**5. Wh-Questions**

Remember that, for Stanley, two things are key: *knowledge how* consists in knowing the answer to a question, while *knowledge how* should fit within a more general account of knowing answers to questions. Toward that end, he seeks to set out for his readers the similarities between knowledge how and knowledge-*wh* and so between "how" and "wh" questions. He believes that knowledge ascription is always done in a similar way, comprising the ability to answer a "how" or a "wh" question. Just as one says things like "Hannah knows *where* her bike is", "Hannah knows *why* her bike has a flat tire", and "Hannah knows *when* she parked her bike in the garage", so one says things like "Hannah knows *how* to ride a bike." Of course, one *could* give each of these ascriptions its own account: one for *knowledge where*, one for *knowledge why*, one for *knowledge when*, and so on. What is striking, though, is that all these ascriptions have a similar semantic structure [1] (p. 36): "it is a stable cross-linguistic fact that most of the sentences ... are translated with the same verb used in translations of sentences of the form 'X knows that p'", and "the same word 'know' occurs in all of these constructions." For Stanley, that means they represent a single, unified phenomenon. He writes that [1] (p. 37): "the fact that we do not employ different words for these notions suggests they are at the very least intimately related concepts."

Rumfitt [21] criticizes this line of reasoning. He notes that French everyday language contains several distinct terms for knowledge how: e.g., *savoir faire*. Such terms do not seem to fit the pattern Stanley prescribes.

Stanley replies that the apparent problem is nothing more than a matter of Gricean conversational implicature: while many languages spell out embedded questions in full in accordance with his model, others do not. Their omission of the question word is guided by Grice's maxims [1] (p. 141, *emphasis added*):

It is clear that in a language in which it is possible to drop the overt question word in expressions of knowing how, Grice's maxim of manner predicts that one ought to drop the question word. But there is no language known to me where the propositional verb together with the bare infinitive means *knowing where*. *So the fact that in many languages ascriptions of knowing how do not superficially appear to take the form of an embedded question should not lead us to analyze them as relations to activities. So doing would lead to an unwarranted asymmetry between states of knowing how to do something and states of knowing when to do something and where to find something, asymmetries that all parties to the debate about the nature of practical knowledge should reject.*

Not only does Stanley seem to think he can explain linguistic developments in the French language by appeal to Grice, he also claims that interpreting *knowledge how* as "relations to activities" would lead to an "unwarranted asymmetry" between states of knowing how and other states of knowing-wh. When Stanley says that *knowledge how* is propositional, he really does mean that it is propositional on a par with knowing where the nearest gas station is; but this raises a di fficulty.

#### **6. Ability to Execute a Skilled Action**

For a unified theory of embedded questions to be possible in the way Stanley wants, the answer to a "how" question, as an expression of *knowledge how,* must consist of a proposition. As we argued in Section 2, *knowledge how* is the ability to execute a skilled action—noting that, for Stanley, it is not a requirement of *knowledge how* that the agen<sup>t</sup> actually is able to execute the skill; an abstract ability su ffices. (We will say more on that below.)

The problem is that, by virtue of the argumen<sup>t</sup> from knowledge transfer, it cannot be the mere grasp of a proposition that constitutes *knowledge how*, because *knowledge how* cannot be transferred propositionally. *Knowledge how* must comprise a certain practical kind of grasp. *Knowledge how* does not consist of a propositional truth *per se* but rather the practical grasp of that propositional truth. It follows that the answer to a question about *knowledge how* does not consist of a proposition *per se* but of the practical grasp of that proposition, which is what constitutes the skill. If that is so, it is not the case, *pace* Stanley, that the answers to embedded questions have uniform structure?<sup>6</sup>

If we are right, this weakens Stanley's case for intellectualism. Despite what he claims, his theory seems unable to provide a unified semantic theory, at least when it comes to embedded questions. More tellingly, we believe we have identified an implicit component of genuinely non-propositional knowledge lurking within his theory: what he calls the practical grasp of the proposition. That grasp constitutes the ability to act upon the proposition by performing a skilled action; but does not this ability then constitute a competence in itself, independent from the proposition? If so, is it not this competence that really constitutes *knowledge how*?

<sup>6</sup> We are aware it may seem odd to say that *knowledge how* should consist in a propositional truth, but this is a consequence of Stanley's theory. Remember he holds that *knowledge how* must consist of an answer to a question. Given that he wants a unified semantic theory of questions, the answer to a question—including the "how" question—must consist of propositions.
