*4.3. Sub-Regional and Regional Response*

As a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)' and the Islamic Military Alliance (IMA)', Nigeria continue to engage with states and non-state actors at the international level to counter extremist messaging, narratives, and ideologies used by Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations to recruit members (Agence France Presse 2016; Martin 2018; United Nations 2018). The Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience (RSSRR) was launched in the areas affected by the activities of the Boko Haram terrorists by the Lake Chad Basin Commission, with support from the African Union, United Nations, and other non-state actors. The RSSRR strategy offers a multidimensional approach that allows governments, civil societies, religious organizations, and communities to strengthen the institutional capacity to combat terrorism and all its imprints in the region (see African Union 2018). These engagements, partnerships, and initiatives established by states and non-state actors in stemming the recruitment capacity of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region were expected to not only identify the key drivers of public support for terrorist organizations, but also counter the negative ideologies and the various methods used by terrorist groups to consolidate and expand their operations through recruitment.<sup>28</sup>

The joint military coalition between member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission under the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) achieved some success by limiting the territorial expansion of the terrorist organization to other parts of the continent and degrading its capacity to carry out coordinated attacks (Iwuoha 2019). The recapturing of Baga and other communities previously controlled by the terrorists a ffected their ability to recruit and fund their operations.<sup>29</sup>

To conclude this section, it has been argued that the measures and initiatives taken by stakeholders at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels achieved some success in preventing the recruitment ability and territorial expansion of Boko Haram from spreading to other parts of the continent by limiting their presence to the Lake Chad region (see News Express 2015; Lake Chad Basin Commission News 2019). The trade blockade along Dikwa–Maiduguri–Gamboru–Ngala trading routes impacted

<sup>27</sup> Phone Interview, 2 August 2019.

<sup>28</sup> Discussions with A Conflict Resolution and Security Expert with Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), Kampala, Uganda, 3 January 2019.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with an Executive Assistant Commissioner Finance, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja–Nigeria, 22 October 2018.

the illicit funding of activities by this group, thus hindering its capacity to attract further fighters (Omenma 2019; Samuel 2019). The continuous engagemen<sup>t</sup> and the role played by faith-based organizations and clerics across the northeast and Lake Chad in deconstructing the negative narratives and propaganda used by Boko Haram to project their religious and ideological sentiments a ffected their expansion and recruitment capacity (Olojo 2017; Michael Kpughe 2017; ACN News 2018).

### **5. What Are the Challenges Facing Stakeholders in Combating Boko Haram's Recruitment?**

The various initiatives designed to counter the operational capacity of Boko Haram to recruit and expand its activities face a series of challenges. This is because, despite these measures, the group continues to thrive by attracting fighters across Lake Chad (Punch News 2017; Sigelmann 2019). During one interview, one informant expressed the opinion that one challenge confronting actors in countering the recruitment of individuals into extremist and terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, is "the ignorance and belief by actors that there is a universal solution to counterterrorism without clearly understanding the context, local dynamics, and situations that allows terrorism to thrive. This is because, individuals are motivated and driven by several reasons to join terrorist groups".<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the inability of actors to understand and identify reasons individuals join terrorist organizations impedes any counterterrorism strategy designed to combat terrorist recruitment by actors.<sup>31</sup> This narrative is supported in several studies, which sugges<sup>t</sup> that the complexity of the conflict in the Lake Chad where multiple terror groups like Boko Haram and its factional group Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) are involved in the conflict, with each group having its separate rules of engagemen<sup>t</sup> and modus operandi (Bappah 2016; Anyadike 2018). This makes it di fficult for actors to defeat them using the current *state-centric* or military strategy (Munshi 2018; Mentone 2018; Salkida 2019). This is because the current approach is not only *reductive*, but also fails to involve all relevant stakeholders in countering terrorist threats (see International Crisis Group 2016; Salkida 2019). It also does not identify *the drivers* of the conflict, guarantee *stability* of the region, enhance *social cohesion*, and seek *sustainable solutions* that will stem violent extremism, terrorist recruitment, and terrorism across the Lake Chad region (Sigelmann 2019; Zenn 2019). That explains the recent calls by actors and stakeholders to change the strategy by incorporating a multidimensional approach that will incorporate all relevant actors when tackling terrorism in the Lake Chad region to reflect the current realities and dynamics of the conflict (Olojo 2019).

Another challenge confronting actors is the *technological deficit and lack of trust* among actors involved in managing the conflict and communities a ffected by Boko Haram to identify threat forces affecting the fight against terrorism recruitment.<sup>32</sup> The accusation and perception that members of the MNJTF and individuals in the host communities act as double agents and informants for the terrorists affects any approach to counter and limit the activities of Boko Haram across the northeast and Lake Chad region (Agbiboa 2018). This is because increasingly, soldiers and o fficers of the MNJTF are accused of divulging sensitive operational and tactical information to the insurgents, supplying them with weapons and aiding their illicit tra fficking of stolen goods and other contraband products across Lake Chad (Dietrich 2015; Solomon 2017; Premium Times 2018). That has impacted negatively on the image of members of the security sector, where several reports and commissions of inquiries have accused the military of committing a series of human rights violations such as rape, extortion, extra-judicial killings, looting of properties, arresting innocent locals, and branding other communities as suspect areas (See Galtimari 2011; Abbah 2012; Amnesty International 2018). This has negatively impacted the civil—military relations amongs<sup>t</sup> communities and soldiers across Lake Chad, as locals often clash with soldiers accusing them of collaborating with Boko Haram for financial settlements (Agbiboa 2018).

<sup>30</sup> Interview with a Journalist/Reporter with Premium Times News Paper, covering the situation in the northeast and Lake Chad, 18 May 2019.

<sup>31</sup> Interview, 18 May 2019.

<sup>32</sup> Phone Interview with a member of the Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons–PRESCOM, 12 March 2019.

This negative perception complicates any avenue for e ffective civil–military engagement, support, and trust between the military institutions and communities a ffected by the terror acts committed by Boko Haram. This high level of mistrust a ffects any response towards preventing Boko Haram's recruitment capacity as well as stopping them from carrying out various acts of barbarity.<sup>33</sup>

The lack of trust in the managemen<sup>t</sup> and utilization of intelligence amongs<sup>t</sup> actors has been revealed by various studies, which highlighted the importance of having an e ffective surveillance and intelligence system to assess, monitor and report threats of terror-related activities (Donovan et al. 2016; Göpfert 2016; Agbiboa 2014, 2018). This level of mistrust a ffects any e ffort by relevant actors to combat the activities of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram to recruit and carry out attacks across the northeast (Brechenmacher 2019). This position also reflects the *eyes on the street* analogy put forward by Agbiboa34, which points out the failure of relevant actors to combat Boko Haram's recruitment strategy and terrorism in the northeast. Despite its e ffectiveness in managing threats and threats perceptions, this approach could not yield the desired result due to levels of mutual suspicion between security forces and members of community continuing to grow, the non-involvement of locals in counterterrorism e fforts, and the fear of being branded as an informant for or against Boko Haram (Reuters 2011; Nnodim and Olaleye 2017; Brown 2018). Consequently, individuals are reluctant to report on the workings of the terrorist group and persons suspected to be a ffiliated to Boko Haram due to fear of reprisals. Additionally, the fact that Boko Haram predominantly uses non-formal financial institutions to control its finances also makes it di fficult for banks and other financial regulators to report any suspicious activities that facilitate acts of terror (see Financial Action Task Force 2016). This is because Boko Haram relies on non-formal channels to fund its activities, such as the collection of tax from locals, robberies, proceeds from kidnapping, and other transnational criminal activities, which makes it di fficult for banks to track and report funds suspected to be for terror-related activities.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, the inability of the relevant actors to stem the flow of cash by Boko Haram to stop their ability to recruit also presents certain challenges.<sup>36</sup>

Combating terrorist recruitment and elements of terrorism in society require the state and its various agencies to show the *capacity to coerce and convince* citizens it has the ability to end it.<sup>37</sup> As the state has not been able to demonstrate that commitment, questions regarding its commitment and legitimacy have arisen.<sup>38</sup> Contextualizing this narrative in combating Boko Haram recruitment strategy as well as the conflict, the Nigerian governmen<sup>t</sup> and other multilateral agencies have not demonstrated that they have the ability to confront this challenge.

Several factors contribute to the inability of the state and its agencies to coerce and convince citizens that it has the ability to prevent the recruitment and expansion of Boko Haram across the Lake Chad region. In the aspect of *policy operationalization*, examples of initiatives such as the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST); the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE); the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience; National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NCTS); amongs<sup>t</sup> other laudable strategies designed by the governmen<sup>t</sup> and other multilateral institutions in the region to tackle radicalization and other conditions leading to violent extremism are ye<sup>t</sup> to make any significant impact in addressing the security challenges in the Lake Chad region<sup>39</sup> (See also European Commission 2017; African Union 2018; Mentone 2018;

<sup>33</sup> Interview with the Program O fficer at Center for Children and Crisis, A Civil Society Organization in northern Nigeria involved in providing humanitarian help to victims of Conflicts and Violence, 23 August 2019.

<sup>34</sup> This approach centred on the use of native-traditional intelligence, and peer-to-peer collaboration between security actors and members of communities to report any suspicious activity that facilitates terror acts.

<sup>35</sup> Discussions with Professor Warrissu Alli, Former Director of Research, Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, 14 November 2018.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with A Researcher a Conflict Resolution Researcher at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra Ghana, 12 March 2019.

<sup>38</sup> Interview, 12 March 2019.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with a Transnational Threat Expert at Institute of Security Studies, South Africa, 9 February 2019.

Innocent 2018). The influx of foreign terrorist fighters accompanied by the illicit tra fficking of arms, drugs, and other transnational criminal activities across the Lake Chad region also highlight the failure of the governments across the region to *control and secure their borders against external threats* (Oyewole 2015; Obamamoye 2019). The *poor attitude of the leaders* of member countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission towards the deteriorating e ffect of climate change is a factor in creating the preconditions for Boko Haram to recruit, thrive, and expand its activities across Lake Chad (Gulland 2019). The e ffect of this further led to the displacement, instability, and inter-group relations of communities inhabiting the Lake Chad region (Doherty 2017; See Vivekananda et al. 2019). The negligence by the political actors allowed Boko Haram to have control of resources across Lake Chad (United Nations 2018). This has not only enabled them to recruit fighters, but also to gain ammunition for its operations (Gerretsen 2019). There has been a lack *of unison in inter-agency collaboration* in combating the threat of this terrorist group (United Nations 2018). *The endemic corruption and lack of accountability* by actors involved in combating the threat by Boko Haram has contributed to fueling the conflict (Hashimu and James 2017; Searcey and Emmanuel 2019). This is because stakeholders involved in stemming the activities of Boko Haram converted the conflict into an avenue for 'rent-seeking' and a 'cash-cow' business (BBC News 2016). This explains why despite the huge budgetary allocations, the architects of the security sector cannot address the insecurity in Lake Chad.<sup>40</sup> Many were of the view that the fact that a 'ragtag army' such as Boko Haram could overcome a trained army demonstrates the high level and depth of corruption in the counterterrorism e fforts in the northeast and Lake Chad region.<sup>41</sup> These factors show the failure and inability of the state and its agencies to show its capacity to coerce and convince citizens that it has the ability to tackle the challenges of terrorism and insecurity across the Lake Chad region.
