**3. Theoretical Framework: Decoloniality**

The article is couched in decoloniality theory. The theory has roots in Latin America with leading scholars like Walter Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres, Quijon, Dussel (Wanderley and Barros 2018) and championed by Sabelo Gatsheni Ndlovu in South Africa. It was "born out of a realisation that ours is an asymmetrical world order that is sustained not only by colonial matrices of power but also by pedagogies and epistemologies of equilibrium that continue to produce alienated Africans" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b, p. 11), who, in turn, hate, colonise, and oppress other Africans. In its broader perspective, the theory represents a commitment to challenging and reformulating the communicational scientific discourse, from a criticism of the mediating power of the Eurocentric hegemonic thinking, to a native cultural paradigm (Eliana Herrera and Del Valle Rojas 2016, p. 78). It does so through a deliberate attempt to break with monologic modernity, and issuing an invitation to engage in dialogue (Maldonado-Torres 2011, p. 261). It is, furthermore, a theory that rejects modernity, which is located on the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, in favour of a decolonial liberation struggle to achieve a world beyond Eurocentric<sup>1</sup> modernity (Grosfoguel 2011, p. 21), dehumanisation, and all acts that seek to reduce people's ontological density. The theory questions the legitimacy and sanity of celebrating postcolonial thinking, while the majority of Africans remain mentally colonised (Kaunda 2015, p. 77). The theory was chosen to inform the thinking of this article since one of the theory's primary mandates is to work towards a vision of human life that is not dependent upon or structured by the forced imposition of one ideal of society on those that differ in ideas (Mignolo 2007). The theory is appropriate in the South African contexts since it engages in a struggle against the Eurocentric design strategy [to colonise African continent], which is visible in religion informed by binarism and hierarchisation, and which keeps power imbalances and the colonial legacy intact (Sithole 2014).

It may be interesting to the reader that, in this article, decoloniality is not used to promote a struggle to decentre the Global North against Global South, as much of decoloniality research does. This article focuses on the Global South versus Global South actors, who, by default or by design, have

<sup>1</sup> Eurocentric is a general term used in this paper to refer to what is referred to as West, or Global North, and, more precisely, the African colonisers, whose impact is still felt today, despite 26 years of South African independence.

replaced Global North colonial masters, and have occupied the big brother mentality of determining what is right and wrong, while at the same time ignoring justice and equity within the prophetic space. To this end, the article agrees with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b, p. 11), who centers around the perspective that the struggle of decoloniality is a "melee against invisible vampirism of imperialism technologies and colonial matrices of power (coloniality) that continue to exist in the minds, lives, languages, dreams, imaginations, and epistemologies of modern subjects in Africa and the entire global South."

As indicated above, the article will consider the three motifs of decoloniality, namely, coloniality of power, knowledge, and critique. The article defines coloniality. Coloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism (Maldonado-Torres 2011). Coloniality is a name for the 'darker side' of modernity, which needs to be unmasked because it exists as "an embedded logic that enforces control, domination, and exploitation" (Mignolo 1995). Coloniality of power is a useful concept that delves deep into the roots of the present asymmetrical global power relations, and the way the present modern world order was constituted. It boldly enables a correct naming of the current 'global political present,' as a racially hierarchised, Eurocentric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, sexist, capitalist, heteronormative, hegemonic, and modern power structure (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Coloniality of power describes modern global power as a network of relations of exploitation, domination, and control of labour, nature and its productive resources, gender and its reproductive species, subjectivity and its material and intersubjective products, and knowledge and authority (Quiano 2007). The coloniality of knowledge poses epistemological questions that are linked to: (a) the politics of knowledge generation; (b) questions of who generates which knowledge and for what purpose; (c) the question of relevance and irrelevance of knowledge; and, (d) how some knowledges disempower/empower communities and peoples (Ake 1982; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a). The article refers to coloniality of knowledge in this article mainly because prophetic movements appear to tussle and compete on issues relating to who has better and more attractive religious knowledge, in order to gain popularity. Coloniality of being is defined by Maldonado-Torres (2011) as the combination of coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge. Furthermore, coloniality of being is that of racial invention, where the notion of race and nationality is used as the organising principle through combining power and knowledge (Sithole 2014). To this end, there exists the notion that people who are not citizens of a certain country do not belong to its zone of being; thus, they should be subjected to dehumanisation, xenophobia, and other acts that reduce their ontological density. This mentality must be challenged. In essence, the article combines these three motifs, which are pertinent and relevant to the South African context marred with coloniality manifested in many ways, in which one of them is religion.

### **4. Factors that Influence Prophetic Conflict in South Africa**

In this section, the article responds to the first question, namely, what are the factors propelling prophetic conflict in South Africa? Responding to this question will expose the readers to the challenge of prophetic conflict in South Africa. In doing so, the article intends to show the need for a Jonathanic theology, which is explained in greater depth when in response to the second question. Various factors are discussed, the first one being popularism.

Prophetic movements in South Africa have been marred by competition, which, in some cases, has gone beyond control, and has led to conflict. Religious adherents or believers move from one prophetic movement to the next, following popular prophets. Arguably, prophetic movements are the fastest growing religious movements in South Africa. While precise statistics are lacking, scholars agree that prosperity gospel followers rival, if not exceed, the numbers of followers of mainstream religions (Van Wyk 2019). This claim implies that some churches or religious groups continue to lose members to big and popular prophetic organisations. Followers of prophetic movements are not captive victims of so-called cult leaders. In fact, they move constantly between churches in search of more

efficacious "technologies" and "stronger prophets" (Van Wyk 2019). Magezi and Banda (2017) believe that the popularism sought by some contemporary prophets is a sign of them actually competing with Christ—they often project themselves as uniquely anointed by God. There is a silent force among prophets in South Africa, who are on a quest of gaining power through teaching, prophecies, and other actions. Some have required adherents eat snakes, drink diesel, be sprayed with Doom—all to gain power, which, in turn, translates into popularism. The desire for power has forced some prophets to resort to unconventional practices. In some cases, the prophets become, as suggested by Henze (1996, p. 1), legalistic and mind controlling, and they exhibit authoritarian tendencies. Cognisant of these practices, the media, politicians, prophets, and the general populace that were attracted became involved in conflict between those who practice and support what others believe to be malpractices, and those who believe that their mandate is to be harbingers of truth and the pure gospel.

Most foreign prophets have been accused of using faith to extort money from people (CRL Rights Commission 2017). In fact, during hearings of the Commission, some pastors or prophets demonstrated their resistance to the Commission by refusing to take the prescribed oath, refusing to submit the required financial documents and bank statements, and causing dramatic scenes (CRL Rights Commission 2017, p. 17). Some prophets were accused of money laundering, such as Shephard Bushiri (Lindeque 2019; TimesLIVE 2019; Evans 2019), and Pastor Alph Lukau (Montsho 2019; Matangira 2019)—both foreign nationals who operate churches in South Africa. However, according to the CRL Commission report, there are many local religious groups in South Africa who are also deemed to be "profiteering from religion," especially through their refusal to submit their financial records to the CRL commission; these include Pastor Mboro and Prophet Hadebe (CRL Rights Commission 2017). In commenting on prophet Hadebe, Collinson (2017) reports that Hadebe refused to appear before the Commission and ignored its request to view his church's financial statements.

Shepherd Bushiri, a well-known leader who had been accused of prophetpreneurship, is a Malawian who was arrested in 2018 on allegations of fraud and money laundering, among other crimes. Bushiri, in response to allegations of commercialising religion, said, "I am a businessman and that is separate from being a prophet. My prosperity is from private businesses. Such questions are not asked from leaders of white churches but when an African man prospers, then it's a problem" (Fihlani 2018).

While the article does not seek to either exonerate or condemn Bushiri, the article submits that, in South Africa, there is the idea that, when one race or nationality does something, like extort believers, it is wrong, and when it is done by another race or nationality, it becomes right. The point, which relates to the source of conflict, is that prophetic movements in South Africa, whether local or foreign, are characterised by commercialisation of religion; however, the outcry becomes louder when the movement involved has foreign origins.

The article has attempted to show that both local and foreign prophets (not only those mentioned) have been accused of profiteering, which, if it is proven to be true, means that prophetic movements must re-examine their relevance in the context of promoting social justice and social transformation. With reference to decoloniality, commercialisation of the gospel is accompanied by power, and this power makes the holder great. I, thus, problematise the commercialisation of the gospel, especially when it is used to subject the poor to even worse poverty, and to dehumanise people through criminal acts that extort money from them. Societies cannot prosper in the context of exploitation, especially by religious leaders, who are supposed to be the moral agents of change. So, in decoloniality, exploitation, whether by local or foreign prophets, must be challenged, and religious misconduct and delinquency must be prosecuted and judged—not based on race, nationality or colour—as these acts remove some people from the zone of being.

In an attempt to gain popularity, prophets have resorted to performing miracles; however, some of these miracles are questionable. One 'miracle' that became problematic was performed by Pastor Alph Lukau, and resulted in an intensification of the call for foreign prophets to return to their own countries and perform miracles for their own people (Matangira 2019; Montsho 2019). A local prophet

who seemed agitated by this miracle was Prophet Paseka 'Mboro' Motsoeneng, founder of Incredible Happenings Ministries. In responding to Lukau's so-called miracle, Jordaan (2019) cites Mboro saying, "They say I am jealous. What jealous. I gave away cars' houses. There is no competition here. I'm here because the name of Christ has been played with. This miracle is a fraud and if it's not' they must bring proof. Let's talk about it as men of God. That man never died. God will heal people when he wants' in any way he wants. Let's not fake things."

In addition, Lukau's miracle attracted the attention of Bishop Elly Mogodiri of St. Oaks Global Church of Christ, who is cited by Njilo (2019) as commenting that, "I am aware and have been duly advised that this case falls within the ambit of organised crime' fraud and misrepresentation' among other misdemeanours. As a result' I have since approached my local police station' being Hartbeespoort SAPS in the North West province' and opened an organised crime case."

It is clear from this discussion that 'fake miracles' are one of the ways in which prophets gain popularity, and also a source of conflict among the prophetic movements. From a decoloniality lens, this phenomenon refers to coloniality of power, which transfers the prophets who are deemed powerful to the zone of special being, while those prophets who cannot perform such miracles are moved from the zone of being. Decoloniality evokes the need to challenge acts and narratives that enhance people's ontological density at the expense of made-up miracles.

Criminality or mafia-based tendencies that are hidden in religious narratives are one of the common issues that haunt the prophetic movement in South Africa, and serve as a cause of conflict. Kgatle (2017) describes criminal or mafia groups as "churches [that] are known for their refusal to affiliate with established denominations in South Africa. Some of these churches also refuse to be part of the South African Council of Churches (SACC)." In most cases, these mafia churches strive, as suggested by Damiani (2002, p. 45), by "destroying any individual personality and replace the void with a cultic personality that no longer questions, thinks critically, or feels the impact of an abusive system." In most cases, this type of criminality is not visible, but is hidden from religious adherents. It causes those who are subjected to it to become incapacitated, and to see, name, describe, and explain it as it is institutionalised, naturalised, and normalised (Sithole 2014). The article agrees with the observation by Magezi and Banda (2017), that, under normal circumstances, prophets are conduits through which God's authority is extended to the believer. Sadly, this creates opportunities for prophets to abuse their followers, because the leaders are feared and considered as beyond questioning (Magezi and Banda 2017).

The list of criminality and mafia tendencies exhibited by both local and foreign prophets is long. For example, Timothy Omotoso is known for rape scandals, money laundering, and human tra fficking (Dube et al. 2017); the Seven Angels Ministry for constitutional delinquency, abuse of resources and preventing children from attending school (Dube 2019). In some cases, congregants have to ingest or are sprayed with dangerous poisons, ostensibly as part of a healing process (Jamaica Observer 2016). As long as religious leaders are guilty of such practices, religions will continue to remain a problematic institution in society, and, even worse, create competition which accelerates to conflict. Thus, Kaunda (2015, p. 75) warns that, "as long as African mind remains one of the spaces for oppressive religious structures there seems to be no possibility of academy and knowledge decolonization and consequently, no social transformation, no political progress and no economic development."

In light of these factors, evil or otherwise, the article submits that religious leaders should remain agents for peace, social justice, and accountability, through peaceful resolution of di fference, and dialogue as a benchmark that society can follow. The continued conflict, the article submits, is a "darker side" of modernity that needs to be unmasked (Mignolo 2000), because it exists as an embedded logic that enforces control, domination, and exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress, and modernisation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b, p. 13), and protection of citizens from foreign prophets. Cognisant of this, the article suggested the tenets of Jonathanic theology for framing a space for peaceful resolution of the conflict between local and foreign prophets.

### **5. Jonathanic Theology: What Does It Entail and What Opportunities Does It O**ff**er?**

This section responds to the second research question and discusses the themes that have been raised. Jonathanic theology is a term that was coined for the sake of this article, and for future discussions. It should not be confused with the theology propounded by Jonathan Edwards. Rather, it is framed within the story of Jonathan and David (I Samuel 18–20), a biblical passage which intends to evoke a new reading of and thinking on. The article does not intend to use the passage, like many scholars have done, to justify homosexuality or lesbianism, or to read the passage in the context of biblical wars caused by tussles for a throne. There is an attempt to reread the texts anew, informed by Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2013a) argumen<sup>t</sup> that decoloniality emphasises an agenda that involves rethinking the very constitution of the present and the construction and reconstruction of new identities and philosophies. The attempt is to use the text of 1 Samuel 18–20 to tease a new theology of prophetic defence, peace, and peaceful resolution of difference in the context of ambivalence of the prophetic terrain, marked by dislodging prophetic movements with different ideas from one's own. The article wishes to emphasise that prophetic vocation can survive in the contexts of collective effort to defend oppression, racism, and inequality that arise from bolding a different theological stance. The article provides a reread and reinterpreting of 1 Samuel 18–20 informed by a decoloniality lens, especially its motifs of coloniality of power, knowledge, and being. By doing so, the theology embedded within the text will evoke a philosophy of liberation, which entails rehumanisation of the dehumanised, and the courage to care and to love (Mpofu 2017, p. 4).

### *5.1. Tenets of the Jonathanic Covenant in 1 Samuel 18–20*

This section unpacks various tenets emanating from the story of David and Jonathan. For the purposes of grounding readers on how the conceptualization of Jonathanic theology came about, the article briefly highlights the story. The story of Jonathan and David is taken from the Bible and, in particular, from 1 Samuel 18–20. Saul was the king of Israel; however, his popularity was diminishing while David was getting a spotlight among the Israelites. Saul was not pleased with David's popularism and sought to kill him. Jonathan was Saul's son and a friend to David. In the context of Saul's attack on David, Jonathan stood to protect David against his father Saul. Jonathan made a covenant with David to ensure that David was protected from Saul and, likewise, David was to remember the family of Jonathan when he ascended to the throne, which he did with Mephibosheth in 2 Samuel 9. The bottom line of the story is a commitment of Jonathan to promote peace in the context of political and religious contexts, which made me reread the story and see its applicability in the prophetic movements in South Africa, to tease new meanings of the story and debates in the field of religion, politics, and peace towards contributing to a better future for all.

While Jonathan and David were not prophets, the principles within the story can be applied into the South African prophetic space. Referring to it as Jonathanic theology does not seek to undermine the role played by David in this story, it is not the case; the article refers to Jonathanic theology because it was Jonathan who took the initiative to protect, defend, and make peace with David in the face of Saul's brutality towards David. Jonathan's actions can make up a theology on its own, especially with reference to his defence of David, and his attempts to make peace with David, regardless of Jonathan being a potential heir to the throne should David be deposed. The approach is relevant and serves as a reminder, as postulated by Abbink (2014, p. 89), that religious leaders are not only community leaders and preachers, but also moral authorities who play mediating roles in solving local conflicts—also between people of different faiths or denominations—and they should not be promoting violence and hatred of people of difference. To this end, the article identified four tenets that define Jonathanic theology for peaceful resolution of difference, namely, brotherly love greater than the throne, defence for the afflicted in society, sincerity to power, and commitment to purpose. Below, informed by decoloniality motifs, these tenets will be discussed in detail.
