**14. Conclusions**

Although there has been a proliferation of interpretations of the dynamics driving the recent secessionist surge in Catalonia, few studies have payed su fficient attention to providing an accurate description of the contours of the emergen<sup>t</sup> social division between pro-independentist and pro-unionist factions or camps within Catalan society. Such neglect contributes to a clear tendency within scholarly analysis to reproduce and reify an alleged collective will of the Catalan people. A precise picture of who the independentists are, and who the unionists are—that is, a careful depiction of the main correlates of pro-independentist and pro-unionist sentiment, and a sociological understanding of the way in which this emergen<sup>t</sup> social division is embedded within broader constellations of material and social relations—such a descriptive, empirical approach has been largely missing from much of the scholarly debate.

This article follows the approach originally pioneered by Juan Linz to the empirical study of nationalism by seeking to situate the emergen<sup>t</sup> social division in Catalonia over the question of independence within a broader constellation of power relations.

We make use of original survey data to bring into focus a variety of demographic, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal indicators with which this division is associated. We emphasize the special salience of language practices and ideologies in conditioning, if not determining, attitudes towards independence. More concretely, we demonstrate the continuing legacy of what Linz famously referred to as a three-cornered conflict, among regional nationalists, the central government, and immigrant workers (and now their descendants), which has long conditioned democratic politics in Catalonia.

Linz's diagnosis of the three-cornered conflict provides a necessary historical context for understanding the origin and significance of the ethno-linguistic correlates to the emergen<sup>t</sup> social division between pro-independentist and pro-unionist factions or camps in Catalan society that we document in the article. By demonstrating the continuing relevance of Linz's diagnosis/model, we hope to correct the tendency in much of the scholarship: (1) to reproduce reified notions about the will of the Catalan people, and (2) to neglect careful sociological analysis of the way in which the correlates of secessionist preferences are embedded within constellations of power relations in Catalan society.

Our point is not to claim that nothing has changed since Linz made his diagnosis but rather, to insist that despite all the changes in context that have occurred, it remains impossible to understand the dynamics of the current secessionist surge, and especially the limits to its appeal, without paying close attention to the long latent, now ever more salient, ethno-linguistic cleavage inside Catalan society. Or to put the point somewhat di fferently: to understand the dynamics of the recent secessionist surge requires a historical understanding of the emergence and subsequent crystallization and freezing of the ethno-linguistic cleavage in Catalan society, and an understanding of how this cleavage continues to intersect with and reinforce other existing cleavages.

In this article, we show how divisions associated with the reinforcing cleavages of language and class are reflected in, and have even been exacerbated by, the still ongoing conflict between pro-independence and pro-unionist camps in the region. Indeed, our fine-grained, descriptive analysis of the survey data allows us to conclude that the three-cornered conflict remains alive and well—that ethno-linguistic divisions within Catalan society continue to condition the dynamics and limit the appeal of the Catalan nationalist cause in general, and of Catalan secession in particular. This stubborn sociological reality renders it very di fficult for the Catalan nationalist cause to hope to marshal su fficient unanimity to force the issue of independence.

Even so, close to half of the Catalan citizenry has by now come to register a rather intense preference in favor of independence, and this equally stubborn, if emergent, sociological reality in turn renders it quite di fficult for Spanish authorities to enforce the will of the Spanish majority without appearing to tyrannize the Catalan minority. All of this leads us to expect that a considerable degree of social and, above all, political conflict, most likely even a constitutional impasse, over the question of Catalan independence, is here to stay, certainly for the foreseeable future.

**Author Contributions:** Both co-authors prepared the survey, analyzed the survey results, and worked on successive drafts of the article together.

**Funding:** The research was funded by Spain's Ministry of Economy. Research Project CSO2014-59320-P. La política lingüística en el sistema escolar catalán. *Plan Nacional, Convocatoria Excelencia, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España*. Principal Investigator: Roberto Garvía.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.
