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Two-Layer Bus-Independent Instruction Set Architecture for Securing Long Protocol Data Units in Automotive Open System Architecture-Based Automotive Electronic Control Units

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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a bus-independent hardware (HW)-based approach to secure long protocol data units (PDUs) in Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR)-based automotive electronic control units (ECUs). Our approach is based on extending previous works that implemented two AUTOSAR communication (COM) application-specific instruction set processors (ASIPs). COM ASIP V1 introduced two instructions to handle the transmission and reception of PDUs no larger than 8 bytes and signals no larger than 32 bits individually through send signal and receive signal instructions. COM ASIP V2 introduced two extra instructions to handle long signals and PDUs of arbitrary lengths. We extended the instruction set architecture (ISA) of our previous ASIPs by introducing six new instructions, in COM ASIP V3, to hash PDUs that contain these signals to authenticate transmission and reception of such PDUs. The experimental results show that COM ASIP V3 can handle (i.e., transmit, receive, calculate hash, or verify hash) a 64-byte controller area network flexible data-rate (CAN FD) frame in 1.575 μ s and a 254-byte FlexRay frame in 6.301 μ s. These measurements indicate that the throughput of our new COM ASIP is much higher, 42 \times to 75 \times , than the throughput required by these communication buses.

Keywords: automotive security; secure communication buses; authentic frame transmission in ECUs; AUTOSAR communication ASIP; hardware security module; GCM authentication encryption



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1. Introduction

New communication buses (CAN FD [1,2], FlexRay [3–5], Ethernet, etc.) can transmit frames of longer lengths compared to traditional communication buses (CAN [6] and Local Interconnect Network (LIN)). These traditional communication buses are able to handle frames no larger than 8 bytes, whereas CAN FD can transmit frames of up to 64 bytes, FlexRay can transmit frames of up to 254 bytes, and Ethernet can transmit frames of up to 1518 bytes. These long frames contain many pieces of information. In some scenarios, it is needed to ensure the authenticity of these frames and make sure they will not be altered by attackers. In the context of AUTOSAR layered architecture [7], these frames are represented by PDUs in the Com module [8], and pieces of information inside PDUs are represented by signals in the Com module.

Our approach is based on extending previous works that implemented two AUTOSAR COM ASIPs. The first COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V1) [9–11], as shown in Figure 1, introduced two instructions to handle transmission and reception of PDUs up to 8 bytes in length. This is done by handling signals no larger than 32 bits individually, inside these PDUs either by packing them during PDU transmission (i.e., through send signal instructions) or by unpacking them during PDU reception (i.e., through receive signal instructions). The second COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V2) [12] introduced two extra

instructions (i.e., the send long signal instruction and the receive long signal instruction) to handle long signals and PDUs of arbitrary lengths. The additions to COM ASIP V1 to support the long signal instructions are shown in Figure 2.




Figure 1. COM ASIP V1.

In this study, we further extended COM ASIP V2. We introduced six additional instructions, in COM ASIP V3, that perform different hashing operations. These hashing operations secure transmitted PDUs by hashing signals that correspond to these PDUs to ensure the authenticity of such PDUs during transmission. These hashing operations are performed using a two-layer process. This two-layer process modifies the original Galois/counter mode of operation (GCM) algorithm [13,14] to make it faster and increase security of it.

Our paper focuses on two aspects. The first aspect is an automotive cybersecurity feature. This feature involves securing long PDUs in AUTOSAR-based automotive ECUs using a bus-independent HW-based approach. This is done by designing an ISA that contains six hashing instructions that are responsible for ensuring authenticity for such PDUs during transmission and reception to prevent attackers from altering such PDUs. After that, this ISA is realized on an ASIP. The automotive cybersecurity aspect has been addressed by other recent papers [15–17] as well, in different ways.

The work in [15,16] aimed to secure communication between ECUs—without the need to authenticate transmitted data—from vulnerabilities of unencrypted communication channels, such as CAN buses. This is done with an intrusion detection system capable of analyzing traffic over the CAN bus and of understanding whether the messages transmitted over the communication channel are malicious or not. This is achieved using a two-step algorithm. The first step is a pre-processing step that is used to filter and verify incoming messages through spatial and temporal analysis to decide whether they may or may not be a possible attack. The second step uses a machine learning technique through a Bayesian network that is trained through a pre-established dataset during the simulation phase. The outcome of the second step is whether we are in the presence or not of an attack.




Figure 2. The additions to AUTOSAR COM ASIP to support the long signal instructions.

The second feature of our paper is an optimization aspect, as our paper also focuses on optimizing generic signal-based communication for AUTOSAR-based ECUs. Optimizing performance of AUTOSAR-based ECUs using HW-based approaches is a new field that has been addressed by other papers as well (e.g., optimizing serialization of application data before transmitting them [18]). Our work, in addition to these other ideas, from other papers, can be combined together to provide much greater enhancements for AUTOSAR-based ECUs to cope with the increased speedup of today’s SW applications.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction about our previous COM ASIP ISA (i.e., COM ASIP ISA V2). After that, it describes details of a highly secure hashing algorithm, named GCM [13,14]. This algorithm is used by COM ASIP V3. After that, it describes details of a new concept, named two-layer security, that is used by our ASIP to increase the security of the original GCM [13,14]. After that, it describes the changes needed in our ASIP components to support the hashing instructions. After that, it describes the additions that we made in the ISA of our ASIP to support these hashing instructions. Section 3 shows the experimental results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 4.

2. Materials and Methods

This section is organized as follows. Section 2.1 gives a brief introduction to our previous COM ASIP ISA (i.e., COM ASIP ISA V2). Section 2.2 describes the details of a highly secure hashing algorithm, named GCM [13,14]. This algorithm is used by COM ASIP V3. Section 2.3 describes details of a new concept, named two-layer security, that is used by our ASIP to increase the security of the original GCM [13,14]. Section 2.4 describes the changes needed in our ASIP components to support the hashing instructions. Section 2.5 describes the additions that we made in the ISA of our ASIP to support these hashing instructions.

2.1. A Brief Introduction to COM ASIP ISA V2

Our previous ISA consists of four phases. These phases are fetching, decoding, execution, and delivery. The execution phase consists of two sub phases (i.e., extraction and packing/unpacking). Our previous ISA supports four instructions (i.e., send signal, receive signal, send long signal, and receive long signal). Each instruction requires 12 cycles (i.e., cycle 0 to cycle 11) to complete its execution.

2.1.1. Actions in Cycle 0

The instruction memory component, named IM1, is activated by the control unit component to fetch a new instruction. The address of this instruction is specified by the IM1_addr control signal.

2.1.2. Actions in Cycle 1

The control unit component decodes an instruction fetched in the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 0) to get three pieces of information, as shown in Figure 3. The first piece, named OpCode, is an instruction type that defines whether this instruction is a send signal, a receive signal, a send long signal, or a receive long signal instruction. The second piece, named SigId/Virtual Signal Id, is an identifier for a virtual signal that is currently processed by this instruction. The third piece, named SigValue/Virtual Signal Value, is a new value for a virtual signal that is currently processed by this instruction.

B ₆₃	B ₅₆	B ₅₅	B ₄₀	B ₃₉	B ₈	B ₇	B ₀
OpCode		Virtual Signal Id		Virtual Signal Value			RFU

Figure 3. Proposed instruction format in the ISA of COM ASIP V2.

For each virtual signal, there are eight words related to this virtual signal that are saved in a read only memory (ROM) component, named rom_n. These words contain properties that represent which PDUs contain these virtual signals and how these virtual signals are placed inside their corresponding PDUs. The structure of the rom_n component is shown in Figure 4.

Word #	B ₃₁	B ₂₆	B ₂₅	B ₂₀	B ₁₉	B ₁₄	B ₁₃₋₁₂	B ₁₁	B ₀
0 Same	Init Value								
1 Same	Invalid Value								
2 Modified	Virtual IPDU Signal Start Position								
3 Same	bPos		UbPos		bSize		E	RFU	
4 New	IPDU Signal Update Bit Position								
5 New	Real IPDU Id (Send Long Signal Instruction)								
6 New	Real IPDU/Signal Start Position (Send/Receive Long Signal Instruction)								
7 New	Real IPDU/Signal Length (Send/Receive Long Signal Instruction)								

Figure 4. Encoding of properties for virtual signals inside the rom_n component.

Send Signal and Receive Signal Instructions

We are interested in two words, which are the third and the fourth words. The third word contains the virtual IPDU signal start position that represents the start position of an 8-byte window inside the PDU. This 8-byte window contains a currently processed virtual signal. The fourth word contains four properties that represent how a virtual signal is placed inside its corresponding 8-byte window inside the PDU. These properties are bPos (corresponds to ComBitPosition in the context of AUTOSAR Com [8]), UbPos (corresponds to ComUpdateBitPosition in the context of AUTOSAR Com [8]), bSize (corresponds to ComBitSize in the context of AUTOSAR Com [8]), and E (i.e., Endianness).

Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

We are interested in three additional words, which are the sixth, seventh, and eighth words. The sixth word contains the real IPDU Id, which represents an identifier for a PDU that contains a currently processed virtual signal and its corresponding real signal as well. The seventh word contains either real IPDU start position or real signal start position. Real IPDU start position will be used in a send long signal instruction to give a position, inside the IPDU component, to lower SW layers to access PDUs after adding (i.e., packing) new values for virtual signals to them. Real signal start position will be used in a receive long signal instruction to give the application layer a position, inside the IPDU component, to access real signals that correspond to virtual signals that are being processed by currently executed instructions. The eighth word contains either real IPDU length or real signal length. Real IPDU length will be used in a send long signal instruction along with real IPDU start position to transfer data, as some of PDUs transmitted from the IPDU component to lower SW layers. Real signal length along with real signal start position will be used in a receive long signal instruction to transfer data from the IPDU component to the application layer.

In cycle 1, the control unit component multiplies SigId by 8 and adds a constant value (i.e., 2) to it to get address of the third word related to this virtual signal in the rom_n component.

2.1.3. Actions in Cycle 2

The control unit component multiplies SigId by 8 and adds a constant value (i.e., 3) to it to get address of the fourth word related to this virtual signal in the rom_n component.

In addition, the control unit component saves the processed SigId (i.e., $(\text{SigId} * 8) + 2$) from the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 1) in the low address register component, named LReg.

2.1.4. Actions in Cycle 3

The control unit component saves the processed SigId (i.e., $(\text{SigId} * 8) + 3$) from the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 2) in the high address register component named HReg.

The control unit component also activates a multiplexer, named Mux, to make its output come from the LReg component.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The control unit component multiplies SigId by 8 and adds a constant value (i.e., 5) to it to get address of the sixth word that corresponds to this virtual signal in the rom_n component.

2.1.5. Actions in Cycle 4

The control unit component activates the rom_n component to read a word from it. The address of this word comes from the LReg component. Data inside the rom_n component at this address contain a virtual IPDU signal start position for a PDU that corresponds to a currently processed virtual signal.

The control unit component also activates the Mux component to make its output come from the HReg component.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The processed SigId (i.e., $(\text{SigId} * 8) + 5$) from the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 3) is saved in the VirtualP1Reg register. In addition, the control unit component multiplies SigId by 8 and adds a constant value (i.e., 6) to it to get the address of the seventh word that corresponds to this virtual signal in the rom_n component.

2.1.6. Actions in Cycle 5

The virtual IPDU signal start position is saved in the IPDU Id Reg component.

The control unit component also activates the rom_n component to read another word from it. The address of this word comes from the HReg component. Data inside the rom_n

component at this address contain those four properties that we mentioned above (i.e., bPos, UbPos, bSize, and E). Those properties represent how a virtual signal is placed inside its corresponding 8-byte window inside PDU.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The processed SigId (i.e., $(\text{SigId} * 8) + 6$) from the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 4) is saved in the VirtualP2Reg register. In addition, the control unit component multiplies SigId by 8 and adds a constant value (i.e., 7) to it to get the address of the eighth word that corresponds to this virtual signal in the rom_n component. In addition, the control unit component activates the Mux component to make its output come from the VirtualP1Reg register.

2.1.7. Actions in Cycle 6

The word that is read from the rom_n component in the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 5) is saved in the OtherInfo Reg component.

The control unit component also activates the IPDU component. The IPDU component contains current runtime values for PDUs, to read the current runtime value for an 8-byte window inside the PDU, named the original IPDU value, which corresponds to a currently processed virtual signal. The address used to access the IPDU component comes from the IPDU Id Reg component.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The processed SigId (i.e., $(\text{SigId} * 8) + 7$) from the previous cycle (i.e., cycle 5) is saved in the VirtualP3Reg register. In addition, the control unit component activates the Mux component to make its output come from the VirtualP3Reg register. It also reads a word from the rom_n component; the address of this word comes from the VirtualP1Reg register. This word represents Real IPDU Id. It will be saved in the real IPDU Id Reg component in the next cycle (i.e., cycle 7).

2.1.8. Actions in Cycle 7

The operations unit unpack component uses two inputs, which are bPos, of a currently processed virtual signal, and the original IPDU value. These inputs are used to extract a 32-bit shadow, named original shadow. In case of a send signal/send long signal instruction, this original shadow will be used to place a new value for this currently processed virtual signal in its corresponding 8-byte window inside PDU. In case of a receive signal/ receive long signal instruction, this original shadow will be used to extract current runtime value for this currently processed virtual signal from its corresponding 8-byte window inside PDU.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The control unit component activates the Mux component to make its output come from the VirtualP3Reg register. It also reads a word from the rom_n component, and address of this word comes from the VirtualP2Reg register. This word represents either the real IPDU start position, in case of a send long signal instruction, or real signal start position, in the case of a receive long signal instruction. This word will be saved in the real IPDU/signal start position Reg component in the next cycle (i.e., cycle 8).

2.1.9. Actions in Cycle 8

The operations unit pack component uses three inputs, which are bSize, of a currently processed virtual signal, original shadow, and SigValue. In case of a send signal/send long signal instruction, the operations unit pack component places SigValue—the SigValue extracted in cycle 1—in original shadow based on bSize to construct modified shadow A. In case of a receive signal/receive long signal instruction, the operations unit pack component constructs, based on bSize, modified shadow B that represents the current runtime value for this currently processed virtual signal.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The control unit component reads a word from the rom_n component, and address of this word comes from the VirtualP3Reg register. This word represents either real IPDU length, in case of a send long signal instruction, or real signal length, in case of a receive long signal instruction. This word will be saved in the real IPDU/signal length Reg component in the next cycle (i.e., cycle 9).

2.1.10. Actions in Cycle 9

The operations unit final component uses four inputs, which are modified shadow (i.e., modified shadow A in cases of send signal/send long signal instructions, and modified shadow B in cases of receive signal/receive long signal instructions), bPos, IPDU Id, and original IPDU value. In case of a send signal/send long signal instruction, modified shadow A is added, based on bPos, to the original IPDU value to construct a new value (i.e., final IPDU value). This final IPDU value represents the final value, after adding a new value for this currently processed virtual signal, for the 8-byte window inside PDU that corresponds to this currently processed virtual signal. In case of a receive signal/receive long signal instruction, modified shadow B is passed to the next cycle as it is.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The word read from the rom_n component will be saved in the real IPDU/signal length Reg component, as mentioned above.

2.1.11. Actions in Cycle 10

The output from the previous cycle (i.e., final IPDU value for a send signal/send long signal instruction and modified shadow B for a receive signal/receive long signal instruction) is passed to the output buffer component to be saved. In addition, the final IPDU value for a send signal/send long signal instruction is passed to the IPDU component to save a new value for an 8-byte window inside PDU that corresponds to a currently processed virtual signal.

Only for Send Long Signal and Receive Long Signal Instructions

The output buffer component is activated to save outputs from the real IPDU Id Reg, the real IPDU/signal start position Reg, and the real IPDU/signal length Reg components.

2.1.12. Actions in Cycle 11

In cycle 11, a SW part of Com module can access the output buffer component. In case of a send signal/send long signal instruction, this SW part of the Com module can get, through the output buffer component, a final value for a PDU that corresponds to a currently processed virtual signal. In case of a receive signal/receive long signal instruction, this SW part can get, through the output buffer component, a current runtime value for a currently processed virtual signal from its corresponding PDU.

2.2. The GCM Hashing Algorithm

GCM [13] is a highly secure algorithm that was published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2007 [14]. It is currently implemented in many hardware security modules (HSMs) that are parts of many automotive micro-controller units (MCUs). Many papers have optimized implementations of GCM, increasing its throughput and the speed of its internal operations in application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)-based architectures [19–23] or field programmable gate array (FPGA)-based architectures [24–31]. GCM is also used in network-based systems to secure communication [32–37]. GCM has been used in automotive [38] and IOT domains [39,40] as well.

GCM is used for authentication encryption with associated data. GCM provides three main features. The first feature is assurance of confidentiality of input data. This is achieved by encrypting input data using a variation of the counter mode operation of encryption [41],

which is a recommended block cipher mode of operation for an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [42]. The second feature is assurance of authenticity of confidential data from the previous feature. This is achieved by using a universal hashing function that is defined over a binary Galois (i.e., finite) field. The third feature is assurance of authenticity of additional data that are not encrypted. The GCM authentication encryption process is shown in Figures 5 and 6. The symbols and processes shown in these figures are described in Table 1.




Figure 5. GCM authentication encryption.




Figure 6. The $GCTR_K$ process.

Table 1. The symbols and processes used in the GCM authentication encryption.

Symbol	Description
IV	The initialization vector (IV) is a bit string that should be unique within the specified context. Length of IV, in bits, shall be from 1 to $2^{64}-1$ and shall be multiple of 8 so IV constructs a byte string. It is recommended to strict length of IV to 96 bits to simplify designs that use GCM and increase their efficiency and operability.
Y_0	The pre-counter block (Y_0) is a 128-bit block constructed from IV. After incrementing Y_0 , it is used as an initial counter block (ICB). ICB is used along with the plaintext (P) to construct the ciphertext (C). Details of converting IV to Y_0 are described in [14].
inc ₃₂	Incrementing the right-most 32 bits of input by 1 modulo 2^{32} .
P	This is the plaintext, which authentication encryption, using GCM, will be applied to it. Length of P, in bits, shall be $\leq 2^{39} - 256$ and shall be multiple of 8 so P constructs a byte string. P is divided into 128-bit blocks. Blocks generated by this dividing process are P_1 to P_n , where n refers to number of blocks generated by this dividing process.
$GCTR_K$	$GCTR_K$ is the function used by GCM to generate ciphertext from a given ICB and a given plaintext using a given block cipher key (K). It divides plaintext into 128-bit blocks. It mainly performs, as shown in Figure 6, exclusive-OR (XOR) operations between plaintext blocks generated by this dividing process mentioned above and ICB after incrementing it per processed block then applying the forward cipher function ($CIPH_K$) to it. Details of $GCTR_K$ function, used in GCM, are described in [14].
C	This is the ciphertext that is generated by applying $GCTR_K$ function to ICB and plaintext. It is used to assure confidentiality of plaintext. Each block of plaintext will result in a block of ciphertext. Generated ciphertext blocks are C_1 to C_n .
A	The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), abbreviated as A, help to identify how to interpret plaintext. For example, within a network protocol, AAD might include sequence numbers, ports, addresses, protocol version numbers, etc. GCM assures authenticity but not confidentiality of AAD. Length of AAD in bits, shall be $\leq 2^{64} - 1$ and shall be multiple of 8 so AAD construct a byte string.
0^v	0^v are zero bits, of length v, that are appended to AAD to make bit length of generated string multiple of block length (i.e., multiple of 128 bits).
0^u	0^u are zero bits, of length u, that are appended to ciphertext to make bit length of generated string multiple of block length (i.e., multiple of 128 bits).
$[\text{len}(A)]_{64}$	The 64-bit representation of length, in bits, of AAD.
$[\text{len}(C)]_{64}$	The 64-bit representation of length, in bits, of ciphertext.
0^{128}	The zero block (0^{128}) is a 128-bit block. All of its bits are zeros.
H	The hash subkey (H) is the output from applying $CIPH_K$ to the zero block (i.e., 0^{128}) under a block cipher key K.
$CIPH_K$	$CIPH_K$ is the forward cipher function of cipher block under a block cipher key K. In GCM, $CIPH_K$ is used to generate H from the zero block. It is used by ICB during $GCTR_K$ function as well.
$E(K, Y_i)$	The cipher counter i ($E(K, Y_i)$) is the output from applying $CIPH_K$ to the counter Y_i . H is generated by applying $CIPH_K$ to the zero block so H is equivalent to $E(K, 0^{128})$.
$GHASH_H$	$GHASH_H$ is the hash function under the hash subkey H. This function is used to generate a single 128-bit block. It performs multiplication operation, for the binary Galois (i.e., finite) field of 2^{128} elements, between the input data ($A \parallel 0^v \parallel C \parallel 0^u \parallel [\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$) and H. Details of $GHASH_H$ function are described in [14].
MSB_t	MSB_t represents the most significant t bits of a provided input block.
T	T is the tag that represents a hash value, generated by GCM, that should be appended to transmitted data. It is used to assure authenticity of plaintext and AAD.

In Figure 5, there are 7 processes that are highlighted in yellow. The first process is the inc_{32} function that is used to increment the pre-counter block (Y_0) each time to generate a new counter block to be used with the GCTR_K function.

The second process is the GCTR_K function near the top of the table. This process receives two inputs and produces one output. The two inputs are the plaintext P blocks and the counter blocks. The outputs are the ciphertext C blocks.

The third process is the CIPH_K function that is used to generate the hash subkey (H) from the zero block (0^{128}).

The fourth process is the yellow diamond in the middle of the table. This diamond is an aggregation function that aggregates six inputs. These inputs are the Additional Authenticated Data A; 0^v , which are 0 bits in length and appended to A; the ciphertext C blocks; 0^u , which are 0 bits in length u appended to C; $[\text{len}(A)]_{64}$, which represents the length of A in bits; and $[\text{len}(C)]_{64}$, which represents the length of C in bits.

The fifth process is the GHASH_H function that performs a multiplication operation between two inputs and produces one output. The first input is the aggregated data resulting from the fourth process ($A \parallel 0^v \parallel C \parallel 0^u \parallel [\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$), and the second input is the hash subkey (H) resulting from the third process. The output from the fifth process is one of the inputs to the sixth process.

The sixth process is the GCTR_K function, shown near the bottom of the table. This process receives two inputs and produces one output. The first input is the output from the fifth process and the second input is the pre-counter block (Y_0). The output from the sixth process is the input to the seventh process.

The seventh process is MSB_t , which takes the most significant t bits of the provided input to produce the final tag T.

Figure 6 describes, in detail, the second process (i.e., GCTR_K function on the top of Figure 5). As described before, the GCTR_K function receives two inputs and produces one output. The two inputs are the plaintext P blocks P_1 to P_n and the counter blocks Y_1 to Y_n . The GCTR_K function applies the forward cipher function (CIPH_K) to the second input (i.e., the counter blocks Y_1 to Y_n) to produce the cipher counters $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$. After that, the GCTR_K function does exclusive-OR (XOR) operations between the cipher counters $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$ and the plaintext P blocks P_1 to P_n to produce the ciphertext C blocks C_1 to C_n .

2.3. The Two-Layer Security Process Using GCM and COM ASIP

We introduced a two-layer process to increase the security of the GCM hashing algorithm. In order to use GCM with our COM ASIP, we analyzed three designs to construct plaintext. The first option is to consider each PDU as the plaintext that is an input to GCM. The second is to consider each signal as the plaintext that is an input to GCM. The third is the two-layer security process that is described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4.

2.3.1. The First Design

For the first design, we need to divide each PDU into blocks of fixed length. The length of each block is 128 bits.

The First Difficulty

The first difficulty in this design comes from the fact that instructions supported by our COM ASIP work with signals but not with PDUs. Supporting this new design will require changing structure of our ASIP, introducing many new components and data paths, and changing the ISA of our ASIP completely, which will affect both the flexibility and performance of our ASIP.

The Second Difficulty

Another difficulty comes from the fact that signals differ from each other in their sizes and positions within PDUs. By dividing PDUs into 128-bit blocks, we might find that one signal, based on the position and size of this signal within its corresponding PDU, spans

over two consecutive blocks, as shown in Figure 7, where signal 3 spans over block 0 and block 1. This will also complicate our ASIP and affect its flexibility and performance. Based on the previous points, we discarded that design choice.




Figure 7. Signal spans over two consecutive blocks.

2.3.2. The Second Design

For the second design, we need to divide each signal into blocks of fixed length, where length of each block is 128 bits. A signal can fit into one block if its length is ≤128 bits. If the length of the signal is >128 bits, it is divided into more than one block. In both cases, padding is used, if it is necessary, to have complete blocks (i.e., length of input data is multiple of block length).

A Better Design

This design is better than the first design. The reason is that instructions supported by our COM ASIP already work with signals, so we do not need to introduce many changes in the structure of our ASIP. Although this design seems better than the first design, it has two main difficulties.

The First Difficulty

The first difficulty is that this design requires reserved bytes for each signal to contain its hash value, which will require transmitting much more data from sender ECUs to deliver hashes of such signals to receiver ECUs so receiver ECUs can verify such signals correctly. This will consume the bandwidth of communication buses that connect ECUs and will decrease the throughput of such communication buses to transmit actual data. Table 2 shows the utilization percentage, to transmit actual data, of communication buses when we use different tag lengths. The original tag length is 128 bits, and truncated tag lengths can be smaller (16 bits, 32 bits, 64 bits, etc.). The red color indicates that the utilization percentage is less than 50%, the green color indicates utilization percentage is more than 50%, and the yellow color indicates utilization percentage is 50%. As we can see, the utilization percentage is less than 50% in most of cases, which impacts the throughput of the communication buses and affects the performance and usability of our design.

Table 2. Utilization percentages of communication buses using different tag lengths and signal sizes.

		Tag Length in Bits			
		16	32	64	128
Signal Size in bits	1	6%	3%	2%	1%
	2	11%	6%	3%	2%
	4	20%	11%	6%	3%
	8	33%	20%	11%	6%
	16	50%	33%	20%	11%
	32	67%	50%	33%	20%
	64	80%	67%	50%	33%
	128	89%	80%	67%	50%
	...				

The Second Difficulty

The second difficulty is that we need to change the structure of the PDUs to have room to hold hash values for signals contained in these PDUs. We have two approaches. The first

More Security

Based on the previous points, attackers also need to know positions and sizes of all signals inside ECUs to be able to break the second layer of security, which is much more complex than using only one layer of security.

2.3.4. The Modified GCM Algorithm

In order to integrate GCM within our COM ASIP, we have made some modifications to the original GCM to make it faster. The modified GCM algorithm is shown in Figure 9. The modifications that we have been made are based on identifying possible processes, in the original GCM algorithm, which can be done offline.




Figure 9. The modified GCM algorithm.

The First Offline Process (Generating Y_0 from IV)

The first process is generating Y_0 from IV. This process has to be done online in case IV can be changed. In the context of our COM ASIP, IV is static and has a fixed length, 96 bits, so converting IV to Y_0 can be done offline, and Y_0 is saved in a secure memory component that is part of our ASIP.

The Second Offline Process (Generating $E(K, Y_0)$)

The second process applies $CIPH_K$ to Y_0 . This process (i.e., $E(K, Y_0)$) is part of the $GCTR_K$ process that is applied to the output from the $GHASH_H$ process. In the context of our COM ASIP, Y_0 is static because IV is static, so $E(K, Y_0)$ is static as well and can be done offline. $E(K, Y_0)$ is saved in a secure memory component that is part of our ASIP. Based on the previous points, the $GCTR_K$ process that is applied to output from $GHASH_H$ process will turn out to be an XOR operation between $E(K, Y_0)$ and output from the $GHASH_H$ process. This is shown in Figure 9.

The Third Offline Process (Incrementing Y_0 and Generating Y_1 to Y_n)

The third process is incrementing Y_0 to generate counters, Y_1 to Y_n , which is used as inputs to the $GCTR_K$ process that is applied to plaintext blocks. This process can be done offline, and these counters, Y_1 to Y_n , is saved in a secure memory component that is part of our COM ASIP.

The Fourth Offline Process (Generating $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$)

The fourth process is applying $CIPH_K$ to counters Y_1 to Y_n . This process (i.e., $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$) is part of the $GCTR_K$ process that is applied to plaintext blocks. In the context of our COM ASIP, Y_1 to Y_n are static because Y_0 is static, so $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$ are static and can be performed offline. $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$ is saved in a secure memory component that is part of our ASIP. Based on the previous points, the $GCTR_K$ process that is applied to plaintext blocks will involve XOR operations between plaintext blocks (i.e., P_1 to P_n) and $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$. This is shown in Figure 9. To simplify the design of our ASIP and increase its efficiency and operability, counters are limited to 64 counters, from Y_1 to Y_{64} , to reduce the size of secure memories that is used to save these counters (i.e., Y_1 to Y_{64}) and their corresponding cipher values (i.e., $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_{64})$).

The Fifth Offline Process (Calculating the Length of AAD)

The fifth process is calculating the length of AAD. In the context of our COM ASIP, AAD is only one block (i.e., its length is 128 bits), so it has a fixed length, and $[\text{len}(A)_{64}]$ can be replaced, as shown in Figure 9, by a static value (i.e., $0x0000000000000080$).

The Sixth Offline Process (Appending vs. Bits to AAD)

The sixth process is appending vs. bits to AAD. This process (i.e., 0^p) was eliminated, as the length of AAD is multiple of block length (i.e., length of AAD is 128 bits, which corresponds to one block).

The Seventh Offline Process (Appending u Bits to C)

The seventh process is appending u bits to C . This process (i.e., 0^u) was eliminated, as the length of C is a multiple of block length. We ensured this because, based on the third design in Section 2.3.3 that we selected, each virtual signal is considered as one plaintext block, and each PDU contains a number of virtual signals, so we have a number of complete blocks that represents this PDU.

The Eighth Offline Process (Generating H)

The eighth process is generating H from the zero block. The zero block (i.e., 0^{128}) is static, so H (i.e., $E(K, 0^{128})$) is static as well. Thus, generating H from the zero block can be done offline, and H is saved in a secure memory component that is part of our COM ASIP.

The Modified GCM Algorithm

Based on the previous offline processes, we modified the original GCM algorithm, and our modified design, as shown in Figure 9, is integrated within our COM ASIP. This modification is described in Section 2.4. In Figure 9, the components and processes that are done offline are highlighted in green, and those that are done online are highlighted in yellow.

Secure Memory Components Are Needed

Based on those offline processes, we concluded that we need secure memory components. These memory components are used to save Y_0 , $E(K, Y_0)$, and Y_1 to Y_n ; and $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$ and H . Y_0 and Y_1 to Y_n can be removed from these secure memory components because they will not be used directly, as shown in Figure 9, in our modified GCM algorithm. The only secure memory components that are needed are those that are used to save $E(K, Y_0)$ and $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$ and H .

2.4. The Changes and Additions in COM ASIP Components to Support the Hashing Instructions

The format of instructions, in the IM1 component, in COM ASIP V3, is kept same as the format of instructions in COM ASIP V2. The only difference is that six new hashing instructions are supported, as shown in Table 3, so our COM ASIP V3 supports 10 instructions. These new hashing instructions work in a similar way to the receive signal and the receive long signal instructions. These hashing instructions will get values for signals specified by these instructions, and then the modified GCM algorithm is used to calculate and update tag values for PDUs, based on values for signals specified by these hashing instructions, which contain these signals.

Table 3. The instructions supported by different versions of COM ASIP.

Instruction	OpCode	COM ASIP Version
Send Signal	0xFF	COM ASIP V1 & V2 & V3
Receive Signal	0x11	
Send Long Signal	0xEE	COM ASIP V2 & V3
Receive Long Signal	0x22	
Start Hashing	0x33	COM ASIP V3
Start Hashing Without AAD	0x66	
Update Hashing	0x44	
Finish Hashing	0x55	
Hash Once	0x77	
Hash Once Without AAD	0x88	

2.4.1. The Start Hashing Instruction

This instruction is used to start the hashing process, using the modified GCM algorithm, for the first signal (i.e., P_1) in a given PDU to generate the first ciphertext block (i.e., C_1). It is used as well to prepare AAD and apply the GHASH_H process to merged input $A \parallel C_1$. The components and processes from the modified GCM algorithm used by this instruction are shown in Figure 10.

2.4.2. The Start Hashing without AAD Instruction

This instruction is similar to the start hashing instruction. The only differences, as shown in Figure 11, are that no AAD is used and that the GHASH_H process is applied directly to C_1 .

2.4.3. The Update Hashing Instruction

This instruction is used to continue the hashing process, using the modified GCM algorithm, for the next consecutive signals (i.e., P_2 to P_{n-1}) in a given PDU to generate the next consecutive ciphertext blocks (i.e., C_2 to C_{n-1}). It is also used to apply the GHASH_H process to these ciphertext blocks (i.e., C_2 to C_{n-1}). This instruction increments the length of the ciphertext by 0x80, which is the length of a 128-bit block in bits, per invocation of this instruction. Figures 12 and 13 show how this instruction is performed for P_2 and P_{n-1} consecutively, where each invocation of this instruction is responsible for only one plaintext block.




Figure 10. Start hashing instruction flow.




Figure 11. Start hashing without AAD.




Figure 12. Update hashing for P₂.

2.4.4. The Finish Hashing Instruction

This instruction is used to finish the hashing process, using the modified GCM algorithm, for the last signal (i.e., P_n) in a given PDU. It applies the GHASH_H process to the last ciphertext block (i.e., C_n). It increments the length of the ciphertext by 0x80 to reflect length of the last ciphertext block. It produces a final value for AAD, where value for AAD is either 0x80 or 0x00. 0x80 is used in cases where the first signal in this PDU is processed using a start hashing instruction. 0x00 is used in cases where the first signal in this PDU is processed using a start hashing without AAD instruction. After that, it applies the GHASH_H process to the counter block ([len(A)]₆₄ || [len(C)]₆₄). After applying GHASH_H process, an XOR operation is performed between the block generated by the GHASH_H process and E(K, Y₀) to generate a tag that should be appended to this PDU upon transmitting it. This tag is used to ensure authenticity of this PDU and make sure it will not be altered by attackers. Figure 14 shows how this instruction is performed.

2.4.5. The Hash Once Instruction

This instruction is used if there is only one signal inside a given PDU. This instruction performs the hashing process, using the modified GCM algorithm, for this signal along with AAD and merged input [len(A)]₆₄ || [len(C)]₆₄. [len(A)]₆₄ is 0x80 because there is only one AAD block. [len(C)]₆₄ is 0x80 because there is only one block in plaintext that is represented by the signal specified by the hash once instruction. Figure 15 shows how this instruction is performed.




Figure 13. Update hashing for P_{n-1} .

2.4.6. The Hash Once without AAD Instruction

This instruction is similar to the hash once instruction. The only differences, as shown in Figure 16, are that no AAD is used and that $[\text{len}(A)]_{64}$ is 0x00 in this case.

2.4.7. The Modified rom_n Component

The structure of the rom_n component is same as the one that we used in COM ASIP V2, as shown in Figure 4, and there is no need to add any extra words to it.

2.4.8. The Modified Output Buffer Component

The output buffer component has been extended, as shown in Figure 17, to contain two extra words that will be reserved for a tag value that should be appended to each PDU upon performing a finish hashing, a hash once, or a hash once without AAD instruction.

2.4.9. Extra ROM Components

As described previously, we need secure memory components to save $E(K, Y_0)$ and $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_{64})$ and H. We extended our COM ASIP to contain three additional secure memory components (i.e., they can be only read by our COM ASIP during its internal operation). The first one, named the cipher pre-counter register, is a 128-bit register that will be used to save $E(K, Y_0)$. The second one, named cipher counters memory, is a group of 64 registers, where width of each register is 128 bits. The cipher counters memory will be used to save $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_{64})$. The third one, named the cipher zero vector register, is a 128-bit register. The cipher zero vector register contains H that is equivalent to $E(K, 0^{128})$. We added an additional fourth memory component, named the AAD register, that is used

to save AAD. The AAD register is a 128-bit register because the length of AAD in our current COM ASIP design is restricted to one block (i.e., 128 bits). It is not mandatory to make this fourth component secure. These components are shown in Figure 18.




Figure 14. Finish hashing instruction flow.

2.5. The Additions to COM ASIP ISA to Support the Hashing Instructions

The additions to COM ASIP V2 to support the hashing instructions are shown in Figure 18. For the previous send long signal and receive long signal instructions, no changes in instruction flow during the twelve execution cycles are needed. These instructions (i.e., the send long signal and the receive long signal instructions) work without any extra logic to handle them in COM ASIP V3. For the hashing instructions, the changes in instruction flow are illustrated below.

2.5.1. Changes in Cycles 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

In cycles 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, no changes are expected.




Figure 15. Hash once instruction flow.




Figure 16. Hash once without AAD.

Output Buffer					
Word #	B ₆₃	B ₃₂	B ₃₁	B ₀	COM ASIP Version
0	IPDU Value (Send Signal instruction) or			Signal Value (Receive Signal instruction)	COM ASIP V1 & V2 & V3
	RFU				
1	RFU		Real IPDU Id (Send Long Signal instruction)		COM ASIP V2 & V3
2	RFU		Real IPDU/Signal Start Position (Send/Receive Long Signal instruction)		
3	RFU		Real IPDU/Signal Length (Send/Receive Long Signal instruction)		
4	Tag				COM ASIP V3
5					

Figure 17. The modified output buffer component.




Figure 18. The additions to AUTOSAR COM ASIP to support the hashing instructions.

2.5.2. Changes in Cycle 6

In cycle 6, the control unit component checks which hashing instruction is currently being executed. It activates, based on the hashing instruction, the needed memory components to read a word from each of them. Table 4 shows which memory components that will be activated.

Table 4. The actions performed by the control unit component to support the hashing instructions.

Instruction	Action
Start Hashing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activates the Cipher Counters Memory to read the first word (i.e., $E(K, Y_1)$) from it. • Activates the Cipher Zero Vector Register to read it. • Activates the AAD Register to read it and sets length of AAD to 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits. • Sets length of ciphertext to 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits.
Start Hashing Without AAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activates the Cipher Counters Memory to read the first word (i.e., $E(K, Y_1)$) from it. • Activates the Cipher Zero Vector Register to read it. • Sets length of AAD to 0x00. • Sets length of ciphertext to 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits.
Update Hashing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activates the Cipher Counters Memory to read the next word, starting from $E(K, Y_2)$, from it. • Increments index used to access the Cipher Counters Memory for upcoming instructions. • Increments length of ciphertext by 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits, per invocation of this instruction.
Finish Hashing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activates the Cipher Counters Memory to read the next word from it. • Activates the Cipher Pre-Counter Register to read it. • Increments length of ciphertext by 0x80 and constructs the counter block (i.e., $[\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$).
Hash Once	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activates the Cipher Counters Memory to read the first word (i.e., $E(K, Y_1)$) from it. • Activates the Cipher Zero Vector Register to read it. • Activates the Cipher Pre-Counter Register to read it. • Activates the AAD Register to read it and sets length of AAD to 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits. • Sets length of ciphertext to 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits. • Constructs the counter block (i.e., $[\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$). Value of $[\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$ will be 0x00000000000000080000000000000080 in this case.
Hash Once Without AAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activates the Cipher Counters Memory to read the first word (i.e., $E(K, Y_1)$) from it. • Activates the Cipher Zero Vector Register to read it. • Activates the Cipher Pre-Counter Register to read it. • Sets length of AAD to 0x00. • Sets length of ciphertext to 0x80, which is length of a 128-bit block in bits. • Constructs the counter block (i.e., $[\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$). Value of $[\text{len}(A)]_{64} \parallel [\text{len}(C)]_{64}$ will be 0x00000000000000000000000000000080 in this case.

2.5.3. Changes in Cycle 7, 8, and 9

In cycle 7, 8, and 9, no changes are expected.

2.5.4. Changes in Cycle 10

In cycle 10, the output buffer component is activated to apply the GHASH_H process, using the inputs received from cycle 6, to update a tag value that should be appended to a given PDU. Upon executing a finish hashing, hash once, or hash once without AAD instruction, a final tag value for a PDU that is currently processed is placed in the output buffer component.

2.5.5. Changes in Cycle 11

In cycle 11, no changes are expected.

3. Experimental Results

This section is divided into two sections. Section 3.1 contains synthesis results of our new COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V3) and a comparison between them and those of our previous COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V2). Section 3.2 lists results of a throughput comparison between our new COM ASIP and different communication buses.

3.1. Synthesis Results of COM ASIP V3

Our new COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V3) has been synthesized on ArtixTM-7 FPGA. The target device used for synthesizing COM ASIP V3 was an xc7a100t-3-csg324. Logic utilization from synthesizing COM ASIP V3 is shown in Table 5. These synthesis results were generated by synthesizing a COM ASIP instance working on 2000 virtual signals. Each signal needs 8 bytes in the rom_n component to save its related information, so the rom_n component has a size of 16 kB, whereas the IPDU component has a size of 1.6 kB. The size of the IPDU component depends on the number of PDUs contained in COM ASIP and the lengths of these PDUs. Each PDU contains one or more signals out of these 2000 virtual signals mentioned before. Each signal has a different length. The maximum length of each signal is 32 bits.

Table 5. Logic utilization from synthesis results for COM ASIP V3.

Logic Utilization	COM ASIP V3
Number of Slice Registers (Out of 126,800)	1001 (0.8%)
Number of Slice LUTs (Out of 63,400)	43,701 (68.9%)
Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs (Out of 44,178)	524 (1.2%)
Number of Block RAM/FIFO (Out of 135)	15 (11.1%)
Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs (Out of 32)	1 (3%)
Minimum period (ns)	8.205
Maximum clock frequency (MHz)	121.879

The above number of signals and their lengths were selected for compatibility with our previous COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V2). We used 2000 virtual signals [12]. Sizes of the IPDU component and the rom_n component for our previous COM ASIP were the same as the sizes of the IPDU component and the rom_n component in our new COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V3). A comparison between the logic utilization of our previous COM ASIP and COM ASIP V3 is shown in Table 6. The Diff. column represents an increase in logic utilization by COM ASIP V3 compared to COM ASIP V2, with respect to FPGA resources.

Table 6. Comparison between logic utilization of COM ASIP V2 and COM ASIP V3.

Logic Utilization	COM ASIP V2	COM ASIP V3	Diff. (±%)
Number of Slice Registers	629	1001	+59.1%
Number of Slice LUTs	3689	43,701	+1084.6%
Number of fully used LUT-FF pairs	282	524	+85.8%
Number of Block RAM/FIFO	12	15	+25%
Number of BUFG/BUFGCTRLs	1	1	Same
Minimum period (ns)	6.230	8.205	+31.7%
Maximum clock frequency (MHz)	160.516	121.879	−24.1%

The experimental results show that there is an increase in logic utilization in COM ASIP V3 compared to COM ASIP V2. The highest percentage of increase, as shown in Table 6, is in slice LUTs. This is due to adding GHASH_H function in the output buffer component. This function performs multiplication operations for the binary Galois (i.e., finite) field of 2^{128} elements, so it requires many slice LUTs to perform these operations. There is an increase in block RAM/FIFO, as shown in Table 6. This increase is due to adding secure memory components to save $E(K, Y_0)$ and $E(K, Y_1)$ to $E(K, Y_n)$ and H .

There is an increase in the minimum clock period. This is because of the GHASH_H function that is part of the critical path, because of its multiplication operations, in the ISA of COM ASIP V3. However, this increase is not significant (i.e., +31.7%). This means that COM ASIP V3 can still handle (i.e., send and receive) long signals and secure PDUs with the same performance.

We performed the same tests (i.e., transmitting/receiving a 64-byte CAN FD frame and a 254-byte FlexRay frame) [12] using COM ASIP V3. COM ASIP V3 was able to handle a 64-byte CAN FD frame in 1.575 μ s. It was able to handle a 254-byte FlexRay frame in 6.301 μ s. These measurements can be verified using the same approach that has been used with COM ASIP V2. The only changes were using the maximum clock frequency and the minimum clock period, as shown in Table 5, for COM ASIP V3 calculations.

3.2. Throughput Comparison between Our New COM ASIP and Different Communication Buses

The throughput achieved by our new COM ASIP (i.e., COM ASIP V3) has been compared, as shown in Table 7, against the throughput of CAN FD and FlexRay communication buses. The throughput achieved by our new COM ASIP is much more, 42 \times to 75 \times , than the throughput needed by these high-speed communication buses.

Table 7. Throughput comparison between COM ASIP V3 and different communication buses.

Frame Length	Time Needed to Handle Frame			
	CAN FD (1 Mbit/s)	FlexRay (10 Mbit/s)	COM ASIP V3	Gain
64-byte CAN FD	118 μ s	N/A	1.575 μ s	75 \times
254-byte FlexRay	N/A	262.4 μ s	6.301 μ s	42 \times

For example, transmitting a 64-byte CAN FD frame on CAN bus running on 1 Mbit/s baud rate (i.e., the highest baud rate for CAN bus) takes 118 μ s [12], and transmitting a 254-byte FlexRay frame on FlexRay bus running on 10 Mbit/s baud rate (i.e., the highest baud rate for FlexRay bus) takes 262.4 μ s [12]. However, COM ASIP V3 can handle (i.e., transmit, receive, calculate hash, or hash verify) a 64-byte CAN FD frame and a 254-byte FlexRay frame in 1.575 μ s or 6.301 μ s, respectively.

4. Conclusions

Our paper introduced a bus-independent HW-based approach to secure long PDUs in AUTOSAR-based automotive ECUs by designing an ISA and realizing it on an ASIP. This approach is a new approach that has not been reported before for AUTOSAR-based ECUs.

We extended the ISA of our previous ASIP by introducing six new instructions to COM ASIP V3, to hash PDUs that contain long signals to authenticate transmission and reception of such PDUs. Our new ISA, similarly to the previous ISA, consists of four phases. These phases are fetching, decoding, execution, and delivery. With this new extension, our new ISA can secure these PDUs by hashing signals that correspond to these PDUs to ensure the authenticity of such PDUs during transmission. The hashing process is performed using a two-layer process. This two-layer process modifies the original GCM algorithm to make it faster and increase the security of it.

The experimental results show that the throughput of our new COM ASIP is much higher, by 42 \times to 75 \times , than the throughput required by CAN FD and FlexRay communication buses. The great throughput achieved by our new COM ASIP will allow original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and Tier 1 suppliers to use it to cope with communication throughput required by today's AUTOSAR-based automotive SW applications. Our ASIP is bus-independent, so it can work with all types of ECUs that are connected through different communication buses.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.H., M.W.E.-K., A.S. and M.S.; methodology, A.H.; software, A.H.; validation, A.H.; formal analysis, A.H.; investigation, A.H.; resources, A.H.; data curation,

A.H.; writing—original draft preparation, A.H.; writing—review and editing, A.H., M.W.E.-K., A.S. and M.S.; visualization, A.H.; supervision, M.W.E.-K., A.S. and M.S.; project administration, A.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:

HW	Hardware
PDU	Protocol Data Unit
AUTOSAR	Automotive Open System Architecture
ECU	Electronic Control Unit
COM	Communication
ASIP	Application-Specific Instruction Set Processor
COM ASIP V1	The First Version of COM ASIP
COM ASIP V2	The Second Version of COM ASIP
ISA	Instruction Set Architecture
COM ASIP V3	The Third Version of COM ASIP
CAN	Controller Area Network
CAN FD	Controller Area Network Flexible Data-Rate
μ s	Microsecond
LIN	Local Interconnect Network
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode of Operation
SW	Software
IM1	Instruction Memory in COM ASIP
IM1_addr	Address Lines of Instruction Memory in COM ASIP
OpCode	Operation Code for Instructions in COM ASIP
SigId	Identifier for a Signal in COM ASIP
Id	Identifier
SigValue	Value for a Signal in COM ASIP
ROM	Read Only Memory
rom_n	ROM component in COM ASIP
IPDU	Interaction Protocol Data Unit
bPos	Bit Position for a Signal in COM ASIP
UbPos	Update Bit Position for a Signal in COM ASIP
bSize	Bit Size for a Signal in COM ASIP
E	Endianness for a Signal in COM ASIP
LReg	Low Address Register in COM ASIP
HReg	High Address Register in COM ASIP
Mux	Multiplexer in COM ASIP
Reg	Register
OtherInfo	Other Information Register in COM ASIP
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
HSM	Hardware Security Module
MCU	Micro-Controller Unit
ASIC	application-specific integrated circuit
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Array
IOT	Internet of Things
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
IV	Initialization Vector
ICB	Initial Counter Block
inc	Increment
P	Plaintext
C	Ciphertext

K	Block Cipher Key
XOR	Exclusive-OR
CIPH _K	Forward Cipher Function
AAD	Additional Authenticated Data
len	Length
H	Hash Subkey
MSB	Most Significant Bit
T	Tag
TM	Trademark
kB	Kilobyte
LUT	Lookup Table
FF	Flip-Flop
RAM	Random Access Memory
FIFO	First In, First Out
BUFG	Global Clock Buffer
BUFGCTRL	Global Clock Buffer Controller
ns	Nanosecond
MHz	Megahertz
Diff.	Difference
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer

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