**3. Terrorism Recruitment (TR) and Boko Haram's Recruitment Strategy: What Does the Literature Say?**

### *3.1. Terrorist Recruitment: Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Discussions*

As suggested by Forest(2006), there is no universally accepted definition for the concept of terrorism recruitment (TR). However, most studies on terrorism are of the opinion that terrorism recruitment refers to the various sociological, political, economic, ideological, religious, and psychological strategies and tactics used by terrorist organizations to enlist members (Faria and M 2005; Neumann 2012; Özeren et al. 2014; Klein 2016; Bloom 2017). These strategies could be violent or non-violent as well as the integration of the various socio-cultural, economic, ideological, psychological, and political conditions that motivate individuals into joining terror groups (Post et al. 2002; Forest 2006; Knapton 2014; Jones 2017).

Most theoretical discussions on terrorist recruitment situate their narratives on the basis of the *Social Movement Approach* (Gentry 2004). This is because the theory places emphasis on the narrative that most terrorist organizations started as informal and semi-structured groups focusing on certain societal issues and challenges a ffecting societies (Beck 2008). These challenges enabled them to create the false perception among individuals and targeted groups leading them to believe that they can provide a better alternative. These movements are predominantly anti-establishment, anti-status quo, and anti-elitist, seeing them as the reasons for creating the conditions for the social problems affecting societies (Shannon 2011; Prud'homme 2019). These movements create the opportunity and space for terrorist organizations to mobilize and recruit members given that their messages resonate some level of social consciousness that appeals to individuals and groups with grievances against the establishment (Kruglanski and Fishman 2009; Newton 2011; Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger 2014; Özeren et al. 2014; Del Vecchio 2016; Klein 2016). Consequently, these terror groups continue to use the platform they have under the pretext of social movements as a strategy for not only recruitment; these recruits are continuously engaged by these violent extremist groups to ensure the sustainability and survival of such movements (Pieri and Zenn 2018). The emphasis on ensuring the group's survival

is an important component through which relevant stakeholders involved in countering the threat posed by terror groups and their expansionist agenda should explore and address. This is because any process of disengagement and counter-terrorist recruitment requires a high level of effort by these actors to limit the influence of some of these negative social movements (ibid).

It is important to note that despite the advantage of social movements as instruments of social change in societies, where they serve as a vehicle for easy mobilization (Hairgrove and Mcleod 2008), they also offer some level of legitimacy for individuals and groups aggrieved by certain societal dysfunctions to express their resentments against the current social order by effecting positive change (Joosse et al. 2015). With the ability to mobilize and a wider reach to a targeted population to disseminate their messages, terrorist groups easily exploit these avenues and opportunities provided by these movements to recruit individuals and groups who share similar radical religious and ideological beliefs (Sarjoon et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2018; Madonia and Contreras 2019).

As put forward by Loimeier (2012), Adegbulu (2013), and Murtada (2013), Boko Haram emerged from the various social movements that existed in the northern part of Nigeria, including Mohammed Marwa's *Maitatsine*<sup>6</sup> movement of the 1980s to the *Sahaba Muslim Youth Organization*, Abubakah Lawan's *Ahlulsunnawal Jama'ah*, and the *Yobe Taliban*, which existed from the 1990s to the early 2000s (Aghedo 2014; Olojo 2015; Azumah 2015; Chiluwa 2015; Gray and Adeakin 2015; Voll 2015; Iyekekpolo 2016; Pieri and Zenn 2016; Amaechi 2017; Magrin and Montclos 2018; Rasak 2018). These organizations later evolved to what is today known as *Boko Haram*. These movements not only have a massive following in northern Nigeria, but their extreme views against secularism, and the modern state system have endeared them to many who believe they serve as an instrument for social change in Nigeria.<sup>7</sup>

Besides the social movement theoretical stance that explains the various strategies used by terror groups and other violent extremist groups, to recruit fighters, another theory that seeks to explain the paradigm of terrorist recruitment is the anthropological emphasis on *culture* as an avenue these terror groups used to attract and enlist recruits into their folds (Pieri and Zenn 2018). This theory extends the narrative by studies that situate their focus and emphasis on the daily ideological and operational drivers used by these groups to recruit fighters. This approach focused on the level of social engagements, inter-group relations, solidarity, and bonds created by this jihadi culture (Pieri and Zenn 2018). To sum up, this approach explains this paradox of terrorist recruitment as a lifestyle through which people learn over time (Pieri 2019).

Relating this to the Boko Haram recruitment strategy, studies revealed that beyond the public propaganda and instrumentalization of violence by this terror group, Boko Haram has interacted and built inter-group relations, strong communal bonds, loyalty, and solidarity (MacEachern 2018; Agbiboa 2019; Pieri 2019). This form of loyalty, social cohesion, and culture enabled the group to not only attract naïve individuals into joining them (Boko Haram), but also making it possible for the group to ensure that these recruits see the "jihadist culture" as nothing but a way of life (Pieri and Zenn 2018). It reflects this pattern of lifestyle in its members engaging in the popular motor-cycle transportation business popularly called '*achaba'* in communities they control (Agbiboa 2019). Members of the group are also said to regularly interface and interact with the locals in communities they control. They also engage in preaching their jihadist messages, expressing themselves in comedy, music, drama, dance, and other forms of entertainment in the *Arabic, Kanuri, and Hausa*<sup>8</sup> languages (Pieri and Zenn

<sup>6</sup> The Maitatsine ragtag Islamic group was a radical sect with over 3000 members under the tutelage of a Cameroonian Islamic Mufti Mohammad Marwa. This sect was predominantly in Kano state, in the Northern part of Nigeria and was principally aimed at bringing Islam back, which they considered then was gradually losing its meaning in the north because of the belief that liberal-oriented values were corrupting the Muslim lifestyle. Therefore, they considered themselves reformists to the tenets and teachings of Islam. Their activities frequently led to violent confrontations with governmen<sup>t</sup> operatives. These violent confrontations resulted in crises between 1980–85, destroying many lives and properties.

<sup>7</sup> Most studies have offered similar anecdotes on the evolvement of this terrorist organization.

<sup>8</sup> These three languages are mostly and widely spoken by communities and locals across the northeast and Lake Chad region.

2018). Therefore, it is said that the group adopts this tactic as a strategy to attract individuals into joining them. This is because these locals see them as ordinary people, interacting with ordinary locals regardless of the popular narrative that the group (Boko Haram) uses violence to propagate its messages to the public.

Studies by other scholars (Adegbulu 2013; Hill 2013; Zenn et al. 2013; Aghedo 2014; Olojo 2015; Chiluwa 2015; Gray and Adeakin 2015; Pham 2016; Pieri and Zenn 2016), focused on the negative misrepresentation of ideology and the weaponization of religion by terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram to recruit members. This could be seen through the negative teachings given by Mohammed Yusuf to his followers that Islam abhors 'Western civilization' and all its imprints (see Umar 2012, p. 144). Such messages increasingly created the false perception that Western civilization is anti-Islamic and most of the problems a ffecting the society are linked with the saturation of Western values in Nigerian society (Hansen 2017; Zenn 2018). These negative misrepresentations and the instrumentalization of religion encouraged individuals to join Boko Haram. Olojo (2017), Magrin and Montclos (2018), were of the view that despite the negative use of religion as a tool for terrorist recruitment, it also plays a vital role in deradicalization and also dissuading individuals from becoming members of terrorist organizations. According to their analysis, religious leaders and clerics have a role in changing the narrative and negative representation of religion used by terror groups to recruit members.

Further studies (Ayegba 2015; Eke 2015; Dowd and Drury 2017; Oriola 2017; Rufai 2017; Ajala 2018; Babatunde 2018; Hentz 2018) focused on the multidimensional challenges confronting Nigeria, which enabled Boko Haram to exploit and lure individuals into joining their crusade. These challenges ranged from the long history of conflict in the country, the inability of the governmen<sup>t</sup> to address the problems of bad governance, corruption, poverty, unemployment, provision of social services to citizens, marginalization, and inequality, which paved the way for alienation and a lack of trust between citizens and their leaders. These conditions of social exclusion and disillusionment, especially in the northern part of Nigeria, created an avenue for radical groups to conscript individuals to their groups, like in the case of Boko Haram.
