Cataloging and Testing Flood Risk Management Measures to Increase the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Networks
Abstract
:Highlights
- Flood Mitigation Measures need to be collected systematically to utilize the benefits of critical infrastructure network models for flood risk management.
- Enhanced Decision-Making and Coordination: Systematically collecting flood mitigation measures enables more informed decision-making and fosters intersectoral coordination, ensuring effective and context-appropriate flood risk management strategies across various CI sectors.
- Improved Resilience and Resource Optimization: This approach enhances the resilience of CI networks to flooding events and optimizes resource allocation by identifying the most cost-effective and efficient mitigation measures, supporting robust policy development and implementation.
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Flood Measures for Critical Infrastructure Networks
2.1. Methodology for the Derivation of a Measure Catalog
2.2. Generalized Measures
2.3. Hierarchical Structures, Flood Impacts, and Exemplary Measures of Critical Infrastructure Sectors
2.3.1. Electricity Sector
2.3.2. Information and Communication Technology Sector
2.3.3. Freshwater Supply
2.3.4. Wastewater Treatment
3. Risk-Based Evaluation of Flood Measures for Critical Infrastructures
3.1. Consideration of Flood Measures in Flood Risk Management
3.2. Model-Based Evaluation of Flood Measures for Critical Infrastructures
4. Case Study—Potential of Flood Measures in the Vicht Catchment
4.1. Critical Infrastructure Network Model
4.2. Hydraulic Model: Input and Output
4.3. Current Risk
4.4. Testing Measure for Effectiveness
5. Discussion & Outlook
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Interviewee’s Occupation | Sector of Expertise | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electricity | ICT | Freshwater | Wastewater | Gas | Other | ||
1 * | Technical director of a regional drinking water supply company | X | |||||
2 * | Managing director of the municipal utilities | X | X | X | |||
3 * | Managing director of the municipal utilities | X | X | X | |||
4 | Expert at the state ministry for energy supervision and energy regulation | X | X | X | |||
5 | Board member in an association of critical infrastructure operators | X | X | X | X | ||
6 | Independent international blackout and crisis preparedness expert | X | X | ||||
7 | Professor of electrical engineering with a focus on cable networks | X | |||||
8 * | Leader of the disaster management team of a telecommunications provider | X | |||||
9 * | Expert in system operations and the crisis Management Framework for a regional electricity, gas, and telecommunications network operator | X | X | X | |||
10 * | Team leader for network planning in a wastewater collection and treatment company | X | |||||
* With experience in flood events |
Electricity Generation and Distribution (A) | Information and Communication Technology (B) | Water Supply (C) | Wastewater Treatment (D) | Gas Supply (E) | Not-sector-specific, Overarching Measures(F) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Impact (1) | Electricity and water are incompatible due to the high conductivity of water. The presence of water can compromise electrical insulation and increase the risk of electrical accidents. | Network node points on neighborhoodlevel can be active (glas fiber-based) or passive (copper based). The active once are running currents and therefore cause short circuits when flooded. Other components from bigger magnitude can be affected, exchange points, data centers or amplifiers. Telecommunication towers can be affected as well since they usually need a connection to the wired system and are also active–running currents. Satellite communication is not considered in detail Disruptions from mobile communication and landline services are possible. High dependency on functioning electricity supply. | Damaged or disrupted pumping stations cause pressure drop in the supply lines. This subsequently leads to the entry of foreign substances from outside into the pipeline system. Treatment plants are not prepared for additional pollutants that can be introduced by flooding. In case of flooding, well facilities near bodies of water (shore filtrate facilities) are damaged for an indefinite period. | Pumping stations for transferring wastewater fail (directly or due to power failure) - Waste water reservoirs overfill and float in public places Process control system fails due to power failure or internet failure Backwater causes water to penetrate electrical components of the wastewater treatment plant Waste water volume decreases by 50% in affected areas | The gas supply sector has a strong dependency on the availability of information and communication for their operations. Some assets are depending on electricity supply. Piping systems itself are usually not affected during flood events. Other punctual structures are affected by inundation. | Inundation causes disruption to all punctual assets across all sector. The difference is the height that structures and withstand and the vulnerability itself. For the electricity and waste water treatment sector the impact through flooding may lead to immediate health risk in the impacted areas. |
Response (2) | Printout of network plans as a back-up option Prioritisation of response measures in specific areas and for assets of prioritized customers. In the event of faults, maintenance personal has to automatically show up at the control centre. Establish possibility to connect emergency power systems for priori-tised consumers. Release or disconnection (Freischaltung) of transmission facilities …to prevent uncontrolled situations. …to avoid fault current in installations that can be passed on to actually unaffected installations by parallel network routing. | In Germany telecommunication provider aim at measures to continue service for 48h after a disruption from electricity supply Wireless linking of masts, antennas etc to connect otherwise disrupted masts and antennas (Expensive and needs preparation to reserve frequencies). Bring in mobile wireless base stations which usually don’t have a power generation unit. X + 4-h rule is established to set the goal that 4 h after an incident is reported a providers has to restore functionality. It is considered the threshold, depending on specific incident characteristics. | Coordinated emergency meeting points and procedures in case of disturbance scenarios. Definition of a priority list for protection and replacement facilities. Mobile and stationary emergency power supply systems can restore either electricity or water supply in emergencies (generators, pumps, combined pump-power systems). | Backup emergency systems Mobile deployment and activation of power generators and waster water pumps. Utilization of fuel reserves. Dispatching of flush-suction vehicles. Shifting communication to dedicated frequency networks. Creation of blackout plans, flood scenario checklists, and plan lists. | Timely activation of important service providers for the gas operators. Sending out prewritten texts or information to end users and network partners Demanding the electricity shut-off for endangered or impacted assets from electricity supplier. The gas pipelines function as their own storage. Disruptions in the supply structure can be compensated for a while through the remaining gas pressure in the system. | Possibility to easily connect network replacement components to assets. Availability and staff for the installation of network replacement units (Generators, pumps, ICT systems). Technical maintenance staff gathers in predefined meeting points during disruptive events. Priority lists for response measures. |
Recovery and Rehabilitation (3) | Prioritisation of recovery measures in specific areas and for specific vulnerable infrastructures: Administration buildings, clinics, hospitals and old people’s homes (possibly police). Provision of reserve capacities | Active cable nodes have to be repaired with sufficient personal and material. Passive cable nodes only need to be cleaned and dried. From response measures to reconstruction–dismantling of backup power systems. Using post-event analysis of hazard situations to improve reporting channels and documentation procedures. | Ventilation and de-aeration at hydrants. Opening of closing sluises | Prioritised draining of treatment plan areas and pump stations within the catchment area of treatment plant. Set-up of internal communication network and connection of process control room to landline. Restoration of electricity supply. Demand assessment and procurement of emergency power generators and pumps. Obtaining external capacities for the drying of electric motors for pumping stations. Opening manual flood barries. Overhauling of dirty pumps, electric motors, and control cabinets. Maintaining the operation of the pumping stations within the urban area until flooding or evacuation of the site/catchment area. Minimizing damages for the quickest possible resumption of operations. | Drainage of affected pipeline sections at the lowest points using suction pumps, so called pipeline pigs or the inlet of gas under sufficient pressure. Inspection and control of special structures (e.g., ducts), measurement and control technology in all pressure zones Ventilation of affected network components. | Priority lists for recovery measures. |
Prevention and Mitigation (4) | Culverting of supply lines instead of routing them underneath bridges Flood adapted components: Pressurised water-tight cable entries, Oil-immersed transformer cooling systems which are usually waterproof. HQ100 as a boundary for construction of equipment Or otherwise increase of facilities to HQ100 height + x Strategically placed mobile flood protection systems: flood defence walls, flood barrier systems such as the beaver system. Purchase and regularly check and operate standby power systems. Overlapping of service areas to decrease Communication Back-Ups: Setting up a company radio system in the area of influence of grid operator Regular training and use of the company radio system by employees Acquisition of satellite radio to enable communication between different supply levels of the power supply network | Elevating node junctions (KVz) or Multifunctional casing (MFG). Rerouting of physical network. Protection through flood barriers of masts and antennas for which a repositioning is not possible Including batteries in mast systems which can operate 8–12 h with battery usage, though it is not possible for many masts since the energy demand of mast operations currently exceeds the battery capacities. Insurance risk maps are used to identify facilities that require additional protective measures or the rerouting of cables (reinsurance) with cost vs. Damage functions. | Locating water supply facilities out of areas likely to be impacted by flooding. Ensure possibility to connect emergency power generators for pressure boosting systems. Elevation of facilities and replacement facilities. Detachment from indispensable ICT dependency and training of the team for the handling of manual control measures. Digital infrastructure is only optional. Monitoring and remote control are connected to the internet but are not necessary for functionality. Redundancy can be strengthened by establishing connections between different supply networks that compensate for the disruption of procurement or treatment facilities. | Installation of backflow preventers. Positioning of fixed backup pumps in designated areas. Additional protective measures for facility buildings: Waterproofing, protective dikes, installation of barriers. Expansion and elevation of the medium-voltage system. Increasing availability of maintenance and repair staff by sensitisation for individual prevention and mitigation measures on individual level. | Routing of pipelines not parallel to river flow directions. Placement of water construction elements and gabions to prevent scouring due to increased flow velocities. Segmentation of local networks through the regular installation of shutdown and control systems to minimize the impact of outages in a small area. Sufficient elevation or enclosurement of network assets. No or cautious placement of structures within flood prone areas. | Rerouting of linear structures to prevente routing along the river body or replacing punctual CI assets in flood risk areas. Elevating or protecting critical components of CI assets vulnerable to inundation. Placement of water construction elements and gabions to prevent scouring due to increased flow velocities. Increasing the number of connections to other network islands to better compensate service disruptions caused by high level impacts. |
Preparedness (5) | Layperson-operable emergency equipment Storing of spare transformators for each transformation level from highest voltage level, high voltage level and medium voltage level to the low voltage level. This can significantly reduce the recovery time after an event, but also leads to buying of peak in case of a large scale event. On the other side this leads to higher costs which are in case of no event not compensated and normal ongoing maintenance works are prevented monetarily. Sensitisation for decreasing availability–adaptation measure for potentially affected populations Sandbags Storage of sandbags Identification of particularly suitable properties for storage with sandbags Preparation of information to share with public if needed Prepare crisis management committee and personel Define a permanently staffed disaster response team including… the provision of two rooms (communication & consultation/organisation) the provision of food or the activation of such Frequent Preparation and training courses Training on documentation communication and assembly protocols for legal responsibility Printout of network plans as a back-up option Stockpiling of mobile switchgear and emergency power systems | Inform public to charge mobile phones and have a battery radio available. Encouraging a bigger pool of network replacement units (telecommunication and electricity), spare parts warehouses and stockpiling. Close collaboration with meteorological services, regular checks of the ELVIS flood portal are carried out by employees. Mobile response units conduct patrol services capable of installing sandbags. | Emergency management teams should be staffed with CI operators. Preparation of communication channels as backups. (satellite phones, internal communication networks, radio) Definition of measuring points for flood water depths or other factors important for the operator in advance. Stocking of sand, sandbags and the communication about their availability. Arrangement of object protection contractors for facilities. Clarification of access authorization for vehicles before a flood event. | Activation of manual backflow preventers. | Preparation of scenario cases to train staff on services disruptions Storage of flood inundations maps which should be validated in adapted based on new events Obtaining special rights for operational response teams and their vehicles. Inclusion of gas supply sector in crisis management committees. | Including CI operators in crisis management comitees. Organising the availability, operability of mobile flood defenses or sandbags. Previous communication with service providers withrelevant during crisis response and recovery (security firms, technical contractors, administration of permits for maintenance vehicles e.g.) regarding capacities and access permissions. Regional networking of critical infrastructure operators to enhance readiness with backup systems and fuel reserves. |
Sector | Sector Level Assets | Number of Elements | Element Attributes | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Point | Polygon | Connector | Threshold [m] | Repair Time [d] | ||
Electricity | High voltage level transformation | 35 | 0 | 2034 | 0.5 | 365 |
Low voltage level transformation | 735 | 735 | 0.2 | 30 | ||
Information and communications technology | Exchange points | 45 | 45 | 1141 | 0.1 | 100 |
Telecommunication mast | 138 | 138 | 0.1 | 100 | ||
Data centre | 3 | 0 | 0.1 | 100 | ||
Freshwater | Procurement, treatment, distribution facilities | 22 | 22 | 235 | 0.1 | 100 |
Wastewater | Wastewater treatment | 29 | 29 | 242 | 0.1 | 180 |
Gas supply | Measurement, control and regulation facilities | 11 | 11 | 48 | 0.3 | 75 |
Emergency services | Police | 12 | 12 | 115 | 0.2 | 365 |
Fire services | 68 | 68 | 0.2 | 365 | ||
Ambulances | 12 | 12 | 0.2 | 365 | ||
Technical relief | 23 | 23 | 0.2 | 365 | ||
Health | Hospitals | 35 | 35 | 159 | 0.2 | 365 |
Care centers | 124 | 124 | 0.2 | 365 | ||
Governmental institutions | Public administration/penal institutions | 55 | 55 | 55 | 0.1 | 365 |
Total/Average | - | 1347 | 1309 | 4029 | 0.19 | 240 |
Return Period T | Unit | T100 | T1000 | T10,000 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Probability of Occurence phyd | [1/a] | 1.45% | 0.495% | 0.055% |
Tributary 1 | [m3/s] | 67.66 | 97.05 | 125.72 |
Tributary 2 | [m3/s] | 18.20 | 26.10 | 33.82 |
Tributary 3 | [m3/s] | 43.49 | 62.38 | 80.81 |
Tributary 4 | [m3/s] | 16.14 | 23.16 | 30.00 |
Tributary 5 | [m3/s] | 14.50 | 20.79 | 26.94 |
Return Period | Failure Type (Electricity/ICT/Freshwater/Other) | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Direct | Sectoral | Transsectoral | Total | |
T100 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
(0/0/0/3) | (0/0/0/0) | (0/0/0/0) | (0/0/0/3) | |
T1000 | 6 | 9 | 21 | 36 |
(1/1/0/4) | (6/3/0/0) | (0/2/1/18) | (7/6/1/22) | |
T10,000 | 7 | 9 | 21 | 37 |
(1/1/0/4) | (6/3/0/0) | (0/2/1/18) | (0/2/1/18) |
Number | Sector | Disrupted Point Element | Measure Description | Model Implementation | Reference to Cells in Table 2 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
I. | Electricity | Substation | Storing of spare parts such as transformers for shorter duration of repair work | Decreased recovery time = 30 d | A5/F5 |
II. | Electricity | Substation | Elevation of substation including pressurized water-tight cable entries | Increased threshold = 1 m | A4/F4 |
III. | ICT | Exchange point | Redundant power supply from unaffected area | Redundant power supply from low transformation area in unaffected area | B4/F4 |
IV. | ICT | Telecommunication mast | Water-proof cable inlets and elevated | Increased threshold = 0.5 m | B4/F4 |
V. | Freshwater | Freshwater treat- ment facility | Network replacement unit to decrease disruption time from power cut (fuel storage 48 h) | Decreased recovery time = X − 2 d | C2/F2 |
Measure/Scenario | Electricity | Difference | ICT | Difference | Freshwater | Difference | Health | Difference | Social | Difference | Total | Difference |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Risk—Disrupted Population RCI [people × days/a] | ||||||||||||
Current situation | 37,099 | - | 81,404 | - | 83,897 | - | 570,418 | - | 110,429 | - | 883,248 | - |
Measure I. | 3049 | 34,050 | 14,113 | 67,292 | 6896 | 77,001 | 289,602 | 280,816 | 42,043 | 68,386 | 355,703 | 527,545 |
Measure II. | 0 | 37,099 | 8086 | 73,318 | 0 | 83,897 | 264,455 | 305,963 | 35,919 | 74,510 | 308,460 | 574,787 |
Measure III. | 37,099 | 0 | 29,694 | 51,711 | 83,897 | 0 | 566,244 | 4174 | 110,429 | 0 | 827,363 | 55,885 |
Measure IV. | 37,099 | 0 | 73,318 | 8087 | 83,897 | 0 | 570,418 | 0 | 110,429 | 0 | 875,161 | 8087 |
Measure V. | 37,099 | 0 | 81,404 | 0 | 83,438 | 459 | 570,418 | 0 | 110,429 | 0 | 882,789 | 459 |
Risk—Disrupted Population Time RCI,Pop [people/a] | ||||||||||||
Current situation | 102 | - | 282 | - | 230 | - | 1563 | - | 303 | - | 2479 | - |
Measure I. | 102 | 0 | 282 | 0 | 230 | 0 | 1563 | 0 | 303 | 0 | 2479 | 0 |
Measure II. | 0 | 102 | 81 | 201 | 0 | 230 | 725 | 838 | 98 | 204 | 904 | 1575 |
Measure III. | 102 | 0 | 140 | 142 | 230 | 0 | 1551 | 11 | 303 | 0 | 2325 | 153 |
Measure IV. | 102 | 0 | 201 | 81 | 230 | 0 | 1563 | 0 | 303 | 0 | 2398 | 81 |
Measure V. | 102 | 0 | 282 | 0 | 230 | 0 | 1563 | 0 | 303 | 0 | 2479 | 0 |
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Schotten, R.; Bachmann, D. Cataloging and Testing Flood Risk Management Measures to Increase the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Networks. Smart Cities 2024, 7, 2995-3021. https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities7050117
Schotten R, Bachmann D. Cataloging and Testing Flood Risk Management Measures to Increase the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Networks. Smart Cities. 2024; 7(5):2995-3021. https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities7050117
Chicago/Turabian StyleSchotten, Roman, and Daniel Bachmann. 2024. "Cataloging and Testing Flood Risk Management Measures to Increase the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Networks" Smart Cities 7, no. 5: 2995-3021. https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities7050117