**1. Introduction**

Catalonian secessionism acquired relevance in Spanish politics from 2010 onwards. Before that, social activism and political parties pursuing secession were a minor issue. Secessionist forces won three regional elections and sustained governments by tiny majorities in the Autonomous Parliament in this period. Two anomalous consultations about self-determination were organized and around 2 million (38% of population census) supported secession from Spain. An "Independence Declaration" was proclaimed on 27 October 2017, devoid of any legal or practical consequence. Such a move resulted in the full suspension of home rule, sanctioned by Spanish Parliament, that endured until mid-2018.

Secessionist parties renovated their lead at the last regional election (27 December 2017). The Spanish Government decided to advance elections both to defuse the crises and finish the suspension of home rule. The results, however, confirmed the stagnation though the formation of a new Regional

Government had to wait until mid-2018, after several attempts to reinstate in power the rebellious leaders who had fled to exile or been imprisoned. These unsuccessful e fforts were blocked by legal provisions dictated by the Spanish High Court. A left-wing governmen<sup>t</sup> was formed in Spain, in June 2018, which had the initial support from Catalonian and Basque nationalists. This seemed to open an opportunity to explore new arrangements but the talks between the Central Government and the secessionist Catalan governmen<sup>t</sup> did not lead to any advancement. At Spain's general election of 28 April 2019, left-wing parties renovated their lead, although without reaching a stable majority. The formation of a new governmen<sup>t</sup> had to wait until January 2020, after a new general election, on November 2019, that finally led to an apparently viable left coalition. On 14 October 2019, the Spanish Supreme Court<sup>1</sup> handed down sentences of several years in prison to nine secessionist leaders, finding them guilty of sedition for their role in the failed 2017 bid for independence.

The surge of pressing demands for independence has thus endured, with minor oscillations, since 2010. Two regional elections (September 2015; December 2017), two illegal referendums of self-determination in which only the secessionists went to the poll stations (9 November 2014; 1 October 2017), and a series of systematic surveys both by CEO (the o fficial survey agency of the Regional Government)<sup>2</sup> and CIS (the o fficial survey agency of the Central Government)3, showed the existence of a political division in two halves on the issue of secession. Over the last five years the question "Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state?" (CEO series of "political barometers") received 45% to 48% "YES" answers to "NO" answers from 44% to 48%, and 5–10% remnants of "DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER". Results on 21 December 2017 regional elections disclosed an almost perfectly divided society: Turnout reached an historical mark of 79.1%; secessionist parties go<sup>t</sup> 2,079,330 votes (47.33%), whereas non-secessionist parties won 2,227,421 votes (50.71%). A narrow margin of 150,000 votes distanced unionists from secessionists.

Catalan unionists (around three million, from a census of 5.5 million within a population of 7.5 million) did not join the secessionist venture. Most of them have familial, a ffective and economic links with Spain. They are heterogeneous though they predominate on coastal conurbations around Barcelona and Tarragona, as well as in other medium-sized towns (Lepic 2017; Maza et al. 2019). They remained expectant all along the secessionist surge, but during October 2017, in the weeks preceding the "Independence Declaration", unionist activism increased amid escalating tensions (Barrio and Field 2018; Garcia 2018). They deployed demonstrations in downtown Barcelona that competed with the huge ones that secessionists had mounted repeatedly (Barrio and Field 2018; Coll et al. 2018; Crameri 2014, 2015; Garcia 2018; Tobeña 2017a, 2017b).

The main social consequence of the sustained secessionist campaign has been the excavation of a deep political divide between two large fractions of Catalan citizenry, secessionists and unionists, which was absent before the precipitous demands of segregation from Spain (Amat 2015; Elliott 2018; Ucelay-da Cal 2018). The lack of a social majority behind the vigorous but failed secessionist venture opened apprehensions and frictions that were mostly unknown previously. Neighbours, colleagues and even friends and families who had shared feelings of belonging to both Catalonia and Spain (in di fferent degrees) as a part of their attachments and values, are now divided on the issue of secession and must endure living together amid unsolved tension (Garcia 2018; Morel 2018; Coll et al. 2018; Oller et al. 2019a, 2019b).

The secessionist movement devoted, from the start, big e fforts to convincing the world that it was deeply rooted on a spontaneous and widely distributed aspiration to attain sovereignty that came from all corners and social strata within Catalonian citizenry. That is, without distinctions that might sugges<sup>t</sup> the operation of a political agenda biased by economic, territorial or cultural/ascendancy based

<sup>1</sup> In Spain the "Supreme Court" is the highest judiciary level. The "Tribunal Constitucional" (High Spanish Court) is the highest instance for both legislative and judiciary litigations, equivalent to the Supreme Court in other Western countries. 2

CEO (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, http://ceo.gencat.cat/).

<sup>3</sup> CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/index.html).

interests. It must be recognized that that kind of discourse obtained a good reception (Crameri 2014, 2015; Minder 2017; Dowling 2018; Cardenal 2020), though there were cautions signalling towards the concomitant influence of top-down mechanisms rooted on a harsh political struggle between secessionist formations to lead the region (Barrio and Field 2018; Elliott 2018).
