crisis is illustrative in that sense. In October 2020, when COVID-19 cases were soaring in The Netherlands he tweeted: "So the treatments and surgeries of "Henk" and "Ingrid" [two quintessential Dutch names to refer to the native, white Dutch population,

AUTHOR.] who are suffering from cancer, heart failure or other illnesses have to, yet again, be postponed because our IC units are predominantly being occupied by "Mohammed" and "Fatima" who do not speak our language and who don't care about the restrictions?". Not only is he stigmatizing Dutch citizens of Moroccan descent as not being able to speak Dutch and abusing our healthcare system, he is also presenting them as a risk to public health for not following the rules. Despite an overall loss in the total number of seats in parliament compared to the previous elections, the Party for Freedom (PVV) did come out as the third largest political party in the Dutch elections of March 2021.

5. Research Approach

As explained in the previous paragraph, the Dutch case is an interesting case to take a closer look at in light of the central aim of this article, which is to see to what extent Dutch political and media discourse can be qualified as instigating the governance of COVID-19 through migration. In this section we clarify our research approach by discussing the method of discourse analysis, our data collection and our data analysis.

5.1. Method: Discourse Analysis

The term 'discourse analysis' refers to a method for investigating the construction of social reality. Meanings we give to words and images depend on cultural assumptions and help to maintain cultural assumptions. Cultural values are linked to events. Language or images about certain events have a socio-cultural value, which in turn produces socio-cultural effects. The system of communication expressions related to a wider social and cultural network is called 'discourse'. (McDonald 2003) There are many ways to study discourse, ranging from the more to less rigid and/or critical in approach. Several theorists, therefore, rightly point out the lack of clarity surrounding the analysis of discourses (cf. McDonald 2003; Garrett and Bell 1998; Van Dijk 1998; Said 1974).

For this research we have taken inspiration from Carol Bacchi's 'What's the Problem Represented to Be' (WPR) analysis of policy discourse (Bacchi 2009). Bacchi's approach draws heavily on a Foucaudian perspective in suggesting that we are governed by problematizations. Bacchi therefore does not distinguish between policy and policy proposals, because both are part of the broader discourse that influences the degree of social attention to a problem. In this way, administrators not only respond to existing social problems (which would be 'for the taking' for administrators); administrators play an active role in constructing these problems through the discourse they form in proposing and discussing policy. Both policy and policy proposals are aimed at addressing and solving problems; however, all policies rest on specific interpretations and presentations of 'the problem'. To return to the example we gave earlier, the proposal of a PVV member to close the borders in response to unaccompanied minors going missing shows that this member has a very specific problem view. The problem, according to him, does not seem to lie with the fact that these children are going missing, but with the presence of these children. In addition, policy and policy proposals are also shaped by (unspoken) 'self-evident' assumptions. For example, it can be assumed that the meaning of certain concepts is universal—think, for example, of the concept of the 'illegal' migrant—where in reality this is controversial. In this way we are partly governed by the ways in which certain things are problematized (as well as the way in which other matters are regarded as unproblematic). The aim of Bacchi's WPR approach is to identify and critically study the problematizations underlying a specific policy document or proposal and to uncover the (implicit) assumptions on which a problem interpretation rests.

It is important to note that a discourse analysis does not yield neutral or objective conclusions, as any scientific result is influenced by, among other things, the selection and execution of a method and the positionality of the researcher(s). Bacchi also emphasizes that applying the WPR approach does not guarantee homogeneous results. Not only do the personal interests, analytical focus and assumptions of the researcher(s) play a role in the selection of a relevant policy document or proposal, but their interpretation will also

differ per researcher. Despite the systematic consideration of proximity and proportionality (in order to consistently differentiate between governing through migration and governing migration), there are many in-between cases; expressions which are neither fully governing through migration nor governing migration (or expressions which are both). In that respect, it is important to note that our analysis of public and political discourse is an impression of debates in Dutch society rather than an exact reflection of them. Finally, the political sensitivity of this analysis should also be acknowledged, as well as the risk that our personal political beliefs may influence conclusions. To make the analysis as neutral as possible, we will consistently state political colors from a party or other source, and we always work from the principle of charity, i.e., presenting other people's arguments in their strongest form.

5.2. Data Collection

This study focuses on the timeframe of 1 January 2020-1 November 2020.This time-frame is related to our specific focus on the impact of COVID-19 on discourses about migration. Although COVID-19 spread before 2020, the implications of this for The Netherlands were first discussed around January 1st. In the context of this article, under 'political discourse' we understand the text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions, such as presidents and prime ministers and other members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national and international levels to include both the speaker and the audience. We chose to combine an analysis of political discourse with an analysis of media discourse, as political discourse is increasingly mediatized and media discourse increasingly politicized. To grasp public and political discourse, we have respectively focused on national and local media as well as parliamentary and governmental debates in The Netherlands. The choice of parliamentary debates and reports, and of news articles, is not based on a reductive understanding of political and public discourse; in contrast, it is inherent in discourse analysis to work with sources that, while indicative of the bigger picture, are not fully representative. In addition, it should be noted that although we now seem to suggest a strict separation between media and political discourse, as already mentioned, in reality these discourses are intertwined.

All the sources were open access available; for the parliamentary and governmental debates in The Netherlands the national database www.officielebekendmakingen.nl was consulted, a database that gives access to the transcripts of all governmental, parliamentary and other debates by political institutional actors and committees. Within the scope of our timeframe, we have collected and stored every document that mentions COVID-19 (or any variation thereof, like pandemic or corona). This led to a selection of 564 documents. These documents have been checked manually to see if they contained one or more of the following search terms: (labor) (im)migration, (labor) (im)migrant(s), alien(s), border(s), asylum(seeker; process; application), refugee(s), healthcare, crime and integration. This led to a final selection of 137 documents for the political discourse (all of which thus discuss both COVID-19 and one or more of the aforementioned search terms).

The sources for the media analysis were obtained through the NexisUni news database that is freely accessible through our University Library. In the selection of national newspapers and magazines we have paid attention to political diversity, and we have prioritized larger media platforms; for local newspapers, we have included all available newspapers within our timeframe[7]. Obviously, this approach leaves out an important domain where discourse happens nowadays, that is, social media. However, for this article we chose to limit ourselves to official media resources. For the media discourse the initial collection of media outings counted 408 and, after a similar check as described for the political discourse, we included a total of 84 articles.

5.3. Data Analysis

We converted both final selections to Atlas.ti, a computer program for data analysis in qualitative research that helps to structure the process of coding and analysis. This means

that we have two Atlas.ti files (one for political discourse and one for media discourse) in which all our data (respectively 137 and 84 documents) have been stored and coded manually. In our endnotes, we refer to document numbers (e.g., D1, 2, 3), which are based on our documentation system in the database. By adding a P or an M we distinguished between the political discourse and the media discourse. DP1, for example, refers to document 1 on political discourse in Atlas.ti, whereas DM1 refers to document 1 on media discourse. In the Appendices A and B we provide an overview of the various documents, so that they can be traced back to their original source.

Our codes consist of a combination of the above search terms (migration, border, asylum, etc.) and any variation of COVID-19. Using these codes as a guideline, we were able to quickly identify paragraphs and sentences in our data that were discussing both migration and COVID-19. After that, each set of codes was manually reviewed to see if a link was made between COVID-19 and migration, and if so, what the nature of this link was. This means that we looked at specific sentences as well as at short paragraphs (usually about five sentences long). Also, sentences and paragraphs are always viewed in the context of the entire source; after all, with many codings, it was necessary to read both backwards and forwards to understand the nature of any particular link between COVID-19 and migration. For example, an isolated sentence or paragraph often does not provide a definitive answer about how a statement is intended and/or how it will be received by a possible audience.

Furthermore, we assessed each alleged link between COVID-19 and migration for proximity, proportionality, the perceived (implicit and/or explicit) underlying problematization, and any unspoken assumptions. This process was guided by questions like 'how is migration / how are [various groups of] migrants being problematized in the light of COVID-19?', 'how are [various groups of] migrants being framed?', 'what are the underlying assumptions?', 'are the linked entities sufficiently related to one another for them to be connected like this?', 'is the link logically consistent?', and 'are proposed countermeasures proportionate and proximate to the harm they seek to address?'. On the basis of our answers to these guiding questions, we were able to group together paragraphs and sentences into categories like 'Governing migration through COVID-19' and 'Governing migration and COVID-19'.

6. Results

Our primary objective has been to identify the extent to which governing migration through COVID-19 manifests in media and political discourse. In other words, we have not only sought to examine whether the rhetoric of governing through migration is prevalent in discourse, but also whether COVID-19 plays a role in this rhetoric. We will start by discussing the role of COVID-19, after which we will turn to some more general observations on the ways migration and migrants are represented in media and political discourse.

7. Political Discourse

Starting with political discourse, it is important to note that the results are diverse, and ought to be treated with nuance. Generally, it can be concluded that while governing migration through COVID-19 manifests in debates, this rhetoric is also frequently challenged and critiqued in parliament, government, or both.

7.1. Problematizing Migrant Communities inside and outside The Netherlands through COVID-19

Overall, out of 134 documents, 42 contained one or multiple expression(s) which are indicative of governing migration through COVID-19.[8] As mentioned in the introduction, the narrative that migrant populations around the globe carry a wide array of communicable diseases and, therefore, pose a threat to public health in destination communities, is a strong one and tends to resurface in moments of crisis. This narrative, in which migrants

are perceived as carriers of disease, only comes up occasionally in the 2020 political discourse. The rhetoric of governing migration *through* COVID-19 is more diverse than we initially expected; it also manifests through discussions on border policies, humanitarian aid for refugee camps, economic hardship, and governmental compensations for overdue asylum processes during COVID-19.

To start with the narrative that migrants could bring and spread COVID-19, there are but a few examples of this in political discourse. For example, in response to several questions in parliament, the Ministry of Justice and Security declares that "approximately fifty aliens have been denied entrance into The Netherlands to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 since 19 March 2020".[9] In this example, COVID-19 seems to justify the specific rejection of aliens. Another example relates to labor migrants. The Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport expresses the following during a debate about COVID-19 outbreaks in workplaces:

> "Is it possible to test more goal oriented? The answer to that question is "yes". I mentioned slaughter houses as one of the examples of which you know: there are many labor migrants there. Perhaps the cooling conditions, the working conditions, also play a role (...)"[10]

This example is perhaps more subtle in its assumption that labor migrants would spread COVID-19. Nonetheless, the Minister appears to assume that the presence of labor migrants is among the factors that led to an outbreak in slaughterhouses. Only on second thought does he seems to consider the labor conditions.

More commonly, governing migration through COVID-19 manifests in broader discussions. For example, in debates on border policies, two political parties stand out in their appeal to governing migration through COVID-19, namely, the Party for Freedom (PVV) and the Forum for Democracy (FvD). These parties are respectively characterized as nationalist right-wing populist and conservative right-wing populist; both are Eurosceptic and anti-immigration. These parties have urged the current Dutch government to close the borders, similar to some other member states of the European Union. To illustrate their stances, a member of PVV expresses the following during a parliamentary debate:

> "Because other countries have closed their borders due to corona measures, their asylum influx has almost completely dried up. With 270 asylum migrants in April, the lowest number in at least twenty years, there lies a unique opportunity to prevent the asylum influx from increasing again."[11]

Here, it is clear that COVID-19 is treated as a legitimation to close the Dutch borders, with the specific aim of averting migrants. At the same time, it is worth highlighting that the government itself explicitly counters this form of governing migration through COVID-19. The government frequently expressed its discontent regarding the reintroduction of internal border controls in the European Union, and writes:

> "(...) the introduction of internal border control to counter the influx of asylum into The Netherlands is not the government's preference."[12]

Besides border policies, we have identified some mild expressions of governing migration through COVID-19 in debates surrounding the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Services (IND). This organization is responsible for asylum processes, and is legally required to process any request within six months. If this term is exceeded, the Dutch government is obliged to financially compensate asylum seekers in the form of penalty payments. While the IND deals with structural backlogs, and as COVID-19 has only amplified rather than caused the backlogs, the costs of these payments has exceeded 70 million euros. In light of this, a temporary amendment of the law has been approved, as a result of which the Dutch government is no longer required to pay compensation for overdue asylum processes. While this suspension is not a direct result of COVID-19, it is at least remarkable that asylum seekers and migrants are being cut off financially for overdue governmental work within the timeframe of this pandemic. In other words, COVID-19 seems to have facilitated momentum to cut back on asylum processes.

A final context in which governing migration through COVID-19 manifests is that of economic hardship in combination with insufficient public healthcare facilities and supplies. Regarding migrant communities outside The Netherlands, the scarcity of medical supplies is an argument to refrain from humanitarian aid for refugee camps. This argument exclusively comes from party members of PVV and FvD. As a member of PVV expresses it:

> "I would like to object to the fact that we will be sending some 15,000 relief goods to Greek islands (…) whilst the number of corona cases in The Netherlands has doubled in comparison to Tuesday. Then we are not going to send relief supplies to Greece that we desperately need for our own peoples here, are we? Have we gone completely crazy?".[13]

With regard to migrant communities inside The Netherlands, these too are occasionally held accountable for inadequate medical care. Another member of PVV contends:

> "If we had not fired 75,000 healthcare workers, if billions had not been spent on asylum seekers, and if that money had instead been invested in healthcare, then the crisis—really—would have been smaller."[14]

7.2. Problematizing the Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Communities within and outside The Netherlands

While varying expressions of governing migration *through* COVID-19 are present in political discourse, there are just as many documents in which the specific vulnerabilities of migrant communities inside and outside The Netherlands are stressed. Out of 134 documents, 55 documents contain one or multiple expression(s) which stress the impact of COVID-19 on migrant communities.[15] Members of the political party DENK have been particularly vocal about this:

> "The virus does not discriminate. We can all get it and it is impossible to predict what the effects will be. However, certain groups suffer more than others. While one Dutch person wonders whether there is a food package left at the food bank, another is upset, because he cannot drink his beer in the village café. And there is a clear difference in consequences for the elderly and the young, people with and without work, and people with and without a migration background. For example, statistics indicate that the excess mortality among people with a migration background is 48%, and without 38%."[16]

DENK has a left-wing political orientation, and statements like this are broadly shared as well as put forward by parties with left-wing and centrist political orientations. Similarly, several outbreaks of COVID-19 among labor migrants in The Netherlands have resulted in an increase in governmental support. While these migrants have sometimes been accused of disobedience in respect of the measures against COVID-19, the pandemic has mostly shed light on their poor working and living conditions. Consequently, a task force was set up for the protection of labor migrants in May 2020. The objective of this was to mitigate outbreaks of COVID-19, as well as to strengthen the position of labor migrants in the long term.[17]

With regard to migrant communities outside of The Netherlands, we can see that while COVID-19 is used to restrict humanitarian aid for refugee camps, the reverse is also true; COVID-19 is also cited as a reason to increase humanitarian aid flows for refugee camps. For example:

> "We still see that all over the world, vulnerable refugee children are suffering from the corona crisis in refugee camps. Who cares for them?"[18]

7.3. Problematizing Migrants for Other Things than COVID-19

Having elaborated on our results in relation to COVID-19, we will now turn to some more general observations on the ways in which migrants are represented in political discourse. First of all, governing migration through COVID-19 is merely one of the ways in which governing through migration manifests. Migrants are also linked to, if not blamed

for, a lack of affordable housing in The Netherlands and carbon dioxide emission in relation to climate change. Out of 134 documents, 11 contain one or multiple expression(s) of this.[19] To start with affordable housing, a quote by a member of PVV is quite illustrative of this rhetoric:

> "Immigration swiftly increases the housing shortage; construction workers cannot compete with the enormous growth of immigrants."[20]

This rhetoric belongs to the domain of governing through migration because it falsely implies a causal link between housing shortages and immigration. In a similar vein, members of FvD argue that the admittance of migrants leads to higher carbon dioxide emissions, leading to an overall intensification of climate change.[21]

7.4. Not Problematizing the Connection between Migration and Crime

Since PVV and FvD are generally considered populist parties, their engagement in these forms of governing through migration is not too surprising. More remarkable is the frequency with which migration and migrants are linked to crime by a wide array of political parties (including liberal, socialist, Orthodox–Calvinist and Christian–democratic ones). Out of 134 documents, 35 contain one or multiple expression(s) of crimmigration.[22] Currently, the biggest party in The Netherlands is a liberal one: the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). After PVV and FvD, this party most regularly links migration to crime. For example, when a member of PVV requested a plenary debate between government and parliament to discuss high crime rates among asylum seekers, the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Justice and Security (VVD) shared his concerns. This Secretary of State, who is responsible for the implementation of migration policies, has responded to this by '*lik-op-stuk-beleid*', meaning that minor violations and incidents among asylum seekers are immediately punished. Such punishments come in the form of withholding living allowances, transfer to high-surveillance locations, and restraining orders.[23] During this same debate, the Secretary of State concludes:

> "The figures in this incident overview are indeed worrying and nuisance in any form is unacceptable. They are alarming messages indeed. I agree with Mister Hiddema [member of FvD, NI] on that. But at the same time, we must see the following. Like Mister Emiel van Dijk [member of PVV, NI] has put forward, we would prefer to close the borders and not let them in here. But we have an asylum system and that means that . . . We are a constitutional state: anyone who comes here to ask for asylum, will get a procedure. (...) We do our utmost to ensure that this runs as smoothly as possible, that no shoplifting takes place and that indeed all other organizations work well together to ensure that nuisance is limited as much as possible."[24]

Besides this, crime rates are also linked to the presence of migrant communities. The following expressions are examples of this; both come from the Reformed Political Party (SGP), which is a conservative Orthodox–Calvinist party.

> "(...) is the urban unrest [referring to drug-related crime, NI] not also an integration problem?"[25]

> "Noting that crime figures continue to show a worrying overrepresentation of people with a non-Western migration background; calls on the government to recognize and investigate this problem and to develop a targeted approach to reduce crime in these groups as well as in total."[26]

8. Media Discourse

The media discourse showed some similarities, but also some differences compared to the political discourse. In line with the political discourse, an oft-discussed topic in the various news articles was the situation in the various refugee camps located in different locations on the outskirts of the European Union.

8.1. Problematizing Refugees as Victims and/or a Potential Threat to Public Health

Of the 84 articles that were included in our analysis of media discourse, 30 addressed matters around refugees.[27] The majority of these articles spoke of the various refugee camps at the external borders of the European Union, in particular the Canary Islands and Italy, but with an emphasis on the situation on the Greek islands of Samos and Lesbos. It was on the latter island where a destructive fire broke out in an encampment called 'Moria'. A close read of the articles reveal two main problematizations: on the one hand, as illustrated by the deplorable and inhumane circumstances under which asylum seekers have to 'live' in the encampments, the lack of 'care' for the health of asylum seekers amidst a global pandemic was problematized. As vividly described based on first hand experiences and observations by NGO workers, the amount of people packed together in the encampments without access to personal protective equipment and without the possibility of taking necessary hygienic measures is a 'humanitarian disaster' in the making.[28] Several articles indeed mention outbreaks of COVID-19 among asylum seekers.[29]

At the same time, there are articles that discuss how the global pandemic, given the inequalities between the Global North and the Global South in the distribution of medical equipment (and later on also the vaccine), might also spark more migration from the Global South to the Global North. What this shows is how the problematization of the asylum seeker, or more broadly the migrant, as the victim of inhumane circumstances is closely intertwined with a less explicit problematization of the asylum seeker as a potential risk to public health because of the very same circumstances that support the problematization of the asylum seeker as the victim. We also see the problematization of migration sparked by COVID-19 in general, as in "COVID-19 will lead to migration pressure on Europe's external borders due to the growing instability in vulnerable countries".[30] This begs the question to what extent calls for financial and medical support for the Global South are driven by true humanitarian motives or moreso by the self-interest of European member states in the Global North?[31] How, moreover, should this wish to provide help in the Global South be seen in light of observations by Doctors without Borders (MSF) who, based on the actions of several European member states located at the external borders of Europe, state that "European countries are now using COVID-19 to obstruct humanitarian aid".[32] The NGO is addressing actions by the Italian authorities as a result of which the boat *Sea Watch 4*, the search and rescue ship run by Sea-Watch and MSF, could not provide help to boat refugees drowning in the Meditarreanean.

A topic that seemed more prominent in media discourse than in political discourse is the extent to which different migrant communities in The Netherlands were hit harder by the COVID-19 crisis and what the cause of this could be.

8.2. Problematizing Migrant Communities in The Netherlands as Victims and/or a Potential Threat to Public Health

A substantial number of articles (35) in our final selection of media discourse centered around the extent to which migrant communities in The Netherlands were, as in countries such as the US and the UK, disproportionately affected by the virus. In those articles, as in the articles discussing the situation of refugees and asylum seekers outside of the country, two narratives—or two problematizations—come to the fore: (a) the migrant as a victim of social and economic circumstances that will increase their risk of contracting COVID-19 or being seen as scapegoats, and (b) the potentially hazardous migrant who is more likely to spread the virus due to their religious and cultural practices or general lack of respect for and compliance with COVID-19 restrictions in The Netherlands. [33] The first narrative in many ways can be seen as a counter narrative to the more xenophobic and especially Islamophobic second narrative.

To start with the second narrative, migrant communities as potential spreaders of the virus, this narrative seemed to especially take flight after a head doctor from the Amsterdam University Medical Hospital Intensive Care Unit mentioned in an interview that there were many people with a migrant background hospitalized in the intensive care

units.[34] Although the doctor states that there are most likely many reasons contributing to this, his statement was used by anti-Islam politician Geert Wilders to send his earlier quoted tweet about Mohamed and Fatima taking up beds that should go to autochthonous Dutch people. Following Wilders' Tweet the Chairman of the Dutch catering industry association stated that research had shown that 'COVID-19 outbreaks among migrant communities' were more problematic than the risk of contracting COVID-19 in a restaurant or a cafe.[35] There are several articles that indeed seem to problematize some cultural and religious practices that are associated with different migrant communities in The Netherlands, with a clear emphasis on the Moroccan and Turkish communities but also with mentions of the Surinamese and Ghanese community. An important aspect of concern are large gatherings in the context of religious activities—a concern that is especially voiced around the month of Ramadan.[36] It has to be mentioned that religious gatherings *in general* have been problematized in the context of the pandemic, not just those of Muslims. Besides this, another cause for concern, outside of the context of religion, is gathering with friends, family and community members more generally,[37] as well as not being upfront about having COVID-19 out of a sense of shame of having contracted the disease.[38] These dynamics would, according to the articles, be more present within migrant communities than within native Dutch communities.

The problematization of migrant communities as spreaders of COVID-19 is not unique to The Netherlands. Several pieces illustrate not only the scapegoating mechanism that almost automatically seems to kick in when countries are faced with an intangible threat, but also illustrate how in various other countries different migrant communities have been targeted because of it.[39]

The second problematization that is clearly visible in the media discourse seems to be a direct response to the one that was just discussed. While taking the notion of migrant communities as reluctant to respect the COVID-19 restrictions as a point of departure, these articles paint a much more nuanced picture. The articles address the complex mix of social and economic factors as a result of which migrant communities are not in a privileged situation where they are able to work from home, to self-quarantine or socially distance themselves from family or community members who have tested positive, or to homeschool or home entertain their children. Combined with higher levels of obesity and diabetes in these communities, these circumstances make clear how the virus 'discriminates'. The virus, as is communicated clearly in these pieces, has led to a further deterioration of the already vulnerable living situation in which migrant communities often find themselves.[40] These articles also point out that migrant communities are not the only communities facing that reality; lower class, lower educated white Dutch communities are in the same boat. What is further questioned is the extent to which the government has been clear and inclusive in its communication on COVID-19 and the measures around it. The call to use 'unusual suspects' and 'unusual leaders' in connecting with different communities—Imams, athletes, musicians, etc.—is echoed in these contributions as well.[41] Thus, all in all, this problematization can be seen more as a problematization of the current state of affairs in Dutch society, in which the socio-economic gap between various groups has grown tremendously over the past decades and in which polarization and fear of 'the other' seem to have become more and more common.

9. Conclusions

Actions speak louder then words, but words do set the stage for possible further actions. The Dutch political and media discourse shows a two-sided picture: on the one hand, migration and migrant communities in The Netherlands are problematized in the light of COVID-19; on the other hand, the analysis of both political and media discourse also shows that pushback is indeed being offered against the 'pandemicization' of migrants, especially as far as migrant communities in The Netherlands are concerned. When it comes to discussions on asylum-seekers and refugees, the pushback is less visible and all parties express concern about the situation in refugee camps and the implications for

the country if the people living in these camps were to in fact make their way to The Netherlands. Interestingly enough, despite these concerns and contrary to many other European countries, The Netherlands has never closed its borders by reinstating permanent border checks. Although problems are observed in the way in which different groups of people comply with the COVID-19 rules, the causes that are identified to explain this non compliant behavior are very diverse. For example, the higher numbers of Dutch people with a migrant background in the ICU, and also the higher mortality rates among this group, are not exclusively sought in that background. Indiscriminate governing of COVID-19 'through' migration seems to be mostly absent. With the exception of the parties that have an explicit anti-migration, anti-Islam and anti 'open' borders agenda—Forum for Democracy and the Party for Freedom—the other coalition and opposition parties are reluctant to explicitly link COVID-19 to migration or to propose stricter anti-migration policies on that basis. The reasons for the limited presence of 'governing COVID-19 through migration' in the Dutch discourse are not clear, and somewhat unexpected. In our opinion at least, the absence of that clear link does not immediately give rise to too much optimism. This somewhat skeptical attitude is reinforced by the extent to which the linking of migration and crime—and thus the assumption of a causal relationship between the two phenomena—seems to have become normalized in the discourse, with neither government nor opposition parties questioning it. The interlinking of crime and migration has been widely problematized by scholars studying the process of crimmigration (Stumpf 2006; Van Der Woude et al. 2014), who have illustrated how this process can lead to the creation of a penal subsystem focused on territorial exclusion of the national social body instead of reintegration which has been crafted for the non-citizen (Aas 2013, 2014; Bosworth et al. 2018; Bowling and Westenra 2020). Franko refers to this penal subsystem as a form of 'bordered penality', indicating how the absence of formal citizenship status crucially affects the procedural and substantive standards of justice afforded to non-members and leads to the creation of two parallel penal systems: one for citizens and one for non-citizens. The fact that the link between crime and migration—with all its underlying assumptions—is normalized all over the political spectrum is cause for concern.

It should also be noted that the analysis presented in this article focuses on the first phase of the pandemic in The Netherlands; the collected data include the first and part of the second wave. There have now been a third and fourth wave, and there are concerns about a possible fifth wave. In other words, uncertainty persists and, most likely, will affect the overall discourse. Both Bauman and Beck point out that in times of uncertainty, the most visible groups of 'others' will eventually be identified as being (partly) responsible for the underlying problem (Beck 1986; Bauman 1998). It will also be interesting to see how the pandemic will influence thinking about mobility in general. To stay with Bauman, the question is to what extent tourists (postmodern westerners) and vagabonds (refugees, asylum seekers, illegal immigrants or dissidents) will both be able to move around the world again or whether there will be (even more) attempts to limit the mobility of vagabonds and the 'crimmigrant other' (Franko 2020). While according to Bauman it was already the case before the pandemic that the light was green for tourists to move freely around the world, while the light for vagabonds was red, it is expected that this last light will turn a darker red due to the pandemic. After all, if tourists want to travel safely, the vagabonds have to give way. Illustrative of the latter is the development of the European Travel Information and Authorization System as part of a broader development towards 'smarter' border control. The description of ETIAS states that it concerns a "largely automated IT system created to identify security, irregular migration or high epidemic risks posed by visa-exempt visitors traveling to the Schengen States, whilst at the same time facilitate crossing borders for the vast majority of travelers who do not pose such risks."[42] Irregular migration here is lumped together with safety and health risks as a risk against which member states must be protected, but which should not affect tourists.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A. Political Discourse Documents (Indicated in the Text as DocumentPolitical DP + Number)

1. Plenair debat 02.06 (2)
2. Plenair debat 02.06
3. Plenair debat 06.07
4. Plenair debat 15.06
5. Plenair debat 16.06 (2)
6. Plenair debat 01.04
7. Plenair debat 01.07
8. Plenair debat 01.09
9. Plenair debat 02.07 (3)
10. Plenair debat 02.07 (8)
11. Plenair debat 02.09 (3)
12. Plenair debat 03.06
13. Plenair debat 03.09 (4)
14. Plenair debat 03.09 (5)
15. Plenair debat 03.09 (6)
16. Plenair debat 03.09
17. Plenair debat 04.06 (5)
18. Plenair debat 08.04
19. Plenair debat 09.09 (4)
20. Plenair debat 09.09 (5)
21. Plenair debat 09.09
22. Plenair debat 10.06 (3)
23. Plenair debat 10.06 (4)
24. Plenair debat 12.03 (3)
25. Plenair debat 14.05
26. Plenair debat 14.07 (2)
27. Plenair debat 16.04
28. Plenair debat 16.09
29. Plenair debat 17.06 (2)
30. Plenair debat 17.09 (2)
31. Plenair debat 17.09
32. Plenair debat 18.03
33. Plenair debat 18.06 (4)
34. Plenair debat 18.06
35. Plenair debat 19.08
36. Plenair debat 20.05 (2)
37. Plenair debat 20.05
38. Plenair debat 22.04
39. Plenair debat 22.09
40. Plenair debat 24.06 (2)
41. Plenair debat 24.06
42. Plenair debat 25.06 (2)
43. Plenair debat 26.03
44. Plenair debat 26.05
45. Plenair debat 28.05 (2)

46. Plenair debat 28.05
47. Plenair debat 30.06 (2)
48. Vragenuur 19.05
49. Verslag mondeling overleg 01.07
50. Verslag mondeling overleg 16.06
51. Voorstel van wet 06.10
52. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 03.07 (7)
53. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 07.10
54. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 11.06
55. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 12.06
56. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 15.06
57. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 24.08
58. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 26.05
59. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 29.09 (2)
60. Verslag van de vaste commissie 03.07 (6)
61. Verslag van de vaste commissie 09.06 (2)
62. Verslag van de vaste commissie 13.10
63. Verslag van de vaste commissie 24.04 (3)
64. Verslag algemeen overleg 06.05
65. Verslag algemeen overleg 06.10
66. Verslag algemeen overleg 07.10
67. Verslag algemeen overleg 08.04
68. Verslag algemeen overleg 10.07 (3)
69. Verslag algemeen overleg 12.05 (2)
70. Verslag algemeen overleg 12.05 (3)
71. Verslag algemeen overleg 12.05
72. Verslag algemeen overleg 12.06
73. Verslag algemeen overleg 13.05 (2)
74. Verslag algemeen overleg 13.05 (3)
75. Verslag algemeen overleg 13.05
76. Verslag algemeen overleg 16.07 (3)
77. Verslag algemeen overleg 16.09 (3)
78. Verslag algemeen overleg 16.09
79. Verslag algemeen overleg 16.10
80. Verslag algemeen overleg 24.07 (4)
81. Verslag algemeen overleg 24.09 (2)
82. Verslag algemeen overleg 24.09 (3)
83. Verslag algemeen overleg 25.09
84. Verslag algemeen overleg 28.07 (5)
85. Verslag algemeen overleg 29.07 (6)
86. Verslag algemeen overleg 30.04
87. Verslag algemeen overleg 31.07 (2)
88. Verslag algemeen overleg 31.07 (4)
89. Verslag algemeen overleg 31.07 (5)
90. Verslag algemeen overleg 31.07
91. Verslag notaoverleg 17.06
92. Verslag voorstel van wet 05.10
93. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 05.06
94. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 07.10
95. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 08.05 (3)
96. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 08.05 (4)
97. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 08.10
98. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 10.04 (2)
99. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 10.04 (3)

100. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 10.06
101. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 11.06 (3)
102. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 12.05 (4)
103. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 15.05 (2)
104. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 16.04
105. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 16.07
106. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 16.10
107. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 17.06 (3)
108. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 17.06
109. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 18.06
110. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 19.05 (2)
111. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 19.05 (3)
112. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 19.05 (6)
113. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 20.08 (2)
114. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 21.07 (2)
115. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 22.04
116. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 23.03
117. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 23.04 (2)
118. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 23.04 (3)
119. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 24.04 (2)
120. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 24.06 (7)
121. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 26.03
122. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 26.05 (3)
123. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 28.08 (6)
124. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 29.04 (5)
125. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 29.05 (3)
126. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 29.05
127. Verslag schriftelijk overleg 30.03
128. Verslag vragen en antwoord 02.07
129. Verslag vragen en antwoord 06.10
130. Verslag vragen en antwoord 16.06 (2)
131. Verslag vragen en antwoord 16.06 (4)
132. Verslag vragen en antwoord 17.06 (2)
133. Verslag vragen en antwoord 17.06
134. Verslag vragen en antwoord 18.06
135. Verslag vragen en antwoord 27.10 (2)
136. Verslag vragen en antwoord 27.10
137. Verslag vragen en antwoord 29.10

Appendix B. Media Discourse Documents (Indicated in the Text as DocumentMedia DM + Number)

1. Vluchteling op Samos wanhopig
2. Afrika vergeten in coronacrisis is niet in ons belang
3. Bosbrand bij overvol vluchtelingenkamp op Grieks eiland Samos
4. Wij leven hier al jaren tussen ratten en kakkerlakken.
5. Wordt het ooit weer normaal: NRC peilt de stemming in elf Nederlandse buurten
6. 69 nieuwe coronadoden gemeld in Nederland, 44 ziekenhuisopnames
7. Alles beter dan 'dat daar';De Polen oordelen over vijf jaar sociaal-nationalisme
8. 'Als er één besmet raakt, krijgen we het allemaal'
9. 'Amsterdamse Ghanezen hebben vaker corona-antistoffen in bloed'
10. Arts op de Sea-Watch 4: een droom om moedeloos van te raken
11. Artsen zonder Grenzen waarschuwt voor corona in Griekse vluchtelingenkampen
12. Corona Nieuws VN vrezen xenofobie
13. Artsen zonder Grenzen hervat migranten missie op Middellandse Zee

14. Bij Ventimiglia willen vluchtelingen grens over
15. 'Blijf positief en vertrouw op Allah'
16. Buurtsuper en moskee moeten helpen om iedereen te bereiken met corona campagne
17. Corona houdt de Bijlmer in zijn greep
18. Corona in kamp gevluchte Rohingya
19. Corona in kamp Moriazal catastrofale gevolgen hebben
20. 'Corona is niet iets om geheim te houden'
21. Corona is niet kleurenblind, onderzoek wel
22. Corona Jihad
23. Coronavirus duikt op in Rohingya-vluchtelingenkamp in Bangladesh
24. COVID-19 en geweld Libi_ dwingen migrant naar Canarische eilanden
25. 'De kaarten zijn in de lucht gegooid';Mensenrechten in tijden van corona
26. De noodzaak van vaccinsolidariteit boven vaccinnationalisme is groot
27. De overheid greep redelijk snel in en de toeristen bleven weg
28. De vader en moeder van BNT162b2;Een vaccin en zijn politieke context
29. De volgende brand hangt in de lucht
30. 'Deze ramadan maakt extra indruk'
31. Discrimineert het coronavirus Het heeft er alle schijn van
32. Een keizer zonder kleren;Precaire beroepen Het romantische beeld van Europa
33. Eerste 25 van de honderd kwetsbare Griekse vluchtelingen in Nederland aangekomen
34. Eerste coronadode in Grieks migrantenkamp
35. Empathie
36. Evacueer vluchtelingen op Griekse eilanden, nu
37. Geen brasa in de Bijlmer waarom slaat corona hier zo hard toe
38. 'Gevaarlijke situatie' in azc's door tekort hulpmiddelen
39. Gran Canaria gaat meer tentenkampen bouwen
40. Grenscontrole Duitsland rond arbeidsmigranten
41. Grieken bouwen een muur tussen Lesbos en Turkije
42. Griekse migratie kwestie blijft zorgelijk
43. 'Harteloos en xenofoob';Nederland laat jonge asielzoekers in de steek
44. Heel Parijs binnen, behalve het uitschot
45. Hekken rond de wijk corona _n het nieuwe corona beleid treffen vooral de armsten
46. Het plein van de Al-Haram Moskee in Mekka is leeg, zoals ook het Sint-Pietersplein in Rome leeg is
47. Hoop in tijden van misère
48. 'Hulp aan Afrika is in ons belang'
49. IC-chef Girbes: fout om patiënten om etniciteit anders te behandelen
50. Imam: Corona Besmetting wordt soms verzwegen
51. In de Randstad liggen corona-IC's vol migranten
52. In de Randstad liggen de corona-IC's vol migranten
53. In Moria zitten vluchtelingen klem
54. Investeer juist nu in armoedebestrijding
55. Kunnen de rechts-populistische partijen binnen Europa electoraal munt slaan uit de ziekte-uitbraak
56. Maduro vluchtelingen zijn virusdragers
57. Migranten als zondebok de woestijn in sturen Ik denk niet dat wij daar als samenleving beter van worden.
58. Migranten sterven relatief vaker aan coronavirus
59. Niet iedereen kan verantwoordelijkheid voor gezondheid aan;Commentaar
60. Offerfeest op 1.5 meter inmiddels weten de gelovigen hoe het werkt
61. Ongezonder, lager geschoold, niet altijd thuis kunnen werken; Corona Besmettingen
62. Ook de ramadan is even anders
63. Op elkaars lip in plastic tenten
64. Op Lesbos is de chaos compleet 12,000 mensen op straat, terwijl corona rondwaart

65. Opvallend veel migranten onder Britse coronadoden
66. Opvang asielzoekers zit weer propvol;Opvang in Nederland zit vol
67. Overal extra corona controles, maar fruitkweker Ren Simons vreest ze niet
68. Relatief veel migranten sterven door coronavirus
69. Stampvol vluchtelingenkamp Lesbos kansloos bij besmetting coronavirus
70. Stroom bootmigranten uit Libië zwelt weer aan
71. Tegen elke prijs;Essay Vluchtelingen en Europa
72. Veel coronapatienten met migratieachtergrond op ic's: Taalproblemen kunnen rol spelen
73. 'Verplaats vluchtelingenop Lesbosnaar lege hotels'
74. Vluchtelingen betalen hoge prijs voor pandemie miljoenen mensen krijgen niet de hulp die ze nodig hebben
75. Vluchtelingen op Lesbos in gevaar na besmetting
76. Vluchtelingen op Lesbos willen niet opnieuw in een kamp, ook al is het splinternieuw
77. Volk van buiten;Column
78. Voor je het weet zit er 30 man in de huiskamer; Tijdens het Offerfeest; Corona Verslapping
79. Voor vluchtelingen is corona slechts een van de problemen
80. Wie zijn hier de verliezers
81. Wordt de ene bevolkingsgroep harder geraakt door corona dan de andere
82. Zondebok
83. Zorg dat we in deze crisis geen groepen vergeten
84. Zwakke groepen zijn immuun voor corona beleid

Notes

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7. The newspapers included are: AD/Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, De Stentor, De Gelderlander, Noordhollands Dagblad, De Telegraaf, Brabants Dagblad, Eindhovens Dagblad, Tubantia, De Volkskrant, Noordhollands Dagblad, de Volkskrant, Dagblad De Limburger, BN/DeStem
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9. DP 124
10. DP 42
11. DP 1
12. DP 124
13. DP 69
14. DP 6
15. DP 10, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 45, 47, 50, 58, 61, 65, 66, 69, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 101, 107, 110, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 121, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135
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18. DP 42
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20. DP 3
21. DP 28

22   DP 1, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 26, 28, 30, 39, 41, 48, 50, 66, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 100, 105, 115, 120, 121, 124, 130, 135, 137

23   DP 48

24   DP 48

25   DP 30

26   DP 30

27   DM 1, 79, 76, 75, 73, 71, 70, 69, 64, 63, 56, 41, 39, 36, 34, 33, 29, 24, 23, 19, 18, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 8, 4, 3, 2

28   DM 8, 11, 10

29   DM 75, 64, 34, 18, 19, 14

30   DM 48, 24

31   DM 48, 2

32   DM 13

33   DM 84, 83, 81, 80, 77, 72, 68, 62, 61, 60, 59, 58, 57, 55, 56, 52, 49, 45, 44, 43, 38, 66, 37, 35, 31, 30, 22, 21, 20, 17, 16, 15, 9, 5

34   DM 77, 52, 58, 49

35   DM 57, 82

36   DM 78, 60, 30, 15

37   DM 5, 37, 17, 78

38   DM 20, 50

39   DM 22, 45, 56, 80, 77

40   DM 83, 81, 84, 78

41   DM 84, 72

42   https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-borders/etias_en (last accessed 21 May 2021)

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