**9. Conclusions**

We have attempted to argue that *knowledge how* must comprise more than the mere grasp of a proposition even if one otherwise accepts Stanley's intellectualism. We have done this by describing an implicit conflict between what we have called the argumen<sup>t</sup> from knowledge transfer and Stanley's argumen<sup>t</sup> from embedded questions: one that is revealing of certain characteristics of Stanley's "practical grasp" of a proposition that he downplays. At heart, our objection to Stanley is simple: even if *knowledge how* is propositional, it must involve an element of knowing how to act correctly upon the proposition; and this element of knowing how to act correctly cannot itself be propositional. Thus, *knowledge how* involves an irreducible non-propositional element and cannot be reduced to *knowledge that*. As Ryle [23] (p. 28) put it: "to be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply them." In accordance with our naturalistic stance, we have looked for input from cognitive science and found it offering convincing support for our non-reductive approach.

**Author Contributions:** Both authors have contributed to: Conceptualization, Methodology and Writing—Original draft preparation, Review and Editing. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Acknowledgments:** Thanks to Santiago Amaya, Dan Egonsson, Olav Gjelsvik, Ingvar Johansson, Katarzyna Paprzycka, Joel Parthemore, Björn Petersson, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Andreas Engh Seland and our anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback on this text. Sections 2–7 based on C.V. Felix's doctoral thesis *Slips, Thoughts and Actions* (2015).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.
