*4.1. National Response*

The statement made by President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria at the 73r<sup>d</sup> session of the United Nations General Assembly that "the terrorist insurgencies we face, particularly in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, are partly fueled by local factors and dynamics, but now increasingly by the international jihadi movement, runaway fighters from Iraq and Syria and arms from the disintegration of Libya," and called for global action to counter the threats of terrorism (United Nations News 2018). This statement not only further explains the changing tides of insecurity in Lake Chad, but also the capacity of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), to recruit, expand, and continue to carry out several attacks across the northeast and Lake Chad region (Salkida 2019).

Various studies (Agbiboa 2015; Oyewole 2015; Assanvo et al. 2016; Bappah 2016) have reflected on several efforts by states and non-state actors at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels to counter the operational capacity of Boko Haram to recruit and carry out attacks. At the national level, the Nigerian governmen<sup>t</sup> has engaged in a series of administrative, legislative, and inter-agency collaboration efforts between local institutions and international agencies to counter the activities of Boko Haram.

Some of the administrative measures adopted by the Nigerian governmen<sup>t</sup> included: the *multi-track approach*, which involved persuasion, dialogue, and consultation with political, religious, and community leaders in the states and communities affected by activities of the terrorist group to counter the narratives of radicalization and other negative doctrinal elements (Olojo 2017, 2019); the *declaration of a state of emergency* in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states accompanied by the five-year trade embargo placed along 'Dikwa-Maiduguri-Gamboru-Ngala routes' to interdict the transnational crime activities by Boko Haram (Sahara Reporters 2013; Samuel 2019); and the launch of the *National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Extremism* in 2017 to strengthen the capacity of agencies to tackle violent extremism, enforce the rule of the law and human rights, enhance effective community engagement, capacity building and resilience to counter violent extremism, resilience, and strategic communication by various stakeholders and actors in the society (Ogunmade and Olugbode 2017).

Furthermore, other initiatives were launched such as the *'Buhari Plan of 2016'* for effective and transformative engagemen<sup>t</sup> between the government, religious organizations, and communities affected by the activities of Boko Haram in the northeast (see African Union 2018, p. 17). The newly established *'Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative'* was saddled with the responsibility of developing a comprehensive strategy towards rehabilitating, reintegrating communities, rebuilding and reconstructing the northeast (Punch News 2016). The launching of the *'Operation Safe Corridor'* was aimed at addressing challenges associated with terrorist recruitment, violent extremism, deradicalization, rehabilitating and reintegrating repentant Boko Haram terrorists back to society after undergoing various stages of thorough psycho-spiritual therapy and evaluations by religious clerics and psychology experts (DW News 2019).

Due to the fact that terrorist recruitment is connected to the capacity of terror groups to fund their operations (Clarke 2015), the Nigerian governmen<sup>t</sup> is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa in line with the mandate of the Financial Action Taskforce on Counter-Terrorism Financing (See GIABA 2015; Financial Action Task Force 2016). At the legislative level, the National Assembly comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives amended the 2011 Terrorism (Prevention) Act. The amended law was expected to support inter-agency counterterrorism collaboration between various actors to combat terrorism. It strengthened the capacity of law enforcement officers to detain and prosecute individuals suspected to be sponsors and members of terrorist organizations (see Federal Government Nigeria 2011). It also boosted the capacity of institutions to deal with the sponsors of terror-related activities. The amendment further allowed for the death penalty to be given as punishment for individuals and groups found guilty of committing and facilitating acts of terror in the country (See Federal Government Nigeria 2011, 2013). This legislation further strengthened the Money Laundering Prohibition Act of 2011 and also led to the establishment of the National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) by financial institutions to prevent terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram from not only funding their operations, but also expanding their activities by recruiting fighters (see Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit 2018).

### *4.2. Response from Faith-Based Organizations and Civil Society Organizations*

Studies have shown that the Muslim and Christian communities and places of worship constitute the sectors that are mostly a ffected by the attacks carried out by Boko Haram across Lake Chad with over 2134 fatalities recorded across both communities in 2018 (see Nigeria Watch 2019). These attacks further a ffected the already deplorable and tense Christian–Muslim relations that have characterized most of the conflicts and tensions between these two religions in recent years (Michael Kpughe 2017; Faseke 2019; Nche et al. 2019).

Despite the attacks on religious institutions by Boko Haram, under the broader Coalition of Civil Societies with over 5000 registered agencies, the two dominant religions have engaged in various 'non-violent' engagements to fight against the forces of violent extremisms, radicalization, and terrorist recruitment across the Lake Chad region (See Mahmood and Ani). Religious leaders also use their understanding of the true doctrinal principles to discourage the narrative and ideological propaganda employed by Boko Haram to recruit fighters (Olojo 2017, 2019). An example can be seen in Sokoto State where the *Muslim Umma* (Muslim Community) stopped and chased *Kabiru Sokoto*<sup>20</sup> out of the state in order to prevent the indoctrination of people through his radical ideology (Adamu 2012).

Furthermore, through e ffective collaboration between these religious bodies and civil society organizations, several initiatives, peace concerts, and peacebuilding outreaches were implemented in various areas a ffected by the threat of Boko Haram.<sup>21</sup> As informed by one interviewee, one of such initiative was the *Hadin Kan Mu Karfin Mu* (Our Unity, Our Strength) and the *Ido da Ido* (Face to Face) project organized by International Alert Nigeria (IAN)<sup>22</sup> in July 2019, with the support of religious groups and the communities of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states<sup>23</sup> considered to be the three states most a ffected by the activities of the insurgents (See Zirima 2018). This initiative was aimed at "Reinforcing the Resilience and Re-integration of Women and Children, Promoting Peacebuilding in Communities a ffected by Boko Haram and strengthening e ffective engagemen<sup>t</sup> between community vigilantes and security o fficers across a ffected areas."24 It was expected that this project would help targeted groups address the problems of radicalization, lack of diversity management, mutual coexistence, and intolerance, and help strengthen mutual trust amongs<sup>t</sup> communities irrespective of their religious beliefs for sustainable peace.<sup>25</sup> Also, a decision was made by the Borno State governmen<sup>t</sup> and the Borno State Islamic Association to establish peace clubs, as well as to design the curriculum used by educators for the teaching of peace studies for children attending the Western schools at both the primary and secondary level, and also those children attending religious schools or *Madrasas* (See TRT World News 2018). The adoption and establishment of peace studies and peace clubs will help inculcate sound doctrinal teachings in line with the dictates of the holy books (*Bible and Quran*) and also counter the negative narratives and ideologies used by extremist groups to recruit children.<sup>26</sup>

 Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> A Boko Haram fighter suspected to be the brain behind the December 2012 Christmas Day bombing at the Catholic Church located at Madallah, Niger State in Northcentral Nigeria.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with the Director of Protocol Church of Christ in Nations, 30 April 2019.

<sup>22</sup> It is an international Non-governmental Organization with the mission of breaking the cycles of violence and building sustainable peace through constructive engagemen<sup>t</sup> with communities and groups directly affected by violent conflict. 23

Interview with a Senior Program O fficer at International Alert, North-East Nigeria, 22 September 2019. 24

Interview, 22 September 2019. 25

<sup>26</sup> Phone Interview with Mallam B.M., A Peace Club Teacher in Maiduguri, Borno State, 2 August 2019.

These initiatives contributed to raising awareness on the dangers of extremism, promoted social cohesion and mutual trust amongs<sup>t</sup> various communities and groups a ffected by the activities of the terrorists.<sup>27</sup> This sentiment was also shared by Nigeria's Chief of Army Sta ff Major General Tukur Buratai in a seminar organized by the Nigerian Army Directorate of Chaplain Services, and Directorate of Islamic A ffairs with the theme "Countering Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Nigeria through Spiritual Warfare", where he called on religious groups and leaders to support the state in eradicating the negative use of religion and ideology to fuel insurgency in the country (Nigerian Tribune 2019). He argued that "defeating the ideologies of Boko Haram and ISWAP requires actors to first realize that it was this negative use of ideologies that enhanced the resource base and ability of these terror groups to recruit fighters to join their crusade" (Premium Times 2019). Therefore, terrorism will wither if these negative forces of radicalization are eradicated. This can only be achieved through concerted e fforts and the continuous interface between religious leaders, groups, communities, and the military in countering these radical ideologies and protecting vulnerable groups from falling victim to extremists' beliefs and doctrines (Premium Times 2019).

Therefore, it is important to note that continuous emphasis on inter-faith dialogue and cross-cultural engagements between locals, religious and civil societies on peaceful coexistence, tolerance, and deconstructing the narrative that no religion supports violence can contribute to curbing the threat of terrorism, including its e fforts to recruit and expand (Michael Kpughe 2017; Olojo 2017; Salifu and Ewi 2017; Brechenmacher 2019).
