*3.3. After the 'War of Words', the 'War of Bay'as': Alliance-Building and Fragmentation in the Age of the 'Caliphate'*

ISIS spokesperson, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had in effect announced the restoration of the Caliphate few weeks before al-Baghdadi's caliph-like appearance in Mosul. In his speech, al-Adnani stated that 'with this declaration of the caliphate, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the Caliph Ibrahim and support him'. In the same vein, al-Adnani added that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the caliph's authority and arrival of its troops to their areas' (Al-Adnani 2014). The declaration of the Caliphate, thus, automatically posed a question of authority and allegiance; theoretically to all Muslims, but practically to the other groups in the jihadi movement.

With the help of technology, Adnani's call for bay'as<sup>2</sup> reached the edges of the jihadi world. In a climate of heated debate, a flurry of online bay'as ensued. At that point, most of them were personal bay'as on social media (Holtmann 2014). Increasingly, though, collective baya's from jihadi groups started coming in. Since 2014, more than 40 groups, spanning an area from west Africa to southeast Asia, have pledged an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi. IS has displayed less restraint than al-Qaeda in accepting these bay'as, but nevertheless showed some caution. As early as November 2014, IS made its first round of acceptances, welcoming to its fold five jihadi groups form the Middle East. Not all bay'as were accepted, though. For instance, bay'as from Sinai, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, and the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) resulted in the creation of wilayats (provinces), while in Caucasus and Khorasan (Af-Pak) they were delayed and other ba'yas were accepted, but not considered for official expansion (Dabiq 2014, p. 24). To justify the delays in accepting bay'as from some groups, IS put forward specific preconditions for the creation of new wilayats: unification of the jihadi forces operating in the area, nomination of a leader, a detailed plan of military conquest and submission of the 'file' to IS's central authorities for evaluation and approval (Dabiq 2015b, p. 35). These preconditions seemed to favor groups with established presence in their region, which had relatively fair chances to survive the aftermath of the bay'a.

Although IS's desire to affiliate with established groups that have operational potential is a plausible explanation, it fails to explain why the bay'a of practically non-existent groups in Algeria and Saudi Arabia was accepted in the first place. It appears more probable that expansion into Saudi Arabia was mainly guided by religious justifications and it was decided in the spirit of IS competition with al-Qaeda. In Algeria, the main motive might have been a desire to stir things within al-Qaeda in

<sup>2</sup> Although the exact meaning of bay'a is not clear, it is used to denote a pledge of allegiance and submission to a person of authority. Originally it referred to allegiance to a Caliph (and the Prophet Muhammad himself), but later it was used more loosely. For more on this topic see (Milton and Al-Ubaydi 2015; Porter 2015; Wagemakers 2015).

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and encourage possible defectors. It is equally noteworthy that none of the bay'as made by non-Arab groups were granted affiliation in this first round of acceptances (Milton and Al-Ubaydi 2015, p. 4). The first non-Arab wilaya was established in early 2015 in Af-Pak borderland (Khorasan Province), further highlighting the anti-al-Qaeda reasoning in IS's strategic planning. It is possible, then, that IS opted to begin its expansion with groups that, on the one hand, are smaller but possibly easier to manage (Milton and Al-Ubaydi 2015, pp. 4–5) and, on the other hand, are closer to its Syria/Iraq heartland, and possibly offer better communication channels. In 2015, IS confidence in its global aspirations grew as a result of the increasing tempo of attacks in western countries by small groups or individuals, who pledged bay'a to al-Baghdadi. This new-found confidence prompted IS to enlarge the circle of affiliates and include groups outside MENA.

IS's motivation to seek alliances in the jihadi movement seems rather straightforward. IS sought to create an arc of affiliates to claim a hegemonic role within the jihadi scene. IS expects little from its affiliates. Contrary to al-Qaeda that anticipated its affiliates to shift their priorities from local issues to fighting the far enemy, IS is content to leave its affiliates alone (Zelin 2015, p. 25). They are expected to operate under the banner of IS and they are expected to survive. In the best case scenario, these alliances might also convey logistical benefits to IS, such as streamlining fighters to Syria/Iraq (Milton and Al-Ubaydi 2015, p. 5). Apart from that, IS affiliates were free to organize their activity as they pleased.

Given that IS asked little from its affiliates, it is important to explore what IS offered in return. In other words, if alliances require a degree of need fulfilment on both sides, what the groups that pledged bay'a to IS expected from this affiliation. Their motivations run across the resources-ideology spectrum. Some groups were genuinely excited by the reestablishment of the caliphate (McCants 2016, p. 21). In this sense, they were driven by ideological considerations. These considerations occasionally stemmed from the local circumstances each group faced. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is an interesting example in this regard. Affiliated with al-Qaeda, but in close proximity to the Taliban, the foreign status of IMU in Af-Pak and its conflicts rendered the idea of IS borderless jihad more suited to IMU's goals than Taliban's nationalist aspirations (Jadoon 2018, p. 38).

In terms of resources-related motivations, some groups might have pledged allegiance to IS expecting financial rewards (Jadoon 2018, p. 32) or boosts in recruitment from the media attention their bay'a generated. IMU again is a case in point. Long detached from its main area of operations in Uzbekistan, IMU hoped that affiliation with IS will revive its influence within Uzbekistan and increase recruitment (Jadoon 2018, p. 38). Boko Haram also expected to attract more recruits from other West African countries and the diaspora, and possibly a better and wealthier pool of recruits beyond the 'poor al-majiri boys' profile of most Boko Haram's members (Zenn 2015, p. 21). Resources-related motivations were more central in low-end—operational—cooperation between IS and local groups, which expressed support but did not pledge bay'a to al-Baghdadi. This is most evident in Pakistan, where IS developed cooperative relations and conducted joint attacks with powerful groups, which did not fully share IS ideology, such as Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), Jundullah and the Balochistan National Army (Jadoon 2018, pp. 38–39; Rassler 2015, p. 9). Other groups might have been lured by the prospect of having access to IS's media apparatus, especially if they lacked a propaganda production mechanism of their own. IS-affiliated groups in Somalia are such an example. Although Al-Shabaab retained control of its very prolific media apparatus, the former al-Shabaab groups that pledged allegiance to IS could rely on IS central's media mechanism to produce and distribute their photos and videos from Somalia (Warner and Weiss 2017, p. 31). Boko Haram is also one of the organizations that benefited from better media production after their affiliation with IS (Milton and Al-Ubaydi 2015, p. 6).

While resources-related drivers varied across specific cases, a motivation shared by almost all groups was increased (local) political relevance (Jadoon 2018, p. 32). The motivation was particularly strong in groups operating in competitive jihadi environments. This quest for local power and relevance was only marginally related to the al-Qaeda–IS competition, but it was exceptionally destructive for local conflicts. It is no surprise, then, that most of the groups that pledged allegiance to IS were splinter-groups or factions from established (often al-Qaeda affiliated) organizations (Crone 2017, p. 69; McCants 2016, p. 21) These internal splits unwounded along old cleavages, regional differences or preexisting leadership disputes. They rested on divergences over interests and strategy or sometimes belied a more personal grudge, such as being overlooked in a promotion or stripped of personal fiefdoms. A case in point is the IS affiliate in Af-Pak, which attracted militants, who were unhappy with Taliban's peace negotiations with the governmen<sup>t</sup> in Kabul. At the same time, the founders of the Khorasan Province were often passed over for leadership roles or profitable postings by the Taliban leadership (Rassler 2015, pp. 7–8; Sheikh 2017, p. 43). In the same vein, AQAP militants in Yemen, who broke away to form the IS-Yemen Province, accused AQAP that it was not doing enough to kill Shi'a Houthis (McCants 2016, p. 21). The case of AQAP also highlights the role of generational divides in movement fragmentation, as IS ideology has attracted primarily younger members of AQAP (Clausen 2017, p. 59).

In several cases geographical dispersal attenuated preexisting cleavages, festering poor communication and increasing intra-movement suppression costs. This is best evident in Somalia. Two factions split from al-Shabaab to join IS, one in northern Puntland region and the other in southern Somalia. The former, which is led by Abdulqadir Mumin, is the official IS branch in the region. It has also been the most active, with its biggest achievement being the brief capture of the port town of Qandala in Puntland (Weiss 2019, p. 29). The southern faction has been less formalized and less active. Yet, it has been the primary target of al-Shabaab efforts to stifle internal dissent. Al-Shabaab employed its internal security service, the Amniyat, to arrest and occasionally execute pro-IS members, but due to geographical distance from the Mumin-led Puntland group, it could only deploy it against the much more accessible southern factions (Warner and Weiss 2017, pp. 28–29). Likewise, Taliban were in a striking distance from IMU in Afghanistan. Thus, when IMU's leader Usman Ghazi pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi, in the wake of the confirmation of Mullah Omar's death, Taliban could reach and defeat the Ghazi faction in November 2015, prompting some IMU members, who had followed Ghazi, to return to their fold (Jadoon 2018, pp. 37–38).

Weakness, as result of increased (state) counter-insurgency and military setbacks, has been at the core of some splits. For example, Egyptian army's crackdown in Sinai, in the wake of Morsi's ousting, possibly pushed Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis to make bay'a to IS (Lahoud 2015, p. 14). Likewise, the operations of the Pakistani army in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been central motivation for the Orakzai and Bajaur factions of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to switch allegiance to IS (Jadoon 2018, p. 36). Military pressure and weakness have also played a role in the case of Boko Haram. The large-scale military offensive, launched in February 2015, by Nigeria and neighboring countries (Chad, Cameroon and Niger) severely restrained Boko Haram (Crone 2017, p. 68; Cummings 2017, p. 24). Facing military setbacks and territorial losses, Boko Haram needed IS's global brand to project local relevance.

The previous discussion revealed a complex web of motivations, needs and strategic considerations behind the alliances that IS forged across the jihadi sub-system. These alliances materialized because they fulfilled some needs on both sides. Local groups benefited from media exposure, possible recruitment boosts, increased political relevance and opportunities to settle local scores with their mother-organizations. IS, on the other hand, was content with 'expanding' its global brand and solidifying its claim to hegemony within the jihadi subsystem. They did not compete directly for the same resources. Hence, they could take advantage of the benefits alliances offered without enduring the cost.
