*3.4. InformationA and*/*or InformationC*

We have differentiated two classes of information: abstract and concrete. In this section, we discuss how these two concepts relate to each other.

Information cannot be both abstract and concrete at the same time and in the same sense. What is abstract cannot be concrete, and what is concrete cannot be abstract, not when these terms are interpreted through their most common meanings.<sup>22</sup> InformationC is a purely natural phenomenon—it is in nature, and it is a part of the physical world. Existence for this information implies the existence of a physical entity. InformationA, in contrast, is abstract, so it relies upon the existence of some cognitive system. (We exclude here Popper's concept of World 3 and similar ideas.) Now, let us explore these differences through an example.

Different physical structures may represent the same piece of music. It may be a series of air pressure waves with physical structure SA, or it may be the grooves on a vinyl record with physical structure SB. These and many other structures, can, under certain conditions, all be interpreted as the same piece of music (i.e., the same informationA). Thus, we have several physical objects, each with its unique organization, or informationC (i.e., SA, SB, etc.), ye<sup>t</sup> there is only one informationA, namely, the piece of music.<sup>23</sup> This piece of music is, therefore, clearly a common element of the objects with structures SA, SB, and so on. Obviously, this common element cannot be physical, however, because there is nothing physically common among these very different physical structures. Indeed, the only thing these physical objects share is how they all can be interpreted in the same way by someone or something (i.e., as the piece of music). As the music is not embedded in the physical structures, it must therefore exist outside (transcend) those physical structures in some sense. Thus, it would appear that informationA clearly "exists" in some way. After all, how else could completely different physical structures convey the same meaning? It would seem clear to conclude that abstract information exists, so information is really informationA, not informationC. Such a conclusion has been reached in many studies [66,67,85,86]. However, we claim that this conclusion is incorrect or at least inaccurate. As controversial as it may seem to some, it seems that the proposed explanation for the piece of music is equally applicable to books, symbols, computer programs, game rules, works of art, and so on.

<sup>21</sup> The case of the different mathematical representations of physical information is to some extend but not exactly, similar to the case of two different mathematical models of quantum mechanics (Schrodinger and Heisenberg). Herman Weyl stated that these models are "alternative representations of the same mathematical structure" (as quoted by Heller [86]). We do not claim that physical information is a mathematical structure but we sugges<sup>t</sup> that the different mathematical models of information represent the same physical information as organization, as Schrodinger and Heisenberg's models are different representation of the QM structure.

<sup>22</sup> Abstract things are objects outside space–time. Concrete objects exist in the physical world and are subject to the laws of physics [57,58].

<sup>23</sup> These physical structures can also generally be converted from one to another (e.g., recording a radio performance onto a cassette tape) while preserving the capacity to be interpreted as the same piece of music (i.e., the same informationA).

The correct explanation, we believe, goes as follows: The physical structures (S A, SB, etc.) seem to carry the same information A because we, as cognitive agents, shape these structures in a certain way and later read/interpret them in a corresponding way, thus attributing an interpretation to them. These music-carrying physical structures are radically di fferent, as are their physical carriers (e.g., airwaves, the impression of a vinyl record, etc.). What makes these carriers seem like they "carry" the same music is the interpretation of the agen<sup>t</sup> rather than some factor (information A) that exists outside (or transcends) the physical realm. The agen<sup>t</sup> merely imposes (encodes) appropriate structures over a physical entity following some agreed-upon standard and later decodes it through an appropriate physical process, again following the agreed-upon standard. Music exists purely in the mind of the listener, composer, or interpreter, however, and "abstract information" does not float around in some metaphysical space, a sort of world of ideas that stands ready for us to access it.<sup>24</sup> As we said, informationC is a multilevel organization of physical entities. In the case of music, we are interpreting the macro-level structures of physical objects, not their micro-level organization.

We need to be careful when using terms like "is in," "carries," "is embedded," "locked in," and "contains" when describing how information A relates to informationC. For example, information A is not "embedded" in a physical object in the usual sense of the word. Information A does not exist as some component, substratum, or ingredient of a physical object. Information A is created by a cognitive agen<sup>t</sup> when it encounters some otherwise meaning-less physical phenomenon and decodes its form or organization (usually only a very selective subset of informationC) for its own use or benefit. This explanation should, we hope, counter any assertions that a physical object cannot be information because it cannot carry information A [67,85].

It is entirely possible that a di fferent mind from some other world would interpret the same physical structure di fferently, so these structures actually only carry music for us. There is no music as we know it in viruses [87], biological cells [88], or heavenly bodies [89], ye<sup>t</sup> these physical objects all have specific structures or organizations. We more or less understand the neural perceptual processes for perceiving the organization of physical objects through our cognitive systems, but we do not know how we perceive music. In short, we do not understand the phenomenology of music, nor do we understand the phenomenology of information A in general.

We assume here that the mind is a non-reducible biological phenomenon rather than a reducible emergen<sup>t</sup> phenomenon, even if we cannot accurately explain what it is at our current level of knowledge (apparently, some animals also enjoy Mozart or Bach [90]). We obviously try to avoid Descartes' duality, so we do not postulate the existence of abstract information as some esoteric entity. We also do not advocate the strict reductionism of mental features to neuronal levels. Of course, this argumen<sup>t</sup> can apply only if the concept of the mind is positioned as the locus of information A, which is created (in part) based on di fferent physical signals/stimuli [91]).<sup>25</sup> While this explanation takes away the "abstractness" of information A (because it grounds such information in a biological system), it does not explain how the information in our minds is created, transformed, stored, accumulated, and "transferred" back into our artifacts when we shape physical things. For example, there is no natural law that shapes a car, a table, or a watch (see the modern version of Paley's argumen<sup>t</sup> in [92]).<sup>26</sup> We must admit that we simply do not ye<sup>t</sup> understand how the mind works, so our theories of the mind cannot provide a conclusive explanation for it at present.<sup>27</sup> The only thing we can assume is that the natural world, including the mind and its created artifacts, is causally closed, and there is no "bifurcation" of nature into the world of nature and the world beyond, as implied by Descartes but denied by Whitehead

<sup>24</sup> Apparently, Mozart claimed that he did not compose the music but merely noted it down, however this may be a psychological phenomenon rather than a scientific argumen<sup>t</sup> for the independent existence of informationA.

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, "human behavior is determined by physical processes in the brain" [91]. Similar views are widespread in the literature of the field.

<sup>26</sup> I am referring to the 747 junkyard argument, the details of which may be found in [92].

<sup>27</sup> We assume that the current explanations of the mind as a kind of software and the brain as a kind of hardware are wrong and misguided. See, for example, the arguments of Searle [94].

and other modern philosophers of science. What is more, we may safely claim that thoughts and the mind are part of this world, much like the other phenomena we experience and observe. This claim, however, is not meant to endorse material monism and certainly not physical reductionism [93,94]. There are philosophies of the mind (e.g., biological naturalism) that classify the mind, consciousness, thoughts, ideas, and so on as not being reducible to matter, ye<sup>t</sup> they have a material base [68,95–99] (note that many philosophers of the mind contest this antireductionist view, such as [100]).

In summary, we claim that informationC exists objectively in the physical realm. It is unique in the sense that every physical object has its own organization or structure. Two physical objects may have a similar organization, or their organization may mean the same thing to us (as in the example of music), but their sameness (to us) does not come from these objects. Information A also exists (as an abstract entity), but its existence is contingent upon the presence of a mind or other cognitive system. Information A can also be transferred, stored, communicated, preserved, and transformed, but it needs a physical media to carry it and a mind to recreate it.

#### **4. InformationC: To Be or Not to Be?**

Thus far, we have presented research that recognizes the existence of informationC, but some authors deny that such information exists. We look at some of these studies and weigh their arguments.

Dinneen and Brauner [67] claim that "information-as-a-thing," which for them is information as a physical phenomenon, cannot account for "typical views of information".<sup>28</sup> These problems are avoided, they say, if information is seen as an abstract entity. The only example of "information-as-a-thing" (i.e., physical information) they provide in their 2018 study is a book (as a physical object). We could delve deeper into Dinneen and Brauner's argument, but this is not necessary. It seems that they set up their definition of physical information to fail, because according to their definition, physical information (a book) cannot be information because it cannot have meaning, so information is not physical. This is rather obvious, though. Physical information, or a book in their example, is meaningless by definition (a book is a physical object). Dinneen and Brauner's claim is in some way correct, because the physical object (the book) is meaningless in itself, as all physical objects are. However, their argumen<sup>t</sup> against the existence of physical information as a physical phenomenon, based on the example of the book, is incorrect because they are looking for meaning where there is none to be found. Dinneen and Brauner's attempt was, therefore, certain to fail, because they were looking for meaningful information or meaningful physical information rather than just physical information. For Dinneen and Brauner, "typical views of information" reflects what we refer to in this study as information A. There is nothing typical about this, even though it may be the most prevalent view of information. In science, however, the truth of a theory is not determined according to a majority vote, and the minority opinion is often the correct one. Dinneen and Brauner, it seems, missed the nature of informationC; informationC is not a physical object itself, but its organization (in a sense) discussed here.

In their earlier paper, Dinneen and Brauner [85] formulate three arguments for why a physical thing cannot be information or, more precisely, why what they call "information-as-a-thing" cannot exist. First, "the value of the physical representation is first and foremost its content, and not the physical embodiment of it". Thus, putting forward information-as-a-thing as information is clearly ignoring the content of a physical thing, and we are concerned with this content. Second, talking about physical objects as information is not accurate, because when talking about information, we are more interested in what these physical objects (e.g., DVDs, CDs, USB sticks) contain rather than the things themselves. Thus, the definition of information as a physical object is misleading, as well as the conclusion of the first argument. Third, the same physical object may contain di fferent information depending on time and place: For example, a book's content may be interpreted di fferently. This creates, according to Dinneen and Brauner, a metaphysical problem of identity. If information is a physical

<sup>28</sup> " ... that physical things cannot be information, and information therefore cannot be a physical thing" [67].

thing, it must be the same in all circumstances, otherwise we would have two or more things being the same physical object. We have partially addressed these three arguments in Section 4. As in the above discussion, Dinneen and Brauner do not distinguish between informationC and informationA. When they talk about information, they are actually talking about informationA. They are, in a sense, attributing informationA with a physical presence, and as we have pointed out many times in this study, informationA is not physical, and a physical object is not informationA. It may "contain" informationA for one or more agents, at least in the sense of "contain' as explained above, but a physical object is never informationA. In a rather stretched analogy, we could say that energy does not work, nor does it contain work, but it is certainly related to work. The analogy stops here, though. In defining information (informationA) as a physical object or information-as-a-thing, we are obviously making a mistake by conflating the abstract with the concrete, which will clearly never work. As we said before, physical information is not a physical object in the sense of specific object like a book, a DVD, etc. Physical information, or informationC, is the organization of these objects, as explained in the previous sections. What Dinneen and Brauner face is the concrete-abstract split indicated by Davies [53] and Rovelli [11],<sup>29</sup> but while Rovelli and Davies managed to comprehend and overcome it, Dinneen and Brauner did not.

Bates [66], following Edwin Parker (quoted by Bates), identifies information in nature as a pattern of, or within, physical things. However, Bates' information is not physical, because it is a pattern, an abstract concept realized through a physical medium and recognized by a cognitive agent. This interpretation is seen in Bates' claims that while information as a pattern is everywhere in the universe, total entropy is pattern-free,<sup>30</sup> so it has no information. Therefore, according to Bates, total entropy cannot be interpreted as a pattern, so Bates' notion of "information as a pattern of physical things" is added to some physical phenomena, but not to others.<sup>31</sup> In short, we may say that in Bates' view, information is not a physical entity, even when it is associated with physical objects, but rather a perceived pattern of physical objects. In her own example, some physical phenomena are information-free. It therefore seems that Bates' information has nothing to do with informationC and is more akin to the concept of natural information seen in Millikan's work [101], which is also not informationC. By Millikan's very definition, natural information comprises infosigns carried by natural phenomena that "initiate perception" [101]. In this definition, natural information appears to be simply informationC plus the meaning or interpretation for a physical carrier. Recall that informationC does not need to initiate perception to exist. A similar definition of natural information is given by Piccinini and Scarantino [102].

The conviction that information must have meaning has prevented many researchers from recognizing the existence of physical information. This "epistemic turn" (see James [103]).<sup>32</sup> is characteristic of modern philosophy, and it began with Descartes. For example, von Weizsäcker [41] and others later on, claimed that information must be also physical in some way, ye<sup>t</sup> he could not recognize information without meaning.

Some of the arguments against the concept of informationC have been generated by identifying informationC with Plato's Forms. One such argument, namely, a modified version of the Third Man argument, asks: If informationC is in every physical object, is informationC in informationC? Another argumen<sup>t</sup> questions how the same informationC may exist in different physical objects at the same

<sup>29</sup> The problem is stated as follows: "How can information be physical and abstract at the same time?"

<sup>30</sup> We do not go into details about what is "total entropy" or whether information as a pattern would appear if entropy was less than total (whatever that means for Bates) (i.e., would information as a pattern disappear at one point, or would it appear or disappear gradually?).

<sup>31</sup> The claim that "total entropy is pattern-free" is incorrect, because every physical phenomenon has some organization or pattern, although it may be beyond our understanding in some cases. Bates repeats the common misconception of equating entropy (assumedly thermodynamic entropy) with the popular notion of chaos (of sorts).

<sup>32</sup> The "epistemic turn" denotes the reorientation of modern philosophy from ontology to epistemology as the main philosophical perspective on nature.

time (i.e., how does the same physical thing (informationC) exist in many di fferent places at the same time?) These problems apply to Plato's Forms in his metaphysical view, but as we said from the start, informationC is not one of Plato's Forms, because such objects exist outside space and time, so in this sense, they are abstract objects. While Plato's Forms are in some way physical things (in Plato's view), the nature of their existence (outside the space-time) and relation to reality is exactly what makes them controversial. InformationC as a physical phenomenon does not su ffer from these shortcomings, just as physical objects do not su ffer from the same shortcomings. For example, we do not question whether energy is within energy or whether matter is within matter, even though these phenomena are everywhere. InformationC is more akin to the Aristotelian concept of eidos, but as we pointed out earlier, such analogies to ancient ideas are very precarious and should be drawn with grea<sup>t</sup> restraint. This is why we do not discuss them further in this study, or we do not propose them to be renditions of informationC.

Taking a larger view, any researcher who claims that the concept of information is inherently and exclusively associated with meaning and knowledge is implicitly denying the existence of information as a physical phenomenon for the obvious reasons explained above (i.e., information cannot be both abstract and concrete in the same way and at the same time). Surprisingly, such claims are made with full knowledge that human agents are physical-information-processing systems (see, for example, [18,19,104–106]), and as a computer, our main data-processing system is a purely physical, mindless, and meaningless device. We need to take us (or the mind) out of this picture in a kind of Copernican move to see informationC.<sup>33</sup>

As a reminder, the existence of information as a physical entity is supported by the studies in which information (the concept of information) has been found to have properties that are attributable to physical objects, the studies that have found information useful for explaining certain physical processes, and the studies that have found information as a unifying factor in explaining a range of natural phenomena. (See the authors quoted in the earlier sections of this study.)

#### **5. Physical Information Revisited: Conclusions and Questions**

The time has come to summarize the main findings of this study. We conceptualized physical information, or informationC, as a natural phenomenon that has three properties: (i) a physical, objective existence, (ii) the absence of intrinsic meaning, and (iii) an organization of, or within, nature. These properties are, of course, subject to many interpretations, so they need to be understood within the context of the cited studies.

InformationC, (as a physical phenomenon) exists objectively in the same sense as the physical world around us. InformationC is not abstract in the way that mathematical concepts and ideas are abstract. However, whatever exists contains informationC in some form, and there is no physical phenomenon without informationC, because every physical phenomenon has some level of organization (even if we do not recognize it). InformationC is meaning-less, however, just like all other physical phenomena. Meaning is associated with, or attributed to, informationC by some sort of cognitive system. How meaning is created, though, lies beyond the scope of this study. InformationC is a constituent element of nature, and it discloses itself through the organization of the physical world. 'Organization' is a fairly broad concept, but in this study, organization can be regarded as structure, order, form, or shape, although it cannot be simply identified with it.

InformationC is a carrier (in the sense that was explained earlier) of information A, which is information with meaning or value. Meaning is what we, or generally any cognitive agent, associate with information A. The process of creating information A depends upon the cognitive agent, and in some sense, information A exists in the agen<sup>t</sup> in the same way that thoughts and ideas exist.

<sup>33</sup> By "a Copernican move' we understand the position in which a human person is not the vantage point from which to look at nature.

We always need to be careful when using the term "exist," however, because it means different things for abstract and concrete information. Meaning is defined as something of value for the cognitive agent. From informationC, an agen<sup>t</sup> may derive something that has some significance for the agent's existence or functions, so the agen<sup>t</sup> essentially creates meaning for itself. The same informationC may have a different meaning for a different agent, or more significantly, the same informationC may have no meaning at all for an agent. What constitutes an agent, as well as which agents can create and possess abstract information, is disputable. We could represent the meaning of information on a linear spectrum from purely physical information at one extreme to fully meaningful information for a human agen<sup>t</sup> at the other extreme. The precise boundary between concrete and abstract information may seem fluid, because the concept of meaning is often extended to minimally cognitive organisms, whatever that means, and artificial systems [107,108]. (Indeed, the fluidity of this boundary was exploited by Rovelli in his concept of informationAC.) However, one pole of this meaning spectrum is meaning-less, and this is where informationC lies. The problems with informationA vs. informationC begin when we start trying to attribute meaning to informationC.

The fact that we do not propose any mathematical or formal formula for informationC derives from the fact that this information is represented as an organization or structure of nature, so it may be quantified at different levels in many different ways through many different mathematical models, ye<sup>t</sup> there is no single preferred way to do this. Some models may seem more useful than others, so they may acquire an aura of being "the right model".

Last but not least, we may ask how relevant Floridi's General Theory of Information (GTI) is to the concept of informationC [4]. We ask this because the GTI is seen as an exemplary, comprehensive attempt to define what information is and subsume most, if not all, of the other definitions [85]. Very briefly, the GTI is defined as "data + meaning". In other words, GTI information is data endowed with meaning. We have already discussed what meaning is, but what is data here? Floridi is not clear, however. He writes: "nothing seems to be a datum per se. Rather, being a datum is an external property". This definition somewhat expresses the idea that a datum does not exist in its own right but rather that it is some "X" with added meaning (i.e., it is an external property). Thus, the concept of a datum in the GTI is relative, and its existence depends on some agen<sup>t</sup> elevating it to the status of a datum. Thus, the GTI may be alternatively expressed as "(X + meaning) + meaning". This X is defined as a "fracture in the fabric of being," a "lack of uniformity," or an "external anchor of information". In fact, we do not know what it is, and we cannot by definition know what it is (Floridi compares it to Kant's noumena). So, the GTI is essentially grounded in something we do not know. A somewhat charitable interpretation of the GTI (by disregarding the status of X) would be that because GTI information is tightly coupled with meaning, it actually has nothing to do with informationC. The GTI information is, therefore, a comprehensive, very detailed formulation of informationA, but as we said, this would be a charitable interpretation. Notwithstanding the grounding problem (the status of X), the GDI is still a very useful and thorough attempt to organize and rationalize informationA and may serve as a reference point in the discussions about the nature of information.

Maybe we should again emphasize what is proposed in this study. Every physical phenomenon has some organization or form (in the sense explained), and we denote this as informationC. InformationC is a concrete, physical phenomenon, thus it has no meaning. Cognitive agents that interact with nature—or as we could instead say, the physical environment—sense and react to informationC. The interaction between an agen<sup>t</sup> and the environment is physical. In some cases, an agen<sup>t</sup> absorbs some subset of informationC via its sensory apparatus, and on combining this with its internal resources in some way, it creates informationA. At present, the process in which informationA is created is only vaguely understood. (We do not accept any views that would reduce the mind to neuronal levels or explain the mind as an illusion, a kind of software, or other emergen<sup>t</sup> phenomenon in a reductive sense.) A physical object (a book, a DVD, a CD disk as in the examples cited) is not informationC, although informationC is part of it, and in principle, it does not carry any informationA. Unless we were to postulate some transcendent ontology for meaningful entities (see Popper or Peirce), informationA does

not exist in a physical sense. Information A and informationC may coexist, but existence in both cases means a di fferent thing. The conflict arises when we try to conflate information A and informationC or attribute the same mode of existence to them.

Several questions about the concept of informationC remain unresolved, and the proposed list below presents some of them. These questions are speculative, but they appear in the research on informationC, so they are related to this work. Of course, the real list of unresolved questions about the nature of physical information is likely to be much longer than the one below.

In all the questions below, the term "information" refers to informationC.

Question 1: Do laws for the conservation of information exist, and if they do, what do they claim? Is the total amount of information in the universe therefore constant? *This question probes the problem of "the conservation of information". If information is fundamental to whatever exists in the physical world, does it follow laws for its preservation, much like energy?* (Suggested by the writings of Carroll [52], for example.)

Question 2: Can we claim that whatever exists must contain informationC? Can we defend the paninformatism claim that information is everything that exists? What is more, is paninformatism related to panpsychism? *This question probes the claim that information is in everything that exists. Can such a claim be justified? And does such a claim amount to some kind of paninformatism or panpsychism? If so, what precisely would this entail? Would such a claim trivialize the concept of information?* (Suggested by the writings of Stonier [45], Turek [8], and Carroll [52], for example.) Question 3: Can we interpret informationC as a causal factor, and how could such a claim be verified? *This question probes the alleged causal role of information in the physical world. It amounts to the question of whether information is a passive or active element in nature and what the nature of this activity would be.* (Suggested by the writings of Carroll [52], and von Weizsäcker [41], for example.) Question 4: InformationC is foundational to the physical universe, but in what sense can this statement be made? *This question probes the claim that information is fundamental to nature, but what exactly would this mean? Should such a claim be interpreted along the lines of the proposed information–matter–energy complex? Or should it be interpreted more metaphysically like the Logos of The Bible or the Tao of Tao-Te-Ching as an all-pervading and primordial element of existence?* (Suggested by the writings of Heller [42,43], Dodig Crnkovic [60], Stonier [45], for example.)

Question 5: Can we say that highly complex and chaotic (i.e., non-linear, dynamic) systems have no informationC? *This concerns the problems of chaos and non-linear, dynamic systems. Does information play a role in such systems? Quite often, chaos is associated with a lack of information, which seems to be a questionable interpretation of a physical phenomenon.* (This issue was indicated by Bates [2].)

Question 6: Does informationC imply some form of modern hylemorphism?<sup>34</sup> *This question seeks to identify the similarities between information and hylemorphism in its modern interpretations. The problem of the nature of information and matter and energy has resurfaced in the works of many authors (see the references in this paper), and they all seem to echo Aristotelian metaphysics* (see Jaworki [109]) (Suggested by the writings of Polkinghorne [46], Turek [8], Krzanowski [110], and Carroll [52], for example.)

Question 7: Does the fact that information is physical change the meaning of computation from one of symbolic processing to processing physical information? *We associate computation with*

<sup>34</sup> William Jaworski argues why the hylemorphic structure is the best, and perhaps only, means for explaining the persistence of individuals who change their matter over time. Hylemorphism claims that some individuals, paradigmatically living things, are composed of physical materials with a form or structure that is responsible for them existing and persisting as the kind of things they are. One objection to hylemorphism is that an account of the physical materials that comprise an individual is insu fficient to account for everything it is and everything it does. William Jaworski, however, argues that this objection fails insofar as hylemorphic structure is the best, and perhaps only, means for explaining the persistence of individuals who change their matter over time [109]. A similar claim was made almost 40 years earlier by Turek in a 1978 article on the concept of information and its relation to a restricted form of hylemorphism [8].

*symbolic processing, but computation in computers is, in fact, a highly structured, pure physical process (e.g., as Searle said, "computation is in the eye of the beholder"). Could we extend the concept of computation to any physical process involving changes in physical organization without trivializing the concept of computing? Do we even care*? (Suggested by the writings of Seife [47], Dodig Crnkovic [50,60], and Dodig Crnkovic and Mueller [61], for example.)

Question 8: Can information be equated to some kind of structure, and what would this mean for the concept of structure? *This question proposes explaining the concept of informationC through the concepts of structure and structural realism.* (Suggested by the writings of Heller [42,43], and Schroeder [48,49].)

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest
