**7. Concluding Remarks**

The gist of the present article has been to make a case for a more plausible understanding of knowledge. An understanding of knowledge that, to some extent, harmonizes with agents' subjective experience of their actions when it comes to such phenomena as slips and basic actions, but primarily in regards to cognitive psychological and neuroscientific findings on the nature of agency. This has led us to argue for a distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that, and against a Stanley-styled intellectualism. Our argumen<sup>t</sup> against the latter has been that Stanley's position has certain ontological consequences that do not equate well with neuroscience and psychology. Moreover, cognitive sciences support a distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that; a distinction that especially comes to the fore, we have argued, in the phenomenon of slips.

**Author Contributions:** Both authors have contributed to: Conceptualization, Methodology and Writing—Original draft preparation, Review and Editing. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** A.S. gratefully acknowledges support from Makarna Ingeniör Lars Henrik Fornanders fond and Stiftelsen Elisabeth Rausings minnesfond: forskning.

**Acknowledgments:** We thank our anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.
