*3.2. InformationC Has No Meaning*

This claim states that informationC, as a natural/physical phenomenon, is meaning-less,<sup>15</sup> so the meaning is overlaid on, or added to, informationC rather than it being an intrinsic part of it. How this meaning is created from, or associated with, informationC is an open issue, however. InformationC is just present out there, much like the rocks and the trees, regardless of whether or not some cognitive agen<sup>t</sup> is there to observe them (see also [69–72].)<sup>16</sup> When a tree falls in the forest, it creates a wave of air pressure (i.e., an organized physical phenomenon), which in itself is meaningless. If we are close enough to hear, we add meaning to the sound. (Such a claim is easily verified through a first-hand experience)

Meaning is defined as something that has value or import for a cognitive agent, but this is just one possible definition. An agen<sup>t</sup> may obtain something of value from informationC, something that has some significance for the agent's existence. The meaning may also be an interpretation of informationC—which otherwise, as we have said, is just an inert physical phenomenon—with us attributing to its various properties, such as structure, shape, or importance. Reading tea leaves and astrology are just two examples of such interpretations. The same informationC may have di fferent meanings for di fferent agents, however, or it may not have any meaning at all for some agents. An agen<sup>t</sup> is primarily an artificial or natural system that creates meaning for itself.

In principle, when perceiving environmental stimuli, some claim that there is no clear distinction between an artificial cognitive system, a simple biological system (e.g., a cell or a simple organism), and a conscious cognitive agen<sup>t</sup> in terms of creating meaning [73–77]. From this perspective, and with a su fficient degree of abstraction, an agen<sup>t</sup> could, in principle, be any organic or artificial system that

<sup>13</sup> Every element of the physical realm is a subject to some physical laws, otherwise, by definition, it would not be physical. 14 Theterm"complex"denotesacombinationofelementsas "a wholemadeupofcomplicatedorinterrelatedparts".Weuse

 thistermtoavoid referringtohylemorphism.

<sup>15</sup> Meaning-less denotes an entity that lacks meaning in its essence, while meaningless denotes an entity that has no meaning in a specific context.

<sup>16</sup> Meaning has many interpretations. For this study, if not otherwise stated, we follow the definition from the philosophy of language, where the term "meaning" denotes how language (linguistic constructs) relates to the world. A review of the various theories of meaning is beyond the scope and purpose of this work, however. An extensive list of references can be found in [69], among others. The theories claiming that meaning is the *correlata* to the world are contested by some good arguments by Chomsky [70–72].

senses and reacts to informationC in some way.<sup>17</sup> The lack of any sharp boundaries between meanings in di fferent agents creates a problem for identifying the locus of information A, which is discussed later in this study.

#### *3.3. Is InformationC the Organization of Matter, or Is Responsible For It?*

This claim asserts that informationC is responsible for the organization of the physical world.<sup>18</sup> On the one hand, this seems to be the most critical aspect of information, because information, in general, is fundamentally associated with the concept of some form, organization, or structure. On the other hand, it is very di fficult to define what it precisely means when we say that "information is associated with the concept of some form".<sup>19</sup> The di fficulty arises from ambiguity in the concept of form and organization, as well as in the concept of "association".

Organization may be, as is commonly the case, interpreted as structure, order, form, shape, or rationality when it is perceived by a cognitive entity. We do not posit that informationC is a structure in itself, because we do not know exactly what structure is, nor do we know what kind of structure would be associated with information or how this association would take place. InformationC is certainly not the visible structure or shape of objects, although we admit that informationC does reveal itself through the shape or structure of objects. Objects may be seen in a certain way, as being something, ye<sup>t</sup> this may not be their essence, i.e., informationC is responsible for the shape of things, but it is not their visible shape that is informationC. By way of an analogy, energy presents itself as the capacity of a system to do work, ye<sup>t</sup> it is not work in itself; see the discussions in [78–83].

The word "association" denotes the relationship between the organization or form of informationC and physical reality. This concept is critical to informationC, but we simply do not know what this relationship is. We only guess at its importance. More specific solutions always come down to, in some way, the matter–energy–information complex, but this relationship is as enigmatic as hylemorphism, both in its old and new renditions. The cited authors, despite referring to it, are also not clear about the meaning of this association. It seems that, for now at least, we need to remain at this rather imprecise descriptive level.

Why do we not associate informationC with a specific structure, though? If we did try to equate informationC with some domain-specific structure, such as a mathematical structure or the structure of the physical laws, informationC would simply acquire the characteristics of that domain. In other words, such information would take on a mathematical or scientific flavor, respectively. It also seems that quantifications of information tend to quantify "sensible shapes" rather than the information itself. As an analogy, when we measure mass, we usually measure the gravitational force between it and the Earth rather than the actual mass.<sup>20</sup> In addition, stating that informationC is a mathematical structure of reality would entail adopting some form of Neo-Platonism, which is not a generally

<sup>17</sup> Natural agents (i.e., biological systems) have been shaped by nature to sense its properties, including its structure (i.e., informationC). Nagel [17] discusses the dependency between an environment and an agen<sup>t</sup> in detail. Indeed, we are built to interpret nature, so we could say that interpretation comes to us naturally (we are interpreters per se). Indeed, we seek interpretations, because they are essential for survival and because evolution deems that agents who fail to adequately perceive their environment will not survive.

<sup>18</sup> We are not sure how to interpret the function of informationC in nature. One thing that is certain, however, is that the existence of informationC is recognized in the form of objects. However, whether its role is that of Plato's Forms or Aristotelian *eidos*, or whether the role of informationC is causal or not, is not well understood at present. Some studies claim [9] that information is a primary element of nature, or that information is a third element of nature in an energy–matter–information complex, but these are just intuitions. Due to this ambiguity about the role of information, the statements about informationC and the organization of matter are imprecise.

<sup>19</sup> The structure/organization of physical reality is such a fundamental concept that it cannot be described through other concepts, because structure lies at the foundation of everything that exists. We cannot talk about reality without talking about structure. However, this is, of course, just conjecture.

<sup>20</sup> We stay away from unresolved disputes about the nature and ontology of mathematical constructs, because bringing unresolved disputes into the discussion will not further the resolution of other unresolved disputes, such as the nature of informationC in this case.

accepted interpretation of mathematical objects (see e.g., [84]. We should, therefore, avoid these domain-specific claims and accept that informationC is domain-neutral. What is more, if we were to just claim that informationC is structure, it would not mean much, due to the ambiguous concept behind this unspecified structure. We would then ultimately end up treading the path of structural realism or informational structural realism with its epistemic or ontological versions. In addition, the structures in structural realism are passive, and they do not carry the meaning of "informare" (to shape), or at least nobody has attributed such causal powers to structures in the structural realism literature.

We must add here that different formal representations for informationC are not incorrect (e.g., Shannon, Fisher, Chaitin), but they simply do not address the essence of what they measure21. This is how mathematical formula typically relate to nature [84].

Thus, we merely posit that informationC is just one factor responsible for the organization of the physical world.
