Silence vs. Catering: Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies and High-Quality Corporate Development

Abstract

A corporate carbon information disclosure strategy is essentially an environmental responsibility manifestation of “inconsistency between words and deeds”. It has two forms:, green “silence” and green “catering”, both of which restrict the externalization of green productivity and affect the high-quality development of enterprises. This study shows that ① there is a U-shaped relationship between carbon information disclosure strategies and the high-quality development of enterprises. Green “silence” positively affects the high-quality development of enterprises, and the impact of green “catering” on the high-quality development of enterprises changes from negative to positive. ② Green “silence” affects the high-quality development of enterprises by increasing R&D investment, reducing tax burdens, and intensifying financing constraints, while green “catering” affects the high-quality development of enterprises by decreasing R&D investment, increasing the tax burden, and easing financing constraints. ③ If the competition in the industry is fierce, the green “silence” strategy should be adopted. When there is monopoly in the industry, the green “catering” strategy is dominant. The findings of this study not only provide management suggestions for enterprises on how to correctly treat the carbon information disclosure strategies that have been implemented or planned to promote their own high-quality development, but also provide policy inspiration for relevant regulatory authorities to complete the transition from voluntary disclosure to mandatory disclosure.

1. Introduction

The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) issued the first batch of standards, IFRS S1 and IFRS S2, in June 2023, which introduced a new era of sustainability-related disclosure in the global capital markets. On 31 July 2023, the European Commission formally adopted the first batch of the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS). On 6 March 2024, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formally adopted a two-year proposal to “enhance and standardize climate-related disclosures for investors” and issued the final version of its climate-related disclosure rules. On 12 April 2024, the Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing Exchanges issued guidelines on sustainability reporting for listed companies. Among the first batch of guidelines issued, all of them included “climate change” guidelines, emphasizing carbon disclosure-related matters. Although the carbon information disclosure system of listed companies is becoming increasingly tightened, the disclosure items and scope need to be consummated, and there are gaps in compliance. Enterprises have shown different strategic choices in the process of carbon information disclosure. At present, the theoretical community has not reached a consensus on the definition of “carbon information disclosure strategy”. Through a review and summary of the relevant literature, this paper argues that “carbon information disclosure strategy” refers to the environmental responsibility behavior of enterprises that pursue the optimal reputation-building cost in the process of bargaining with regulatory authorities and exhibit “inconsistency between words and deeds”. It mainly includes two forms of strategies. In one strategy, enterprises are committed to carbon emission reduction but remain “silent” about their green efforts, reduce the proprietary costs, and avoid unnecessary litigation risks and moral constraints [1]. In the other strategy, enterprises exaggerate carbon emission reduction information and “caterize” to the national policy orientation to shape a more positive emission reduction image and obtain high returns from the capital market, but do not take corresponding carbon reduction actions. Whether green “silence” or green “catering” is adopted, there is the problem of action mismatching, which reduces the effectiveness of information transmission. This will undoubtedly interfere with the allocation of capital market resources, hinder the orderly realization of China’s “dual carbon” goals, and affect the high-quality development of the economy. Looking at the existing literature, there are few studies on the economic consequences of the different strategies adopted by enterprises. Hongwei Cheng et al. found that the green “silent” strategy of enterprises can hedge the carbon risk premium and reduce the uncertainty in the future development of enterprises. Xiaohua Sun et al. believe that carbon information disclosure itself can promote the enhancement of corporate value, but the adoption of the green “catering” strategy will bring premium losses and hinder the sustainable development of enterprises [2]. Therefore, it is necessary to study the relationship between different strategies of corporate carbon information disclosure and the high-quality development of enterprises. This paper focuses on the following three questions: ① Do different strategies of corporate carbon information disclosure have a negative or positive impact on the high-quality development of enterprises, or both? ② What is the mechanism by which the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy affects the high-quality development of enterprises? ③ In different competitive environments, which form of carbon information disclosure strategy should enterprises choose to facilitate their high-quality development? This paper takes the manufacturing listed companies that issued corporate social responsibility reports in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2012 to 2020 as samples, examines the U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises, and conducts an extended discussion on the aspects of the mechanism. As the requirements for sustainable development reports are tightened and the third-party attestation capabilities are strengthened, this paper provides certain empirical evidence and management inspiration for enterprises to weigh the relationship between information disclosure and actual actions and complete the smooth transition from voluntary disclosure to mandatory disclosure.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Substantive Green Strategy and Its Economic Consequences

Substantive green strategies tend to invest in green practices without frills, which may directly affect a firm’s productivity or reduce its litigation risk [3,4,5], and also imply significant costs [6].

Prior studies have shown a positive correlation between a firm’s environmental performance and its financial performance. Porter et al. (1995) were the first to emphasize that the early introduction of environmentally friendly products and increased productivity may create a competitive advantage [7]. Subsequent studies have focused on the Porter Hypothesis, which provides empirical evidence of economic and environmental win–win situations. Ambec et al. (2008) summarized the five main reasons for the economic benefits of green firms: (a) easier access to specific markets; (b) more differentiated products; (c) better risk management; (d) improved stakeholder engagement; and (e) lower resource and labor costs [8]. The last reason is consistent with RBV’s view that a firm’s valuable internal resources and capabilities drive competitiveness [9].

2.2. Symbolic Green Strategy and Its Economic Consequences

Symbolic green strategies focus on enhancing external legitimacy [10], which can improve a firm’s reputation and customer satisfaction in the short term while saving costs by avoiding investments in green practices, but they do not directly yield intrinsic economic benefits. When engaging external stakeholders such as customers, government agencies, or local communities, adopting symbolic social responsibility actions can positively impact financial performance [11]; however, the resulting reputational gains and market benefits are lower than those derived from substantive actions [12]. There are also concerns about misleading consumers [13,14] and even misleading investors [15], which can easily provoke negative market reactions.

Empirical findings regarding the economic consequences of symbolic green strategies vary. Walker et al. (2012) found that the symbolic disclosure of environmental information decreased the financial performance of heavily polluting companies in Canada [16], while Yin et al. (2019) discovered the opposite effect for heavily polluting companies in China [17]. Keszey (2020) analyzed the positive impact of green marketing on corporate performance across 296 Hungarian companies without distinguishing the pollution intensity [18]. Conversely, Shrivastava et al. (2019) indicated that implementing voluntary environmental management systems had no effect on corporate performance [19].

Integrating the above two aspects, the research focus in the fields of CSR and environmental information disclosure centers on the phenomenon of “greenwashing” [20] and whether companies’ disclosures in this area align with their actual actions [21]. This research has expanded to the binary classification of greenwashing and “brownwashing” [22,23,24,25] and even to four types of green strategies: green leadership, green parrot, green quiet, and black bird [26]. This paper focuses on the field of carbon information disclosure and categorizes its strategies into two types.

2.3. Carbon Information Disclosure Strategy and Its Economic Consequences

Hart (1995) incorporated the constraints or opportunities that natural environmental factors impose on enterprises into the resource-based view (RBV) analysis framework, fully considered the relationship between the natural environment and enterprises, and proposed the natural resource-based view (NRBV). This formed a research perspective composed of building a corporate competitive advantage by analyzing resources and capabilities in terms of environmental behavior [27]. However, in a complex competitive environment, it is inevitable that there will be actual or potential inconsistencies between the social value systems of enterprises and the macro value system, which threatens the compliance of enterprises. In order to fill the compliance gap, enterprises may take measures to make their own value orientation a symbol of their compliance, such as the green “catering” strategy of carbon information disclosure, or they may maintain basic compliance as much as possible and try to change the expectations of mainstream compliance through the green “silence” strategy [28]. In addition, it is important to discuss costs and benefits during the competition process. If an enterprise does not carry out sufficient carbon reduction practices, it will be difficult to obtain accurate quantitative information. In this disclosure process, it does not need to consider proprietary costs and is more likely to choose the green “catering” strategy. On the contrary, if an enterprise actively practices carbon reduction, once the disclosed information is used by other enterprises, it will be at a competitive disadvantage. In this case, it tends to choose a green “silence” strategy to avoid proprietary costs [29].

Green “catering” or green “silence” is a strategic management process in carbon information disclosure. Enterprises consciously convey more or less information to investors to maintain a good corporate image and adjust their disclosure practices according to the benefits brought by different strategies. In fulfilling their environmental responsibilities, companies choose the green “catering” strategy and conduct impression management out of self-interest, which helps them to obtain government subsidies and financial support such as bank loans in the short term. As information exchange between financing parties becomes more frequent and internal corporate information becomes more transparent, more rational investors can identify the green “catering” strategy of enterprises [30] and believe that the actual carbon reduction efforts of enterprises are inconsistent with their publicized carbon reduction strategies. This may cause abnormal fluctuations in stock trading, have a negative impact on stock prices [31], and damage the reputation of the enterprise. Unlike the green “catering” strategy, which faces the risk of green accusations and environmental litigation, the green “silence” strategy is safer and helps to reduce the uncertainty of the audience’s preferences for carbon information disclosure companies [32]. It can not only avoid unwarranted suspicion and unnecessary disputes but also better fill the compliance gap [33] and create space for the stable development of enterprises. From a macro perspective, although the green “silence” strategy delays the processes of other companies’ green learning and imitation of benchmark companies [34], it hinders the normal advancement of environmental innovation practices in the industry and drags down the green development processes of the whole society.

In summary, based on the natural resource-based view, enterprises analyze the resources that can be mobilized and the utilities that can be obtained behind carbon information disclosure to develop their own competitive advantages, but they face the double traps of a lack of compliance and rising proprietary costs, which leads to two different carbon information disclosure strategies. Existing studies have discussed the economic consequences of green “catering” and green “silence” strategies, focusing mainly on the resources that may be obtained and the potential risks faced by the green “catering” strategy and the risk prevention and transfer effects that the green “silence” strategy may achieve. Few scholars have discussed the direct impacts of the two strategies on corporate development. Therefore, this paper attempts to unify the measurement of the two strategies, study the impacts and mechanisms of corporate carbon information disclosure strategies regarding the high-quality development of enterprises, and enrich the existing research.

3. Research Hypothesis

3.1. Direct Effect of Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure Strategy and High-Quality Development of Enterprises

When companies adopt a green “silence” strategy, they may engage in carbon reduction actions but avoid disclosing relevant carbon information to mask the impact of their carbon costs on shareholder interests [35,36]. In this case, the carbon performance derived from the carbon costs can enhance the company’s financial performance [37], providing new momentum for corporate development. When companies adopt a green “catering” strategy, although their carbon reduction actions may not meet the disclosure standards, they can satisfy stakeholder demands by disclosing sufficient carbon information [38,39], which may improve their reputation among external stakeholders, thereby enhancing their corporate performance. As concerns associated with the green “silence” strategy suggest, under traditional thinking, investors often perceive carbon disclosure as bad news, worrying about the potential costs that companies may incur in addressing global warming, and they respond negatively to corporate carbon disclosure [40]. Furthermore, companies risk facing exposure for misleading stakeholders, which can reduce the loyalty of internal stakeholders and even result in the loss of their support. However, in the long term, companies can alleviate investors’ concerns by regularly issuing carbon news through media outlets, thereby securing lower capital costs [41] to improve their financial position and obtain internal financing for carbon reduction initiatives, which is beneficial for future corporate development.

Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 (H1):

The green “silence” strategy of corporate carbon information disclosure has a positive impact on the high-quality development of enterprises.

Hypothesis 2 (H2):

The impact of the green “catering” strategy of corporate carbon information disclosure on the high-quality development of enterprises changes from negative to positive.

3.2. Mediating Effect between Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure Strategy and High-Quality Development of Enterprises

Although the green “catering” strategy can be favored by capital in the short term, in the long run, fewer environmental actions make it difficult to convince stakeholders. How should the green transformation plan within the enterprise be implemented? How does the carbon information disclosure strategy affect the high-quality development of the enterprise? R&D investment in the energy industry helps to reduce carbon emissions, but there is a lag phenomenon [42]. At the same time, R&D activities are characterized by high costs, long cycles, and high risks. Therefore, when the R&D investment intensity of enterprises is low, carbon emission reduction R&D investment may have been made, but it is unobservable and cannot be reflected in relevant data at the present time. The driving effect on corporate productivity has not yet appeared. Only when the investment continues to a certain extent can scientific and technological achievements be truly transformed into productivity [43]. Therefore, under the correct promotion of R&D investment, the impact of the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy on the high-quality development of enterprises may gradually improve.

Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3 (H3):

R&D investment has a mediating effect on the U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises.

Enterprise development cannot be separated from government policy support, and the government also needs to maintain its relationship with enterprises. As the central environmental protection supervision continues to place pressure on local governments, local governments need enterprises with excellent environmental performance to assist in performance appraisal. Enterprises adopting carbon information disclosure strategies will improve their green awareness and thus obtain more government resources. Taxation is a bridge of interests between the government and enterprises. The “mandatory sharing” of corporate profits will weaken the internal financing capacity of enterprises [44], and a higher tax burden will compress the survival space of enterprises, resulting in insufficient corporate vitality. However, from a macro perspective, tax revenue is an important source of government fiscal revenue. The higher the government’s fiscal revenue, the more funds will be used for public expenditure and the more obvious the effect of promoting the total factor productivity of enterprises [45]. When implementing government policies, the “tax shield” effect of taxation will also encourage enterprises to carry out more R&D activities, which is conducive to improving the innovation level of enterprises [46], alleviating the current situation of the weak actual carbon reduction actions of enterprises, and promoting enterprises to move towards high-quality development.

Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4 (H4):

The tax burden has a mediating effect on the U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises.

The use of carbon information disclosure strategies helps enterprises to obtain more bank loans and ease their financing constraints. When the financing constraints are relatively loose, corporate liquidity increases and sufficient funds are available for long-term investment [47], including carbon emission reduction-related R&D investment, which effectively improves the actual carbon reduction levels of enterprises and promotes their high-quality development. In the process of multiple business transactions with enterprises, banks can deeply understand the behavior of enterprises. Once the authenticity of the information disclosed by enterprises deviates, it is likely to affect the signing of long-term debt contracts, which is not conducive to the high-quality development of enterprises. From another perspective, the more difficult it is for enterprises to raise funds, the more they will cherish their hard-earned funds and seek to optimize their resource allocation and improve their own production efficiency [48,49].

Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5 (H5):

Financing constraints have a mediating effect on the U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises.

3.3. Threshold Effect between Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure Strategy and High-Quality Development of Enterprises

The degree of competition faced by enterprises in the industry will have a great impact on corporate behavior. Under different industry concentrations, corporate carbon information disclosure strategies may have different consequences for corporate development. When the industry concentration is low, the industry competition is fierce, investors are in the initial stage of research, green expectations are strong, and corporate financing faces carbon premium risks. If enterprises adopt the green “silence” strategy to ensure robust carbon information disclosure, they can transfer the risks to competitors with abnormal disclosures and benefit their own development. However, when adopting the green “catering” strategy, corporate behavior is easily monitored by competitors and faces the risk of overexposure, which sends negative signals to investors and directly threatens the funds needed for corporate development. When the industry concentration is high, there is monopoly in the industry, and investors have a basic understanding of each company. If a company adopts the green “silence” strategy, the amount of information available will decrease, which will reduce investors’ confidence in the company’s development. However, when adopting the green “catering” strategy, it can effectively eliminate investors’ doubts and ensure the normal operation of the company.

Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6 (H6):

Industry concentration has a threshold effect in the relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises.

4. Research

4.1. Sample and Data

This paper selects manufacturing listed companies that published corporate social responsibility reports in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2012 to 2020 as the samples. The manufacturing industry accounts for 62.83% of listed companies. It is an important engine for our country’s economic development and a major source of carbon emissions. Therefore, this paper takes manufacturing listed companies as the research subjects. Excluding companies with an abnormal status, such as ST and ST*, and missing values for the main variables in the sample interval, a total of 2352 annual observations of 359 manufacturing listed companies are obtained. The corporate social responsibility report comes from Juchao Information, and other data are from the CSMAR Database. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% quantiles.

4.2. Variable Definition

4.2.1. Dependent Variable

High-Quality Development of Enterprises (HDE). General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that high-quality development is development that can meet the people’s growing needs for a better life and embodies the new development concept. Some research uses the total factor productivity [50] to measure the high-quality development of enterprises, but a single indicator is unable to reflect the theoretical connotations and practical extension of the high-quality development of enterprises. Therefore, this paper refers to the high-quality development index of enterprises proposed by Tao Zhang [51] and takes the new development concept of “innovation, coordination, green, openness, and sharing” as the starting point to propose the following seven dimensions (

Table 1. Evaluation index system for high-quality development of enterprises.

Dimension	Sub-Indicator	Characterization Indicator	Indicator Description	Unit
Business Performance	Profitability	Return on Total Assets	(Total Profit + Interest Expense)/Average Total Assets × 100%	%
	Growth Capacity	Sustainable Growth Rate	Net Sales Margin × Total Asset Turnover × Profit Retention × Equity Multiplier/(1 − Net Sales Margin × Total Asset Turnover × Profit Retention × Equity Multiplier) × 100%	%
	Market Performance	Tobin’s Q	Market Value of the Firm/Replacement Cost of the Firm’s Assets	yuan
	Operating Capacity	Total Asset Turnover	Total Sales Revenue/Average Total Assets × 100%	%
Green Development	Green Governance	Environmental Score of Sino-Securities ESG Rating
	Green Outputs	Number of Green Patent Applications		piece
	Pollution Treatment Capacity		Constructed using content analysis. Using pollution control and cleaner production implementation indicators such as exhaust gas reduction, wastewater reduction, dust and fume control, solid waste utilization and disposal, noise, light pollution, and radiation to score, with quantitative disclosure as 2, qualitative disclosure as 1, and non-disclosure as 0.
Social Sharing	Social Reputation	Social Score of Sino-Securities ESG Rating
	Social Value	Comprehensive Tax Rate	(1 + Tariff Rate) × (1 + VAT Rate) − 1 × 100%	%
	Employee Rights	Growth Rate of Employee Compensation Payable	(Employee Compensation Payable for the Current Year − Employee Compensation Payable for the Previous Year)/Employee Compensation Payable for the Previous Year × 100%	%
Innovation Drive	Innovation Input	Intensity of Innovation Funding	R&D Investment/ Main Business Revenue × 100%	%
		Innovative Intellectual Input Efforts	Number of R&D Staff/Total Number of Employees × 100%	%
	Innovation Outputs	Number of Patents for Inventions		piece
	Degree of Digital Application	Technological Innovation Word Frequency	Emerging integration technologies resulting from digital transformation; total frequency of relevant feature words in the annual report, excluding “Management’s Discussion and Analysis”.	order
		Process Innovation Word Frequency	Upgrading of business processes as a result of digital transformation; total frequency of occurrence of related feature words in the annual report after excluding the content of “Management’s Discussion and Analysis”.	order
		Business Innovation Word Frequency	The total frequency of occurrence of the relevant feature words in the annual report, excluding the content of “Management’s Discussion and Analysis”, due to the change in the business model brought about by digital transformation.	order
Corporate Governance	ESG Governance Ratings	Governance Score of Sino-Securities ESG Rating
	Board Independence		Number of Independent Directors/Total Number of Board Members × 100%	%
	Management Efficiency	Management Cost Ratio	Administrative Expenses/Total Assets × 100%	%
Risk Management	Level of Internal Risk Control	DIB Internal Control Index
	Level of Credit Risk Control	Current Ratio	Liquid Assets/Liquid Liabilities × 100%	%
	Level of Operational Risk Prevention	Operating Cost Ratio	Operating Costs/Operating Income × 100%	%
	Level of Policy Risk Prevention	Percentage of Government Subsidies	Government Subsidies/Net Profit × 100%	%
Open to the Outside World	Open Outcomes	Proportion of Revenue from Overseas Operations	Operating Income from Overseas Markets/Total Operating Income × 100%	%
	External Investment	Amount of Outward Investment	Capital Expenditures − External Investments	yuan
	Open Talent	Percentage of Directors with Overseas Background	Number of Directors with Overseas Background/Total Number of Directors × 100%	%

).

• Business performance is the financial goal of the high-quality development of enterprises [52]. As a micro-component of the macro-economy, after ensuring daily operations, enterprises continue to pursue performance improvement, while taking into account future growth capabilities and striving to achieve excellent market performance. Based on this, this paper selects four indicators, the total asset turnover rate, the total asset return rate, the sustainable growth rate, and the Tobin’s Q value, to measure enterprises’ operating performance.
• Green development is the environmental goal of the high-quality development of enterprises. Enterprises should build a comprehensive environmental management system, take green operations as the goal, continuously improve their pollution treatment capabilities, and prevent environmental violations. Starting from external environmental certification and internal carbon footprints, they should actively produce green products and increase the number of green patents. Based on this, this paper selects three indicators, the environmental score of the Sino-Securities ESG rating, the number of green patent applications, and the pollution treatment capacity, to measure the green development of enterprises.
• Social sharing is the social goal of the high-quality development of enterprises. Not only should enterprises pursue the best corporate benefits, but enterprises should also emphasize the common interests of internal and external stakeholders. From paying attention to employee rights and interests to engaging in social welfare, enterprises actively practice social responsibility, gradually improve their social reputations, and ultimately realize social value. Based on this, this paper selects three indicators, the social score of the Sino-Securities ESG rating, the comprehensive tax rate, and the payable employee salary growth rate, to measure social sharing.
• Innovation drive is the fundamental driving force behind the high-quality development of enterprises. With innovation as the main driving force, enterprises need to integrate financial capital and human capital, enhance their innovation investment, increase their innovation output, meet the needs of digital transformation, integrate emerging technologies, upgrade their business processes, and update their business models to comprehensively improve their production and operation capabilities. Based on this, this paper selects six indicators to measure innovation drive: the intensity of innovation funding investment, the intensity of innovation intellectual investment, the number of invention patents, the frequency of technical innovation words, the frequency of process innovation words, and the frequency of business innovation words.
• Corporate governance is an inherent requirement for the high-quality development of enterprises. Corporate governance aims to use supervision and control as decision-making tools among senior managers. Enterprises should actively build a self-supervision system, enhance their financial credibility, treat related transactions prudently to reduce the risk of external penalties, and maintain a reasonable ratio of directors to supervisors to ensure the implementation of corporate governance strategies. Based on this, this paper selects three indicators, the governance score of the Sino-Securities ESG rating, the ratio of independent directors, and the management expense ratio, to measure corporate governance.
• Risk management is an important guarantee for the high-quality development of enterprises. Today’s international situation is turbulent, external factors have a great impact on the domestic market, and policy uncertainty has increased, which directly affects the cash flows of enterprises. Enterprises need to continuously consolidate the foundation of internal control, prevent risks such as short-term debt repayment pressure and poor capital turnover, ensure the receipt of policy dividends, and achieve stable development. Based on this, this paper selects four indicators, the DIB internal control index, the current ratio, the operating cost ratio, and the government subsidy ratio, to measure risk management.
• Opening up to the outside world is necessary for enterprises to achieve high-quality development. Open cooperation is the main theme in realizing the spillover effects of corporate value. Under the trend of globalization, enterprises continue to expand the width and depth of the supply chain, absorb international talent, and expand their business territory. Based on this, this paper selects three indicators, the proportion of overseas business income, the amount of foreign investment, and the proportion of directors with overseas backgrounds, to measure opening up to the outside world [53].

Finally, the above seven dimensional indicators are calculated using the entropy weight–TOPSIS method to calculate the comprehensive score for the measurement of the high-quality development of enterprises.

4.2.2. Independent Variable

Corporate Carbon Disclosure Strategy (CDS). In this paper, we refer to Yu et al. [54] and Kim et al.’s [25] measures of “greenwashing” and “brownwashing” to determine the type of strategy based on the difference between the degree of corporate carbon disclosure and the actual carbon reduction action score. When the value is negative, it means that the degree of carbon disclosure is less than the actual carbon reduction level, and there is a green “silence” strategy; when the value is positive, the degree of carbon disclosure exceeds the actual carbon reduction level, and there is a green “catering” strategy. Therefore, the smaller the value of the difference, the more serious the degree of “silence” is, and the larger the value of the difference, the more obvious the degree of “catering” is.

$${CDS}_{it}={\displaystyle \frac{{CID}_{it}-\overline{{CID}_t}}{{\sigma }_{{CID}_t}}}-{\displaystyle \frac{{Action}_{it}-\overline{{Action}_t}}{{\sigma }_{{Action}_t}}}$$

${\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{D}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}}$ denotes the degree of carbon information disclosure of enterprises; $\overline{{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{D}}_{\mathrm{t}}}$ denotes the mean value of the degree of carbon information disclosure of all enterprises in year t; ${\mathsf{\sigma }}_{{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{D}}_{\mathrm{t}}}$ denotes the standard deviation of the degree of carbon information disclosure of all enterprises in year t; ${\mathrm{A}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}}$ denotes the score of the actual carbon reduction actions of enterprises; $\overline{{\mathrm{A}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}_{\mathrm{t}}}$ denotes the mean value of the score of the actual carbon reduction actions of all enterprises in year t; ${\mathsf{\sigma }}_{{\mathrm{A}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}_{\mathrm{t}}}$ denotes the standard deviation of the score of the actual carbon reduction actions of all enterprises in year t.

${\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{D}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}}$, as the level of carbon information disclosure, uses CSR reports as the data pool for the extraction of carbon information. Based on Chinese carbon-related policy documents and relevant vocabulary from the literature on carbon information disclosure, and referring to content from the authoritative CDP disclosure framework for global carbon emissions, we constructed a keyword database for carbon information at two levels: a low-carbon strategy and low-carbon governance. Using the Python web scraping technology, we extracted keywords from the CSR reports published by listed manufacturing companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2011 to 2019.Given that the frequency of carbon information disclosure terms may vary among companies in different sub-sectors, a term weighting method is used to address this, ultimately obtaining a corporate carbon information disclosure degree index.

$$w_{c,i}=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}{\displaystyle \frac{(1+\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}(t{f}_{c,i}\left)\right)}{(1+\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}(l_i\left)\right)}}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}{\displaystyle \frac{N}{d{f}_c}},& \mathrm{if} t{f}_{c,i}\ge 1\hfill \\ 0,& \mathrm{else}\hfill \end{array}\right.$$

Here, N represents the total number of CSR reports for sample companies in the same industry for a given year; df_c indicates the number of CSR reports that contain keyword c; tf_c,i represents the raw term frequency of keyword c in corporate i’s social responsibility report; and l_i refers to the total length of corporate i’s social responsibility report.

ACTION_it serves as a measure of a company’s actual carbon reduction actions. It references the carbon information disclosure quality scoring system established by Li H et al. [55], combined with the three main themes included in the CDP survey, to construct a measurement standard for corporate carbon reduction actions around three aspects, “rigorousness of disclosure—effort level—reduction level”. The contents of the CSR reports are analyzed and identified using content analysis methods, and values are assigned to each action indicator according to the standard to obtain an actual carbon reduction action score, with a value range of [0, 10].

4.2.3. Intermediary Variables

• R&D Investment (RD). R&D investment includes capitalized and expensed R&D expenditures. The amount of R&D expenditure varies greatly among enterprises of different sizes, and the data need to be corrected according to the size of the enterprise. Common indicators of the enterprise size include the amount of total assets. Therefore, referring to the practice of Sun et al. [56], the total R&D investment expenditure of enterprises as a proportion of their total assets is used to measure R&D investment.
• Tax Burden (TAX). Regarding the issue of enterprise tax burden measurement standards, there is a large difference within the academic community. This paper draws on the research of Liu et al. [57]; based on the availability of data, the ratio of each type of tax paid by the enterprise to the main business income is used to measure the tax burden of the enterprise.
• Financing Constraint (FC). The KZ index method is used [58]. Financing constraint mainly refers to the financing costs of enterprises, especially the exogenous financing costs of enterprises. Given the unobservable nature of corporate financing costs, Kaplan and Zingales were the first to propose constructing a financing constraint index using firm characteristic variables based on the literature research at the time.

4.2.4. Threshold Variable

Industry Concentration (HHI). Referring to Kapochik et al. (2005), this paper adopts the Herfindahl index to measure the industry concentration of China’s manufacturing industry.

4.2.5. Control Variables

The return on equity (roe), net profit growth rate (grow), equity concentration (oc1), equity checks and balances (oc2_10), proportion of independent directors (pid), and whether or not two positions are combined (dual) are used as control variables.

The definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics are shown in

Table 2. Definitions of variables and their descriptive statistics.

Variable Type	Variable Name	Variable Measurement Method	Mean	S.E.	Min	Max
Dependent Variable	High-Quality Development of Enterprises (HDE)	Based on the indicator system shown in Table 1	0.136	0.044	0.049	0.460
Independent Variable	Corporate Carbon Disclosure Strategy (CDS)	Difference between the level of carbon disclosure and the actual carbon reduction action score	0	1.198	−6.372	6.362
Intermediary Variables	R&D Investment (RD)	R&D expenditure/total assets	0.023	0.018	0	0.162
	Tax Burden (TAX)	Various tax expenditures/main operating revenues	0.027	0.031	−0.128	0.275
	Financing Constraint (FC)	KZ index	0.988	1.902	−6.428	6.012
Threshold Variable	Industry Concentration (HHI)	Herfindahl index	0.174	0.124	0.024	0.736
Control Variables	Return on Equity (roe)	Net profit/shareholders’ equity	0.075	0.115	−1.880	0.574
	Net Profit Growth Rate (grow)	(net profit for the current period—net profit for the previous period)/net profit for the previous period	−0.284	8.676	−333.300	67.980
	Equity Concentration (oc1)	Shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder	0.394	0.190	0.036	0.900
	Equity Checks and Balances (oc2_10)	Proportion of shares held by the second to tenth largest shareholders	0.218	0.127	0.006	0.666
	Proportion of Independent Directors (pid)	Number of independent directors/board size	0.371	0.052	0.308	0.556
	Whether or Not Two Positions Are Combined (dual)	Whether the chairman and general manager are the same	0.194	0.396	0	1

.

4.3. Characteristic Fact

To further understand the influencing factors behind companies’ selection of carbon information disclosure strategies, this study explores three aspects: the strategy type, enterprise ownership, and enterprise size. Based on industry characteristics, it also performs the preliminary determination of the overall relationship between carbon information disclosure strategies and the high-quality development of enterprises.

4.3.1. Types of Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies

During the sample period, the proportion of manufacturing companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets that adopted the “green catering” strategy in their CSR reports reached 72.6%, while the proportion using the “green silence” strategy was 27.4%. This indicates that the “green catering” strategy is favored more by companies (Figure 1).

4.3.2. Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies and Enterprise Ownership

Examining the carbon information disclosure strategies employed by three main types of enterprises, it was found that state-owned enterprises and privately owned enterprises use both strategies to a comparable extent, which may be linked to the complex competitive environment in the domestic market. However, joint ventures tend to choose the “green silence” strategy. These enterprises often exhibit characteristics of cross-listing, and, under the varying international carbon information disclosure standards, they may have conducted sufficient green transformation actions. For reasons related to cost savings in reporting and political considerations, they selectively disclose their carbon information (Figure 2).

4.3.3. Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies and Enterprise Size

Observing four different enterprise sizes, it is apparent that smaller enterprises are inclined to select the “green catering” strategy, while larger enterprises tend to choose the “green silence” strategy more often. This may be because smaller enterprises require more funding to achieve their development goals, thus opting for the “green catering” strategy to attract more investor attention. In contrast, larger enterprises possess stronger financial resources, have sufficient internal funding for asset turnover, and maintain significant technical barriers to prevent competitor expansion; this leads them to adopt the “green silence” strategy to reduce their exposure (Figure 3).

4.3.4. Overall Relationship between Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies and High-Quality Corporate Development, and Differences across Various Categories

Figure 4 shows that there is an overall U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises. Due to the competitive environment and other reasons, the degree of carbon disclosure and the actual carbon reduction actions of enterprises of different business scope in the manufacturing industry may not be the same, so they are categorized to explore this.

If the Herfindahl Index is used as a standard to assess the level of competition in various categories, the “Electrical, Electronics, and Communication” and “Petroleum, Chemical, and Biomedical” categories are representative of higher competition, characterized by low market concentration and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. In contrast, the “Metal and Non-Metal” and “Specialized, General, and Transportation Equipment” categories represent lower competition, with high market concentration and monopolization by larger enterprises. Specifically, as shown in Figure 5, in the two representative categories with higher competition, the U-shaped curve representing the relationship between corporate carbon information disclosure strategies and the high-quality development of enterprises is relatively flat. The difference in the market positions among competitors is small, and the costs of recognizing the chosen strategies are low, resulting in a limited impact on the high-quality development of enterprises. On the other hand, in the two categories with lower competition, the U-shaped curve is steeper, indicating significant differences in market positions among the companies. If a strategy is recognized by competitors, it can trigger significant public backlash, potentially leading to the substantial loss of market shares for the company. Conversely, if the strategy is disconfirmed, it could further solidify the company’s market position.

4.4. Model

4.4.1. Direct Effect Model

Based on the characteristic fact that there is a U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises as a whole, the direct effect model in this paper is set as

HDE_it = cons + β₁ CDS_it + β₂ CDS_2_it + β₃ control_it + μ_i + λ_t + ε_it

(1)

HDE_it is the comprehensive score of enterprise i’s high-quality development in year t, CDS_it is enterprise i’s carbon disclosure strategy in year t, CDS_2_it is the quadratic term of the strategy value, control_it is a series of control variables, μ_i is an individual fixed effect, λ_t is a time fixed effect, ε_it denotes a random perturbation term, and cons denotes a constant term. If β₂ is significant and positive, it indicates that there is a positive U-shaped curve effect between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises.

4.4.2. Mediation Effect Model

Drawing on the nonlinear relationship mediation effect model summarized by Li et al. [59], following the mediation effect test procedure proposed by Zhonglin Wen et al. [60], and combining the theoretical analysis above, there may be a linear relationship between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the mediating variables (R&D investment, tax burden, or financing constraints) and a quadratic relationship between the mediating variables and the high-quality development of enterprises. The following mediation model is constructed:

MED_it = cons + β₄ CDS_it + β₅ control_it + μ_i + λ_t + ε_it

(2)

HDE_it = cons + β₆ CDS_it + β₇ MED_it + β₈ MED_2_it + β₉ control_it + μ_i +λ_t + ε_it

(3)

MED_it is the R&D investment, tax burden, or financing constraint of enterprise i in year t. MED_2_it is the quadratic term of the mediating variable. Under the premise that the regression results of β₁ and β₂ are significant, if the regression results of β₄, β₇, and β₈ are also significant, it indicates that the mediating variable has a mediating effect in the relationship between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises; if the regression results of β₆ are also significant, it indicates that the mediating variable has a partial mediating effect in the relationship between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises; otherwise, it indicates a full mediating effect.

4.4.3. Threshold Effect Model

The panel threshold regression model proposed by Hansen [61] is used to set a single threshold value model with industry concentration as the threshold variable:

HDE_it = cons + α₁ CDS_it × I (HHI ≤ d₁) + α₂ CDS_it × I (HHI > d₁) + α₃ control_it + μ_i + λ_t + ε_it

(4)

where d₁ is the threshold and I(·) is an indicative function that takes the value of 1 if the condition is met and 0 if it is not met.

5. Results

5.1. Results of the Direct Effect Test

The regression results regarding the impact of the corporate carbon disclosure strategy on the high-quality development of enterprises is shown in

Table 3. Results of the direct effect test.

Variable	High-Quality Development of Enterprises
	(1)	(2)
CDS	−0.0019 **	−0.0019 **
	(−2.2184)	(−2.2048)
CDS_2	0.0004 *	0.0004 *
	(1.8821)	(1.8674)
roe		−0.0081
		(−1.2534)
grow		0.0000
		(0.9465)
oc1		−0.0069
		(−0.3349)
oc2_10		−0.0043
		(−0.2530)
pid		−0.0191
		(−0.8353)
dual		−0.0019
		(−0.6588)
cons	0.1162 ***	0.1280 ***
	(50.3204)	(8.9012)
Individual fixed effect	yes	yes
Time fixed effect	yes	yes
N	2352	2352
R2	0.1954	0.1969

* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

. Model (1) only controls for individual and time fixed effects, and model (2) adds the set of control variables on this basis. Model (2) shows that the coefficient of the impact of the corporate carbon disclosure strategy using the quadratic term (CDS_2) on the high-quality development of enterprises (HDE) is significant and positive at the 10% level (β2 = 0.0004), indicating a positive U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and high-quality development of enterprises. In other words, the green “silence” and “catering” strategies both have a significant effect on the high-quality development of enterprises, and, when the degree of green “silence” is stronger, the level of high-quality development of enterprises is also better, i.e., green “silence” can positively influence the development of enterprises. In the process of increasing the degree of green “catering”, the level of high-quality development of enterprises first decreases and then increases, i.e., the impact of green “catering” on the high-quality development of enterprises changes from negative to positive. The test results of model (1) controlling only for individual and time fixed effects are consistent with model (2), the significance of the quadratic terms remains unchanged, and both of them pass the U-test, which verifies Hypotheses 1 and 2.

According to the regression results, the critical value of the corporate carbon disclosure strategy is calculated to be 2.14, at which time the level of high-quality development of enterprises is the lowest, i.e., there is a basic situation of “high at both ends and low in the middle” between the corporate carbon disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises. This means that when the strategy value is negative and the absolute value is large, i.e., the green “silence” is more obvious, the high-quality development level of enterprises is higher. This may be due to the fact that companies with better carbon reduction practices generally show a larger “silence” value (absolute value), and these companies deliberately reduce their carbon disclosure for the sake of the competitive environment in the industry, refusing to become a low-cost learning case for their competitors and avoiding attracting excessive attention from the market to guard against more stringent government regulatory requirements. At this point in time, the company’s internal green innovation and other work is progressing faster, and it continues to improve in quality and efficiency, which greatly contributes to the company’s high-quality development. When the strategy value is negative and the absolute value is small, the green “silence” is weak. At this time, the enterprise may have carried out certain carbon reduction practices, but, due to the internal carbon management system of the enterprise not being sound, as well as other reasons, the uploading and departmental communication are prone to negligence. Moreover, it is impossible to carry out the reasonable measurement of the carbon reduction process, which results in relatively thin carbon information disclosure. The problem of disclosure reveals the lack of a corporate governance system and the hidden danger of the high-quality development of the enterprise. When the strategy value is positive but small (less than 2.14), i.e., when the green “catering” is weak, the level of high-quality development of the enterprise is also low. When the enterprise lacks substantive carbon reduction results and has not conducted sufficient work on carbon disclosure, it is likely to have a redundant organizational structure, low employee motivation, and other problems. Although the enterprise has certain carbon emission reduction actions, if the relevant investment structure is unreasonable, it is eager to achieve results, or ignores basic research, this will greatly affect the enterprise’s R&D efficiency, inhibit the innovation effect of investment, and make it difficult to promote the enterprise’s high-quality development. When the strategy value is positive and large (higher than 2.14), the green “catering” is more obvious and the level of high-quality development of enterprises becomes high. The flexible interpretation of the relevant norms of disclosure helps enterprises to win policy dividends, but it also attracts more attention, bringing the risk of overexposure. Therefore, enterprises will gradually improve their carbon emission reduction-related actions. They will gradually enhance their carbon emission reduction-related inputs, endorse information disclosure with practical actions, and realize high-quality development under the dual leadership of resources and technology.

5.2. Robustness Tests and Endogeneity Analysis

5.2.1. Robustness Tests

To ensure the robustness of the conclusions, the following tests are used. First, we replace the core independent variable. Considering that the qualitative description of enterprises’ carbon reduction inputs may be exaggerated, the assignment criteria in the carbon reduction action scoring system are adjusted, and the regression is conducted after recalculating the value of the carbon disclosure strategy (CDS1); the results are shown in column (1) of

Table 4. Results of robustness tests.

	High-Quality Development of Enterprises
	Replace the Core Independent Variable	Change the Sample Interval		Change the Sample Selection
		2013–2020	2012–2019	Excluding Companies That Disclose Every Other Year	Excluding Just-Disclosed Companies	Excluding Never-Disclosed Enterprises
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CDS		−0.0018 **	−0.0018 **	−0.0015 *	−0.0018 **	−0.0019 **
		(−2.1205)	(−2.1472)	(−1.7357)	(−2.1140)	(−2.1272)
CDS_2		0.0004 *	0.0004 **	0.0004 *	0.0004 *	0.0005 *
		(1.8637)	(2.0324)	(1.8192)	(1.8669)	(1.9566)
CDS1	−0.0018 **
	(−2.3974)
CDS1_2	0.0003 *
	(1.8647)
cons	0.0353	0.0336	−0.0620	0.0661	0.0351	−0.0176
	(0.4658)	(0.4462)	(−0.9023)	(0.9034)	(0.4648)	(−0.1861)
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual fixed effect	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effect	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	2352	2352	2352	2147	2318	1436
R2	0.1995	0.1985	0.1802	0.1980	0.1992	0.2431

* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.

. Second, we change the sample intervals. In order to avoid the impact of outliers in the first and last years of the sample, the regression is conducted with the data excluding 2012 and 2020, respectively, and the results are shown in columns (2) and (3). Third, we change the sample selection. The year of carbon disclosure by some enterprises is not sequential, which may lead to the data not having a steady state; we exclude the enterprises that change their carbon disclosure status during the year, accounting for more than 40% of all sample years. The results are shown in column (4). Enterprises that have just begun to publish CSR reports may not be well informed about the carbon disclosure requirements, and the data lack reliability, so we exclude the enterprises with only one year’s data. The results are shown in column (5). Some enterprises may have never disclosed carbon information in their CSR reports, so these enterprises are excluded, and the results are shown in column (6). As shown in Table 4, the sign and significance of the coefficients of the corporate carbon disclosure strategy have not changed, indicating that the estimation results are robust.

5.2.2. Endogeneity Analysis

In order to address the possible problems of the omission of independent variables, the mutual causation of dependent and independent variables, and measurement errors during the research process, these were handled through instrumental variables using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. Referring to related studies, the fixed asset size (LNPPE) is selected as an instrumental variable. As can be seen in

Table 5. Result of endogeneity analysis.

	(1)	(2)
Variable	CDS	HDE
CDS		−0.0192 *
		(−1.74)
CDS_2	0.0485 **	0.0013 *
	(2.26)	(1.89)
LNPPE	−0.2492 ***
	(−3.93)
Control variables	yes	yes
Individual fixed effect	yes	yes
Time fixed effect	yes	yes
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM	14.992 ***
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F	15.414
N	2318	2318
R2	0.0473	−0.0874

* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

, the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic in the first-stage regression is 15.414, which is greater than the 15% critical value of 8.96 in the Stock–Yogo weak identification test; this indicates that there is no weak instrumental variable problem. Additionally, the instrumental variable passes the unidentified test (Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic = 14.99, p-value = 0.00). From the second-stage regression results, the coefficient of CDS remains significant and negative, and the coefficient of CDS_2 remains significant and positive, which is consistent with the direct effect regression results. This indicates that the test results of the direct effect are robust.

5.3. Formation Mechanism of Positive U-Shaped Curve

5.3.1. Mediator Effect

The above analysis has demonstrated that the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy has a positive U-shaped curve effect on the high-quality development of enterprises. However, it does not specifically explain the formation mechanism of this positive U-shaped effect. In this regard, this paper attempts to validate how the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy influences high-quality development by focusing on three aspects: R&D investment (RD), the tax burden (TAX), and financing constraints (FC). The results of the mediation effect test are shown in

Table 6. Results of mediating effect tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	HDE	RD	HDE	TAX	HDE	FC	HDE
CDS	−0.0019 **	−0.0006 **	−0.0015 *	0.0007 ***	−0.0015 *	−0.0803 ***	−0.0015 *
	(−2.2048)	(−2.2692)	(−1.8502)	(2.6122)	(−1.8118)	(−2.6478)	(−1.9228)
CDS_2	0.0004 *
	(1.8674)
RD			0.2348 **
			(1.9916)
RD_2			0.0010 **
			(1.9750)
TAX					−0.2765 ***
					(−2.6080)
TAX_2					1.5317 *
					(1.8375)
FC							0.0015 **
							(2.1191)
FC_2							0.0014 *
							(1.8031)
cons	0.1280 ***	0.0201 ***	0.1218 ***	0.0159 ***	0.1314 ***	3.7904 ***	0.1200 ***
	(8.9012)	(4.3356)	(8.5972)	(2.7615)	(9.1050)	(6.2795)	(7.9412)
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual fixed effect	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Time fixed effect	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	2352	2352	2352	2352	2352	2352	2352
R2	0.1969	0.0737	0.2044	0.1230	0.1987	0.2569	0.1989

* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

.

1.

R&D Investment

Columns (1), (2), and (3) test the mediating effect of R&D investment. The coefficients of the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy in column (2) are significant and negative, while both the linear and quadratic terms of R&D investment in column (3) are significant and positive. This indicates that the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy affects the high-quality development of enterprises through R&D investment. The corporate carbon information disclosure strategy coefficient remains significant, indicating the partial mediating role of R&D investment between the two, thereby validating Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and R&D investment suggests that when a firm adopts a high level of green “silence”, its R&D investment is stronger. This aligns with the earlier statement that firms executing a green “silence” strategy typically have better carbon reduction practices, supported by R&D investment. Conversely, when a firm adopts a high level of green “catering”, its R&D investment is weaker, consistent with the previous assertion that firms executing a green “catering” strategy may have relatively lagging R&D investment and pressing needs for improvement in their carbon reduction practices. Under different carbon information disclosure strategies, R&D investment and the high-quality development of firms exhibit a U-shaped relationship. Given that R&D activities are characterized by high costs, long cycles, and significant risks, merely increasing investment does not guarantee successful outcomes. If the firm adopts a green “silence” strategy, the reduction in information disclosure transparency could fail to fully reflect the firm’s development prospects in their stock prices, leading to short-sighted behavior by managers according to principal agent theory. However, substantial investment occupies most of the firm’s funds, and managers, influenced by company performance in terms of personal benefits, may gradually adjust the original investment structure, promoting the research process and supporting the high-quality development of enterprises. On the other hand, if the firm adopts a green “catering” strategy, higher transparency in carbon information disclosure can eliminate market noise and attract stakeholder attention, motivating managers to actively explore R&D transformation, improve the carbon reduction systems, and reciprocate with high-quality carbon information disclosure, forming a positive cycle that drives the high-quality development of enterprises.

2.

Tax Burden

Columns (1), (4), and (5) test the mediating effect of the tax burden. The coefficients of the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy in column (4) are significant and positive, while the linear term of the tax burden in column (5) is significant and negative, and the quadratic term is significant and positive. This indicates that the firm’s carbon information disclosure strategy affects the high-quality development of enterprises through the tax burden. The corporate carbon information disclosure strategy coefficient remains significant, indicating the partial mediating role of the tax burden between the two, thereby validating Hypothesis 4. A positive relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the tax burden indicates that when a firm adopts a high level of green “silence”, the tax burden is lighter. Employing a green “silence” strategy can somewhat mitigate the risk of regulatory “whipping the leading horse” and reduce additional administrative penalties. Conversely, when a firm adopts a high level of green “catering”, the tax burden is heavier. Employing a green “catering” strategy might lead to exposure risks, leading to increased regulation and unnecessary administrative penalties. Under different carbon information disclosure strategies, the tax burden and the high-quality development of enterprises exhibit a U-shaped relationship. If a firm adopts a green “silence” strategy, the use of complex tax and accounting information differences to evade tax collection could camouflage managerial misappropriation behaviors and induce major shareholders to deplete the company’s surplus, harming other shareholders’ interests. Based on equity balance theory, when multiple interests conflict, seeking balanced solutions to resolve internal issues will likely favor the high-quality development of enterprises. For firms adopting a green “catering” strategy, positively responding to market calls can attract investor attention, leveraging the opportunity to enhance the operational efficiency for higher returns while possibly exaggerating its tax burden to avoid the regulatory detection of potential internal fraud risks. Following reputation theory, management and shareholders tend to align in decision-making during the risk–reward tradeoff, focusing their collective efforts on achieving the high-quality development of enterprises.

3.

Financing Constraints

Columns (1), (6), and (7) test the mediating effect of financing constraints. The coefficients of the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy in column (6) are significant and negative, while both the linear and quadratic terms of financing constraints in column (7) are significant and positive. This indicates that the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy affects the high-quality development of enterprises through financing constraints. The corporate carbon information disclosure strategy coefficient remains significant, indicating the partial mediating role of financing constraints between the two. A negative relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and financing constraints suggests that when a firm adopts a high level of green “silence”, the financing constraints are stronger. At this time, the non-financial information transparency is low, making it difficult for credit departments and green investors to fully assess the firm, thereby increasing the financing difficulty. Conversely, when a firm adopts high green “catering”, the financing constraints are weaker, with higher information transparency that meets credit standards and investor expectations, thus smoothing the external financing channels and reducing the financing difficulty. Under different carbon information disclosure strategies, financing constraints and high-quality firm development exhibit a U-shaped relationship. If a firm adopts a green “silence” strategy, merely pursuing green technological innovation without showcasing its results may raise concerns among commercial banks and financial institutions regarding liquidity and returns on investment. However, the firm’s inherent accounting conservatism, endorsed by high-level auditors, signals high-quality accounting information, ensuring diverse funding sources and supporting its high-quality development. When adopting a green “catering” strategy, based on new institutional organization theory, the strategy is more likely to secure bank credit and attract institutional investors, capitalizing on entrepreneurial abilities to realize optimal investment and production decisions, thereby promoting the high-quality development of enterprises.

5.3.2. Threshold Effect

Using the panel threshold effect testing method, the threshold effect of industry concentration (HHI) is examined. The test results indicate that, at the 5% level, there exists a single threshold effect for industry concentration, with a threshold estimate of 0.4076 (

Table 7. Results of the threshold effect test and threshold value estimation.

	Variable	Fstat	Prob	Critical Values			Threshold	95% Confidence Interval
				Crit10	Crit5	Crit1
Single Threshold	HHI	16.90	0.05	12.988	17.104	25.544	0.4076	[0.3843, 0.4078]

). The likelihood ratio function of the threshold variable displays the threshold estimate and the 95% confidence interval (Figure 6). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is validated.

According to

Table 8. Parameter estimation results of the panel threshold model.

	HDE
CDS·I (HHI ≤ 0.4076)	−0.0024 ***
	(−3.1890)
CDS·I (HHI > 0.4076)	0.0105 ***
	(3.1676)
cons	0.1343 **
	(11.2823)
Control variables	yes
Individual fixed effect	yes
Time fixed effect	yes
N	1620
R2	0.2189

** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

, when the industry concentration is low (HHI ≤ 0.4076), the coefficient for the effect of the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy (CDS) on the high-quality development of enterprises (HDE) is −0.0024, which passes the significance test at the 1% level. At this time, the competition in the industry is relatively intense; the greater the degree of green “catering” in strategies, the more firms mimic each other, leading to negative externalities that adversely affect the firms themselves. Therefore, it is suitable to choose a green “silence” strategy to transfer the market risks to competitors, which is beneficial for long-term development. When the industry concentration is high (HHI > 0.4076), the coefficient for the effect of the firm’s carbon information disclosure strategy on the high-quality development of enterprises is 0.0105; this also passes the significance test at the 1% level. In this case, there is monopoly in the industry, making it difficult for firms adopting a green “silence” strategy to gain market attention. Lacking the necessary capital infusion, such firms need to enhance the degree of green “catering” in their strategies to serve as industry role models and attract traffic, thereby changing the market landscape and opening up new avenues for enterprise development.

6. Discussion

This study uses data from manufacturing companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges that disclosed social responsibility reports between 2012 and 2020 to explore the impact of corporate carbon information disclosure strategies on the high-quality development of enterprises. The main conclusions of the research can be summarized in three aspects. First, there is a U-shaped relationship between the corporate carbon information disclosure strategy and the high-quality development of enterprises, where the green “silence” strategy positively impacts the high-quality development of enterprises, and the effect of the green “catering” strategy shifts from negative to positive. Second, R&D investment, the tax burden, and financing constraints play mediating roles in the relationship between the two, with green “silence” influencing the high-quality development of enterprises by increasing R&D investment, reducing tax burdens, and intensifying financing constraints, while green “catering” affects the high-quality development of enterprises by decreasing R&D investment, increasing tax burdens, and alleviating financing constraints. Third, further analysis reveals that industry concentration exhibits a threshold effect in this relationship: when the competition within the industry is intense, the green “silence” strategy should be adopted; in cases of industry monopoly, the green “catering” strategy prevails.

The findings from this study provide management suggestions for companies regarding how to correctly handle their chosen or planned carbon information disclosure strategies to promote their high-quality development, as well as policy implications for relevant regulatory authorities. First, for those considering a strategy with low value—choosing the green “silence” strategy or tentatively planning a green “catering” strategy—companies should consolidate the carbon reduction results that they have achieved and actively assess the latest carbon information disclosure requirements, making their carbon reduction processes transparent, clarifying the input–output ratios, and continuously optimizing their carbon reduction techniques to accelerate their high-quality development. Second, for those with high strategy values—who have already adopted the green “catering” strategy—companies can temporarily leverage their outstanding qualitative information disclosure advantages to secure bank credit support and analyst attention, alleviate financing constraints, and actively conduct R&D investment under favorable liquidity conditions, thereby improving their weak carbon reduction situation and gradually achieving “consistency between words and actions”. This will help them to stay within the regulatory boundaries and avoid falling into traps set by competitors or caused by the pitfalls of tax burdens, steering them towards a path of high-quality development. Finally, for regulatory agencies, it is essential to improve the carbon information disclosure system, categorizing the requirements for different listed companies. For constituent stocks and cross-listed companies, mandatory regulations should be introduced to ensure accountability for disclosures among industry leaders. For general listed companies, voluntary disclosure should be encouraged for information that is difficult to disclose or obtain, thus lowering the threshold for carbon information disclosure. Additionally, promoting the external verification and certification of carbon disclosure information is crucial, along with actively identifying companies that exhibit inconsistencies between claims and actions, enhancing the accuracy and readability of the disclosed data and fostering a favorable atmosphere for carbon information disclosure, ultimately transitioning from voluntary to mandatory disclosure through regulatory evolution.

It is worth noting that, because the sample for this study consists of Chinese manufacturing companies that have published social responsibility reports, these enterprises are willing to respond to policy requirements and consciously adopt carbon information disclosure strategies. For companies in other economies around the world, strategic disclosure behavior is a frequently discussed topic. In the face of increasingly severe climate change conditions, there will be greater attention to carbon information disclosure at all levels, from the national level to individual enterprises, and the consideration of its impacts on corporate development will intensify.