**4. Answering Questions**

Building on his earlier work with Williamson, Stanley holds that *knowledge how* always amounts to knowing the answer to a question; but this does not mean that all such knowledge consists in the ability to verbalize one's answers, because [2] (p. 214) "knowing how to ride a bicycle involves knowledge of a distinct proposition than does knowing how to explain how to ride a bicycle."<sup>5</sup> One's ability to answer a question can be latent, in which case one simply acts, based on implicit facts; as Stanley puts it [2] (p. 214): "only grasping a way to ride a bicycle is required to know how to ride a bicycle." The cycle-riding agen<sup>t</sup> has, in a practical way, grasped the requisite propositions for riding a bike: i.e., she knows of some means, *w*, such that *w* is a way to ride a bicycle. Her *knowledge how* consists in an ability to answer certain questions in principle, not necessarily in practice.

It is important for Stanley that, even though knowledge how to Φ is the same as knowing a fact about Φ, the intellectualist does not demand from the agen<sup>t</sup> that she can explain how to Φ. The only requirement is that she grasps a way in which Φ can be performed, though Stanley understands that one might think otherwise [2] (p. 214): "perhaps the very fact that the intellectualist defines knowing how in terms of propositional knowledge suggests that someone who knows how to do something must be able at least to *express* her propositional knowledge." The point is that the agen<sup>t</sup> need only be able to express that knowledge *somehow*, perhaps with demonstratives, not necessarily explain it verbally: a weaker claim than the one might otherwise think Stanley is making.

Stanley explicates his point by offering the young Mozart who, having been asked, "how do you do it?" points to one of his masterpieces while writing it, saying [2] (p. 214): "this is how I can do it." Of course, one could object that this does not answer the question of how to compose a masterpiece. An answer should be informative, and Mozart's "answer" is not illuminating at all—not so much because he cannot verbalize himself as because he is seemingly unable to give any satisfactory answer. It seems counterintuitive to say that he possesses an ability to answer the "how" question presented to him. Nevertheless, Stanley claims that Mozart's pointing at his masterpiece, while composing it, is an expression of *knowledge how*. He justifies this by asking one to consider what words should count as expressing *knowledge how*. If *all* words should count—and Stanley believes they should—then, Stanley says, demonstrative expressions like "this" count, and Mozart has successfully expressed his *knowledge how*.

<sup>4</sup> Arguably, many everyday *knowledge how* questions, and basically all those one expects to be answered verbally, are concealed *knowledge that* questions: e.g., "how do I ge<sup>t</sup> to the bus stop?" and "how do you play chess?" are both asked in a "how" manner but are really requests for *knowledge that*.

<sup>5</sup> Stanley quotes Fodor: "There is a real and important distinction between knowing how to do a thing and knowing how to explain to do that thing. But that distinction is one that the intellectualist is perfectly able to honor ... The ability to give explanation is itself a skill—a special kind of knowing how which presupposes general verbal facility at the very least. But what has this to do with the relation between knowing how and knowing *that*? And what is there here to distress an intellectualist?" (quoted in Stanley [2] (p. 213).

Stanley does not seem much concerned with how the recipient interprets Mozart's gesture. What matters is that Mozart has a way to express his knowledge that Stanley's intellectualism can capture. Stanley goes further: the intellectualist need not hold that an agen<sup>t</sup> is able to express the proposition that represents her *knowledge how* in words at all, not even using demonstratives. Her *knowledge how* need be nothing more than a state implicated directly in action. Stanley writes [2] (p. 215):

The southpaw is winning on points. But then the expert boxer adjusts and starts boxing in a particular way that is the best way to fight against a southpaw. The announcer, pointing at the way in which the expert boxer is fighting, utters: "He knows that that's the best way to beat a southpaw." *The announcer's knowledge-ascription is quite explicitly a true ascription of knowledge-that*. Furthermore, it is true *whether* or not the boxer is able to verbalize his knowledge of the way in question of boxing against a southpaw in non-indexical terms, non-demonstrative terms.

The point Stanley wants to make here is that it is not a requirement on his intellectualist account that *S* can verbalize his *knowledge how*. The expert boxer knows how to beat a southpaw without being able to verbalize this knowledge. This, he says, is analogous to the fact that one can know multiple different shades of a colour without being able to express this knowledge [2] (p. 215).

We have two responses to this. First, that an observer—the announcer in this case—can have propositional knowledge about another person's *knowledge how* does not imply that the latter knowledge is not of a different, more *practical* sort. Second, is it genuinely possible to know the answer to a question, in the sense required by Stanley's account, if one is unable to verbalize one's *knowledge how*? As we argue throughout, an intellectualist account which accepts a "mute" grasp of propositions is highly problematic. It runs the risk of ending up in precisely the type of conception of *knowledge how* that it seeks to avoid. What seems to constitute a practical mode of presentation for Stanley involves some kind of expertise irreducible to the proposition in itself. Moreover, Stanley's conception of *knowledge how* seems very distant from how research suggests that cognitive processes work.

Stanley's expert boxer has grasped certain boxing truths, expressed through his change of tactics. We have a problem with this. If, as Stanley claims, knowledge always involves grasping a proposition, and this is meant to capture how actions are informed by intelligence, it seems to us a proper demand that the agen<sup>t</sup> should be able to give a more informative expression to the proposition she is meant to grasp. If she cannot do so, it is hard to see in what sense she grasps a proposition. Stanley's "mute" grasp of a proposition strikes us as mysterious, ye<sup>t</sup> Stanley offers nothing to dispel the mystery. Instead, he focuses on shared characteristics of "how" and "wh" questions.
