1. Introduction
A core question in distributive policy is determining how to share water resources equitably and reasonably ([
1], pp. 42–44). Article 5(1) of the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention (UNWC) defines equitable and reasonable utilization as:
“Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with the adequate protection of the watercourse”.
Article 6(1) of the UNWC lists seven relevant factors and circumstances that the Basin States should take into account when determining an equitable and reasonable water allocation. These factors are:
- (a)
“Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;
- (b)
The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
- (c)
The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
- (d)
The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States;
- (e)
Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
- (f)
Conservation, protection, development, and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
- (g)
The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use” [
2].
Wouters (2013), McIntyre (2016), McCaffrey (2007), and Wolf (1999) state that equitable and reasonable utilization is a fundamental principle of water allocation [
2,
3,
4,
5,
6]. Most of the international water law agreements contain the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization [
2,
7], including:
Article IV of the Helsinki Rules (1996), [
8];
Articles 10.1, 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the Berlin Rules on water resources (2004), [
9];
Article 2.2c of the UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Water Convention, 1994), [
10];
Articles 4–6, 26 of the Mekong River Basin Agreement (1995), [
11];
Article 2 of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol on shared watercourse systems (1995), [
12]; and
Article 4(1) of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA, 2009), [
2].
Practical application of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle to resolve a water allocation dispute is a significant challenge [
2,
6,
13,
14,
15]. Wolf (1997) argued that the equitable and reasonable utilization definition is vague and not applicable to specific water conflicts [
2]. Moreover, the finalization of the UNWC (1997) took more than 20 years, because there were difficulties in “marrying the legal and hydrologic intricacies” ([
2], p. 336). Van der Zaag et al. (2001) explained that the principle is “defined in general terms, and is thus prone to subjective interpretation” ([
13], p. 19). Postel (2014) stressed the need to develop more precise criteria [
14]. Lankford (2013) argued that the principle and its factors, as is, is misleading to riparian states [
15]. Wolf (1997) complemented that the difficulty is aggravated by not having a hierarchy of the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization. None of the factors, nor the water uses, have priority over others ([
2], p. 337). In support of the equitable and reasonable principle, Dellapenna (2006), argued that:
“Non-lawyers, particularly engineers and hydrologists, sometimes see this list as a poorly stated equation: if one simply fills in numerical values for each factor, one could somehow calculate a state’s share of the water without reference to political or other non-quantitative variables. However, the UN Convention is a legal document that ultimately calls for judgments, and in English, at least, the word “judgment” carries a connotation that the result is not dictated in any immediate sense by the factual and other inputs that the judge relies upon in exercising judgment. Treating this list as an algorithm misses the point entirely”.
Unfortunately, whether the principle is treated as a “judgment” or a “poorly stated equation”, it remains ambiguous and thus complicates the process of judgment-making or application of an equation [
2]. The ambiguity of the equitable and reasonable principle has led to “dialogues of the deaf” amongst water policy communities within certain basins. A “dialogue of the deaf” occurred when policy communities are “unable to resolve a controversial issue […] As a result, two or more coalitions of actors” engage in prolonged and extensive debates ([
17], p. 4). Due to the interdependencies of the actors, the controversial issue remains unresolved “for years on end” ([
17], p. 6). Also, the arguments by the different parties cannot be scientifically falsified due to factual support and conflicting belief or value systems. Van Eeten (1999) explained that “dialogue of the deaf” issues are “trans-scientific” ([
17], p. 7). The conflicting views are derived from scientific knowledge, but cannot be resolved solely by science. The different arguments are solid, plausible, tried, tested, and perfected over time. Science alone cannot resolve the deadlock [
17].
Sabatier (1988) explained that the actors in a “dialogue of the deaf” situation do not listen to one another and tend to “talk past the other” ([
18], p. 155). They do not listen because (1) all of the positions are well-known, that an actor knows what the other actor will say before they begin to talk; (2) there is no reason for debate because the arguments are well developed and cannot be refuted through science; and (3) “data, evidence, and arguments [are] dependent upon the belief system from which one views the problem” ([
17], p. 8). The deadlock may paralyze water allocation processes because any further deliberations do not result in any change or learning.
According to van Eeten (1999), the negative aspects of a “dialogue of the deaf” in public policy are: (1) “paralysis and pendulum swings”, in which the pendulum constantly swings from one extreme to another; (2) “institutional sclerosis” ([
17], p. 10), in which democratic processes are undermined through inertia and an inability to make decisions [
19,
20]; (3) “undermines learning” ([
17], p. 10), the arguments are irrefutable, established, plausible, and repeated throughout the deliberations; and (4) the process stifles any form of innovation. Facts cannot falsify trans-scientific issues that emanate from belief systems, and thus the actors rarely consider other options [
17].
To address “dialogues of the deaf”, policy experts have proposed seven strategies ([
17], p. 11). Sabatier Jenkins-Smith (1993) and van Eeten (1999) state that these seven proposals have certain predicaments, as explained in this paragraph. The first strategy is to ‘choose the better argument’. Actors are encouraged to choose another argument that is more coherent, persuasive, and empirically sound. However, since the arguments contain trans-scientific information, no new polished argument may pass the test. The second strategy is that ‘the truth lies in the middle’. To get to the truth would involve simple extrapolation to get to the middle of the two divergent views ([
17], p. 13). Nevertheless, the truth may lie in the extremes, in another dimension, or there may be no single truth. This approach is too simple and lacks the basis for addressing the complexity in “dialogues for the deaf”. The third strategy is to ‘get the big picture’. The proposed argument is to examine the issue using the Hegelian logic (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis). This approach has failed in “dialogues of the deaf” because there are two or more “big pictures” ([
17], pp. 13–14). According to Roe (1994), the competing claims provide two or more different puzzles that may interlock but cannot lead to one complete picture [
21]. Van Eeten (1999) explained that policy experts use this approach in several models including the welfare economics and multi-criteria analysis. The approach fails to address “dialogues of the deaf” because it entails prioritization and making trade-offs that result in the selection of one competing claim over another. The fourth strategy is ‘let politics decide’. This approach leaves the entire decision-making process in the hands of political institutions who make the decision or “decide not to decide” ([
17], p. 14). Van Eeten (1999) explained that ‘let politics decide’ is a partial solution because: (1) a policy made without technocratic support is bound to fail during the implementation stage; (2) political decisions are power decisions that may ignore the truth and validity of competing claims; and (3) politically imposed solutions are not neutral. The fifth strategy is ‘bargain for joint gains’. This approach brings the actors together through a consensus-led or mediated process to convert a win-lose situation into a win-win situation ([
17], pp. 15–16). Hoppe and Hisschemöller (2018) explained that it is a partial solution, because the actors’ logic of rights impairs the logic of gains and losses [
22]. The sixth strategy involves ‘participation and open discourse’ ([
1], pp. 16–17). Fischer (1995) stated that “the objective is to initiate and pursue reasoned dialogue and consensus” ([
23], p. 20). The excavation process may clarify values and arguments, but might not lead to shared meaning, shared understanding ([
17], p. 16), new insights, and shared learning. As a consequence, the main competing positions may remain intact after prolonged and resource intensive participatory processes. Finally, the seventh strategy is to ‘just let it be’ ([
17], p. 17). Sabatier (1988) explained that the ‘just let it be’ strategy persists until the external driving factors alter power dynamics and lead to change ([
18], p. 155). Van Eeten (1999) cautioned that this approach “releases us from the obligation of looking for answers. It claims there are none”. This approach is inadequate because it removes ‘dialogues of the deaf’ from further inquiry and sends a message that there are no solutions to such deadlocks ([
17], p. 17).
Van Eeten (1999) proposes defining new agendas as a solution to the ‘dialogue of the deaf’. Through van Eeten’s (1999) research, competing views were re-casted, made more amenable to analysis, deliberation, and negotiation, and four environmental deadlocks were resolved. This approach deconstructs the dialogue through developing a crosswalk from the competing views to scenarios. The actors cannot readily identify their competing views within this new platform. Therefore, they are more open to discuss issues, make trade-offs, and move away from solidified positions.
In this research, we implement the four-step process for defining new agendas:
- Step 1
Reconstruct the policy arguments to the debate.
- Step 2
Compare and contrast arguments to understand the debate character better.
- Step 3
Identify a crosswalk position.
- Step 4
Define a new agenda to recast the issue.
In Step 1, this paper adopts the basic definition of equality by evenly distributing the total sum of Nile water discharge between the 11 riparian states. Each country gets less than 30 mm in depth ([
24], p. 30). Though this distribution ensures an equal allocation of the water resources amongst the 11 riparian states, the approach is unfair, as it is based on nine distributive challenges of equality. We discuss these distributive challenges in more detail in
Section 3.1.
Step 2 as a process stimulated critical thinking on a fair water allocation method for the Nile Basin. The crosswalk identified in Step 3 consists of:
A group-based distributive method (recipient dimension);
A value-based distribution method aimed at addressing the needs of all the Nile Basin States (item dimension); and
A consensus-based distribution (process dimension).
The paper defines a new agenda, as proposed in Step 4, through recommending a change in the current definition of the recipient of the water resources, the item to be allocated, and the process. These changes widen the scope and ensure that more resources are available for allocation.
The division of the paper is in six parts. The introduction is a summary of research, the problem of interest, and an outline of the rest of the paper. The background section introduces the case study, the relevant Nile basin water agreements, the provisions on equitable and reasonable utilization, and the research problem. In the methods section, the authors introduce the Stone (2002) equality conceptual framework, customized for the Nile Basin, the nine factors that will be used to determine equitable and reasonable utilization, and the interpretative policy analysis approach [
1]. The results section provides a detailed account of the findings for each of the nine water allocation methods. The discussion section provides an analysis of the results of applying the conceptual framework in the Nile Basin and the proposed recommendations. The last section provides a brief conclusion.
5. Discussion
This section comprises four parts. First, a consolidation of the critical findings of the results section on the nine definitions of equity and an identification of a crosswalk. Then, a discussion of the challenge with the identified crosswalk. After that, a definition of a new agenda about the three dimensions of equity: the recipients (member-based, merit-based, rank-based, and group-based distributions); the items (need-based and value-based distributions); and the process (competition-based, consensus-based, and voting-based distributions). Finally, an explanation of the replicability of the research approach to other basins with similar challenges.
5.1. Identify a Crosswalk: Choosing a Nile Basin Water Allocation Method
One key outcome of the research findings in
Section 3 of this paper was the lack of a shared meaning on how to address the Nile Basin water allocation challenges. It was also evident that many sets of discourses on how to address the Nile Basin equity challenge exist. Some of these discourses seem to be slowly developing into dominant discourses. Unfortunately, the process is haphazard and slow. Policy analysts could play a significant role in connecting the sets of discourses that have sound scientific backing with practice. Policy analysts may support the process of reframing and develop a shared meaning, and if need be, the suppression of other divergent knowledge sets and alternative discourses that may not lead to fair water allocation.
Some methods incorporated more factors than others (
Table 6). The assessment does not provide a full account of the “process” dimension. Such an account would require more detailed analyses of Nile Basin processes and what the negotiators and decision-makers took into account before developing a specific policy document. The CFA process is analyzed because it forms the basis of this paper. However, many Nile Basin processes may need further and more in-depth analyses to be able to assess process-based distribution concretely (whether competition, consensus or by voting).
The results and analysis section assesses nine competing definitions of equity.
Table 6 is a summary of the outcomes of the assessment. The ticks in the table indicate the factors taken into consideration in each water allocation method.
The central research question is: with all these competing methods of equity, which one translates into equitable and reasonable utilization, in the context of the Nile Basin? This research question is further broken down into the following sub-questions:
Across all methods: Which equitable and reasonable utilization factors are not taken into account in the various water allocation methods? (Results and Analysis Section)
Recipients: Who are the eligible Nile Basin recipients? What criteria make the identified Nile Basin recipients eligible? Which recipients does this research recommend? (Discussion Section)
Item: What is being allocated? How do Nile Basin players define or envision the item being allocated? What kind of item does this research recommend? (Discussion Section)
Process: What decision-making processes have been used so far in the Nile Basin to determine equitable and reasonable utilization? What kind of process does this research recommend? (Discussion Section)
Table 6 demonstrates that there is no right or wrong definition of equity; none of the nine water allocation methods met Article 4(2) of the CFA requirements. Since none of the nine definitions met the equity requirements as set out in the CFA, then there is the need to consider combining different options to develop a combined distributive method. Merit-based distribution is the most promising to a rational decision-maker. However, it was the least preferred option after competition-based distribution, when analyzing the various discourses. It entails drastic reforms, thereby reducing the likelihood of adoption.
Apart from merit-based distribution, the other two forms of distribution that may not be successful, if advocated for as a sole distributive method are the membership-based and competition-based distributions. Membership-based distribution is intuitively a robust solution, at face value, because an equal-slice solution for every member “looks and feels” ([
1], p. 56) equal. However, when subjected to further scrutiny, it does not pass the test. There is a link between the membership-based solution and a simple majority voting-based distribution. If every member state has one vote, then there is a high likelihood that the decisions made by such an institution will contravene most of the factors outlined in Article 4(2)(b).
The competition-based distributive method, on the other hand, is preferred by most member states as the most straightforward and best internal solution to the problem. However, when water resources are shared and scarce, competition-based distribution is not recommended, because it may lead to land degradation and overexploitation of the water resources. Competition-based distribution barely takes into account any of the provisions of Article 4(2)(b). Moreover, natural factors, hydrology, and the surface area of the drainage basin in a particular Basin State may limit a riparian state’s competitive actions.
Therefore, based on
Table 6, the most preferred distributive method should incorporate the following distributive methods in the final solution:
Recipients Dimension: A group-based distributive method.
Items Dimension: A value-based distribution. Need-based distribution does not help resolve the scarcity issue. However, a value-based distribution that ensures that the benefits are used to address the needs is preferable.
Process Dimension: A consensus-based distribution, with the possibility of using the political reasoning model when the countries reach an impasse (process dimension). Since there is a link between recipients and item dimensions, if the recipients are correctly identified, and the item focus is selected, then the dangers of process bias are reduced.
In the subsequent sub-sections, the paper focuses on outlining the challenges of the identified crosswalk, defining a new agenda for the three dimensions of equity, and identifying the replicability of the research in other river basins.
5.2. The Challenge with the Crosswalk
Apart from the fifth factor (existing and potential uses), all of the other factors were incorporated, with some factors considered more than other factors, based on the number of times each factor was incorporated. Other factors that also received little attention in the nine distributive methods were: the population that depends on the water resources for other riparian states [Article 4(2)(c)], the contribution made by each Basin State to the Nile waters [Article 4(2)(h)] and “the extent and proportion of the drainage area in the territory of each Basin State” [Article 4(2)(i)]. Basin States’ social and economic needs [Article 4(2)(b)], and the effects of the proposed options on other Basin States [Article 4(2)(d)] are the two factors that are between the most considered factors and the least considered factors [
31]. The first factor relating to “geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character” was regarded as the most important in determining equitable and reasonable utilization {Article 4(2)(a)]. The second most-considered factors are conservation issues [Article 4(2)(g)] and the availability of comparable alternatives to planned or existing uses [Article 4(2)(g)].
According to International Law, there is no hierarchy in the nine factors for determining equitable and reasonable utilization; they need to be considered as a whole [
2].
Table 6 demonstrates how difficult it is for any given basin to develop a water allocation method that incorporates all nine factors as a whole. The best option that may incorporate eight factors is a combination of four distribution methods. This option, as discussed earlier, is a group value consensus-based method that ensures that the value-based method aims to address the needs of the Basin States (need-based distribution). The problem with this proposed water allocation method is its inability to incorporate Article 4(2)(e).
According to
Table 6, all of the distributive methods were unable to incorporate the fifth factor on existing and potential uses and the costs of the proposed measures [Article 4(2)(e)], which is a significant limitation to our proposed water allocation method. The paper infers that Article 4(2)(e) cannot be incorporated into any of the allocation methods because it defeats the primary purpose of any allocation. The Basin States can only allocate if they have something to allocate. Allocation of all of the Main Nile water resources through previous agreements and existing uses defeats the need to dedicate time, money, and other resources to develop an allocation method through an extensive and all-inclusive participatory process when all the players know beforehand that there is nothing to distribute. The 84 BCM is already allocated between two riparian states.
The lack of incorporation of Article 4(2)(e) is a primary reason that the Nile Basin cooperation programs and processes have stalled. Addressing the spirit of the law in Article 4(2)(e) throughout the entire CFA document may have facilitated the signing and ratification of the CFA agreement by all 10 member states. Therefore, efforts to resolve the Nile impasse should focus on addressing the core problem: how to sufficiently incorporate Article 4(2)(e) into the proposed water allocation method. This paper makes proposals on how this can be addressed in the subsequent subsections.
5.3. Define a New Agenda (Recipient, Item, and Process)
5.3.1. Dimension: A Group-Based Distributive Method
According to the study results, the eligible Nile Basin recipients are the Nile Basin States. The paper extensively describes the criteria for current eligibility of Nile Basin recipients. The criteria are summarized as follows:
Member-based distribution: 10 member states and one observer (Eritrea).
Merit-based distribution: The recipient is a member state that has met the established performance and reward system. Poor or non-performing states do not receive any water allocation.
Rank-based distribution: Tiered water allocation based on a Basin States’ rank or level.
Group-based distribution: There are two established groups: the Eastern Nile and the Nile Equatorial Lakes. There is also a group-based distribution between Egypt and Sudan, which was established under the 1929 and 1959 agreements.
Equity seeks to ensure fairness in any distribution of resources. To arrive at equity, the substantive aspects of the distribution have to be just, and the process must be “justly arrived at” [
62]. However, after making the distribution, who will be the recipients? According to International Water Law, the players have traditionally been the Basin States. Therefore, the traditional recipients of the Nile water allocation are the Basin States.
However, in reality, the recipients cannot be a Nation State. The actual recipients are the Basin citizens. In every country, the governments have their resource allocation mechanisms, which vary from one riparian state to another. Therefore, it may be difficult to separate the basin citizens of one riparian state from other citizens who are not within the basin. If a country has a centralized government and all of the public resources are collected in a consolidated fund, these resources can then be distributed to the various regions (which may be completely different from the Nile Basin geographical regions in the country). Introducing another resource allocation mechanism specifically for the basin citizens within that riparian state may not be feasible. Therefore, it would be more practical to consider having the recipients as the population of people within the Basin States instead of the Basin citizens within a particular Basin State. This approach would be practical and also increase the Democratic Republic of Congo available area and resources since its basin area is only 0.9% of the entire Democratic Republic of Congo and 0.7% of the Nile Basin. However, the entire country has sizeable arable land and hydropower potential (outside the basin area) that if considered as a whole, would be a great asset to the Nile Basin.
Therefore, the paper recommends a drastic shift in thinking about who the recipients are, from the Basin States to the population within the Basin States. If the recipient is the population of the 11 states, then it is a vast population that is drastically increasing. Also, the scale covered by the 11 riparian states is massive (1/10th of Africa). This shift in the mental model on who is the recipient is essential because it will enable scientists and policymakers to visualize the complexity of issues and facilitate the process of moving away from water allocation discourses towards development.
Once there is a mental model shift toward development, then it will be apparent that development is only possible if the scale is manageable. Therefore, group-based distribution helps reduce the scale to a more manageable level, while still maintaining the overall basin vision.
Understanding the recipient of the distribution helps policymakers to scale down to a level that is realistic. Groups can help to scale down to a manageable and realistic level and maintain the basin-wide vision.
5.3.2. Items Dimension: A Value-Based Distribution
The distributed item is surface water (freshwater) from the Nile River (Main Nile). Most of the literature considers allocating only the 84 BCM annual surface Nile waters flow from the Main Nile. Few studies consider incorporating groundwater [
24] and green water resources (stored rainwater in the soil as soil moisture) [
13]. Most of the Nile Basin discussions define or envision the distributed item as the runoff from the Nile River (Main Nile) [
42].
The research proposes a shift away from the Main Nile towards the entire Nile ecosystem. There are significant losses of water through evaporation in the Lake Victoria and Sudd sub-basins. These losses are barely taken into account. Also, as discussed earlier, there are immense benefits of constructing dams upstream, especially along the Blue Nile in Ethiopia. This critical point is ordinarily sidelined because the distributed item has for many years been the 84 BCM in the Main Nile.
The paper proposes a significant reconsideration of the distributed item. It suggests broadening the current focus on freshwater to incorporate salty drainage basins within the Nile. The expansion may spur joint desalination projects to expand the distributed item. The paper also broadens the current focus on surface water to incorporate groundwater resources. If the item includes groundwater resources, then the pie significantly increases. Joint actions may help reduce the depletion of groundwater resources and improve water quality. The inclusion of green water expands the pie and introduces critical issues such as climate change, improving the productivity of arable lands and better managing the green water resources. Finally, the incorporation of greywater resources to ensure that the entire basin has improved water recycling projects so that the wastewater is purified and reused. All of these actions will broadly expand the pie and address the water challenges currently facing the basin.
In summary, an expansion of the distributed item should include:
Both fresh and saline water resources (blue water).
Both surface and groundwater resources (blue water).
Green water resources.
Greywater resources that can be recycled and reused.
5.3.3. Process Dimension: A Consensus-Based Distribution
In the past, the adoption of the consensus approach to dispute resolution led to delays in Nile Basin processes. However, the voting and competition-based distributions have a very high probability of being rejected as unjust. Consensus-based distribution has the highest probability of attaining a just distribution, but it is almost impossible to implement. The research proposes a shift from the rational decision-making model toward a political reasoning model of decision-making, to be able to reach consensus on a water allocation method that is equitable and reasonable.
The results indicate that most of the Nile Basin decision-making processes have been using the rational decision-making model. Rational decision-making is the process of choosing an action from a set of plausible actions after an evaluation of the effects of all of the possible actions [
63]. Under the rational decision-making model, the goal of policy scientists is the production and application of knowledge to inform policymaking [
64,
65]. The development of rational public policies requires three key ingredients: rational reasoning, rational society, and rational policymaking. According to Stone (2002), policymakers who use the rational model of decision-making usually undertake five critical steps [
1]. First, develop objectives for the planned decision. Then, find alternate courses of action that would help them attain the planned objectives. Third, use scientific methods to predict, forecast, or anticipate the effects of each alternative cause of action. Fourth, assess the possible effects of each alternative cause of action. Finally, select the alternative that maximizes the achievement of their planned objective(s) ([
1], p. 11).
The authors propose Stone’s model of political reasoning in place of the rational decision-making model. The political reasoning model involves category-making and metaphor-making aimed at strategically persuading policymakers toward developing a dominant discourse and suppressing other discourses, for the sake of advancing policy ([
1], pp. 11–12). The authors further propose a shift from the market model of society that assumes that society is a “collection of autonomous, rational decision-makers” ([
1], p.12) toward a political model of the society. A political model of decision-making acknowledges that people are not autonomous agents. Culture, tradition, emotional bonds, and social groups connect people. Also, people’s perceptions and preferences are not fixed and independent [
66]. The political reasoning model captures the essence of any policymaking process: the struggle for dominance and subsequent suppression of contested views. In policymaking, ideas are not only the medium of exchange, but they are also the mode of influence. As Stone (2002) stated, “ideas are even more powerful than money, votes, and guns” ([
1], p. 13). Therefore, the primary focus of policymaking should be to strive for the shared meaning that is needed to minimize conflicts and spur collective action [
41].
5.4. Replicability of the Research Approach in Similar River Basins
The Stone (2002) concept on equality was chosen for this study because it is a simple definition of equality that every policymaker can easily visualize as a starting point before getting into the various water allocation methods. It is a valuable framework because it starts with a simple model that increases in complexity as the research progresses. It is a framework that can be used by scientists and policymakers in many circumstances to support water allocation decisions.
This research recommends the use of the Stone (2002) framework together with the nine CFA factors at a smaller scale in the basin. Follow-up studies would help advance some of the recommendations made in this paper or verify the viability of the proposed distribution methods. The research method applies to any of the Nile sub-basins, namely: Main Nile, Atbara, Blue Nile, White Nile, Baro–Pibor–Sobat, Bahr el Gazal, Sudd (Bahr el Jebel), Victoria–Albert Nile, and Lake Victoria [
24]. Beyond the Nile Basin, the current study can be replicated in basins within Africa that face similar challenges. Some of the possible basins to apply the approach include Volta, Zambezi, Senegal, Congo, Limpopo, Okavango, Senegal and Orange River Basins. The CFA provisions do not apply to other river basins in Africa. Therefore, the nine CFA factors should be replaced by the United Nations Water Courses Convention (UNWC) list of seven factors that are relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization [
32].
Overall, the approach adopted in this study is replicable within the Nile Basin at the basin-wide level, as well as at the sub-basin level and also smaller scales (local, national). At the African level, the approach can be replicated in all of the large complex basins facing similar water scarcity challenges. However, to adopt the approach outside the Nile Basin, there is a need to use either an existing agreement between the Basin States of a particular river basin or the provisions of Article 6(1) of the United Nations Water Courses Convention (1997).
6. Conclusions
The criteria that was developed in this paper for assessing a fair water allocation method sought to operationalize the equitable and reasonable utilization principle, which is a core water allocation principle in the International Water Law. One key outcome of the analysis was the lack of a shared meaning on how to address the Nile Basin equitable allocation challenge. It was also evident that many sets of discourses exist on how to address the Nile Basin equity challenge. Some of these discourses seem to be slowly developing into dominant discourses. Unfortunately, the process is haphazard and slow. Policy analysts may support the process of reframing and develop a shared meaning, and if need be, suppress alternative discourses that may not lead to a fair outcome.
In this research, we implement the van Eeten (1999) four-step process for defining new agendas:
- Step 1
Reconstruct the policy arguments to the debate.
- Step 2
Compare and contrast arguments to understand the debate character better.
- Step 3
Identify a crosswalk position.
- Step 4
Define a new agenda to recast the issue.
In Step 1, we adopted Stone’s (2002) basic definition of equality by evenly distributing the total sum of Nile water discharge between the 11 riparian states: each country gets less than 30 mm in depth. Although this distribution ensures an equal allocation of the water resources amongst the 11 riparian states, the approach is unfair based on nine distributive challenges of equality. We discussed these distributive challenges in more detail in
Section 3. Then, we compared and contrasted the current Nile Basin discourses to understand the water allocation debate better (Step 2). Afterward, we identified a recipient item process-based water allocation method as a crosswalk position (Step 3). Finally, we defined a new agenda for the Nile Basin (Step 4).
The interpretative policy analysis results indicated that none of the nine definitions of equity derived from Stone’s (2002) equality conceptual framework met the Nile Basin CFA criteria for determining equitable and reasonable utilization. For operational purposes, the paper proposes a combined method that addresses eight of the nine factors that are relevant in determining equitable and reasonable utilization. An outline of the proposed water allocation method is as follows:
Recipients Dimension: A group-based distributive method.
Items Dimension: A value-based distribution. Need-based distribution does not help to resolve the scarcity issue. However, a value-based distribution that ensures that the benefits are used to address the needs is preferable.
Process Dimension: A consensus-based distribution (process dimension). Since there is a link between recipients and items dimensions, if the recipients are correctly identified, and the item focus is selected, then the dangers of process bias are reduced.
An important factor that is not accounted for in all of the proposed water allocation methods is Article 4(2)(e) of the CFA. The provisions of Article 4(2)(e) (incorporate existing and potential uses) nullify the purpose of any water allocation method. The current water use leaves no room for further water allocation.
Therefore, the paper proposes to:
Broaden the recipient focus to ensure that all of the interventions focus on the population living in the 11 Nile Basin states. The expansion will widen the scope of the problem and provide better lenses for the solution.
Broaden the scope of the item being distributed to include:
Both fresh and saline water resources (blue water)
Both surface and groundwater resources (blue water)
Green water resources
Greywater resources that can be recycled and reused.
Broaden the decision-making process to strive for consensus-based distribution. Since consensus-based distribution is a complicated process, there needs to be a shift in the policy-making process from the current rational decision-making model toward political reasoning. The paper proposes a shift from:
The strength of the method is that the criteria are transparent and straightforward, making it easy for decision-makers and politicians to understand, appreciate, and apply it. Since the determination of equitable and reasonable utilization is a joint effort that requires the participation of multiple actors from the respective Basin States, a simple, transparent criterion is vital for building trust and increasing situation awareness and thus enhancing cooperation. The proposed water allocation method aims to stimulate critical thinking about the equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile Basin water resources. It may facilitate reaching a consensus through the expansion of available options. Researchers and policy analysts can apply the method in Nile Basin sub-basins and similar basins within Sub-Saharan Africa.