**1. Introduction**

The impacts of the turbulent years in European life and politics which began with the Great Recession starting in 2008 have been and are still being felt in many areas of social and political life and in many countries of the European Union. This is the background to this paper which focusses on related questions of national identity in Spain and Germany as defined and propagated by, respectively, Vox España (Vox) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). It is to be noted from the beginning that each of these new parties contains the name of the respective country (with all the accompanying rational and emotional overtones) plus the suggestion of something new: The first is to be the "voice" of a Spain not otherwise heard, and the second asserted that there did exist an alternative to Angela Merkel's Euro bailout (Jahn 2013); it also continues to assert that there is an alternative to existing policies and practices deemed harmful to national identity. These two parties with strong nationalistic or nativist tendencies emerged in EU member states marked, until recently, by a stable party system in which each existing party broadly viewed national identity similarly (open, liberal, EU-oriented) while di ffering and competing in the areas of social, European, foreign and economic policies, each proclaiming its link to country. That the positions of the two new parties exercise a noticeable attraction for voters emerges quite clearly from recent election results: In the elections of 2 December 2018 for the parliament of the autonomous community of Andalusia Vox obtained 10.97% of the vote and 12 seats. Subsequently, in the general election of 28 April 2019, it won 10.26% of the votes and 24 seats in the *Congreso de los Diputados*, though none in the Senate. By the date of the Spanish elections AfD was represented in the parliaments of all sixteen states of Germany with support ranging from 5.9%

(Schleswig-Holstein) to 24.3% (Saxony-Anhalt), as well as in the Bundestag, where it had 94 members and nationally achieved 12.6% of the *Zweitstimmen*1.

In the slightly later Spanish election cycle of 26 May 2019 with elections for all municipal councils, for the parliaments of twelve of the seventeen *comunidades autónomas* and for the two autonomous cities of Melilla and Ceuta on the North-African coast, Vox also presented candidates. It published a separate manifesto for the EP election and a joint one for the elections for the parliaments of the autonomous communities. The party succeeded in electing representatives in seven of the twelve communities where elections were held. It obtained 6.2% of the votes for the European Parliament, which translated into three representatives. Most recently, in the repeat of the national elections on 10 November 2019, Vox obtained 15.1% of the vote (an increase of 50% over the April result) and with 52 seats more than double its representation in the Congreso de los Diputados.

These two parties have irrupted onto the political scene in their respective countries where they are playing a role and have achieved a visibility and audibility beyond what their numbers might suggest. With counterparts in Austria, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, etc., many of which existed years before AfD and Vox, they are part both of a Europe-wide populist, nationalist and nativist phenomenon, representing also a real challenge to the European Union. Given that Vox España has emerged so very recently, and Alternative für Deutschland only a very few years earlier (see below), and that the question of national identity is at the core of their public positions, it is revealing to compare in a detailed manner the parallels between the two parties in this central area. This is being done in order to gain an appreciation of just what they stand for, particularly as there is relatively little in English on AfD<sup>2</sup> and only (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Gould 2019) on Vox, both of which limit themselves largely or exclusively to the Andalusian elections of December 2018.

## **2. Outline and Methodology**

For the purposes of this paper and its analyses the definition of national identity to be used is that of the project at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Seville, *Nacionalismo de estado de democracias multinacionales: El impacto de la Gran Recesión sobre la identidad nacional*: "We define national identity as the subjective feeling of belonging to a territorially-defined political community within which the inhabitants feel that they share certain characteristics or common elements"3.

In undertaking a point-by-point qualitative analysis of o fficial party documents (as well as a reference to an important speech by Vox's leader, Santiago Abascal Conde, at a mass meeting in Madrid), the comparison will show how very di fferent parts of the European continent which achieved stable democratic governmen<sup>t</sup> after a period of extreme-right/fascist rule have now produced and are propagating very similar right-wing views on national identity—a term which includes among other topics culture, the family, the relationship to Europe, and immigration. In order to gain a full appreciation of the proximity of the two parties it is important to lay out their positions in some detail.

The corpus of material for analysis are publicly available documents of each of the two parties: For Vox the *Manifiesto fundacional* (Vox España 2014) and *100 medidas para una España viva* (Vox España 2018), plus the separate manifestos for the EP elections of 2019, *Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas de 2019* (Vox España EP 2019), and the joint manifesto for those *autonomías* re-electing their parliament in 2019 (Vox España EA 2019). For AfD the manifestos for analysis are those for the important series of elections at the national, regional, and European levels in 2017, 2018, and 2019 (AfD 2017; AfD Bavaria 2018; AfD Hesse 2018; AfD EP 2019). Reference will also be made to the AfD manifestos for state elections in Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, the

<sup>1</sup> Germany's electoral system is characterised by the fact that voters each have two votes: The first is for an individual candidate in the voter's electoral district, and the second, the Zweitstimme, is for a party list in the voter's state.

<sup>2</sup> However, for a very detailed analysis of AfD manifestos, see (Gould 2018).

<sup>3</sup> Definimos la identidad nacional como el sentimiento subjetivo de pertenencia a una comunidad política, definida territorialmente, con la que uno imagina que comparte algunos rasgos o elementos comunes.

Saarland, and Schleswig Holstein. The importance of these documents is that that they are (a) issued by the parties themselves and thus there can be no claim of misrepresentation by journalists or others, (b) they are definitive, and (c) they stand at the beginning of the important communication chain for both national-level or regional-level communications (radio and television reporting) and electoral-district-level communication (e.g., person-to-person), plus the increasing role of social media communication. As such, these documents are absolutely fundamental. They represent the state of the parties' thinking at the time of the election in question.

Following the critical discourse analysis example of the seminal work *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität* (Wodak et al. 1998), the approach is qualitative, concentrating on identifying what the parties present as fundamental characteristics of their respective nation and how they do it: This includes the linguistic construction of a shared culture (both national and European) linking past, present and future, and also the nature of the national state as the present and future framework within which the nation exists, to which it gives (or should give) form, and which in turn moulds or accepts the nation itself. In this way it will show the pivotal role of language in creating "opaque as well as structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control" (Wodak and Meyer 2009, p. 10). The paper will undertake this investigation of national identity as propagated by what are stipulated to be populist parties (Bebnowski 2015; Turnbull-Dugarte 2019; Häusler 2019).

After background information on the two parties, Sections 3 and 4 will consider the linked views of national identity (including the national state) and crisis which the parties are propagating in the public political sphere in each country. In this respect, the two parties demonstrate a remarkable range of similarities which this paper will explore together. However, there is one significant di fference: Their attitude towards the national state as it exists in their respective territory.

In Section 5 the paper will take a further step. It will argue that the parties' presentations are not simply descriptive but are also dynamic and amount to a performance of identity crisis. This paper will point to Vox's and AfD's allegations of the failure of old-line parties to protect national identity, thus in their view engendering a crisis. Following Taggart (2000), Mo ffitt (2014, 2016) argues for the key role of crisis in understanding contemporary populism. The significance and function of performance of crisis by contemporary populist parties as outlined by Mo ffitt is that it is an important device employed by them to gain and maintain electoral success. The application of his six-step model of crisis performance will permit the paper to establish a further link between these two comparable parties situated in very distinct countries. At the same time, it will show how a 'problem' area can be transformed into a threatening existential force of long duration.

In the Conclusion the paper will briefly consider the technological and human environments, as well as the constellation of nineteenth-century, twentieth-century, and twenty-first-century forces which have come together in Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland to promote their performance and propagation of crisis.
