1. Introduction
This paper contains two main results. The following theorem is the first main result. Theorem 2 below is the second main result, along with the associated technique of consistency proofs by class forcing over the power-less set theory , or, equivalently, the second-order Peano arithmetic .
Studies of the relationship between Gödel’s constructibility and the analytic definability of the reals (here: points of the Cantor discontinuum
or the Baire space
) began with a profound study by Shoenfield [
1], in which it was established that all
reals are constructible. With the development of the forcing method in the 1960s, various models of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory
ZFC were proposed, in which there exists a non-constructible real analytically definable above the Shoenfield level
; see a survey [
2] by Mathias. Of those, the strongest result was obtained by Jensen [
3], and it corresponds to the case
of Theorem 1. A similar result for
, but in the absence of (ii) and (iii), was obtained by Jensen and Solovay [
4] using a different technique. Further research in this direction included, in particular, studies of Solovay [
5] on
reals under large cardinal assumptions, Abraham [
6] on definable reals coding minimal collapse functions
, Harrington [
7] on definable well-orderings of the reals in the absence of the continuum hypothesis, David [
8] on non-constructible
reals, Jensen and Johnsbraten [
9] on
reals, any pair of which entails a collapse function
, and many more.
Theorem 1. If , then there exists a generic extension of the universe in which it holds that:
- (i)
There is a nonconstructible real , such that:
- (ii)
holds;
- (iii)
a is minimal over , in the sense that but any real either belongs to or satisfies
- (iv)
But all sets are constructible and in
We have recently succeeded in proving a weaker version of Theorem 1, again without (ii) and (iii), but for all
, in [
10], using essentially the same technique of forcing by almost disjoined sets as in [
4], but modified by the method of the definable generic construction of the notion of forcing. This led us to the problem of incorporating (ii) and (iii) into this general result, and Theorem 1 solves this problem. The first part of this paper (
Section 2,
Section 3,
Section 4,
Section 5,
Section 6,
Section 7,
Section 8,
Section 9,
Section 10,
Section 11,
Section 12 and
Section 13) contains the full proof of Theorem 1, using a similar definable generic modification of the forcing notion originally developed in [
3], so that the level of definability is determined by the value of the parameter
in Theorem 1. This innovation, on top of Jensen’s forcing, is the sine qua non of our proof of Theorem 1. See
Section 9 for a sketch of the construction.
The second main result of the paper concerns an important aspect of the result above in the context somewhat similar to the “reverse mathematics” approach. Indeed, Theorem 1 essentially asserts, for any given
, the consistency of the conjunction
with the axioms of
ZFC. We may note here that the conjunction
can be adequately and rather straightforwardly represented by means of a suitable formula of the language
of
, second-order Peano arithmetic.
We recall that, following [
11,
12,
13], second-order Peano arithmetic
is a theory in the language
with two sorts of variables: for natural numbers and for sets of them. We use
for variables over
and
for variables over
, reserving capital letters for subsets of
and other sets. The axioms are as follows in (1)–(5):
- (1)
Peano’s axioms for numbers.
- (2)
Induction as one sentence: .
- (3)
Extensionality for sets of natural numbers.
- (4)
The Comprehension schema CA: , for every formula in which x does not occur, and, in , we allow for parameter-free variables other than k.
- (5)
The schema of Countable Choice: , for every formula with parameters allowed, where .
The theory
is also known as
(see, e.g., an early survey [
11]), az
(in [
14] or elsewhere). See also [
15].
The analytical representation of Gödel’s constructibility is well known since the 1950s; see, e.g., Addison [
16], Apt and Marek [
11], and Simpson’s book [
13]. This raises
the problem of the consistency of (the analytical form of)
under the assumption that only the consistency of
as a premise is available, rather than the (much stronger) consistency of
ZFC. This is why we consider and solve this problem in our paper.
The working technique of such a transformation of the consistency results related to
ZFC to the basis of
is also rather well known since some time ago. (See, e.g., Guzicki [
17].) It makes use of
as a proxy theory.
We recall that the power-less set theory is a subtheory of ZFC obtained so that:
- (a)
The power set axiom PS is excluded;
- (b)
The well-orderability axiom WA, which claims that every set can be well ordered, is substituted for the usual set-theoretic axiom of choice AC of ZFC;
- (c)
the separation schema is preserved, but the replacement schema (which is not sufficiently strong in the absence of PS) is substituted with the collection schema: .
A comprehensive account of main features of
is given in, e.g., [
18,
19,
20].
Theories
and
are known to be equiconsistent (Kreisel [
12], Apt and Marek [
11]; see
Section 18 for more details on this equiconsistency claim), so we can make use of
as the background theory instead of
. If now we have established the consistency of a
-sentence
S by means of a generic extension of
, the constructible universe, via a forcing notion
, then we check if
P can be defined in
as a set or class in
and whether
is strong enough to prove that
P-generic extensions of
model
S. And, if yes, then we have a proof of the consistency of
S with
on the basis of the consistency of
alone.
Such a method (sketched, e.g., in [
17]), however, does not seem to immediately work even for the result in [
3] (
of Theorem 1). Indeed, the construction of Jensen’s forcing notion
(either using Jensen’s [
3] original method or via the diamond principle
as in ([
21] 28.A) in
does not directly work in
because the proof of the key CCC property (the countable chain condition) and some other involved properties of
, using either method, heavily depends on countable elementary submodels of
, hence transitive models of
itself, which is way beyond
. In the second part of this paper (
Section 14,
Section 15,
Section 16,
Section 17 and
Section 18), we circumvent this difficulty by means of the method of killing only antichains that belong to a certain transitive model of the bounded separation axiom instead of the full separation as in
, in the course of a Jensen-like transfinite construction of the forcing notion. This innovation is not a trivial and easily seen modification, and we may observe that not all mathematically meaningful results about hereditarily countable sets, and countable ordinals in particular, can be rendered on the
basis; see, e.g., [
22]. The relevant changes are concentrated in Definition 10 and Condition 4
+ in
Section 15.
Thereby, the following theorem is the second main result of this paper.
Theorem 2. If , then the conjunction of items of Theorem 1 is consistent with provided that itself is consistent.
2. Preliminaries
Let be the set of all strings (finite sequences) of natural numbers. Accordingly, is the set of all dyadic strings.If and , then is the extension of t by k as the rightmost term. If , then means that t extends s, while means a proper extension of strings.
If , then is the length of s, and (strings of length n), and, accordingly, .
A set is a tree iff, for any strings in , if then . Thus, every non-empty tree contains the empty string . If is a tree and , then put ; this is a tree as well.
Let PT be the set of all perfect trees .Thus, a non-empty tree belongs to iff it has no endpoints and no isolated branches. In this case, there is a largest string such that ; it is denoted by (the root of a perfect tree T). If , then s is a branching node of T; that is, and .
Each perfect tree
defines a perfect set
of all paths through
T; then, accordingly,
, where
If are trees in and there is a finite set such that , then we say that S is clopen in T; then, is a relatively clopen subset of . Trees clopen in itself will be called simply clopen; thus, clopen trees are those of the form , where is a finite set and for each .
A set is a true antichain iff (or, equivalently, is finite) for all in A. If , then a set is:
- -
Dense in X, iff, for every tree , there is a subtree ;
- -
Open dense in X, iffit is dense in X and holds whenever , , and ;
- -
Pre-dense in X, iffthe set is dense in X.
As usual, if , , and there is a finite set such that (or, equivalently, ) then we write ,and if, in addition, A is a true antichain, then we write .
Thus, perfect sets in the Cantor space are straightforwardly coded by perfect trees in . It takes more effort to introduce a reasonable coding system for continuous functions . Let FPT (functional perfect trees) be the set of all sets such that
- (a)
If , then ;
- (b)
c is a tree; that is, if and , then ;
- (c)
; that is, ;
- (d)
c has no endpoints; that is, if and , then there is such that ;
- (e)
For every m, there exists such that if , then there is a string satisfying .
If
is continuous, then the set
, where
belongs to
FPT (condition (e) represents the uniform continuity of
F defined on a compact space), and
, where
(a function coded by
c). Conversely, if
, then
.
Lemma 1 (well known). If and , then either there is a string such that the restriction is a constant, or there is a subtree , such that the restriction is an injection.
3. Splitting Systems of Trees
If and , then let , where ; obviously, are trees in as well. Define for by induction on so that and .
A splitting system is any indexed set of trees satisfying
- (A)
If and , then .
It easily follows from (A) that
- (B)
; and
- (C)
If and strings belong to , then .
Lemma 2 (routine). If is a splitting system, then is a perfect subtree of , and . In addition, for all s.
We proceed to several slightly more complicated applications.
Lemma 3. If , then there exists a sequence of trees such that for all n and whenever .
Proof. If , then there are perfect trees and such that . This allows us to easily define a system of trees such that
- (1)
If , then is a splitting system consisting of subtrees of ;
- (2)
If and , then .
(The inductive construction is arranged so that, at each step n, we define all trees with and and also all trees with .) Now, we simply put for all k. □
Lemma 4. If and is continuous, then there exist perfect trees such that either for all or for all .
Proof. Suppose that for some . By continuity of F, there are a clopen subtree and a clopen neighborhood A of such that and . Hence, for all . The compact set is either countable or has a perfect subset. If X is countable, then let and, for every, let be an arbitrary perfect tree such that .
Assume that there is a perfect tree T such that . By Lemma 3, there are trees such that , , and [ whenever . Choose such that and let . □
4. Jensen’s Construction: Overview
Beginning the proof of case of Theorem 1, we list essential properties of Jensen’s forcing :
(1) consists of perfect trees (a subset of the Sacks forcing);
(2) forces that there is a unique -generic real;
(3) “being a -generic real” is a property;
(4) forces that the generic real is (nonconstructible and) minimal.
Thus, forces a nonconstructible real singleton over , whose only element is, therefore, a real in .
Jensen [
3] defined a forcing
in
in the form
, where each
is a countable collection of perfect trees
. The construction of the
-sequence of sets
is arranged so that each
is generic, in a certain sense, over the least transitive model of a suitable fragment of
ZFC, containing the subsequence
. A striking corollary of such a genericity is that
forces that there is only one
-generic real. Another corollary consists in the fact that, for a real
, being
-generic is equivalent to
. The construction can be managed so that the whole sequence
is
, or, more exactly,
in
. (We recall that HC = all
hereditarily countable sets. A set
x is hereditarily countable iff its transitive closure is at most countable.) Altogether, it follows that if
is a
-generic real, then
in
; that is,
in
, which is obviously the lowest possible level for a nonconstructible real. The minimality of
-generic reals follows from another property of
: given a tree
and a continuous
, there is a tree
(a stronger condition) such that
is either a bijection or a constant.
Now, we consider this construction in detail.
5. Jensen’s Sequences
In this section, we argue in .
See
Section 1 regarding matters of the power-less set theory
. Let
be the theory:
+ “the set
exists” (then
exists as well) + “
”. Note that
(all sets constructible up to
) is a natural model of
.
Definition 1 (in ). Suppose that and is a sequence of hereditarily countable sets. We let be the least CTM , necessarily of the form , containing and such that strictly and still all sets , , are, at most, countable in M.
Definition 2 (in ). If , then let be the αth element of the set in the sense of the Gödel canonical well-ordering of .
Thus, for any and , there exist uncountably many indices such that and .
For any ordinal , we let (Jensen’s sequences of length ) be the set of all sequences , of countable sets , satisfying the following conditions 1°–6°.
- 1°.
consists of all clopen trees , including the full tree itself.
- 2°.
If , , and is a perfect tree clopen in T, then .
- 3°.
If and , then there is a tree .
- 4°.
If , , , is open dense in , then
- 5°.
If , , and , then there is such that and:
- either
we have for all ,
- or
we have for all .
- 6°.
If , , and , then there exists such that and the restricted function is either a bijection or a constant.
Let . (Jensen’s sequences of any countable length).
Lemma 5 (in ). Suppose that and . Then, is pre-dense in the set .
Proof. First, is dense in by . Now, by induction on , suppose that is pre-dense in . To check that remains pre-dense in , consider any tree . By definition, , and hence we have by . (Note that the set belongs to and is open dense.) It follows that there exist a tree and a string such that . Finally, by , so T is compatible with , as required. □
Lemma 6 (in ). Assume that . Then, the forcing satisfies CCC in . Therefore the cardinals are preserved in -generic extensions of .
We recall that CCC, or the countable chain condition, is the claim that every antichain in a given partially ordered set is at most countable.
Proof. Arguing in , suppose that is a maximal -antichain, that is, a pre-dense set, and, if belongs to A, then there is no tree , . Consider a countable elementary submodel containing A. Let be the Mostowski collapse; . Let . Thus, and . The set satisfies and is pre-dense in . It remains to prove that
Suppose toward the contrary that . Then, T is compatible with some by Lemma 5; that is, there is a tree , .
On the other hand, ; hence, we have and . It easily follows from that . Then, as well, and hence there exist and such that the tree satisfies ; therefore, . However, by , and but , contrary to A being a -antichain. □
The following rather obvious lemma demonstrates that the top level of a Jensen sequence of successor length can be freely enlarged by adding smaller trees, with only care of the property .
Lemma 7 (in ). Suppose that and , so that is the last term in this sequence. Let be trees in and . Let consist of all trees in and all trees , clopen in S. Then, the sequence belongs to , too.
6. Extension of Jensen’s Sequences
Now, we prove a theorem that shows that Jensen’s sequences of any countable length are extendable to longer sequences in .
Theorem 3 (in ). Suppose that . Then, any sequence has an extension .
Proof. We argue in . Basically, we have to appropriately define the top level () of the extended sequence. The definition goes on in four steps.
Step 1: we define a provisional set satisfying only requirements , . Put . Fix an arbitrary enumeration of all sets , , open dense in , and any enumeration . For any k, there is a system of trees satisfying the following conditions (i)–(iii):
- (i)
If , then ;
- (ii)
For each
k,
is a splitting system in the sense of
Section 3;
- (iii)
If and , then .
Indeed, if some is already defined and , then the trees and belong to as well, and hence there are trees and in , which belong to .
It remains to define , where .
Step 2. We are going to shrink the trees obtained at Step 1 in order to satisfy requirement . Suppose that and , as in . (If , then we skip this step.) We may assume that the enumeration is chosen so that . Let (a continuous map ). By Lemma 4, there exist perfect trees such that either for all or for all . The new set still satisfies and , of course.
Step 3. We shrink the trees obtained at Step 2 in order to satisfy 6°. This is similar to Step 2, with the only difference being that we apply Lemma 1 instead of Lemma 4.
Step 4. If is one of the trees in obtained at Step 3, then we adjoin all trees clopen in to in order to satisfy 2°. □
7. Definable Jensen’s Sequence
Each of the conditions
,
,
(
Section 5) will have its own role. Namely,
implies CCC and continuous reading of names (Lemma 10) and 5° is responsible for the generic uniqueness of
as in Lemma 11, while
yields the minimality of
. However, to obtain the required type of definability of
-generic reals in the extensions, we need to take care of the appropriate definability of a Jensen’s sequence in
.
Definition 3. Recall that HC is the collection of all hereditarily countable sets.
= all sets , definable in HC by a parameter-free formula.
= all definable in HC by a formula with sets in HC as parameters.
Collections , etc.are defined similarly. Something like means that only x is admitted as a parameter. It is known that under , and that is the same as for reals and sets of reals, modulo any appropriate coding, and the same with parameters.
Lemma 8 (in ). The set is .
Proof. Suppose that is a sequence (of any kind) of length , , the set contains J and is a model of , and, for every , the model (defined in Definition 1) also belongs to . Then, the property of J being a Jensen sequence is absolute for . This yields a definition for the statement “J is a Jensen sequence” in the form: there is such-and-such ordinal such that and “J is a Jensen sequence” holds in . □
Corollary 1 (in ). There exists a sequence .
Proof. For every we define, by transfinite induction, to be the least set, in the sense of the Gödel well-ordering of , such that . To establish the definability type of the sequence obtained, use Lemma 8. □
8. Adding One Jensen Real: Theorem 1, Case
Here, we prove the case of Theorem 1.
Definition 4. By Corollary 1, fix a sequence such that it is true in that
- (1)
—will be used in Lemmas 9, 10, 11 and Corollary 2; and
- (2)
is a sequence—will be used only in Corollary 2.
Put .
Consider such a set
as a forcing notion over
, the ground universe. It is ordered so that
means that
S is stronger as a forcing condition. Thus,
,
Jensen’s forcing of [
3] (see also [
21], 28.A), consists of (some, not all) perfect trees by construction.
Lemma 9. If is a -generic set over , then the intersection is a singleton , and ; hence, .
Reals , being a -generic set over , are called -generic over. The next lemma provides a useful tool of representation for reals in -generic extensions.
Lemma 10 (continuous reading of names). Suppose that is -generic over . Let . There exists such that .
Proof. Let
. Let
be a name for
x in the forcing language; then, every
forces
We argue in . Let . Each set is dense in Let be a maximal -antichain. Then, every is countable by Lemma 6; hence, there is an ordinal such that , and, for each k, , and the set belongs to . Note that is dense in by the maximality of .
By
of
Section 5, there exists
. By
, we have
for every
k, so that there are finite sets
such that
and, if
belongs to the same set
, then
.
Put . For any k, there is a finite set of values l such that . Thus, a continuous function can be defined in as follows: iff for some . Let be a continuous extension of ; for some . Then, T forces , where is the canonical name for . □
Lemma 11. If is a -generic set over , then is the only element of the set in . Moreover, is minimal over .
Proof. If , then the real belongs to since all sets are pre-dense by Lemma 5. To prove the opposite direction, consider any and . By Lemma 10, there exists such that . There is an ordinal in such that and . Let witness . In the “either” case of , T obviously forces that , while, in the “or” case, T forces .
To prove the minimality, consider any real . By Lemma 10, we have , where . It follows from 6° that there exists such that is either a bijection or a constant. If is a bijection, then by means of the inverse map. If is a constant z, say for all in , then obviously . □
Corollary 2 (= Theorem 1, case ). Assume that is -generic over . Then, satisfies Theorem 1 for .
Proof. Lemma 11 implies that ; hence, in . Thus in , as required by (i) of Theorem 1. The minimality claim (iii) follows from Lemma 11, whereas the equality of (ii) of Theorem 1 in is implied by Lemma 9. Finally, (iv) holds since all sets are constructible by Shoenfield’s absoluteness. □
9. Warmup: Definable Generic Forcing Construction
To solve the general case of Theorem 1, we employ one more idea. Jensen’s -sequence as in 4 can be seen as an -branch of type through the set of all countable (transfinite) sequences satisfying conditions 1°–6° above.
The idea behind the general case is to maintain the choice of in such a way that the final -long sequence of (countable sets of trees) intersects all suitably definable (depends on !) “dense” sets. In this way, we will obtain a version of Jensen’s forcing that allows us to prove Theorem 1. The main cog in this construction is that, because of the “definable genericity”, the resulting set resolves every boldface set D of perfect trees, in the sense that either it contains a tree in D or it contains a tree non-extendable to a tree in D. This makes similar to the Sacks forcing up to level , leading to claim (iv) of Theorem 1 because of the homogeneity of the Sacks forcing.
Such a
definably generic forcing construction was applied to great effect by Harrington [
23] with the almost disjoint forcing. We will overview some new results in this direction in the
Section 19.
Now, let us present the definably generic forcing construction in detail.
10. Complete Sequences and Forcing Notions
Approaching the general case of Theorem 1, we begin with a few definitions.
Definition 5. Let be a partially ordered set. For any , let be the set of all that solve D in the sensethat either or there are no elements .
Recall Definition 3 on the definability types like and .
Definition 6 (in ). Suppose that . A sequence is -complete if, for any set , there is such that —meaning that either or there is no sequence in D extending .
A set of perfect trees is -complete if, for any set , the set is dense in P.
Thus, n-completeness is a property of “generic” nature, where genericity is related to a family of sets distinguished by a definability property.
Lemma 12 (in ). If a sequence is -complete, then is -complete.
Proof. Suppose that is a set, and ; that is, for some . We prove that there is such that . The set D of all sequences , such that there exists , is . It follows that for some , i.e., either , or there is no sequence in D that extends .
If , then, by definition, there is a tree with , as required.
Suppose that is not extendable to a sequence in D, and denote . Then, the extended sequence is not extendable to a sequence in D because is not extendable. By 3°, there is a tree , . We claim that .
Suppose, to the contrary, that and there is such that . Then, by Lemma 7, there is a set containing and such that is still a sequence in extending , and by the choice of . But, this contradicts the non-extendability of , and therefore . □
Lemma 13 (in ). If , then there exists an -complete sequence
Proof. Let be a universal set. That is, U itself is , and if is a (boldface) set, then there is a parameter such that . As we argue in , for any , let be the th element of in the sense of Gödel’s well-ordering of . Then, and the sequence is .
To prove the lemma, we define a strictly -increasing sequence of sequences as follows. Let be the empty sequence.
Let whenever is a limit.
For every , if is defined, then let be the Gödel-least sequence such that and .
The limit sequence is n-complete by construction, and, by an easy estimation, based on the assumption that U is , it belongs to . □
The next theorem is the conclusive step in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 (in ). Assume that , is an - complete sequence (Lemma 13), and . Then, -generic extensions of prove Theorem 1.
Its proof will be accomplished in
Section 13. A few remarks follow before the proof starts.
Lemma 11 implies that if is -generic over , then the corresponding real is minimal. It also follows from the same lemma and the fact that the sequence is in that the singleton is and hence is in . It is a more difficult problem to prove the remaining claim of Theorem 1, that is, that any set in is constructible. We will establish this fact in the remainder; the result will be based on the -completeness property and on some intermediate claims.
11. Digression: Definability of the Sacks Forcing
Our next goal is to estimate the definability of the Sacks forcing relation, restricted to formulas of a certain ramified version of the second-order Peano language.
Definition 7. Let be the ordinary language of the second-order Peano arithmetic, with variables of type 1 for functions in . Extend this language so that some type 1 variables can be substituted by symbols of the form , and each is viewed as a name for , where a means a generic real of any kind. (Recall that is a continuous map coded by .) Let be the extended language; the index s is from Sacks.Accordingly, and will denote the standard types of formulas of .
If and φ is a formula of , then is the result of the substitution of for any name in φ; is a formula of with real parameters.
Definition 8. Let be the Sacks forcing relation (that is, is the forcing notion). Define an auxiliary relation of “strong” forcing , restricted to formulas, , generally, to all existential formulas of , as follows:
- (*)
If is a formula of with the only free variable x (over ), and , then if there exists such that .
But, if φ is a formula, then we define: iff .
It is a known property of the Sacks forcing that any real
x in the
- generic extension
of the universe
has the form
, where
; see, e.g., [
24]. Therefore, the forcing relation
as in Definition 8 is still adequate. In particular, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 14. Suppose that φ is a closed formula in , , and . Then, iff there is no , such that .
Here, is the result of the canonical transformation of to a form.
Now, let us address the descriptive complexity of .
Lemma 15. The relation restricted to formulas is . If , then the relation restricted to formulas is while restricted to formulas is .
Proof. We argue by induction. Suppose that
is a closed formula in
. It follows from the Shoenfield absoluteness and the perfect set theorem for
sets that, for any
,
is equivalent to the set
being countable, and then to
as any countable
set
consists of elements of type
. Yet, the displayed formula is
, hence
, as
is a
relation.
The step : make use of Definition 8(∗).
Now, the step
. Suppose that
,
is a closed formula in
, and
. Then, by Lemma 14,
is equivalent to
and hence we obtain
using the inductive hypothesis for
. □
12. Back to the -Complete Jensen’s Forcing
Let and be the same as in Theorem 4. We begin with the following.
Lemma 16 (in ). For any closed formula φ in , the set of all such that or is dense in .
Proof. The set is by Lemma 15. Therefore, the set is dense in by Lemma 12. However, it follows from Lemma 14 that is equal to the set of all such that or . □
It is a basic fact of forcing theory that the truth in generic extensions is, in a certain way, connected with the forcing relation. Thus, the truth in -generic extensions of corresponds to the -forcing relation. However—and this is the key moment—the following theorem shows that the truth in -generic extensions is also in tight connection with , the Sacks forcing notion, up to the level . This is a consequence of - completeness, of course: in some sense, the - completeness means that is an elementary submodel of with respect to formulas of a certain level of complexity.
Theorem 5. Let and be the same as in Theorem 4. Suppose that is a closed formula in , or , and a set is -generic over . Then, holds in if there is such that .
Proof. We argue by induction on k. Let be a closed formula. If and , then, in , is true for all with, at most, a countable set of exceptions; see the proof of Lemma 15. And, all exceptions are , hence absolutely defined and belong to . Therefore, the generic real cannot be an exception, thus holds in . If is , then is , being , and if , then, by definition, for some , and so on. On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 16 that there is such that or . This easily implies the result for .
Step . Let be a formula. Suppose that fails in . Then, holds in , and hence, by the inductive hypothesis, there is a condition satisfying . Then, by Lemma 14, there is no with . Conversely, suppose that there is no with . Then, by Lemma 16, there is a condition satisfying . It follows that holds in , and, subsequently, fails, as required.
Step . Thus, let be a formula , where is . Assume that satisfies . This entails, by (∗) of Definition 8, that for some , a code of the continuous map . Apply the induction hypothesis to the formula : it says that holds in . But, is , where . Therefore, holds in , as required.
In the opposite direction, let be true in ; that is, holds for some . By Lemma 10, there is such that . The formula coincides with and hence holds in . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, there is such that . But, then, by (∗) of Definition 8, as required. □
13. Proof of Theorem 1: General Case
Here, we accomplish the proof of Theorems 4 and 1. We fix .
Let be the same as in Theorem 4. If a set is -generic over , then all sets in are constructible by Theorem 5 because, by the homogeneity of the Sacks forcing, for any parameter-free formula and any trees , we have
Let us present this final argument in more detail.
If
, then let
be the set of all homeomorphisms
; clearly,
is non-empty. Suppose that
. Recall that continuous functions
are coded so that
is the function coded by
. If
, then write
iff
for all
. If
and
are formulas of
(see
Section 11), and
for all
i, then write
. In this case, the formulas
and
coincide for any
.
Lemma 17. Suppose that , , Φ and Ψ are closed formulas in one and the same type, or , and . Then, if and only if .
Proof. Routinely argue by induction on the complexity of the formulas. □
Corollary 3. If and
is a formula in or , then iff .
Proof. Pick , note that (as contains no symbols of the form ), and apply Lemma 17. □
Lemma 18. If is -generic over , and is in , then and x is in .
Proof. Let
be a parameter-free
formula such that
in
. Consider the tree
. Then,
by Theorem 5 and Corollary 3. It remains to refer to Lemma 15. □
This ends the proof of Theorems 4 and 1.
14. Theorem 2: Outline
As the proof of Theorem 1, given above, contains a heavy dose of the forcing technique, first of all we have to adequately replace
with a more
ZFC-like, forcing-friendly set theory, dealing with Theorem 2. We will make use of the theory
as such a proxy theory. (The upper minus stands for the absence of the power sets axiom, whereas l and c in the lower index stand for the constructibility (
) and countability.) The following is the according proxy theorem (compared to Theorem 1).
Theorem 6. If , then there exists a generic extension of the universe of , in which all axioms of hold, along with the following:
- (i)
There is a nonconstructible real such that:
- (ii)
holds;
- (iii)
a is minimal over the ground universe of , in the sense similar to (iii) of Theorem 1;
- (iv)
But, all sets are constructible and in the ground universe of
The universe of is naturally identified with . It will take some effort to obtain the proof of Theorem 1 relativized to so that it can be executed in the universe of , denoted by below for the sake of convenience.
To establish Theorem 6, we will make use of a suitable version of the forcing notion as a definable class in , and a class-forcing notion, CCC, with regard to all definable class-antichains, and then we will show that -generic extensions of prove Theorem 2.
Yet, there is a serious obstacle: the treatment of
involves ordinals and some other objects in
(rather than
) in the proof of the key CCC result by Lemma 6, and this is not admissible in
. We overcome this difficulty, following the idea of a recent construction of definable-◇ sequences by Enayat and Hamkins [
25].
Definition 9. The ground set universe of is denoted by . We use to denote the collection (a proper class) of all ordinals in ; all of them are countable.
Remark 1. Arguing in , we will often consider (definable) proper classes as they will play a more essential role than is common in ZFC. We will also consider such things as class-size collections of proper classes, e.g., class-long sequences of proper classes , with the understanding that the real thing considered in this case is some (definable) class whose slices are equal to the given classes .
15. Jensen’s Sequences, Version
Adapting the proof of Theorem 1 above for the proof of Theorem 6, we are going to introduce as a definable class forcing under . In this section, we argue in
Definition 10 (in ). If and is a sequence of any sets, then let be the least CTM M, necessarily of the form , which
- (1)
Models , i.e., with the collection and separation schemata (see Section 1) restricted to bounded ∈-formulas; - (2)
Contains ; and
- (3)
Contains the set = all -formulas, with parameters in , true in .
Compared to Definition 1, we may note that, arguing in , it is not suitable to refer to models of . This is the reason for passing to here.
Definition 11 (in ). If , then let be the αth element of the set in the sense of the Gödel canonical well-ordering of .
For any ordinal , we let (Jensen’s sequences of length , version) be the set of all sequences of length , of countable sets , satisfying conditions 1°, 2°, 3°, 5°, 6° of Definition 2, and the following condition instead of 4°.
- 4†.
If , , , is open dense in , then .
Let .
Lemma 19 (in ). Suppose that and . Then, is pre-dense in the set —the proof is similar to Lemma 5.
Lemma 20 (in ). Assume that . Then, the forcing notion satisfies CCC in with regard to all antichains definable in with parameters.
In this lemma, CCC is naturally understood in the class form: every class-size definable antichain is a countable set.
Proof. Suppose that is a maximal -antichain. As A is definable, assume that , where is a parameter and any - formula.
There exists a limit ordinal such that , the set satisfies , the set is a maximal -antichain, and therefore pre-dense in , and, finally, is elementarily equivalent to with regard to , so that, overall, we have: .
Let . We assert that . Indeed, by definition, the truth set belongs to . On the other hand, by the above. It follows that since M models .
Now, it suffices to prove that . Suppose, to the contrary, that . Then, T is compatible with some by Lemma 19; that is, there is a tree , . On the other hand, it follows from 4† that . Then, as well, and hence there exist and such that the tree satisfies ; therefore, . However, by 2°, and but , contrary to the assumption that A is a -antichain. □
The following extendability theorem is proved in a similar way to Theorem 3, so we skip the proof.
Theorem 7 (in ). Suppose that . Then, any sequence has an extension .
16. Definable Jensen’s Sequence and
the Forcing Engine, Version
We deal with the issue of the definability of Jensen’s sequences in .
Remark 2. Note that = all sets, in . The definability types , , consist of definable classes in , of course.
Lemma 21 (in , note similarities to Corollary 1). There exists a sequence .
Definition 12 (in ). By Lemma 21, fix a sequence of sets , such that it holds in that (1) , and (2) is a sequence.
Put .
Consider such a set as a forcing notion (here, a proper class) over .
The forcing engine does not necessarily work in
for an arbitrary class-size forcing notion. But, there is a type of forcing notions that admits adequate treatment of forcing similar to the standard
ZFC case. This is the class forcing theory of S. D. Friedman [
26,
27], further developed by Antos and Gitman [
19] to be applicable over
.
Definition 13 (S. D. Friedman, see [
19,
26])
. A forcing notion (a partially ordered definable class)
is
pre-tame if, for every class sequence
of dense classes
, parametrized by elements of a set
a (so that
is a definable class), and every condition
, there is a condition
and a sequence
of sets
such that each
is pre-dense below
q in
P.
Theorem 8 (S. D. Friedman, see [
19,
26])
. In , let P be a pre-tame class-forcing notion. Then, P preserves and satisfies the main forcing principles, including the truth forcing and forcing definability theorems. Remark 3. The forcing notion , introduced by Definition 12, is a class forcing satisfying CCC by Theorem 20. Therefore, is pre-tame under , as, obviously, is any CCC forcing. We conclude that Theorem 8 is applicable, and hence usual forcing theorems are valid for -generic extensions of , the set universe.
This justifies all forcing results in
Section 7 and
Section 8 above, on the basis of
.
In particular, we have:
Corollary 4 (in , = Theorem 6, case ). Assume that is -generic over . Then, satisfies Theorem 6 for .
This completes the proof of Theorem 6, case .
17. Theorem 6: General Case
Recall Definition 2 on the definability types like .
Definition 14 (in ). Suppose that . Similarly to Definition 6, a sequence in is -complete if, for any set , there is such that , i.e., either or no sequence in D extends .
A set of perfect trees is -complete if, for any set , the set is dense in P.
The two following results are the conclusive steps in the proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 22 (in , similar to Lemma 13). If , then there exists an -complete sequence
Theorem 9 (in , similar to Theorem 4). Assume that , is an - complete sequence(Lemma 22), and . Then, -generic extensions of prove Theorem 6.
This completes the proof of Theorem 6 (general case).
Corollary 5. If , then the conjunction of items of Theorem 6 is consistent with provided that is consistent.
Proof. This is a usual metamathematical corollary of Theorems 9 and 8 and Remark 3. □
18. Reduction to Second-Order Peano Arithmetic
Corollary 5 reduces Theorem 2 to the statement
We recall that the consistency of is the blanket assumption in Theorem 2. Yet, we can use the following equiconsistency result:
Theorem 10. Theories and are equiconsistent.
Proof. The theorem has been a well-known fact since some while ago; see, e.g., Theorem 5.25 in [
11]. A rather natural way of proof is as follows.
Step 1. Theory
is interpreted in
by the tree interpretation described in [
11], § 5, especially Theorem 5.11, or in [
13], Definition VII.3.10 ff. Kreisel [
12], VI(a)(ii), attributed this interpretation to the type of “crude” results.
Step 2. Arguing in , we define the transitive class of all constructible sets, which models .
Step 3. We argue in . If every ordinal is countable, then immediately all sets are countable; that is, we have . If there exist uncountable ordinals, then let be the least of them. Then, is a transitive set that models .
We conclude from Steps 1,2,3 that and are equiconsistent. □
Combining Theorem 10 and Corollary 5, we finalize the proof of Theorem 2.
19. Conclusions and Problems
In this study, the method of definable generic forcing notions was employed to the construction of a model in which, for a given
, there is a nonconstructible
real
a, minimal over
and satisfying
, but all
reals are constructible (Theorem 1). This essentially strengthens and extends our earlier results in [
10] by
and the minimality claim. In addition, we established (Theorem 2) the ensuing consistency result on the basis of second-order Peano arithmetic
, instead of the much stronger theory
ZFC typically assumed as a premise in independence results obtained by the forcing method. This is a new result and a valuable improvement upon much of known independence results in modern set theory.
The technique developed in this paper may lead to further progress in studies of different aspects of the projective hierarchy. We hope that this study will contribute to the following crucial problem by S. D. Friedman; see [
26] (P. 209) and [
27] (P. 602): find a model of
ZFC, for a given
n, in which all
sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable and have the Baire and perfect set properties, and, at the same time, there exists a
well-ordering of the reals.
From our study, it is concluded that the technique of transitive models of bounded Separation in
, as in
Section 15, will lead to similar consistency and independence results, related to second-order Peano arithmetic
and similar to our Theorem 2, on the basis of the consistency of
itself.
The following problems arise from our study.
Problem 1. Iterations of Jensen’s forcing were developed by Abraham [
28]. Combining this technique with the finite-support Jensen products technique and some earlier forcing constructions used in the theory of generic choiceless models, a model of
is presented in [
29] in which the countable
holds but the dependent choices scheme
fails for some
relation (which is the best possible). This leads to two different problems:
- (I)
Reprove the consistency results in [
29] on the basis of the consistency of theory
, similar to Theorem 2.
- (II)
Generalize the mentioned consistency result of [
29] to higher projective levels by means of a suitable definable generic forcing notion. That is, given
, define a model of
in which the countable
holds whereas
fails for some
relation but holds for
. A recent paper [
30], containing some consistency results related to different forms of the countable
, is a step in this direction.
Problem 2. The method of definable generic forcing notions has been recently applied for some definability problems in modern set theory, including the following applications:
- -
A model of
ZFC, in which the separation principle holds for a given effective projective type
,
, is defined in [
31];
- -
A model of
ZFC, in which well-orderings of the reals first appear at a given projective level, is defined in [
32];
- -
A model of
ZFC, in which the full basis theorem holds in the absence of analytically definable well-orderings of the reals, is defined in [
33].
It is a common problem related to all these results to establish their -consistency versions similar to Theorem 2.
Problem 3. A somewhat modified forcing notion, say
, rather similar to
of Theorem 4, is defined in [
34]. It is invariant under some transformations so that, instead of a single generic real by
, it adjoins a
-
equivalence class of
-generic reals. (Recall that reals
are
-equivalent if
for all but finite
n. See some generalizations in [
35].) It turns out that this
-generic
-class is a (countable)
set containing no OD (ordinal-definable) elements in the extension, and, at the same time, every countable
set definitely contains OD elements.