Philosophies

20 pages, 254 KiB

Open AccessArticle

by Eduardo García-Ramírez

Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010005 - 06 Mar 2018

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3371

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, [...] Read more.

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Selected Papers from WPCS 2017)

9 pages, 225 KiB

Open AccessBook Review

The Oxford Handbook of Hegel. By Dean Moyar (Ed.). Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2017; 880 pp.; ISBN: 9780199355228

by Michele Cardani

Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 4; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010004 - 28 Feb 2018

Viewed by 5290

Abstract

Despite Georg W.F. Hegel’s claim that “philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late” because, like the owl of Minerva, it “begins its flight only with the onset of dusk” [1] (p. 23), and beyond the contextual and contingent issues that might contribute [...] Read more.

Despite Georg W.F. Hegel’s claim that “philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late” because, like the owl of Minerva, it “begins its flight only with the onset of dusk” [1] (p. 23), and beyond the contextual and contingent issues that might contribute to its return in auge,1 there exist important theoretical reasons to consider the question “why Hegel now and again?” still legitimate and current.[...] Full article

7 pages, 189 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Intuition and Awareness of Abstract Models: A Challenge for Realists

by Dimitris Kilakos

Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010003 - 25 Feb 2018

Viewed by 3127

Abstract

It is plausible to think that, in order to actively employ models in their inquiries, scientists should be aware of their existence. The question is especially puzzling for realists in the case of abstract models, since it is not obvious how this is [...] Read more.

It is plausible to think that, in order to actively employ models in their inquiries, scientists should be aware of their existence. The question is especially puzzling for realists in the case of abstract models, since it is not obvious how this is possible. Interestingly, though, this question has drawn little attention in the relevant literature. Perhaps the most obvious choice for a realist is appealing to intuition. In this paper, I argue that if scientific models were abstract entities, one could not be aware of them intuitively. I deploy my argumentation by building on Chudnoff’s elaboration on intuitive awareness. Furthermore, I shortly discuss some other options to which realists could turn in order to address the question of awareness. Full article

13 pages, 287 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Probabilistic Justification Logic

by Joseph Lurie

Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010002 - 16 Feb 2018

Cited by 6 | Viewed by 2755

Abstract

Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. They are often used as epistemic logics, particularly as models of evidentialist justification. However, in this role, justification (and modal) logics are defective insofar as they represent justification with a necessity-like operator, whereas actual evidentialist [...] Read more.

Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. They are often used as epistemic logics, particularly as models of evidentialist justification. However, in this role, justification (and modal) logics are defective insofar as they represent justification with a necessity-like operator, whereas actual evidentialist justification is usually probabilistic. This paper first examines and rejects extant candidates for solving this problem: Milnikel’s Logic of Uncertain Justifications, Ghari’s Hájek–Pavelka-Style Justification Logics and a version of probabilistic justification logic developed by Kokkinis et al. It then proposes a new solution to the problem in the form of a justification logic that incorporates the essential features of both a fuzzy logic and a probabilistic logic. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Logic, Inference, Probability and Paradox)

2 pages, 287 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Philosophies in 2017

by Philosophies Editorial Office

Philosophies 2018, 3(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3010001 - 11 Jan 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 1933

Abstract

Peer review is an essential part in the publication process, ensuring that Philosophies maintains high quality standards for its published papers [...] Full article

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Philosophies, Volume 3, Issue 1 (March 2018) – 5 articles

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