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Games
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Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets
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Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 April 2016) | Viewed by 50662

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Thomas D. Jeitschko

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
Interests: Industrial Organization; Law and Economics; Auctions; Antitrust
Prof. Mark J. Tremblay

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
Interests: Platform Competition; Multi-Sided Markets; Industrial Organization; and Microeconomics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Multi-sided markets and platforms (e.g., credit cards, digital devices, online auction sites, etc.) have become increasingly important in commerce and exchange, as well as for social interaction. This Special Issue of Games is devoted to the study and analysis of multi-sided markets and platforms, including—but not limited to—game theoretic analysis of multi-sidedness, platform competition, interaction within multi-sided markets, and empirical and experimental research that tests theoretical results or that identifies areas where theory needs to be developed. Of particular interest are Internet auction sites, payment systems, ISPs, media markets, social media, search markets, cryptocurrency markets, and (financial) exchanges, as well as related topics. We welcome authors with research on these topics to submit their manuscripts for this Special Issue of Games.

Prof. Thomas D. Jeitschko
Prof. Mark J. Tremblay
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.


 

 

Keywords

  • Multi-sided markets
  • Platforms

Published Papers (5 papers)

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237 KiB  
Article
Vertical Relationships within Platform Marketplaces
by Mark J. Tremblay
Games 2016, 7(3), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030017 - 12 Jul 2016
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6173
Abstract
In two-sided markets a platform allows consumers and sellers to interact by creating sub-markets within the platform marketplace. For example, Amazon has sub-markets for all of the different product categories available on its site, and smartphones have sub-markets for different types of applications [...] Read more.
In two-sided markets a platform allows consumers and sellers to interact by creating sub-markets within the platform marketplace. For example, Amazon has sub-markets for all of the different product categories available on its site, and smartphones have sub-markets for different types of applications (gaming apps, weather apps, map apps, ridesharing apps, etc.). The network benefits between consumers and sellers depend on the mode of competition within the sub-markets: more competition between sellers lowers product prices, increases the surplus consumers receive from a sub-market, and makes platform membership more desirable for consumers. However, more competition also lowers profits for a seller which makes platform membership less desirable for a seller and reduces seller entry and the number of sub-markets available on the platform marketplace. This dynamic between seller competition within a sub-market and agents’ network benefits leads to platform pricing strategies, participation decisions by consumers and sellers, and welfare results that depend on the mode of competition. Thus, the sub-market structure is important when investigating platform marketplaces. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)
542 KiB  
Article
Can We Predict the Winner in a Market with Network Effects? Competition in Cryptocurrency Market
by Neil Gandal and Hanna Halaburda
Games 2016, 7(3), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030016 - 07 Jul 2016
Cited by 110 | Viewed by 25912
Abstract
We analyze how network effects affect competition in the nascent cryptocurrency market. We do so by examining early dynamics of exchange rates among different cryptocurrencies. While Bitcoin essentially dominates this market, our data suggest no evidence of a winner-take-all effect early in the [...] Read more.
We analyze how network effects affect competition in the nascent cryptocurrency market. We do so by examining early dynamics of exchange rates among different cryptocurrencies. While Bitcoin essentially dominates this market, our data suggest no evidence of a winner-take-all effect early in the market. Indeed, for a relatively long period, a few other cryptocurrencies competing with Bitcoin (the early industry leader) appreciated much more quickly than Bitcoin. The data in this period are consistent with the use of cryptocurrencies as financial assets (popularized by Bitcoin), and not consistent with winner-take-all dynamics. Toward the end of our sample, however, things change dramatically. Bitcoin appreciates against the USD, while other currencies depreciate against the USD. The data in this period are consistent with strong network effects and winner-take-all dynamics. This trend continues at the time of writing. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)
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396 KiB  
Article
Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market
by Heinrich H. Nax and Bary S. R. Pradelski
Games 2016, 7(2), 10; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020010 - 30 Mar 2016
Cited by 13 | Viewed by 6178
Abstract
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own [...] Read more.
We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the alternative workers available on the job market. Workers bargain for better jobs; either individually or collectively as unions, adjusting wage demands upward/downward depending on whether they are currently employed/unemployed. We show that such a process is absorbed into the core with probability one in finite time. Moreover, within the core, allocations are selected that are characterized by surplus splitting according to a bargaining solution such that (i) firms and workforce share total revenue according to relative bargaining strengths, and (ii) workers receive equal workforce shares above their individual outside options. These results bridge empirical evidence and provide a rich set of testable predictions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)
262 KiB  
Article
The Impact of the Irrelevant: Temporary Buy-Options and Bidding Behavior in Auctions
by Ronald Peeters, Martin Strobel, Dries Vermeulen and Markus Walzl
Games 2016, 7(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010008 - 01 Mar 2016
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 5876
Abstract
With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the application of [...] Read more.
With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the application of the buy-option avoids revenue-enhancing bidding; at high buy-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started). The latter suggests a particular type of anchoring, where bidders use the buy-price to update their expectations about the strengths of their opponents. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)
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916 KiB  
Article
Revenue Implications of Strategic and External Auction Risk
by Andrea Robbett, Michael K. Graham and Peter Hans Matthews
Games 2016, 7(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g7010005 - 27 Jan 2016
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5731
Abstract
Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common [...] Read more.
Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common auction mechanisms except for the English auction. We do not find evidence that bidders’ measured risk preferences can explain these patterns of overbidding. To enhance salience, we introduce a second novel treatment with external risk. This treatment captures the risk, prevalent in online auctions, that winners will not receive a good of value. We find that dynamic auctions—including the English—are particularly susceptible to overbidding in this environment. We note that overbidding is somewhat diminished in later periods and that our results may thus have particular relevance for bidders who are not highly experienced or who have not directly experienced losses. We conclude with a brief discussion of research implications. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Analyses of Multi-Sided Markets)
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