*4.2. Fundamentalism as an Element of Modern Politics*

Studying the dispute accompanying modern politics, in his book entitled *A Conflict of Visions. Ideological Origins of Political Struggles* Thomas Sowell (2007) takes as his starting point the experience of two revolutions: American and French. The former brought about the formation of a constrained government, which respected the presence of religion in the public sphere; the latter, being in a way a harbinger of the totalitarianisms of the 20th century, organised an open war against Christianity combined with a state terror, which was perceived as—let us quote Robespierre—"a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to country's most urgen<sup>t</sup> needs" (Carr 1951, p. 154).

Where did this di fference come from? Sowell believes it had its source in two diametrically di fferent metapolitical views, understood as ideal types in Weber's sense: constrained and unconstrained (Sowell 2007). The former attempts to reconcile conflicting interests and opinions about what may be considered as social good, while the latter strives to implement a knowable and identifiable social good as an overriding value (for example, the Marxist ideal of a classless society) (Vanberg 1987, p. 547). The former, referring to the intuition that civilisation is but a thin layer superimposed over layers of barbarism, sees "postponing the end" as the "basic structure of all human politics," which seems to be here "a watchful keeping in check of those tendencies which are conducive to exploding the 'original chaos'" (Spaemann 2012, p. 275). The latter, inspired by the optimism of the Enlightenment, sees politics as a tool of constant progress: in a Promethean blast it wants to build a paradise on earth. While in the former perspective, social experiments may threaten the existence of humankind, in the latter there is no risk involved, since—behind man's back, so to say—an invisible hand will lead human history to a happy ending anyway. In the former perspective, the goal is to "postpone the end," while in the numerous versions of the latter—to "prepone" it.

A di fferent perception and moderation of the dynamics of social processes results, according to Sowell, from a di fferent concept of the political reason in the advocates of both visions. The proponents of the unconstrained vision believe that it is possible to find a rational answer to all problems and challenges, if only the forces of intelligence and of virtue could be made to prevail over ignorance and wickedness (Berlin 1950, pp. 351–85). Consequently, the unconstrained vision employs intellectual reflection to look for a solution of the political problem and establish some form of the ideal order. Every social change which is a step towards achieving this desired ideal should be preferred, no matter the cost (Sowell 2007, p. 29). In the course of the teleological process leading to social change, it is conditionally permissible to use violence, characteristic of revolutionary politics.

In the constrained vision, reason is treated with much more skepticism. Knowledge is conceived first of all as social experience, passed on in non-articulated forms of traditions, customs, habits, sentiments, feelings and behaviours; it is the everyday experience of people, succeeding in the Darwinian contest between that which works and that which does not. Consequently, knowledge is broadly accessible, but always shared. The advocates of constrained vision strongly believe that individual reason is much too insu fficient to capture the diversity and take the right decisions. This gives rise to a politics of cautious evolution: since systemic rationality is more reliable than individual rationality, a reformer will respect the established customs and prejudices of the people, ye<sup>t</sup> "will not disdain to ameliorate the wrong" (Sowell 2007, p. 27). A key category for the advocates of this vision is the compromise (trade-o ff) developed within the framework of systemic processes. One might say that imperfection is here understood as a perfect social solution.

The belief that knowledge is an element which results in qualitative di fferences between people leads the advocates of an unconstrained vision to the conclusion that citizens of narrow horizons should submit to the leadership of the elites who cultivate the mind: philosophers or qualified experts. The special role of "the thinking people" or the "most enlightened and the best" was, according to Sowell (2007, p. 44), a central theme of the unconstrained vision for centuries. Consequently, its advocates placing decision-making rights in the hands of the "avant-garde" (social elite) whose members are, for some reason, more competent in identifying the knowable and achievable good. They are guaranteed—though it is not clear how—a privileged access to resources of virtue and reason. They act as a "surrogate" of the society, leading it toward "ever-higher levels of understanding and practice ... pending the eventual progress of mankind to the point where all can make social decisions" (Sowell 2007, p. 110). As pointed out by Bock-Cote, "the one who knows what a perfect society is, does not engage in political debates but multiplies educational e fforts, and may, if necessary, resort to violence or censorship to prevent the expression of political opinions which challenge his idea of utopia or the meaning of history" (Bock-Cote 2017, p. 302).

Without entering into an in-depth analysis of unconstrained politics (cf. Gierycz 2017), it should be emphasised that Sowell's analysis leads us to the conclusion that the fundamentalist potential is deeply ingrained in one of the two ways of thinking about politics which are characteristic of modern Europe. It appears that the concept of unconstrained politics coincides with an observation made by John Paul II in *Centesimus Annus*: "When people think they possess the secret of a perfect social organization which makes evil impossible, they also think that they can use any means, including violence and deceit, in order to bring that organization into being" (John Paul II 1991, no. 25). Such an approach, the Pope points out, in fact turns politics into a "secular religion," "which operates under the illusion of creating paradise in this world." Evidently, it is not a coincidence that such kind of logic emerges when religion is negated, initiating—together with the French Revolution—the secularisation processes in Europe. It seems that although "the secularist and the sceptic have denounced Christianity first and foremost, because of its encouragemen<sup>t</sup> of fanaticism," Chesterton rightly noted that "religion can be swept out of the matter altogether, and still there are philosophical and ethical theories which can produce fanaticism enough to fill the world" (Chesterton 2017, p. 319).

Since at its roots secular fundamentalism is linked to the hope of a perfect world and is profoundly inherent to the modern understanding of politics in Europe, two questions need to be considered: (1) whether it is not the case that—grating the ambivalent role of religion in the development of fundamentalism, as discussed above (particularly in Section 2)—it is precisely (if not only) religion that represents an e ffective, "systemic" safeguard against such tendencies; (2) what features of religion make it a substratum for fundamentalism, and which of its characteristics make it a hedge, or a natural safeguard against fundamentalist tendencies.
