*2.2. Three-Pronged Political Work*

This strategy was particularly obvious in the 1990–2000s and was mainly structured around three main issues.

A first set of issues related to *the institutional organization of the Church in the Basque Country*: the appointment of bishops and the request for a territorial reorganization of the Church. As early as 1992, José Antonio Ardanza, then president of the Basque government, wrote to Cardinal Sodano, State Secretary of the Holy See, asking him for a meeting in order to comment on the appointment of bishops in the Basque Country. In 1996, the appointment of a non-Basque-speaking bishop in Bilbao (Mons. Blázquez) raised concerns among Basque center-right nationalists. The Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> also repeatedly supported (for instance in 1996–1997) the demand for a unique ecclesiastical province gathering the Basque dioceses. The answer of the State Secretary of the Holy See was always an institutional one, insisting on the universal nature of the Church—"there is no Basque Church, but a universal one"—and on the fact that the territorial organization of the (Spanish) Basque Church was under the jurisdiction of the Spanish Episcopal Conference. Intervening in this first set of issues raised a problem of jurisdiction for the Basque government. To what extent should a regional governmen<sup>t</sup> have its say on internal church a ffairs? The discreet interventions of the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> found a justification in the importance of the Church in Basque society, thus disentangling the secularization of society and the ongoing social presence of the Church, particularly in local welfare.

A second set of issues concerned *information about the Basque political conflict*. Here, the Basque government's main concern was informing the Holy See on a regular basis and transmitting its own reading of the situation. The challenge for the governmen<sup>t</sup> consisted in finding transnational support for the third way it defended, between the anti-terrorist and repressive stance of the Spanish governmen<sup>t</sup> and the implicit support for political violence from the Basque independentist left. The repeated informal meetings between representatives of the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> and Holy See o fficials were above all to maintain channels of information rather than formal attempts to involve the Holy See.

"Informing" the Holy See, however, was far from simple, because it implied gaining enough legitimacy to access its top bureaucracy. Recognition was never taken for granted, due to political pressures and diplomatic rules. The fact that the Vatican Secretariat for Relations with States could maintain informal discussions with the representatives of a regional governmen<sup>t</sup> was not self-evident. On the other hand, maintaining relations with the Vatican made sense in the broader picture of the paradiplomacy developed by the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> (Totoricagüena 2005; Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Opening an informal channel of communication with a subject of international law such as the Holy See was a way for the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> to behave *as* a state while being a non-central governmen<sup>t</sup> actor. Here, as elsewhere (Lecours and Moreno 2003), the link between stateless nationalism and paradiplomacy was conditioned by domestic and international opportunity structures.

Usually discreet and "contained" (Gilbert and Henry 2012), these exchanges of information could be publicized and politicized at critical junctures. In September 2000, the canonization of María Josefa del Corazón de Jes ús Sancho de Guerra Maria, founder of the Servants of Jesus of Charity, gave rise to such a controversy. As the future saint was a native of the Spanish Basque Country (Vitoria, 1842–Bilbao, 1912), the ceremony brought to Rome a significant Basque delegation, including political leaders. Among them was Juan José Ibarretxe, at that time president of the Basque government. The *lehendakari* (president) took advantage of the situation and was received by Mons. Jean-Louis Tauran, then Secretary of Relations with States of the Holy See, a meeting that in itself raised an institutional issue:

"He [Tauran] had no obligation to receive Ibarretxe, since he was the Secretary of Relations with States of the Holy See. Then of course, one might consider that the *lehendakari is* State. *Es Estado*. *España*. He is part of the state. In the territory of the Basque Country, he is the representative of the governmen<sup>t</sup> and of the Spanish state. We can consider it that way. But anyone who would interpret it strictly might say: no. He is not a representative of the state. Besides, there was a minister who was there. Mayor Oreja. So Mons. Tauran would have had a legitimate excuse to say no."1

Apart from this meeting, Ibarretxe took part, along with the delegation organized by the Spanish Embassy, in the ceremony of canonization presided by the Pope on 1 October 2000. The next day, Ibarretxe went to Florence and met with Vannino Chiti, State Secretary for the Presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers, and Claudio Martini, president of the Tuscany Region. After the meeting, Martini

<sup>1</sup> Delegate of the President of Euskadi for external relations of the Basque government. Author interview, Segura, April 2012.

called on the European Union to "help in the process" leading to peace in the Basque Country.<sup>2</sup> The Vatican meeting, for its part, caused controversy in the Spanish media surrounding the ambiguity of the "contribution" to pacification in the Basque Country proposed by the Holy See, though Ibarretxe himself had remained very cautious. He was reported to have given Mons. Tauran a "non-distorted" analysis of the situation in the Basque Country and to have handed him a copy of the peace plan that he had delivered to the Basque political parties. Ibarretxe thanked the Holy See for its offer, a "contribution which will be channeled through the work done by the Basque bishops".<sup>3</sup>

The subtle distinction between the Holy See's offer of a "contribution" rather than "mediation" led to diverging interpretations. The Spanish Church did not react officially, stating that should any mediation effort emanate from the Holy See, it would necessarily transit through the Spanish Catholic hierarchy.<sup>4</sup> The Spanish governmen<sup>t</sup> made it clear that there had not been any proposal of mediation in the conversation held by Mons. Tauran on this occasion with Jaime Mayor Oreja, then Spanish Minister of Home Affairs.<sup>5</sup> Josep Piqué, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made it clear that the Holy See had limited itself to a "generic offer" of collaboration and that the Holy See could not act as an intermediary "between a democratic state and murderers".<sup>6</sup> The Spanish right (Popular Party, PP) and left (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Party) centralist parties released similar declarations, while the Basque center-right (PNV) and social-democrat (*Eusko Alkartasuna*—EA) parties welcomed what they perceived as a "proposal" from the Holy See. Given the controversy, the Holy See deemed it proper to clarify the issue by specifying that there was no question of mediation but instead "the contribution that the Catholic Church could continue to offer" in the search for a solution to the "terrorist" problem in the Basque Country.<sup>7</sup>

Beyond the controversies, the episode above highlights the symbolic sensitivity of the involvement of the Holy See in a domestic conflict. The mere fact that the Secretary of Relations with States of the Holy See had maintained separate conversations with a state minister *and* with the head of a regional governmen<sup>t</sup> could be perceived as a symbolic gain for the Basque authorities. The interview that the Basque president was supposed to give on Radio Vatican was cancelled, as it was considered "inappropriate" by the State Secretary of the Holy See. Secondary questions of etiquette took on a symbolic meaning: Ibarretxe and Mayor Oreja were sitting side by side during the ceremony of canonization, an equal status, which was seen as problematic by observers.<sup>8</sup> For the Basque leader, the domestic context necessitated such an additional legitimacy. The context in the Basque Country had become tense again since the end of ETA's 14-month ceasefire in December 1999. The week after the canonization, the Basque Parliament had to hold a debate on a confidence motion filed by the PP, with the support of PSOE, against Ibarretxe. The few words pronounced in Basque<sup>9</sup> and in Spanish by the Pope during the ceremony also left room for diverging interpretations. The right-wing Spanish press saw this intervention as a clear condemnation of ETA and its supporters.<sup>10</sup> The Basque media, meanwhile, stressed the call for peace and reconciliation in the papal message.

Similar debates took place after ETA's announcement of a ceasefire on 22 March 2006. On 3 April 2006, Monsignor Uriarte, then Bishop of San Sebastián, presented to the Vatican the efforts made by

 2000.

<sup>2</sup> *Deia*, 4 October 2000.

<sup>3</sup> *Deia*, 3 October 2000.

<sup>4</sup> "El Vaticano se ofrece para buscar una 'solución pacífica' en el País Vasco", *El Mundo*, 3 October 2000.

<sup>5</sup> *El Paí<sup>s</sup>*, 3 October

<sup>6</sup> "El Vaticano asegura que no ha propuesto una mediación para lograr la paz en el País vasco", *Diario Vasco*, 4 October 2000. 7 Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Additional problems of etiquette were reported by the Spanish ambassador to the Holy See in his memoirs (Abella y Ramallo 2006).

<sup>9</sup> "May the model and the intermediation of saint María Josefa del Corazón de Jesús help the Basque Country in eradicating violence forever, and in turning the blessed land of Euskadi into a place for peaceful living together and fraternity, where the rights of all persons will be respected and where no innocent blood will ever be shed again" (Holy See press office, *Bollettino*, *sala stampa della Santa Sede*, n.◦568, 1.10.2000, my translation from Basque).

<sup>10</sup> *La Razó<sup>n</sup>*, 2 October 2000.

the Church of the Basque Country in favor of peace. Two days later, Pope Benedict XVI exhorted the congregation gathered in Saint Peter's Square "to pray that everybody will intensify their e fforts for the consolidation of the horizons of peace that seem to be appearing in the Basque country and in Spain, and to overcome the obstacles that might appear"11. Despite a cautious attitude—promoting peace is *not* mediating in the conflict—the intervention of the Pope had a symbolical impact, as it helped put the Basque issue on the universalistic Catholic agenda. However, hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict vanished when ETA resumed its violent campaign in December 2006.

A third set of issues referred to the *historical memory* of the longstanding relationship between the Basque political conflict and the Catholic Church. Revisiting the role of the Church and of the Holy See at the critical junctures of the Basque conflict acquired a new significance when memory issues again came to the fore in Spain in the 2000s (Leonisio et al. 2015, pp. 163–231). The PNV and the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> attached the utmost importance to the memory of the Spanish Civil War and its consequences, thus referring to the enduring contention about the divided positions of the Church. As evidenced by Molina (2011), the debate on the Basque Statute during the Spanish Second Republic (1931–1939) had become an exceptional political myth in contemporary Basque politics. According to current political narratives of Basque identity, the traditional will for self-government among the Basque people was expressed during those years in a wide-ranging demand for autonomy and identity. In contrast, Molina argues, the social complexity of the autonomy project was more related to religion than to ethnic conflict. Thus, this re-enacting of the past and the role of the Church held special significance in the context of the enduring political tensions of the 1990–2000s. In 1996, in the context of a debate about the Basque Church province, the Delegate of the President of Euskadi for External Relations took the initiative of sending Mons. Etchegaray, a French Basque cardinal who was at the core of the "hybrid mode of diplomatic agency" (Troy 2018) of the Holy See,<sup>12</sup> a report by the Sabino Arana Foundation on the 1936 visit of the delegation of the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> to the Vatican. During this visit, Mons. Pizzardo, Secretary for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical A ffairs, had asked President Aguirre to ally with the right-wing CEDA,<sup>13</sup> a proposal that the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> eventually declined. In July 2002, the Delegate of the President of Euskadi sent Juan José Asenjo Pelegrina, General Secretary of the Spanish Episcopal Conference, a copy of the letter *Imperativos de mi conciencia* [Imperatives of my conscience] written in 1945 by Mons. Mugica, former bishop of Vitoria, explaining the positions of the Basque Church during the Civil War. Such a personal missive took on special meaning in 2002 in the midst of a controversy surrounding the pastoral card "Preparing peace", released by the bishops of the Basque Autonomous Community. The bishops' pastoral letter expressed reservations about the new Spanish electoral law on political parties, which had been designed by PP and PSOE to outlaw the Basque independentist party Batasuna. Even if it was not meant to establish any hazardous parallel between the Civil War and the 2002 situation, this historical reminder took on special signification in this context. Further episodes contributed to reactivating memorial issues. In 2007, the Holy See beatified 498 Spanish priests and clerics killed by the republicans during the Spanish Civil War. This decision aroused controversy in the Basque Country, in Spain, and abroad,<sup>14</sup> against the backdrop of the approval of the Law on Historical Memory prepared by the socialist governmen<sup>t</sup> in order to rehabilitate the victims of Franco. Basque nationalists lamented two major shortcomings. The first was the omission of the 16 Basque priests and thousands of republicans and democrats, among them many Catholics, who had been murdered by Franco's troops during the Civil War. The second referred to the

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Luis R. Aizpeolea, "El Papa apoyó el proceso de paz tras la mediación del obispo Uriarte ante el Vaticano", *El Paí<sup>s</sup>*, 22 October 2006.

<sup>12</sup> Roger Etchegaray had been president of the Pontifical Council Cor Unum between 1984 and 1995 and of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace between 1984 and 1998. Between 1979 and 2005, Etchegaray carried out several diplomatic missions on behalf of the Pope in Cuba, Rwanda, Jerusalem, China, and Iraq.

<sup>13</sup> *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*—Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups.

<sup>14</sup> "Le Pape s'invite dans le débat sur la guerre civile espagnole", *La Croix*, 27 octobre 2007.

support of the Spanish Church and of the Holy See for Franco's regime (Iztueta 1981)15. Again, this took on special significance in the context of the Spanish memorial debate.

To sum up, the political work led by the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> with the Holy See during the years of political violence presented three main characteristics. Firstly, it consisted above all in informal and discreet awareness-raising of the Holy See about the Basque government's view on Basque politics. Secondly, the e fficiency of this work rested upon the key role of individual agency. In the 1990–2000s, the Delegate of the President of Euskadi for External Relations, himself a committed Catholic, played a pivotal role in establishing and maintaining, as personal and informal initiatives, this relationship with the Vatican Secretary of State. Thirdly, despite the significant presence of Basque priests and clerics in the Vatican hierarchy, this factor was not necessarily decisive in the Basque government's paradiplomacy e fforts in Rome. Significantly, Mons. Etchegaray (1922–2019), while being central to Vatican diplomacy, remained cautious on the Basque question despite having his views regularly sought by Basque political and social actors. Following Smith (2016) concept of political work, we might conclude that despite its weak results in terms of new *policy instruments* on conflict resolution, the advocacy led by the Basque governmen<sup>t</sup> toward the Holy See did result in the sharing of its *problematization* of the Basque conflict and in enhancing its own *legitimacy* as a substate *and* transnational political subject.

### **3. Looking after Rome from the Left: Plural Mediations in a Deregulated Peace Market**
