*5.2. Analysis of Results in FLI*

Luo and Yan (2010) applied FLI for a more realistic combination of fiscal regimes from the investor's point of view. Moreover, the impact of time sequence differences of the host country on the project, and profit of the investor are also reflected by FLI. According to Figure 4, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which adopt the PSC system, have the most attractive ranking of fiscal terms. Whereas Canada, Australia, and Mozambique, practicing the concessionary system, have the least attractive rankings in terms of the IOC's risk in the earlier stage. The combination level of fiscal components in the PSC system are more attractive than those of the concessionary system.

<sup>13</sup> Attractiveness Ranks of GTi for the countries in PSC are 1. Cambodia, 2. Myanmar, 3. Indonesia, 4, Vietnam (Figure 3), but the ranks of GT are 1. Cambodia, 2. Indonesia, 3. Vietnam, and 4. Myanmar (Figure 2).

<sup>14</sup> Discounted Cash Flow Model for the calculation of GTi.

<sup>15</sup> Non-Discounted Cash Flow Model for the calculation of GT.

**Figure 4.** Attractiveness Rank of Eight Countries by FLI.

Although the U.S. possesses the lowest rank in GT and GTi (Figures 2 and 3), it is in the middle rank (fourth) in FLI (Figure 4), because<sup>16</sup> the ratio of the difference between GT and GTi to GT is neither small nor large compared to other countries. Thus, the risk the IOC will face in the earlier stage of the project in the U.S. is neither high nor low, although the U.S. is the least attractive one in terms of GT and GTi17. Myanmar is in the fifth rank of attractiveness in FLI after the U.S. (Figure 4) and the attractiveness rank is low from the investor point of view. The risk which the IOC will face in the earlier stage of the project in Myanmar is higher than in the U.S., Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia.
