Table S1. Means, SD and Correlations between the Research Variables for BC2003-2016—H1.

			Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5
Independent variables	1.	Timing of the boundary commission's decision	9.04	3.20					
	2.	Socioeconomic status	4.50	2.07	0.03				
	3.	Geographic closeness to the center	5.52	1.87	0.01	0.33 ***			
	4.	Ethnicity (Jewish)	0.71	0.45	−0.07	0.62 ***	0.31 ***		
	5.	Political affiliation (Right, ultra-Orthodox)	0.68	0.47	0.07	0.02	0.31 ***	0.57 **	
Dependent variables	6.	Relative growth in land area of recipient local authority	13.18	47.83	−0.35 **	0.06	-0.18	−0.06	−0.25 *

$N = 94$; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S2. Analyses testing indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between the timing of the decision and relative growth in land transferred (PROCESS Model #1)—BC2003-2016—H2.

	Dependent Variable = Relative amount of Land Transferred to Recipient Local Authority					
	$R^2 = 0.19$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.09$ ***		$R^2 = 0.19$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.09$ **		$R^2 = 0.31$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.16$ ***	
	Model I		Model II		Model III	
Predictors	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T
Fixed	−43.45 (34.53)	−1.25	198.25 (29.88)	4.48 ***	154.99 (26.95)	5.75 ***
Timing of Decision	4.50 (3.10)	1.45	−15.75 (4.13)	−3.81 ***	−12.48 (2.55)	−4.89 ***
Socioeconomic Status	22.52 (6.87)	3.27 **				
Geographic closeness to the center			−26.60 (7.59)	−3.50 **		
Political Affiliation (Right, ultra-Orthodox)					−153.13 (35.07)	−4.36 ***
SES ×Timing	−1.93 (0.61)	−3.15 **				
Geographic closeness to the center ×Timing			2.17 (0.70)	3.09 **		
Political Affiliation (Right, ultra-Orthodox) ×Timing					12.72 (3.26)	3.89 ***

$N = 94$; $p < 0.05$ *, $p < 0.01$ **, $p < 0.001$ ***; R^2 = Model Prediction; ΔR^2 = Prediction of moderation.

Table S3. Analyses testing simultaneous indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between the timing of the decision and relative growth in land transferred (PROCESS Model #2)—BC2003-2016—H2.

	Dependent Variable = Relative amount of Land Transferred to Recipient Local Authority											
	$R^2 = 0.44$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.26$ ***		$R^2 = 0.33$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.17$ ***		$R^2 = 0.43$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.230$ ***		$R^2 = 0.29$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.09$ **		$R^2 = 0.49$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.24$ ***		$R^2 = 0.42$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.18$ ***	
	Model IV		Model V		Model VI		Model VII		Model VIII		Model IX	
Predictors	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T

Fixed	137.35 (37.58)	3.65 **	−18.38 (29.88)	−0.61	107.81 (47.65)	2.26 *	194.94 (37.88)	5.14 ***	275.68 (42.63)	6.46 ***	157.52 (38.62)	4.078 ***
Timing of Decision	−12.81 (4.05)	−3.15 *	3.50 (3.23)	1.08	−9.17 (5.03)	−1.82	−18.89 (4.20)	−4.49 ***	−26.25 (4.74)	−5.53 ***	−14.23 (3.95)	−3.610 ***
Socioeconomic Status	25.92 (5.26)	4.92 ***	39.4 (8.3)	4.73 ***	10.08 (7.14)	1.41						
Geographic closeness to the center	−35.80 (6.13)	−4.73 ***					−31.31 (7.38)	−4.23 ***	−22.94 (7.59)	−3.02 **		
Ethnicity (Jewish)			−158.94 (40.569)	−3.70 ***			59.20 (33.12)	1.78 *			17.82 (49.02)	−1.037
Political Affiliation †					−153.51 (34.39)	−4.46 ***			−119.79 (33.84)	−3.02 ***	−169.30 (38.81)	−3.617 ***
SES × Timing	−2.70 (0.57)	−5.83 ***	−3.86 (0.09)	−4.26 ***	−1.22 (0.77)	−1.56						
G. closeness to the center ×Timing	3.67 (0.69)	5.31 ***					3.25 (0.82)	3.97 **	2.20 (0.86)	2.54 *		
Ethnicity (Jewish) ×Timing			14.77 (4.50)	3.27 ***			−6.98 (3.41)	−2.04 *			−3.82 (5.23)	0.586
Political Affiliation † ×Timing					15.45 (3.75)	4.12 ***			11.66 (3.75)	3.10 **	17.87 (4.28)	3.336 ***

N = 175; $p < 0.05$ *, $p < 0.01$ **, $p < 0.001$ ***; R^2 = Model Prediction; ΔR^2 = Prediction of simultaneous moderation; † = Right, ultra-Orthodox.

Table S4. Means, SD and Correlations between the Research Variables—PGC2016-2022—H3.

			Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Independent variables	1.	Socioeconomic status	4.91	2.34										
	2.	Geographic closeness to the center	4.43	1.78	0.34 **									
	3.	Ethnicity (percentage of Jews)	61.8	46.7	0.72 **	0.25 **								
	4.	Political affiliation… †	0.64	0.48	−0.45 **	0.02	0.24 *							
	5.	Financial soundness	47	19.2	0.81 **	0.41 **	0.71 **	−0.34 **						
	6.	Size of population	K27	K63	0.00	0.31 **	0.10	0.06	0.13 *					
	7.	Area of local authority in KM²	K89²	K302²	0.16 *	−0.20 **	0.18 **	−0.29 **	0.37 **	−0.01				
	8.	The area demanded by the LA… ††	0.37	1.06	0.02	−0.04	.07	−0.05	−0.11	−0.04	0.14			
	9.	Initiator (the recipient local authority)	0.61	0.49	−0.14 *	−0.15 *	−0.21 **	−0.09	−0.17 **	−0.02	−0.12	0.08		
Dependent variables	10.	Relative growth in land area	0.32	1.16	0.20 *	−0.02	0.19 *	−0.10	0.06	−0.02	0.23 **	0.84 **	−0.03	
	11.	Rates of increase in tax revenues	0.30	0.96	−0.17	0.11	−0.25 *	0.19	−0.28 **	−0.13	−0.16	0.02	−0.16	0.15

N = 280; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; † …of the mayor is as of the political affiliation of the Interior Minister or the government coalition ; †† …relative to its size.

Table S5. Analyses testing indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between area demanded and relative growth in land transferred and rates of increase in tax revenues (PROCESS Model #1)—PGC2016-2022—H4.

	Dependent Variable = Relative Amount of Land Transferred to Recipient Local Authority								Dependent Variable = Rates of Increase in Tax Revenues	
	$R^2 = 0.82$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.09$ ***		$R^2 = 0.33$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.06$ ***		$R^2 = 0.73$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.02$ ***		$R^2 = 0.73$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.02$ **		$R^2 = 0.42$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.39$ ***	
	Model X		Model XI		Model XII		Model XIII		Model XIV	
Predictors	B(SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T
Fixed	0.20 (0.13)	1.53	0.11 (0.09)	1.14	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.31	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.69	−0.12 (0.39)	−0.29 ***
Area demanded	−0.32 (0.16)	−2.05 *	0.13 (0.14)	0.96	0.41 (0.18)	2.21 *	0.73 (0.07)	10.22 ***	9.67 (2.24)	4.32 ***
Socioeconomic Status	−0.03 (0.02)	−1.34								
Ethnicity (Jewish)			0.00 (0.00)	−1.13						
Financial soundness					0.00 (0.00)	0.03				
Area of local authority							0.00 (0.00)	0.91		
Initiator (the recipient local authority)									0.42 (0.47)	0.89
Area demanded ×Socioeconomic Status	0.19 (0.02)	7.94 ***								
Area demanded ×Ethnicity (Jewish)			0.01 (0.00)	5.72 ***						
Area demanded ×Financial soundness					0.01 (0.00)	2.78 **				
Area demanded ×Area of local authority							0.00 (0.00)	2.81 **		
Area demanded ×Initiator									−9.66 (2.25)	−4.30 ***

N = 280; $p < 0.05$ *, $p < 0.01$ **, $p < 0.001$ ***; R^2 = Model Prediction; ΔR^2 = Prediction of moderation.

Table S6: Analyses testing simultaneous indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between area demanded and relative growth in land transferred (PROCESS Model #2)– PGC2016-2022 – H4

	Dependent Variable = Relative amount of land transferred to recipient local authority													
	R^2=.83*** ΔR^2=.10***		R^2=.83*** ΔR^2=.10***		R^2=.97*** ΔR^2=.06***		R^2=.83*** ΔR^2=.10**		R^2=.82*** ΔR^2=.10***		R^2=.82*** ΔR^2=.09***		R^2=.83*** ΔR^2=.10***	
	Model XV		Model XVI		Model XVII		Model XVIII		Model XIX		Model XX		Model XXI	
Predictors	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T
Fixed	.23(.15)	1.51	.27(.14)	1.98*	.12(.35)	.35	.21(.14)	1.54	.22(.13)	1.65	.20(.13)	1.54	.43(.16)	2.73**
Area demanded	-.13(.16)	-.80	-.44(.16)	-2.73**	-.64(.21)	-3.01***	-.18(.17)	-1.09	-.34(.16)	-2.14*	-.31(.16)	-1.98*	-.27(.16)	-1.70
Socioeconomic Status	-.03(.02)	-1.21	-.05(.04)	-1.39	-.03(.05)	-.56	-.03(.04)	-.82	-.03(.02)	-1.52	-.03(.1602)	-1.45	-.05(.02)	-2.08*
Closeness to the center	-.01(.03)	-.20												
Ethnicity (Jewish)			.00(.00)	.59										
Political Affiliation†					.09(.15)	.62								
Financial soundness							.00(.00)	-.05						
Size of population									.00(.00)	-.12				
Area of local authority											.00(.00)	.91		
Initiator (the recipient LA)													-.24(.10)	-2.28*
SES X Area demanded	.21(.02)	8.53***	.17(.03)	5.29***	.23(.03)	7.84***	.24(.03)	7.65***	.21(.03)	8.06***	.19(.03)	7.14***	.20(.02)	8.34***
Closeness to the center X Area demanded	-.06(.02)	-2.89***												
Ethnicity (Jewish) X Area demanded			.00(.00)	1.64										
Political Affiliation† X Area demanded					.20(.07)	2.87**								
Financial soundness X Area demanded							-.01(.00)	-2.44*						
Size of population X Area demanded									.00(.00)	-1.83*				
Area of local authority X Area demanded											-00(.00)	-.38		
Initiator (the recipient LA) X Area demanded													-.10(.08)	-1.14

N=175; $p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***$; R^2=Model Prediction; ΔR^2=Prediction of simultaneous moderation

† =Right, ultra-Orthodox;

Table S6 – Continued-1: Analyses testing simultaneous indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between area demanded and relative growth in land transferred (PROCESS Model #2)– PGC2016-2022 – H4

	Dependent Variable = Relative amount of land transferred to recipient local authority													
	R^2=.80*** ΔR^2=.07***		R^2=.91*** ΔR^2=.02*		R^2=.79*** ΔR^2=.07***		R^2=.74*** ΔR^2=.02**		R^2=.74*** ΔR^2=.02***		R^2=.78*** ΔR^2=.06***		R^2=.78*** ΔR^2=.06***	
	Model XXII		Model XXIII		Model XXIV		Model XXV		Model XXVI		Model XXVII		Model XXVIII	
Predictors	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T
Fixed	.23(.15)	1.54	.08(.30)	.26	.11(.17)	.64	-.01(.17)	-.07	-.04(.17)	-.23	.14(.16)	.82	.11(.09)	1.13
Area demanded	.31(.15)	2.02*	1.57(.20)	7.82***	.28(.17)	1.69	1.04(.13)	8.15***	.87(.14)	6.40***	.03(.18)	.17	.14(.14)	.97
Closeness to the center	-.03(.03)	-.92	-.01(.05)	-.22	-.01(.04)	-.19	-.01(.04)	-.14	.00(.03)	-.02				
Ethnicity (Jewish)	.00(.00)	-.75									.00(.00)	-.59	.00(.00)	-1.11
Political Affiliation†			-.06(.21)	-.28										

Predictors	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T	B(SE)	T
Financial soundness					.00(.00)	-.53					.00(.00)	-.18*		
Size of population							.00(.00)	.18					.00(.00)	-.06
Area of local authority									.00(.00)	.85				
Initiator (the recipient LA)														
Closeness to the center X Area demanded	-.06(.02)	-2.57**	-.10(.03)	-3.01***	-.16(.03)	-4.99***	-.09(.03)	-2.75**	-.03(.03)	-1.18***				
Ethnicity (Jewish) X Area demanded	.01(.00)	6.45***									.01(.00)	4.67***	.01(.00)	5.51***
Political Affiliation† X Area demanded			-.25(.13)	-1.91*										
Financial soundness X Area demanded					.03(.01)	5.95***					.00(.00)	.84		
Size of population X Area demanded							.00(.00)	3.09***					.00(.00)	-.18
Area of local authority X Area demanded									.00(.00)	2.84**				
Initiator (the recipient LA) X Area demanded														

N=175; $p < .05$*, $p < .01$**, $p < .001$*** ; R^2=Model Prediction; ΔR^2=Prediction of simultaneous moderation

† =Right, ultra-Orthodox;

Table S6. Continued-2: Analyses testing simultaneous indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between area demanded and relative growth in land transferred (PROCESS Model #2)—PGC2016-2022—H4.

	Dependent Variable = Relative Amount of Land Transferred to Recipient Local Authority													
	$R^2 = 0.79$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.06$ ***		$R^2 = 0.78$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.06$ ***		$R^2 = 0.75$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.03$ ***		$R^2 = 0.74$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.02$ **		$R^2 = 0.76$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.04$ ***		$R^2 = 0.74$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.02$ **		$R^2 = 0.75$ *** $\Delta R^2 = 0.03$ ***	
	Model XXIX		Model XXX		Model XXXI		Model XXXII		Model XXXIII		Model XXXIV		Model XXXV	
Predictors	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T
Fixed	0.11 (0.09)	1.20	0.28 (0.13)	2.18 *	0.05 (0.16)	0.28	−0.02 (0.16)	−0.13	0.29 (0.20)	1.49	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.66	0.09 (0.10)	0.91
Area demanded	0.10 (0.14)	0.76	0.11 (0.17)	0.66	−0.08 (0.26)	−0.33	0.48 (0.19)	2.48 **	0.29 (0.18)	1.63	0.78 (0.08)	9.34 ***	0.85 (0.09)	9.79 ***
Ethnicity (Jewish)	0.00 (0.00)	−1.15	0.00 (0.00)	−1.69										
Political Affiliation †														
Financial soundness					0.00 (0.00)	−0.76	0.00 (0.00)	−0.17	0.00 (0.00)	−1.19				
Size of population					0.00 (0.00)	0.39					0.00 (0.00)	0.20		
Area of local authority	0.00 (0.00)	0.78					0.00 (0.00)	0.92			0.00 (0.00)	0.86	0.00 (0.00)	0.46

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
Variable	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Initiator (the recipient LA)					−0.23 (0.12)	−1.93 *					−0.24 (0.12)	−1.89 *			−0.18 (0.12)	−1.48
Ethnicity (Jewish) ×Area demanded	0.01 (0.00)	5.13 ***	0.01 (0.00)	5.60 ***												
Political Affiliation † ×Area demanded																
Financial soundness ×Area demanded							0.03 (0.01)	3.69 ***	0.01 (0.00)	1.48	0.02 (0.00)	4.20 ***				
Size of population ×Area demanded							0.00 (0.00)	−2.68 **					0.00 (0.00)	1.07		
Area of local authority ×Area demanded	0.00 (0.00)	1.75 *							0.00 (0.00)	1.43			0.00 (0.00)	2.75 **	0.00 (0.00)	3.43 ***
Initiator (the recipient LA) ×Area demanded			0.06 (0.10)	0.58							−0.30 (0.12)	−2.57 **			−0.21 (0.11)	−1.93 *

N = 175; $p < 0.05$ *, $p < 0.01$ **, $p < 0.001$ ***; R² = Model Prediction; ΔR² = Prediction of simultaneous moderation; † = Right, ultra-Orthodox.

Table S7. Analyses testing simultaneous indirect effects of built-in structural and political factors moderating the correlation between area demanded and rates of increase in tax revenues (PROCESS Model #2)—PGC2016-2022—H4.

	Dependent Variable = Rates of Increase in Tax Revenues											
	R^2 = 0.56 *** ΔR^2 = 0.37 ***		R^2 = 0.46 * ΔR^2 = 0.42 ***		R^2 = 0.48 * ΔR^2 = 0.27 **		R^2 = 0.50 ** ΔR^2 = 0.31 **		R^2 = 0.45 * ΔR^2 = 0.36 **		R^2 = 0.44 * ΔR^2 = 0.37 **	
	Model XXXVI		Model XXXVII		Model XXXVIII		Model XXXIX		Model XXXX		Model XXXXI	
Predictors	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T	B (SE)	T
Fixed	0.67 (1.06)	0.63	1.12 (1.06)	1.05	0.20 (0.81)	0.25	1.08 (1.17)	0.92	−0.04 (0.63)	−0.06	−0.08 (0.51)	−0.16
Area demanded	12.22 (3.27)	3.74 ***	9.17 (3.20)	2.87 **	9.25 (2.86)	3.23 ***	9.31 (3.30)	2.83 **	9.94 (2.77)	3.59 ***	9.60 (2.66)	3.61 ***
Socioeconomic Status	−0.12 (0.16)	−0.76										
Closeness to the center			−0.27 (0.20)	−1.30								
Ethnicity (Jewish)					−0.30 (0.68)	−0.45						
Financial soundness							−0.02 (0.02)	−1.08				
Size of population									0.00 (0.00)	−0.08		
Area of local authority											0.00 (0.00)	−0.26
Initiator (the recipient LA)	0.29 (0.54)	0.54	0.41 (0.61)	0.67	0.20 (0.63)	0.32	0.06 (0.10)	0.58	0.32 (0.63)	0.51	0.36 (0.63)	0.57
Socioeconomic Status ×Area demanded	−0.65 (0.45)	−1.43										
Closeness to the center ×Area demanded			0.24 (0.46)	0.51								
Ethnicity (Jewish) ×Area demanded					−1.18 (1.13)	−1.05						
Financial soundness ×Area demanded							−0.01 (0.05)	−0.24				
Size of population ×Area demanded									0.00 (0.00)	−0.08		
Area of local authority ×Area demanded											0.00 (0.00)	−0.26
Initiator (the recipient LA) ×Area demanded	−9.02 (2.35)	−3.83 ***	−9.97 (2.64)	−3.78 ***	−8.09 (2.77)	−2.92 **	−8.82 (2.52)	−3.50 ***	−8.67 (2.79)	−3.11 **	−8.80 (2.79)	−3.16 ***

N = 105; $p < 0.05$ *, $p < 0.01$ **, $p < 0.001$ ***; R^2 = Model Prediction; ΔR^2 = Prediction of simultaneous moderation;

Figure S1. Socioeconomic status as a moderating factor (Model I).

Figure S2. Geographic status of recipient local authority as a moderating factor (Model II).

Figure S3. Political affiliation of head of recipient local authority as a moderating factor (Model III).

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
Figure S4. Simultaneous moderation of SES and geographic status (Model IV).

**Figure S5.** Simultaneous moderation of SES and ethnicity (Model V).

Figure S6. Simultaneous moderation of SES and political affiliation (Model VI).

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
Figure S7. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and ethnicity (Model VII).

Figure S8. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and political affiliation (Model XIII).


Figure S9. Simultaneous moderation of ethnicity and political affiliation (Model IX).

Figure S10. Socioeconomic status as a moderating factor (Model X).

Figure S11. Rates of the national ethnic majority (Jews) as a moderating factor (Model XI).

Figure S12. Financial strength as a moderating factor (Model XII).

Figure S13. Area of local authority as a moderating factor (Model XIII).

Figure S14. Initiator of land transfer process as a moderating factor (Model XIV).

Figure S15. Simultaneous moderation of SES and geographic status (Model XV).

Figure S16. Simultaneous moderation of SES and ethnicity (Model XVI).

Figure S17. Simultaneous moderation of SES and political affiliation (Model XVII).

Figure S18. Simultaneous moderation of SES and financial strength (Model XVIII).

Figure S19. Simultaneous moderation of SES and population size (Model XIX).

Figure S20. Simultaneous moderation of SES and municipal area (Model XX).

Figure S21. Simultaneous moderation of SES and the initiator of process (Model XXI).

Figure S22. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and ethnicity (Model XXII).

Figure S23. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and political affiliation (Model XXIII).

Figure S24. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and financial strength (Model XXIV).

Figure S25. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and population size (Model XXV).

Figure S26. Simultaneous moderation of geographic status and municipal area (Model XXVI).

Figure S27. Simultaneous moderation of national majority (Jews) and financial strength (Model XXVII).

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
Figure S28. Simultaneous moderation of national majority (Jews) and population size (Model XXVIII).

Figure S29. Simultaneous moderation of national majority (Jews) and municipal area (Model XXIX).

Figure S30. Simultaneous moderation of national majority (Jews) and the initiator of process (Model XXX).

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
Figure S31. Simultaneous moderation of financial strength and population size (Model XXXI).

Figure S32. Simultaneous moderation of financial strength and municipal area (Model XXXII).

Figure S33. Simultaneous moderation of financial strength and the initiator of process (Model XXXIII).

**Figure S34.** Simultaneous moderation of municipal area and population size (Model XXXIV).

**Figure S35.** Simultaneous moderation of municipal area and the initiator of process (Model XXXV).

**Figure S36.** Simultaneous moderation of the initiator of process and SES (Model XXXVI).

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
Figure S37. Simultaneous moderation of the initiator of process and geographic status (Model XXXVII).


Figure S38. Simultaneous moderation of the initiator of process and ethnicity (Model XXXVIII).


Figure S39. Simultaneous moderation of the initiator of process and financial strength (Model XXXIX).

Figure S40. Simultaneous moderation of the initiator of process and population size (Model XXXX).


Figure S41. Simultaneous moderation of the initiator of process and municipal area (Model XXXXI).

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Regulatory Mechanisms		Permanent geographic commissions - PGC2016-2022										
		Boundary commissions - BC2003-2016										
Factors		1. Timing of decision	2. Socioeconomic status	3. Closeness to the center	4. Ethnicity (Jewish)	5. Political affiliation	6. Area demanded	7. Financial soundness	8. Population size	9. Area of LA	10. Initiator (recipient LA)
Boundary commissions - BC2003-2016	1. Decision timing	🏛 BC									
	2. Socioeconomic status	🏛 BC⬆ (I)	🏛 PGC								
	3. Closeness to the center	🏛 BC (II)	🏛 BC (IV) / 🏛 PGC (XV)								
	4. Ethnicity (Jewish)		🏛 BC (V) / 🏛 PGC (XVI)	🏛 BC (VII) / 🏛 PGC (XXII)	🏛 PGC / 💰 PGC⬆						
	5. Political affiliation	🏛 BC (III)	🏛 BC (VI) / 🏛 PGC (XVII)	🏛 BC (VIII) / 🏛 PGC⬆ (XXIII)	🏛 BC (IX)	🏛 ⬆ BC					
Permanent geographic commissions - PGC2016-2022	6. Area demanded	🏛 PGC (X)		🏛 PGC (XI)			🏛 PGC (XII)				
	7. Financial soundness	🏛 PGC (XVIII)	🏛 PGC (XXIV)	🏛 PGC (XXVII)			🏛 PGC (XII)	💰 PGC⬆			
	8. Population size	🏛 PGC (XIX)	🏛 PGC (XXV)	🏛 PGC (XXVIII)				🏛 PGC (XXXI)			
	9. Area of LA	🏛 PGC (XX)	🏛 PGC (XXIV)	🏛 PGC (XXIX)			🏛 PGC (XIV)	🏛 PGC (XXXII)	🏛 PGC (XXXIV)	🏛 PGC	
	10. Initiator (recipient LA)	🏛 PGC (XXI) / 💰 PGC⬆ (XXXVI)	💰 PGC⬆ (XXXVII)	🏛 PGC (XXX) / 💰 PGC⬆ (XXXVIII)		💰 PGC⬆	🏛 PGC (XXXIII) / 💰 PGC⬆ (XXXIX)	💰 PGC⬆ (XXXX)	🏛 PGC (XXXV) / 💰 PGC⬆ (XXXXI)		

Notes:
Kinds of impact

Potential Direct Relationship between factor and land transferred	**Potential Indirect Effect** of a factor on the relationship between timing/area demanded and land transferred	**Potential Simultaneous Indirect Effect** of 2 factors on the relationship between timing/area demanded and land transferred

Direction of impact

🏛 BC⬆ Significant improvement in reducing spatial inequality – land transferred in bc2003-2016	🏛 BC Significant preservation of spatial inequality – land transferred in BC2003-2016	🏛 PGC⬆ Significant improvement in reducing spatial inequality – land transferred in PGC2016-2022	🏛 PGC Significant Preservation of spatial inequality – land transferred in PGC2016-2022	💰 PGC ⬆ Significant improvement in reducing spatial inequality – tax revenues increased In PGC2016-2022	💰 PGC Significant Preservation of spatial inequality – tax revenues not increased in PGC2016-2022