Supplementary Materials

This Supplementary Materials provides additional analyses and robustness checks t hat complement and further support the main article's argument and findings. These include:

- Correlation Matrix Table.

- Additional models that explore alternative measures for the domestic level state capacity.

- Additional models that explore alternative measures for the international level state capacity.

Empirical findings

Correlation Matrix Table

For additional robustness checks, I present here a table of the pairwise correlation matrix of the independent variables employed in the main analysis (Table S1). Generally, the results indicate that correlation among explanatory variables is not significantly high, and therefore the independent variables are hardly related to each other increasing the fitness of the model.

Table S1: Correlation coefficients of the independent variables

	Political globalisation$_{t-1}$	GDP per capita$_{t-1}$ (ln)	Democracy$_{t-1}$	Mountainous terrain	Oil resources	Population$_{t-1}$ (ln)	Ethnic fractionalization
Political globalisation$_{t-1}$	1.0						
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$ (ln)	0.52***	1.0					
	(0.00)	(0.00)					
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.51***	0.44***	1.0				
	(0.01)	(0.02)					
Mountainous terrain	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.04***	1.0			
	(0.39)	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Oil resources	-0.09***	0.12	-0.25***	1.0			
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Population$_{t-1}$	0.51***	-0.05***	0.12***	0.26***	-0.03**	1.0	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)		
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.22***	-0.40***	-0.13***	-0.03*	-0.02*	-0.00	1 .0
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.68)	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Alternative measures for the domestic level state capacity

Previous research has used other measures to capture state capacity such as the quality of civil services or the capacity of the state to monitor its population via governmental institutions (Tilly, 2003; DeRouen Jr and Sobek, 2004; Besley and Persson, 2009; Hendrix, 2010; Sobek, 2010). For this reason, I employ an alternative measure for domestic state capacity that focuses on bureaucratic quality. Countries with a high quality bureaucracy are more likely to maintain the control and offer effective state services (see also Fukuyama, 2013). I rely on an indicator from the Political Risk Services Group's (PRSG) International Country Risk Guide, which is a quasi-continuous measure ranging from 0 to 4, based on expert assessments on a state's bureaucratic quality. According to the PRSG, 'high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions'.[1]

Alternative measures for the international level state capacity

Although political globalisation is a rather inclusive measurement that captures various aspects of embeddedness in the international system, I also provide an analysis employing the alternative measure of centrality. This shows a state's involvement in the international system i.e., the networks generated by sharing memberships in IOs (Dorussen and Ward, 2008, pp. 196-198). The data is taken by Dorussen and Ward (2008). Such measure takes into account the connections through all chains in the network including direct and indirect ones.

Table S2 summarizes my findings. The size and the signs of the coefficients, and the standard errors cannot be directly interpreted. Hence, first, I calculated average marginal effects of bureaucratic quality conditional on political globalisation, while holding all other covariates constant at their means (Figure S1 based on Model 1). The results show that as political globalisation increases, the stronger is the conflict-decreasing effect of bureaucratic quality (Figure S1). This means that the bureaucratic quality indicator has a significant impact on decreasing the risk of civil war rather only when the political globalisation is well established (i.e., high levels of political globalisation). Therefore, the results are qualitatively the same with the main analysis when using the indicator of GDP per capita as a state capacity measure.

Additionally, I have calculated average marginal effects of GDP per capita (ln) conditional on centrality (Figure S2 based on Model 2), while holding all other covariates constant at their means. Figure S2 shows that as centrality increases, the stronger is the conflict-decreasing effect of GDP per capita (ln). To this end, centrality also depicts a similar pattern to political globalisation as shown in the main analysis.

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[1]The variable suffers from some missing values, but I capitalize on the fact that it strongly and positively correlates with GDP per capita ($r = 0.7428$). Hence, based on a simple linear regression model that regresses the PRSG variable on income, I employ this variable's predicted values. The final variable I use ranges in [0; 4] and has a mean value of 1.905 (standard deviation of 0.871)

Table S2: Civil war onset and state capacity (alternative measures)

	(Model 1) Bureaucratic quality 1989-2010	(Model 2) Centrality 1962-2012
Political globalisation$_{t-1}$	0.01 (0.00)	
Bureaucratic quality$_{t-1}$	0.13 (0.38)	
Political globalisation$_{t-1}\times$ Bureaucratic quality$_{t-1}$	-0.01* (0.01)	
Centrality$_{t-1}$		0.01* (0.00)
GDP per capita$_{t-1}$(ln)		0.11 (0.15)
Centrality$_{t-1}\times$ GDP per capita$_{t-1}$(ln)		-0.01** (0.00)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Mountainous terrain	0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)
Oil resources	0.61** (0.27)	0.79*** (0.27)
Population$_{t-1}$(ln)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.06)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.98*** (0.31)	1.22*** (0.30)
Peaceyears	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Peaceyears^2	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Peaceyears^3	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-8.58*** (1.20)	-9.51*** (1.49)
N	5,126	5,369
Pseudo Log Likelihood	-633.47	-666.25
Prob > χ^2	0.00	0.00

t Standard errors clustered on country level in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure S1: Civil war onset: bureaucratic quality and political globalisation

Note: Graph shows average marginal effects of bureaucratic quality$_{t-1}$(ln) conditional on political globalisation$_{t-1}$, while holding all other covariates constant at their means. The horizontal bar signifies 90 percent confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line marks a marginal effect of 0.

Figure S2: Civil war onset: GDP per capita and centrality

Note: Graph shows average marginal effects of GDP per capita$_{t-1}$(ln) conditional on centrality$_{t-1}$, while holding all other covariates constant at their means. The horizontal bar signifies 90 percent confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line marks a marginal effect of 0.

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