Special Issue "Other-Regarding Preferences"

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A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 July 2010)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Georg Kirchsteiger (Website)

ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue FD Roosevelt 50, CP 114, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
Fax: +32 2 650 4475
Interests: non-cooperative game theory; experimental economics; other regarding preferences; evolution of market institutions; learning in markets

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The last three decades of experimental and empirical research has produced convincing evidence that economic agents do not only care about their narrow self-interest, but are also motivated by other regarding considerations. Based on this evidence, numerous theories of fairness, reciprocity, altruism, spitefulness, etc. have been developed. While some experimental and theoretical papers have investigated the relationship between these different concepts, it is still an open question which of these motivations are particularly important in which economic circumstances. Furthermore, the application of other regarding preferences has been concentrated on labor markets and contract theory. But in other parts of economics the impact of other regarding preferences has been they have been largely ignored. For the Special Issue in Games I invite theoretical as well as experimental contributions on other regarding preferences. Basic research on the relation between the different concepts of other regarding preferences are as welcome as work applying other regarding preferences to all subfields of economics.

Prof. Dr. Georg Kirchsteiger
Guest Editor

Keywords

  • other regarding preferences
  • relation between different forms of other regarding preferences
  • applications of other regarding preferences

Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements
Games 2010, 1(4), 527-550; doi:10.3390/g1040527
Received: 15 September 2010 / Revised: 15 October 2010 / Accepted: 8 November 2010 / Published: 10 November 2010
Cited by 5 | PDF Full-text (496 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust [...] Read more.
Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We report experiment treatments with sequential choice and strategy responses. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory [2]. Demonstrable differences and similarities between our strategy response and sequential choice data provide insight into the how these protocols can yield different results from hypothesis tests even when they are eliciting the same behavioral patterns across treatments. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
Figures

Open AccessArticle Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
Games 2010, 1(4), 459-477; doi:10.3390/g1040459
Received: 16 September 2010 / Accepted: 14 October 2010 / Published: 21 October 2010
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (202 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with [...] Read more.
We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
Open AccessArticle Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments
Games 2010, 1(2), 89-102; doi:10.3390/g1020089
Received: 16 March 2010 / Revised: 16 April 2010 / Accepted: 16 April 2010 / Published: 22 April 2010
Cited by 6 | PDF Full-text (6531 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously [...] Read more.
In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)

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