Editorial

5 pages, 179 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

by Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.

Economies 2019, 7(3), 69; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7030069 - 08 Jul 2019

Viewed by 3585

Interest in politics and the political process—topics that economists consider to be the purview of the sub-field of study known as public choice—appears to be as high as ever [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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19 pages, 1633 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Is Political Ideology Stable? Evidence from Long-Serving Members of the United States Congress

by Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., Chandini Sankaran and Kamal P. Upadhyaya

Economies 2019, 7(2), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7020036 - 06 May 2019

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 7236

Abstract

This study extends the political science and political psychology literature on the political ideology of lawmakers by addressing the following question: How stable is a legislator’s political ideology over time? In doing so, we employ Nokken–Poole scores of legislators’ political ideology for members [...] Read more.

This study extends the political science and political psychology literature on the political ideology of lawmakers by addressing the following question: How stable is a legislator’s political ideology over time? In doing so, we employ Nokken–Poole scores of legislators’ political ideology for members of the United States (U.S.) House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate who were elected prior to the 103rd Congress that began in early 1991 and who served consecutively through the 115th Congress, which ended in early 2019. Results from individual time-series estimations suggest that political ideology is unstable over time for a sizable portion of the members of both major political parties who serve in the U.S. Congress, while analysis of the pooled data suggests that, after accounting for inertia in political ideology and individual legislator effects, Republican legislators become more conservative over time. These results run somewhat counter to the finding in prior studies that the political ideologies of lawmakers and other political elites are stable over time. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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9 pages, 238 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Public Choice of Public Stadium Financing: Evidence from San Diego Referenda

by Candon Johnson and Joshua Hall

Economies 2019, 7(1), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7010022 - 21 Mar 2019

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5371

Abstract

Local politicians and team owners frequently argue that the public financing of stadiums is important for local economic development. The sports economics literature, however, has largely found that new professional sport facilities do not generate any new net economic activity. We provide context [...] Read more.

Local politicians and team owners frequently argue that the public financing of stadiums is important for local economic development. The sports economics literature, however, has largely found that new professional sport facilities do not generate any new net economic activity. We provide context to this literature by exploring the public choice in the public financing of stadiums. In 2016, San Diego had two ballot measures related to the San Diego Chargers. Measure C would allow officials to raise hotel taxes to pay for a new downtown stadium for the Chargers. Measure D would also raise hotel taxes, but explicitly prevented any money being spent on the Chargers. Both measures failed to receive 50% of the votes cast. We find that zip codes with a higher voter turnout were more likely to vote against both measures, highlighting the importance of the timing of referenda in limiting the ability of clearly defined groups, such as Chargers fans, to have a large influence on the voting outcome. Meanwhile, areas with more Trump voters were more likely to support higher taxes for the purpose of building the Chargers a new stadium. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

17 pages, 628 KiB

Open AccessArticle

A New Quota Approach to Electoral Disproportionality

by Miguel Martínez-Panero, Verónica Arredondo, Teresa Peña and Victoriano Ramírez

Economies 2019, 7(1), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7010017 - 05 Mar 2019

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 4430

Abstract

In this paper electoral disproportionality is split into two types: (1) Forced or unavoidable, due to the very nature of the apportionment problem; and (2) non-forced. While disproportionality indexes proposed in the literature do not distinguish between such components, we design an index, [...] Read more.

In this paper electoral disproportionality is split into two types: (1) Forced or unavoidable, due to the very nature of the apportionment problem; and (2) non-forced. While disproportionality indexes proposed in the literature do not distinguish between such components, we design an index, called “quota index”, just measuring avoidable disproportionality. Unlike the previous indexes, the new one can be zero in real situations. Furthermore, this index presents an interesting interpretation concerning transfers of seats. Properties of the quota index and relationships with some usual disproportionality indexes are analyzed. Finally, an empirical approach is undertaken for different countries and elections. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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17 pages, 515 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Political Entrepreneurs and Pork-Barrel Spending

by J. Zachary Klingensmith

Economies 2019, 7(1), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7010016 - 28 Feb 2019

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 5305

Abstract

Pork-barrel spending is the use of federal money for localized projects that yield only a narrow geographic benefit. It is a commonly held belief that politicians use this spending to improve their chances of re-election. One way that an incumbent can increase their [...] Read more.

Pork-barrel spending is the use of federal money for localized projects that yield only a narrow geographic benefit. It is a commonly held belief that politicians use this spending to improve their chances of re-election. One way that an incumbent can increase their chances of re-election is through increased fundraising. Political entrepreneurs see this opportunity and attempt to benefit from these projects in exchange for campaign contributions. This paper investigates whether incumbents are able to use their position to bolster their campaign contributions. I find pork-barrel spending and political contributions to be positively related, but this effect is only present when the incumbent properly times the project. I also find that general federal appropriations do not have the same impact. This supports the claim that pork-barrel spending can be used as a currency in the marketplace for political capital. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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17 pages, 242 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Political Economy of Abandoned Mine Land Fund Disbursements

by Jessi Troyan and Joshua Hall

Economies 2019, 7(1), 3; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7010003 - 10 Jan 2019

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 4492

Abstract

What factors determine federal spending on environmental goods? Is severity of the hazard the only metric of consideration, or do other factors play a vital role in explaining spending? This paper seeks to answer this question and to identify disbursement patterns within the [...] Read more.

What factors determine federal spending on environmental goods? Is severity of the hazard the only metric of consideration, or do other factors play a vital role in explaining spending? This paper seeks to answer this question and to identify disbursement patterns within the context of the Abandoned Mine Land Fund (AMLF) program, a fund created as an aspect of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. We explore whether political factors, as well as environmental and health factors, have an explanatory role in disbursement of AMLF monies. The political factors examined include environmental interest group influence and legislator preferences and/or pressures to fund sites in their home states or districts. The results found here suggest that there exists a mix of public and private interests present in AMLF disbursement decisions during the overall span of the program, and that political influences have gained strength in the decision-making calculus in response to changes in the funding structure of the AMLF. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

11 pages, 236 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: 2017 Rector Election at Ghent University

by Raúl Pérez-Fernández, José Luis García-Lapresta and Bernard De Baets

Economies 2019, 7(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies7010002 - 08 Jan 2019

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4427

Abstract

After more than half a year of elections (yielding three voting stages and nine voting rounds), the 2017 Rector election at Ghent University (Belgium) resulted in a victory for the duo leading all nine voting rounds, and in a resounding defeat for the [...] Read more.

After more than half a year of elections (yielding three voting stages and nine voting rounds), the 2017 Rector election at Ghent University (Belgium) resulted in a victory for the duo leading all nine voting rounds, and in a resounding defeat for the electoral system. Significant regulation changes were needed in order to break the institutional deadlock in which Ghent University found itself. In this paper, we follow the timeline of the election and dissect what went wrong in the election planning. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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12 pages, 211 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints

by Randall G. Holcombe

Economies 2018, 6(4), 57; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6040057 - 24 Oct 2018

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 16317

Abstract

Constitutional political economy has focused heavily on designing constitutional rules sufficient to constrain governmental power. More attention has been devoted to designing rules that are effective constraints than on the institutions that would be required to enforce them. One problem is that rules [...] Read more.

Constitutional political economy has focused heavily on designing constitutional rules sufficient to constrain governmental power. More attention has been devoted to designing rules that are effective constraints than on the institutions that would be required to enforce them. One problem is that rules are interpreted and enforced by the political elite, who tend to interpret and enforce them in ways that favor their interests over those of the masses. Democratic oversight is ineffective because voters realize they have no influence over public policy, and are therefore rationally ignorant. A system of checks and balances within government is necessary for enforcing constitutional constraints because it divides power among elites with competing interests and enables one group of elites to check the power of others. Checks and balances within governmental institutions are necessary to constrain the government from abusing its power. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

17 pages, 1021 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Foreign Aid, and Freedom

by Joao Ricardo Faria and Daniel Arce

Economies 2018, 6(4), 53; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6040053 - 08 Oct 2018

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 5425

Abstract

This paper presents an extension of the two-period Samaritan’s Dilemma in order to analyze the potential for foreign aid to promote freedom. An example is the United States’ recent opening towards Cuba. It is shown that a donor nation’s dual concern for economic [...] Read more.

This paper presents an extension of the two-period Samaritan’s Dilemma in order to analyze the potential for foreign aid to promote freedom. An example is the United States’ recent opening towards Cuba. It is shown that a donor nation’s dual concern for economic reforms and greater freedoms can exacerbate the Samaritan’s Dilemma, even when economic aid is coupled with targets for freedom. By contrast, a policy that is focused on freedom alone can potentially resolve the Samaritan’s Dilemma. Such a policy requires the donor to temper the degree of altruism that motivates its provision of economic aid to the recipient nation. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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6 pages, 174 KiB

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

The Brennan–Lomasky Test of Expressive Voting: When Impressive Probability Differences Are Meaningless

by J. R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee

Economies 2018, 6(3), 51; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6030051 - 19 Sep 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 4550

Abstract

We consider a test of expressive voting developed by Brennan and Lomasky (1993). They point out that in presidential elections the probability of a tie, and casting a decisive vote, increases “multi-billionfold” as the election becomes increasingly close. They conjecture that if voters [...] Read more.

We consider a test of expressive voting developed by Brennan and Lomasky (1993). They point out that in presidential elections the probability of a tie, and casting a decisive vote, increases “multi-billionfold” as the election becomes increasingly close. They conjecture that if voters are instrumentally motivated there would be enormous increases in voter turnout for presidential elections as they became close. When they find no consistent relationship between closeness and turnout in presidential elections since 1940, they conclude their test justifies a “decisive rejection of the instrumental voter hypothesis.” As dramatic as such a “multi-billionfold” increase is, we argue it would not motivate voting if an instrumental payoff was the only motivation for doing so. The Brennan–Lomasky test does give the correct result, but not for the reason they emphasize. They do see reasons why voting turnout would be moderated other than the dramatic probability of a decisive vote in close elections. Furthermore, they close their test by indicating that one reason turnout might be higher in close elections is that they are more interesting, which is congenial to an expressive account. We agree. We also argue that the observed tendency for voters to confirm their biases rather than change their minds provides additional support for expressive voting. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

10 pages, 247 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Glass Houses and Friends-and-Neighbors Voting: An Exploratory Analysis of the Impact of Political Scandal on Localism

by Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.

Economies 2018, 6(3), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies6030048 - 03 Sep 2018

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 4440

Abstract

The 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama, which was decided on 12 December 2017, was one of the most contentious and scandal-laden political campaigns in recent memory. The Republican candidate, Roy Moore, gained notoriety during the 2017 campaign when a number of [...] Read more.

The 2017 U.S. Senate Special Election in Alabama, which was decided on 12 December 2017, was one of the most contentious and scandal-laden political campaigns in recent memory. The Republican candidate, Roy Moore, gained notoriety during the 2017 campaign when a number of women alleged to national media that as teenagers they were subject to sexual advances by Moore, who was then in his early 30s and serving as a local assistant district attorney. The process and results of this particular election provide the heretofore unexamined impact of political scandal on localism or friends-and-neighbors voting in political contests. Based on data from the 2017 special election in Alabama, econometric results presented here suggest that a candidate who is embroiled in political scandal suffers an erosion in the usual friends-and-neighbors effect on his or her local vote share. In this particular case, the scandal hanging over Moore eroded all of the friends-and-neighbors effect that would have been expected (e.g., about five percentage points) in his home county, as well as about 40% of the advantage Moore had at home over his opponent in terms of constituent political ideology. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Choice)

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