**1. Introduction**

One of the greatest problems that social-science researchers face is the gap between theoretical considerations and the social reality they observe. Religion, which is very difficult to define<sup>1</sup> and encapsulate at the theoretical level, is often overlooked in research, but this further widens the gap between theory and reality. Since religion still plays a very important role in people's lives, it has many functions to fulfill in the life of society, so its inclusion in research would seem to be an important challenge to take up. This is also true in the discipline of International Relations (IR), which—in line with the "Westphalian presumption" prevailing in theoretical considerations—considers religion a minor factor, usually to be excluded from analyses of international reality. Indeed, the lack of references

<sup>1</sup> Also worth noting is the fact that, in the literature on religious studies, a conviction predominates as to the impossibility of this phenomenon being defined in a manner encompassing the world's religious diversity. This is a fundamental problem faced by research into religion. I follow the thoughts of specialists in religious studies in this regard, and also eschew any defining of the phenomenon at this point (Bronk 2009).

to religion in the works most significant for the development of IR theories in the second half of the 20th century should actually be regarded as a feature characteristic of the discipline.

Although, in the wake of the events fed by "religious fuel" that have had a major impact on the international order in recent decades (especially the rise of religious fundamentalism and the September 11th attacks), IR researchers are dealing increasingly with religion in their work, no one really knows how religion ought to be anchored in the discipline, somehow in opposition to the "Westphalian presumption". Likewise, the author of this article cannot claim to have any comprehensive answer to that question, though she is seeking to use the present opportunity to open up further possible paths for exploration. Given the role and place of religion in its society, the Middle East provides an excellent pretext for discussion on the above topic. An additional impulse is provided by the "Mesopotamian turn in IR" postulated by Morten Valbjørn. In itself, this postulate does not constitute any new or revolutionary method of studying international relations. However, it does draw researchers' attention to the need to bring regional studies (in this case, Middle Eastern Studies) and IR closer together, with this serving to open up the latter to multidisciplinarity and a greater focus on historical and cultural aspects.

The method that I have deployed in this text for my research on religion in IR o ffers a combination of the postulate of the "Mesopotamian turn" and the IR approach, with this entailing an examination of the international reality at di ffering levels of analysis (the systemic, state, regional, transnational, and human). A novelty in this approach lies in the way that all are applied at once, though the limited volume of the article obviously precludes analysis of all relevant examples2.

The main goal here is therefore a demonstration of the way religion is present at each level of analysis in international relations vis-à-vis the Middle East and—thanks to that region—the entire international system. Crucially, this presence of religion serves to undermine one of the basic assumptions lying at the heart of the modern international order (and therefore also IR), i.e., the so-called "Westphalian presumption". I, inter alia, emphasize how more attention needs to be paid to the "transnational region" that the Middle East can be taken to constitute—in association with the Islamic world as a whole3. A second postulate entails the need for a restoration of the lost level of analysis in IR, i.e., the level of the human being, for whom religion is—and, in the nearest future, will remain—an important dimension of life, in the given region in particular. It can also be noted how, within analysis of IR, what corresponds closely to the level referred to is the concept of human security developed via the UN system.

The Middle East obliges the researcher to extend considerations to the spiritual dimension of security, as is starting to be realized—not least in reports on social development in the Arab World. It can thus be suggested that, through comparison and contrast with life in societies of the Middle East as it is in practice, religion has been incorporated quite naturally into IR, with this leaving the "Westphalian presumption" undermined at the same time. The consequences of that for the whole discipline may of course be considerable, but much will now depend on researchers themselves, who may or may not take up the challenge posed. The content of this article thus forms an aspect of research into religion within IR, as well as the Middle East, as placed within a wider dimension of sociological considerations vis-à-vis the condition in which today's world finds itself (termed "reflexive modernity").

In the context of the subject being addressed, the work particularly worth paying attention to has been and is by Shakman Hurd (2008), Philpott and Shah (2011), Thomas (2003), Fox and Sandler (2004), Telhami and Barnett (2002), Lee (1997, 2010), Kepel (2003, 2010), and Valbjørn (2004). It is also

<sup>2</sup> For this reason, I omit the important case of Egypt and other countries in the region (e.g., Libya, Lebanon, or Yemen) in point 4.2, which can be considered as some of the limitations of the article.

<sup>3</sup> By the Middle East region, I basically mean the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, i.e., the Arab states, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Apart from Israel, all of these countries are mostly Muslim and are part of the "Islamic world", which, in this article, I identify with the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

worth underlining the significance of the book "Islamic exceptionalism" by Hamid (2017), even as these theses have come under discussion recently in light of observed trends (Akyol 2019). In addition, the research on the Muslim state and society of the Middle East conducted by J. Zdanowski has proved very helpful (Zdanowski 2009, 2013, 2014). In this article, I have also made reference to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports on social development, to work done by the Pew Research Center, and to the most recent polling data from Gallup. Particular emphasis has also needed to be put on a report from a group of specialists coordinated by Meddeb et al. (2017), which has been drawn up for the Barcelona Centre for International A ffairs.

### **2. Assumptions as to the Role of Religion in IR and Its Presence in International Relations in the Middle East**

Bearing in mind the use made of the above studies, it is worth the author establishing at the outset the identity of her own set of key research assumptions. On the one hand, these relate as such to the field that is International Relations, while, on the other hand, we find the matter of religion's role in the Middle East. Leading on from there, a further starting point holds that IR represents an intellectual construct built on "negative secularism" (Philpott and Shah 2011; Shakman Hurd 2008, p. 3). This would be to say that religion, as a conflict-generating factor destabilizing relations in society, has no *raison d'être* in the international sphere. That would then be taken as meaning that this subject need not be researched. Such a conviction formed a basis for the so-called "Westphalian synthesis" (Philpott 2002), which has found its fullest reflection in IR via what Scott Thomas defined as the "Westphalian presumption" (Thomas 2003, p. 23).

And, while this approach reflected secularizing trends present in Western history and culture, it came to be seen as a point of departure for IR research in other parts of the world—and indeed worldwide—as well. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd can thus write of secularism holding sway in IR (secularism as "a form of political authority"). This means that it is through secular optics that researchers perceive and analyze international relations, putting into place complicated theoretical constructs that are nevertheless unable to account for many events and processes actually present or ongoing in societies (Shakman Hurd 2008, p. 3). But, the reality is that civilizational change, dubbed "Post-Modern", means an overestimation of the power of secularism in IR, with inappropriate "talking up" of the subject and with the real-life situation of the Middle East making a new view imperative.

Furthermore, the switching of attention to religion—and attendant negation of the "Westphalian presumption" from this perspective—may o ffer an opportunity for the discipline to find a better place for itself in the system of the sciences (Solarz 2018, pp. 118–20). Once the Iron Curtain had fallen, the circumstance in which the greatest interest was then invested in the history of the social system (also known as the international system), as what was assumed to be a source of comprehensive knowledge of the world we live in, led to "great expectations" being attached to IR as some kind of key to both diagnosing and resolving the problems societies faced as one millennium gave way to another. In this event, the onset of the 21st century saw IR not only failing to satisfy the trust placed in it, but in fact also facing perhaps the greatest challenges the field had ever encountered. In the face of a drawing-back of several di fferent curtains previously shielding the world's cultural diversity from view, it emerged that accumulated knowledge on how the international system operates was far too superficial, and in fact unable to explain very much at all.

If hope is to be reinvested in IR at all, its knowledge will need to undergo reconstruction, this time on the basis of more profound and far-reaching study carried out at lower levels of analysis, and most especially at the levels relating to human aspirations, needs, convictions, and strivings. E fforts to incorporate religion can obviously be helpful as part of the aforesaid reconstruction, and—where IR in practice is concerned—this would denote expansion to accommodate a religious dimension on the part of the concept of human security that the UN system developed with reference to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's original "Four Freedoms".

By adopting certain clear assumptions as to religion in the Middle East, we may present its role in that region's IR with greater clarity. In the first place, we should concur with Scott M. Thomas's observation that social research may not identify religion(s) with a doctrine subject to various di fferent interpretations, but rather perceive the functions it (or they) actually serves (Thomas 2003, p. 25). Equally, R. Scott Appleby o ffered a pithy description of the dual role religion played in the life of society by resorting to the term "the ambivalence of the sacred". By this he meant that, while religion can bring quarrels, conflicts, and wars, it may do just the opposite by inspiring e fforts to achieve peace, justice, and unification/reconciliation in its wake (Appleby 2000; Kulska 2013, p. 86; Solarz 2018, pp. 133–37). And, noting that, let us also recall that any impact of religion on IR (and, in particular, any *positive* impact) represents a fundamental contravention of the Westphalian presumption.

In the second place, as I focus on the role of religion in IR in the Middle East, I do not assume this is the only (or, in any case, even the main) force influencing the observable events and processes. Obviously, other ideative factors are present (not least nationalism and tribal or clan ties), as well as material ones (most especially of a geopolitical or geoeconomic nature)—with each influencing both the perceptions of reality and the decisions made, in this way being in a position to shape IR in this region. All of these phenomena, including the intertwined religion and politics, are mutually impactful and capable of generating or undergoing further change as a consequence of their being in operation see (Lee 2010, pp. 3–9). And that means that, where religion is ignored altogether, or even where its role is played down, the analysis obtained may no longer be considered to relate to reality as is.

In the third place, there can be no doubt that the Islamic World (and hence the Middle East) is playing host to a phenomenon that Maurits Berger terms "Islamization of the discourse". In Berger's view, this is taking on a paradigmatic form, in that what is being expressed in religious categories is even something not having a close link with religion, or frequently representing the abuse thereof (Berger 2010, p. 7). This denotes that IR researchers should be skilled enough to read things from the new narrative; hence, to possess basic knowledge of religion and to be in a position to re-evaluate the secularist approach that has so far held sway.

This can all be served if IR is able to turn back in the direction of regional studies (Valbjørn 2004). Here, it needs to be noted that what Morten Valbjørn postulated was a "Mesopotamian turn in IR" does at one and the same time denote a U-turn in the direction of religion (Schreiber 2012, p. 63). It also means the rejection of what certain IR researchers have come to see as the "Westphalian straitjacket" (Buzan and Little 2001).

On the other hand, the aforementioned "Islamization of the discourse" may also herald the development of the new phenomenon within the political Islam (Islamism) framework that is known as "post-Islamism". This is rooted in the idea that, in the face of the Arab Spring, but also the terror engaged in by Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, the conviction that "the only way is Islam" has not stood the test of time. Changes of awareness of "Post-Modernism" in the Middle East are leading to an attitude sociologists term "reflective individualism" being taken up. The idea here is not to destroy existing structures and configurations, but to negotiate a space for freedom and unconventional behavior for the individual (Hanafi 2012; Zdanowski 2013, pp. 336–37). Such an attitude would seem to achieve reconciliation with a moderate version of religion, while emphatically neither negating nor abusing it.

### **3. Reflexive Modernity in IR: "Westphalian Presumption" vs. "Mesopotamian Turn"**

The reflective individualism referred to above forms an aspect of broader civilizational change ongoing around the world. Sociologists consider that the onset of the "era of modernity" is to be linked to the process of collapse of the "old order" of the feudal society, which took place in the 17th and 18th centuries (Bauman 2004, p. 902). International institutions are, of course, rooted in the "Western culture of modernity" that has come into being since those days (Thomas 2003, p. 22)—which also means that it is their fate to be re-evaluated and undergo modification as that culture does the same. And part of this crisis of modernity can be seen to lie in the challenge religion currently seems to be posing for the social sciences (p. 22).

The term "reflexive modernity" emerges as useful from the point of view of IR, given that it is based around a critical look being taken at oneself along with a willingness to address and correct mistakes one has been making (Bauman 2004, pp. 902–3). This would, in turn, denote that the trends associated with the departure along the road to modernity beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries, with development and progress in the direction of a life characterized by dignity and wellbeing, has served the good of humankind, but still needs reflection and some major course corrections if it is to be given effect in full.

In sociology, this approach has been termed the "revolution of the subject" or the process of individualization, and it is seen to link up with a retreat—on the part of those in authority—from earlier promises that they might solve all of society's problems (promises first, in fact, formulated in the period of classical modernity (pp. 907–8)). Given the 20th century's failed social experiments, the responsibility is now clearly to be shouldered by the individual, who naturally looks for support as he/she strives towards the goal single-handedly. In the cases of many people, that support may be offered by religion, which is often therefore lived and experienced in a deeper, more personal, way. To those on the outside, this phenomenon appears to be a religious awakening, a state of increased religiousness, or a return of (or to) religion.

A religious renaissance may bring with it an anticipated—and necessary—correction of modernity, thanks to the reinsertion of values that make the world more "humanity-friendly". In 1998, President of Iran Sayyid Muhammad Khatami chose the forum of the United Nations to put forward a concept of "dialogue between civilizations", through which religion could play a key role as a unifying and reconciling element see (Dzisiów 2006). Equally, if the (re)awakening links up with the sweeping criticism of modernity, seen as a manifestation of godlessness free of any values (Kepel 2010, p. 37), then the way is clear for the religious factor to exert a dysfunctional impact that does not liberate the human being in any way, but rather enslaves and inflicts much suffering. In the areas conquered by "Islamic State", efforts were made to portray widespread and total violation of human rights, inter alia by way of slavery and sexual violence, public executions, and the destruction of cultural heritage, as justified by historical and religious argumentation (Wejkszner 2016, pp. 109–12).

For its part, the Westphalian order in Europe—as shaped by the Reformation and the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648—denoted a dominant role of the sovereign territorial state, and hence a ban on interference in its internal affairs, including recognized religion. In the light of bloody experiences with religious conflicts, this was—on the one hand—to guarantee rulers the freedom to choose a religion for themselves and their subjects, and—on the other—to end the curatorship of religious authorities (not least The Pope), ensuring their exile from worldly affairs. All of these elements together create the so-called "Westphalian synthesis", and they meant the privatization and marginalization of religion, and—where international relations were concerned—efforts to replace it by a cosmopolitan ethic, which Thomas described as the "Westphalian presumption" (Thomas 2003, p. 23). In the 19th century, the idea of the nation taking the place of religion came to be what bound the state together.

IR researchers saw such Westphalian principles as the foundation of modern international relations, not only on the Old Continent, but also everywhere in the world—and all the more so given the repeated reproduction of the model of the secular nation state as decolonization proceeded with the end of Empire. However, this took no account of actually existing historical and cultural differences, which emerged with renewed vigor as the Cold War came to an end in a period of the exhaustion of Western models that now seemed to have rather little to offer.

In the view of Thomas, the global (especially developing-country) religious awakening we observe is a manifestation of the search for "authenticity and development" (p. 22). As early as in the 1980s, Hedley Bull noted a further phase to the rebellion against the West, which he termed a "struggle for cultural liberation" capable of being viewed as a "reassertion of traditional and indigenous cultures in the Third World" (Bull 1984; Thomas 2003, p. 22). These phenomena only intensified in the 1990s, as it became clear that the modern secular states were not in a position to ensure their people's political participation, or, in fact, to solve their basic existential problems. The failure experienced by foreign cultural models became a pretext for people to fall back on their own tradition, hand in hand with a quest for authenticity and identity, as well as a simultaneous search for more dependable paths of development.

This all denoted a new political/policy approach in developing countries that Thomas describes as "an attempt to indigenize modernity rather than to modernize traditional societies" (Thomas 2003, p. 22; Lee 1997). As S. N. Eisenstadt observes, the reawakening of religion worldwide is not a harking back to traditional forms, but rather a forward-looking attempt to build "multiple modernities" in a Post-Modern world (Eisenstadt 2000; Thomas 2003, p. 23). The result of the changes is, in fact, to be something new for history, i.e., "a truly multicultural international society" (p. 23).

We may note the major chance for IR as a discipline that this all implies—with a synthesis of cultural and historical knowledge plus research of processes on the scale of the whole international system that would allow for real knowledge of that system and its evolution to be obtained. But di fficulties linked with religion's incorporation into IR theory reflect the Western-centered nature of the discipline, which ensures that researchers in the world outside Europe use analytical instrumentation shoehorning the realities of society into categories and notions proper for Western culture, with these therefore being subordinated to the aforementioned "secular authority" (Hurd). The rebellion against that authority is thus one way for IR to achieve the tasks anticipated for it within the system of the social sciences.

In this light, it is worth looking at the postulate presented by Morten Valbjørn, who came out in 2004 with an incisive article, inspirational in terms of research, that made reference to the academic "Mesopotamian turn" referred to briefly above. In more detail, what he was referring to was an overcoming of isolation thanks to the opening up of creative dialogue between two "research streams", i.e., the "River of International Relations" (IR) and the "River of Middle East Studies" (MES). The researcher felt that, just as ancient Mesopotamia had become a cradle of world civilization thanks to the two rivers bounding its territory, so cooperation between IR and MES and the mutual enrichment that was made possible would found an "Academic Mesopotamia", fruitful in terms of future research thanks to its being fed by both streams. Those seeking IR's theoretical generalizations and focused on particular features of the region relevant to MES could—by way of mutual "irrigation" and "cultivation"—engender a better (as more universal) understanding of processes ongoing in the Middle East, while also conferring a new direction upon IR, in the face of continuing theoretical debate that often seemed very distant from the challenges raised by the international reality in particular parts of the world (Valbjørn 2004).

The "Mesopotamian turn" looked particularly apposite and up-to-the-minute in the wake of the tragedy of 9/11 (2001), when IR researchers had once again (for the second time in two decades) to face up to the fact that their discipline had overlooked key phenomena and processes that were essential if reality was to be explained and accounted for. As soon as in 2002, Robert O. Keohane—one of American IR's leading authorities—questioned the suitability of analytical models and theoretical assumptions holding sway previously when it came to explaining the reality of the international situation made plain by September 11th. He, in essence, suggested that academics had been taken in by their own theories. In his view, the attacks on America revealed that "( ... ) all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation. They ignore the impact of religion, despite the fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fueled by religious fervor" (Keohane 2002, p. 272). Keohane simultaneously confessed to his own incompetence where the study of religion was concerned, stating that he would leave the matter open for explanation by other researchers (p. 272). In these circumstances, the utility of regional studies looks very clear.

Let us now note how, from the point of view of IR, the "Mesopotamian turn" denotes a questioning of the "Westphalian presumption", and a necessary reorientation thereof, inter alia in a direction that provides for its incorporating religion. Understanding their region better, those researching within MES emphasize that the Middle East may not be analyzed if no account is taken of the functions that culture and religion there serve (Valbjørn 2004, p. 55). It further needs to be stressed that the impact of religion has "spilled over" beyond the region, permeating into the international system that is the

main subject of IR research. There, it meets up with the influence religion also exerts in other parts of the world, such as America, Africa, Asia, or Eastern Europe.

The difficulties with bringing religion into IR relate on the one hand to the discipline's Eurocentrism, and especially the assumption that each state in each region of the world (Middle East included) reflects the European progenitor. On the other hand, there is the reality that research has first and foremost seen things from the point of view of the state and the system. Only to a lesser degree has the transnational and regional level been taken account of, while the level of the individual has apparently been abandoned entirely.
