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496 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements

by James C. Cox and Daniel T. Hall

Games 2010, 1(4), 527-550; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040527 - 10 Nov 2010

Cited by 11 | Viewed by 9528

Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. [...] Read more.

Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We report experiment treatments with sequential choice and strategy responses. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory [2]. Demonstrable differences and similarities between our strategy response and sequential choice data provide insight into the how these protocols can yield different results from hypothesis tests even when they are eliciting the same behavioral patterns across treatments. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)

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202 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games

by Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel

Games 2010, 1(4), 459-477; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040459 - 21 Oct 2010

Cited by 12 | Viewed by 9696

Abstract

We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal [...] Read more.

We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)

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6531 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

by Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler and Agnes Stribeck

Games 2010, 1(2), 89-102; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020089 - 22 Apr 2010

Cited by 9 | Viewed by 8768

Abstract

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded [...] Read more.

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)

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