*6.1. Epistemons and Ontolons*

Igamberdiev in [95], referring to prior work by Barham, proposed the concept of an 'epistemon' as a description of the sub-systems present in biological functions. Barham [106] regarded living cells as 'epistemic engines', in which a low energy or regulation (epistemic) stroke and a high energy or work (pragmatic) stroke constitute the work cycle. A similar representation was introduced much earlier by the founder of biosemiotics Jakob von Uexküll [109,110]. In fact, Barham may just have rediscovered the latter's semiotic cycle, both phases of the cycle are connected in such a way that the

<sup>9</sup> Whether Being can be talked of in terms of proper parts is an interesting question which has been discussed by Capurro but will not concern us further here.

low-energy (informational) constraints act as signs with respect to high energy (pragmatic) constraints, leading to semiotic, epistemic correlations that have predictive value and which can insure a semiotic, epistemic correlation between the measurement of low-energy environmental signals and the response. The recognition, through its active site of an enzyme to an external chemical stimulus, based on its structure, is such an epistemon. This reaction cannot, at the present level of knowledge, be predicted from the structure *a priori*, but the two components in interaction can be said to be joined by a relation possessing semiotic character. The stability and reproducibility of this relation is made possible via operation of a second semiotic subsystem—the encoding (digital) system. Biological systems therefore include two semiotic subsystems, one based on the structure of imprint and on the recognition of three-dimensional shapes (images), and the other based on the digital linear structure of code.

The interpretation currently preferred by both Authors is based on living systems being first and foremost real, physical, dynamic systems, with a corresponding ontology and hence describable by the 'onto-logic' of Logic in Reality. As in the previous Section, the semiotic descriptions of the meaning-laden biological processes are not false, but are abstractions from the actual flows of energy and molecules in progress. To try to capture these notions, we replace the concept of an 'epistemon' by that of an 'ontolon', an identifiable but dynamic 'individual' (cf. Krause [37]) that refers to or better implies a portion, recognized as such, of that ontological process. As such, an ontolon is a quasi-individual, individual and non-individual, and is an analogue of a quantum system, but only an analogue, quantum-*like*. The ascription of *essential* quantum properties to brain processes is an epistemic ascription.

In contrast to the previous picture, however, our current focus is on actual change rather than on the interpretation of that change, rendering the designation of 'semiotic' almost superfluous. We say almost in order not to exclude epistemological interpretations, but only to insure the proper ontological priority to the dynamics and its logic—LIR. Semiosis in LIR thus describes a *process*, not the application of a doctrine. As a natural process, it is something that starts and stops, and is more or less complete or correct, even persuasive or unpersuasive.

As hypothetical entity, however, the ontolon as some kind of *unit* of real processes-in-progress suggests a kind of identity. We retain for discussion the possibility of a similarity between an ontolon and the Epicurean 'atom' possessing the property of a *clinamen* described above. It thus appears to conflict with our general philosophy of avoiding epistemic identities to describe complex, dynamic phenomena. We argue that there is no *a priori* reason and not to see a process as composed of parts, provided it is understood that these 'parts' are not absolutely separated from a 'whole'. Lupasco showed that a new mereology was implied by the Principle of Dynamic Opposition mentioned above.

Ontolons are thus real, but unlike the epistemological counters of Peirce, we do not require any superaddition of classification or categorization. One can use the concept of ontolons as a device to help focus on the ontological characteristics of processes in relation to other critical aspects such as their ethical valence.

To complete this preliminary discussion of the ontolon as a concept of the parts or entities of dynamic processes, let us briefly consider three other attempts to identify or characterize them. Capurro [111] sees the clear historical derivation from the Greek *ta onta*, a neuter plural participle form best translated by 'existings' or beings. The singular, *to on*, a being, understood as a verbal, participle hence 'dynamic' form would be the equivalent of the ontolon. This interpretation is only acceptable to us if being here includes *becoming*, the processual activity of reality. In our opinion, any attempt to totally separate being from becoming is incorrect. Support (not proof; we are not in a domain of 'proof') comes from the perhaps little-known fact that in several Indo-European languages, the original word for *be* and *become* as the same.

### *6.2. Ontolons and Information. The Informosome*

Following the statement that meaningful information is reality in potential form, we will discuss here how the action of information takes place as a dynamical semiotic process in which the contradictions co-existing as potentialities are resolved during their actualizations and form the basis of new contradictions. We will show that before studying the dynamic process in physics, biology or sociology, we should define the basic ontolon structure for each system. In the frames of this structure, the contradictions become fixed and the system is able to perform a transition to a new level of complexity realizing the principle of negation of negation. By identifying the dynamical structure of ontolon, we understand the basis of a dialectical discourse in the course of interaction between ontolons. A continuous reproduction of a semiotic relation in the structure of ontolon occurs via the process representing the transfer of information.

Peirce coined the neologism 'phaneron' to designate something like the *idea* of Locke forming the 'immediate content of awareness' as opposed to phenomenon. "The phaneron is what appears, as it appears, even if, as it appears, it appears to be more than mere appearance". The di fficulty is that Peirce made no ontological commitment regarding his concepts. He wrote specifically that his 'phaneroscopy' (phenomenology) had nothing at all to do with the question of how far the 'phanerons' it studied correspond to any realities. Elsewhere Peirce says that the phaneron is the totality of what is "in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not." We can only agree with Short [112] that Peirce's positions were "fragmentary, marvelously inconsistent and often unpersuasive". We will attempt to tie our ontolon as closely as possible to the evolution of real physical, biological and cognitive processes.

First, the distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* as the basic attributes of the primary substance in the sense of Spinoza defines the two aspects of movement. While the mechanical cause of movement is well assimilated by physics and can be referred to Aristotelian material and formal causes, the cause associated with *res cogitans* is of a di fferent nature and can be associated with Aristotelian efficient and final causes. It is not necessarily associated with consciousness; rather it is a prerequisite of consciousness at higher levels of complexity appearing during the self-movement of the substance that includes both mechanical and non-mechanical constituents. The basic function of cognition, according to Spinoza, is to move and arrange external objects in which mechanical forces can be controlled but not directly involved.

As discussed in Section 2, in Epicurean terms, the non-mechanical cause will correspond in the control of *clinamen* by the group of atoms that use their own *clinamina* to restrict *clinamina* of other atoms in the organized system. In other words, which are relevant to modern quantum mechanical terms, a group of these atoms appears as a device (representation of an "agency") that measures potential trajectories of other atoms and imposes control over their movement, i.e., it navigates them. The unpredictable deviation of these atoms from the established trajectory becomes a prerequisite of their incorporation into a complex system where their potential deviation is restricted. The complex system of atoms acquires the non-mechanical property of internal measurement [113] in which it is subdivided into levels and attains control. The controlling part (navigator) and the controlled (navigated) part are interrelated within the cyclic structure possessing the property of retrocausality [114] in which the transfer of information takes place and the potential state is taken as the meaningful prerequisite of continuous realization of the stable self-supported state of the system. The action that appears as voluntary in fact represents an example of non-mechanical causality that at higher levels of organization becomes mental causality. When the measuring device represents a part of measured system, the measurement proceeds internally in relation to the whole system. The system undergoes complexification in the course of such continuous internal measurement because it leads to an iterative recursive process. This process corresponds to evolution of the whole system.

The internal measuring device measures, among other elements of the measured system, itself in the state of measuring, which limits possible accuracy of quantum measurement and manifests itself as the uncertainty principle [115]. The increase in complexity as a result of quantum measurement corresponds to the increase in complexity in the course of evolution of the system which can be viewed as a potentially infinite recursive embedding process. There was an attempt to explain the visible expansion of the Universe as a consequence of this infinite recursion [116].

The concept of a dynamic 'unit' of process experience can be found in Wu's concept of an 'informosome'. In his philosophical classification Wu Kun [117,118], any existing material structure contains in itself its 'condensed' history, its current properties and the information of its possible or potential future development. It is a 'condensation' of the contents of all relevant operative relationships. This term is currently in use in biology [119] to refer to mechanisms of protein transfer in the cell, but this process should indeed be understood as informational in the broad sense of this paper. This is a further consequence of our view that both material processes and their informational components evolve together [120]. The term exposome refers to the totality of environmental exposures of an individual from conception onwards, and has been proposed as a critical entity for disease etiology. We note that, interestingly, that like the informosome, the exposome is constituted by a totality of *information*. It *is* an informosome.

#### *6.3. Ontolons and Semiosis in Living Systems. Second-order Non-linearity and Poincaré Oscillators*

When we consider a cyclic structure with internal semiosis, we may imagine such structures in living systems; however, even in simple organized physical systems such as the hydrogen atom, the controlled restriction in the field of potentialities takes place. An electron in its conjunction with proton can be actualized within certain restricted spatio-temporal area, and the spontaneous collapse of wave function becomes restricted within the organized structure of the atom. This reduction of the field of potentialities bears the information that elementary particle acquires within the atom. At the next level of interaction, the cyclic dynamic structure can recognize other structures that are external to it and react in a way that aims to resist possible destruction that can appear as a result of direct mechanical contact.

Nonlinearity and non-linear dynamics have become substantial new subjects of research in their own right, with two journals being published with those titles! The simplest description of a non-linear system is one in which the change of the output is not proportional to the change of the input. Generally, one tries to use a non-linear system of dynamical equations to describe a complex system. A complex system is loosely defined as constructed by a large number of simple, mutually interacting parts, capable of exchanging stimuli with its environment and of adapting its internal structure as a consequence of such interaction. The non-linear interactions involved can give rise to coherent, emergen<sup>t</sup> complex behavior with a rich structure. Key concepts in complexity science are, for example, the coexistence of diversity and stability, for which LIR provides an interpretation. Complexity science also looks at the dynamics of systems in transition regions of self-organized criticality, but as these are di fficult to solve, they are approximated by linear ones, but some phenomena may be hidden by this strategy such as chaos, singularities, and solitons or, we now would add, ontolons. Thus the dynamic behavior of a non-linear system may appear to be counterintuitive and unpredictable.

For us, this picture is quite primitive, since the interactions at the heart of a process and their movement from actuality to potentiality is obscured. We see the term non-linear as describing the complex path between prior and subsequent states of a process from both mathematical and physical perspectives and, we now add, logical ones as well based on Logic in Reality. Thus, *any* movement from cause to e ffect can be seen as a highly non-linear, multi-dimensional process.

But in what exactly does the non-linearity of non-linear dynamics consist? Many physical phenomena are described as emergent: tornadoes certainly arise from complex temperature and humidity gradients, and such systems are considered to be the consequence of non-linear dynamic interactions. From the LIR standpoint, they are (almost) pure, actualized macrophysical processes with no form of internal representation or semantics. Other examples are the dissipative, far-from-equilibrium systems described by Prigogine, and the intrinsically simple structures such as the convection cells in heated liquids or certain oscillating chemical systems, as discussed below.

Our conclusion from this brief overview of the standard notion of non-linearity is that it is *not* a domain to which the principles of LIR apply. We might call the phenomena referred to, to try to characterize the relation, as first-order non-linear processes. If we look at phenomena instantiating the properties of recursion and self-reference, and, consequently, of the Principle of Dynamic Opposition, we start to see an underlying unity which justifies referring to them as instantiating second-order non-linearity. Further parallels can be drawn to concepts of Synchronic Downward Causation.

We propose that this semiotic system first described by Jacob von Uexküll in relation to living systems [109] represents the basic structure of an ontolon as the element of actualized substance bearing not only spatiotemporal but also cognitive attributes. In a di fferent context, this structure was introduced by James Barham [107] in his model of the dynamical informational semiosis. In his theory of the meaning of information he identifies meaningful functions with generalized non-linear oscillators and their associated phase space attractors. By postulating the existence within such oscillators of a component capable of coordinating low-energy interactions with the correct environmental conditions supporting the dynamical stability of the oscillator the meaning of information is interpreted as the prediction of successful functional action. This can be considered as elementary structure of an ontolon, extending Barham's definition of 'epistemon'. The epistemic function should be considered as a secondary to the ontic nature of such structure that represents the basic unit of nature that can potentially evolve into a complex cognitive system.

In fact, the original invention of such structures should be attributed to Henri Poincaré who introduced non-linear dynamics and differential topology in physics in his concept of the Poincaré map describing the simplest non-linear system called the Duffing oscillator. Glass and Mackey [120] suggested that all systems exhibiting limit-cycle behavior should be termed Poincaré oscillators. This structure can be viewed as the basic structure of the ontolon that is realized at different levels of organization. The periodic orbit of the continuous dynamical system is stable if and only if the fixed point of the discrete dynamical system is stable. The trajectory of such oscillators can be called a periodical attractor or limit cycle. The simplest Poincaré oscillator does not assume a developed internal structure, but a complex internal structure can potentially arise as a result of its evolution towards the expansion of its external stability supported by more sophisticated internal dynamics attributed to its "agency". What is important to point out here is that the interaction of Poincaré oscillators having internal information dynamics can be described as a discourse, which result may not be deterministically anticipated. The oscillator itself has its internal rule that appears as its internal logic, and for its revelation in our description as a meta-logic, it is necessary to describe its behavior as a dialectical process.

While classical mechanical movement can be described by bivalent formal logic, the description of the movement that involves control of potential realizations involves another logical scheme that incorporates the potential-actual states as prerequisites of transition (LIR). This meta-logic is the logic of non-mechanical causality and it can be defined as a dialectical logic in its broad sense. It treats causality as the achievement of a solution established in the discourse of communicating ontolons. In this communication, ontolons can oppose each other or unite in larger ontolons in which the unified system of control is formed. We will further consider the internal structure of ontolons corresponding to living systems and to conscious systems. But if we consider all hierarchies of ontolons, we should briefly return to non-living reality and emphasize that even at the lowest quantum level the reality is can be seen with two attributes, one spatial and the other dynamic. This is reflected in the characteristics of quantum as a "wave-pilot" in the de Broglie interpretation [121].

In relation to the phenomenon of life, the ontolon structure is based on the internal constraints that support the uniqueness of each biological system and its self-maintenance. In this representation, it is possible to understand how biological systems enter into a dialectical discourse that corresponds to the operation of the LIR Principle of Dynamic Opposition. It is thus an oversimplification to view biosystems as simply separable into two functional parts, corresponding to a hardware and software. This static approach is still popular in biosemiotics (see previous Section 5) and other rather reductionist concepts. Such concepts ignore the dynamic aspect of semiosis which consists in the fact that the significant system of the genome is internally reproduced within the system and is repaired through sets of internal constraints representing the feedback from the elements that it encodes. Such a system represents a whole with a locally stable point attractor of the Poincaréan type.

The apparent independence of symbol systems from physical laws follows from the analysis of Poincaréan type oscillators representing the basis of the semiotic dynamical cycles described by von Uexküll and Barham. The view that genetic symbol systems have evolved so far from the origin of life and that semiotics does not appear to have any necessary relation whatsoever to physical laws is also true, but it occults the fact that the processes involved instantiate the same categories of Dynamic Opposition and Non-Separability. Pattee [122] states that information does not belong to the category of universal and inexorable physical laws but refers to initial conditions and boundary conditions. Boundary conditions formed by local structures are called constraints, while informational structures such as symbol vehicles are a special type of constraint. Pattee [123] claims that life and evolvability require the complex interaction of rate-independent symbol constraints and rate-dependent physical dynamics. However, the concepts of initial conditions and constraints in physics make sense only in the context of the law-based physical dynamics to which they apply. This is also the case for the concept of information. We agree with Pattee that the illusion of isolation of symbols from matter can arise from the arbitrariness of the apparent epistemic cut. Further, the apparent isolation of symbolic expression from physics seems due to an epistemic necessity, but ontologically it is still an illusion; making a clear distinction is not the same as isolation from all relations. In general, one clearly separates the genotype from the phenotype, but from an operative standpoint, one certainly does not think of them as isolated or independent entities.

Further elaboration of the matter-symbol problem is possible using the two-level framework of analysis implied by LIR. If the illusion of isolation is an epistemic illusion, whose reality is accepted, this means that symbolic expression is not metaphysically isolated from physics. Consequently, their relation or interaction is real, and it can be considered to have an appropriate dynamics. The remaining question concerns the use of antagonism or constraints to characterize these dynamics. This can be resolved by a view of symbolic memory constraints as dynamic processes in themselves, co-evolving with the other components of biological systems [1].

#### *6.4. Rosen's Model and an Endoperspective*

Besides the error-correcting cybernetic controls, the system contains anticipatory mechanisms to pre-empt possible errors, as discussed by Rosen and others [124]. These controls are realized through the agency of a predictive model, converting present information into predicted future consequences. These are *ipso facto* essentially potential and their evolution follows the rules of LIR.

Rosen suggested an alternative to a classical dualistic genetic model of the biological system. He called it the (M, R) system where M is metabolism and R is repair or, as later suggested, replacement [125]. Elements of the metabolic system are continuously replaced and the elements that replace them are also replaced, and this can go to the infinite regression. However, Rosen stated that the system can be "closed to e fficient causation" and contain the internal principle of organizational invariance [125] which results in avoiding infinite regression and closing the system in a stable non-equilibrium state in which the system, remaining open to the material flows, becomes selective for them and closed to the efficient causes that are locked inside of it. This structure is based on the principle of "organizational invariance" [126] that escapes the infinite regression for the internal system's time T, during which the system stably performs its function and avoids "global system failure".

Rosen's theory formulates the basic ontolon structure for living systems. Other approaches include Eigen's theory of hypercycles [127] and the autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela [128] which have common features to Rosen's model but remain less developed in relation to their formalizable and hence logical and ultimately computational value, where possible. Rosen's (M, R) system includes the operation defined by β which designates the system as a whole and acts as a generator of the complete enclosed structure of (M, R) systems. There is no rigid algorithm to take β as this operation has its own ambiguity, but when the β is taken, this ambiguity becomes frozen and internal computation becomes possible (cf. the 'frozen dialectics' of Lupasco [35]. Later, Gunji et al. [129] came to the idea of describing the organizational invariance of a biological system from the point of view of "heterarchy" which naturally involves self-reference through the inherited logical inconsistencies between levels. One description of a heterarchy is as a dualism of the property of self-reference and the property of a frame problem, interacting energetically with each other. The research program of Gunji represents an important current development of Rosen's ideas in which a successful explanation of internally constrained principles of animal behavior and human consciousness has been reached [129]. Rosen's understanding of organizational invariance is similar to Gödel's encoding of statements about the system within it in the application to biological systems. The β parameter representing organizational invariance is equivalent to an agen<sup>t</sup> establishing the set of Gödel numbers generated within the system. The whole biological system can be viewed as consisting of: (a) Metabolism—sets and relations; (b) Replacement—relations on relations; and (c) Organizational invariance—Gödel statements about the sets actually in place and their dynamic relations. It is important to note that Gödel statements are not sets or relations; they are meta-mathematical statements with the dual function of both sets and relations. Logic in Reality is the first *metalogical* system in which such statements can be embedded and given a real interpretation. Thus, the triadic structure of life includes sets, relations, and meta-mathematical as well as metalogical statements (encoded within the system) that are as real and as causally efficient as much as any physical element of the system. Translation of these statements into the system occurs via a sophisticated 'machinery' of transcription, translation and recombination, e.g., splicing events. But we remind the reader that any such event is a consequence of the real dualities or polarities in chemical and biological systems and the movement within them between potentiality and actuality and vice versa.

#### *6.5. The Ontolon Structures of Social Consciousness and Systems*

When we turn to individual and social systems instantiating reflexive consciousness, we find more advanced ontolon structures of the Poincaréan type. The theory of functional systems of Pyotr Anokhin [130] explores the basic ontolon structure for such systems. These systems are based not on the linear transmission of information from receptors to executive organs but composed of synchronized distributed elements organized non-linearly. They support homeostasis due to a change of behavior occurring in the course of interaction with the outside world. The Poincaréan systems including Uexkull's biosemiotics system and, in relation to cognitive events, Anokhin's functional system represent these basic non-linear structures viewed externally, partly but not totally separated from the internal reflexive relation viewed from an endoperspective. The endoperspective in the dynamics of organized systems was explored earlier in dialectical discourse starting with Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle. The movement of science towards an endoperspective today represents a new level of understanding that as demonstrated by the concepts of Rosen and Gunji, to which the principles and dialectics of Logic in Reality apply.

Social communication, in the light of the LIR approach to communication outlined in Section 5.6, becomes a prerequisite of reflexive consciousness. According to Lev Vygotsky and further to Evald Ilyenkov, all higher psychic functions are the internalized social relations. They determine first the interdictive relations where certain actions are prohibited and then turn to the suggestive phase where these prohibitions are internalized (Boris Porshnev [131]) and the person becomes the other for himself and by this controls, regulates and changes his own activity towards other individuals and the external world in total. Almost identical language for the internalization of the nominally external 'other' was used by Igamberdiev to show the ultimately logical rationale for ethical behavior [60]. The work studied by Brenner [1] provides a more detailed scientific explication of Lupasco's insights in this area.

The prerequisite of domination is another important feature of nervous system called the law of dominance formulated by Alexei Ukhtomsky. By "dominant" Ukhtomsky defined "a more or less stable focus of increased excitability, evoked in whatever way, and stimuli newly arriving at the centers of excitation serve to amplify (reinforce) excitation in this focus, while in the rest of the central nervous system inhibition spreads widely" [132]. Through the dominance of the reflexive excitation in nervous system, the "internal speech" is formed that can be represented as a reflexive relation of the structure

of the subject. The mechanism of reference of the subject to himself represents an elementary unit of reflexive consciousness. It also determines the relation of a human being to other human beings which basis is the system of mirror neurons that fire both when the subject acts and when he observes the same action performed by another. The system of references to him/herself and to others leads to the formation of discrete reflexive types that contradict to each other, interact and form complex social relations. This was developed further in the reflexive psychology of Vladimir Lefebvre.

In psychology, the subject becomes a part of a system where it can reflect himself. In this system, the biological reality is represented as unconscious and interpreted as *Ego* through signification by the image of other, *Superego* (Freud) or *Symbolic* (Lacan). It can be considered another logical pattern describing interrelations between consciousness and the external world. It determines the fixation of somebody's image into the other as a possibility to substitute the other [133]. In formalization of this model by Lefebvre [134], the subject *A*1 constructs the image of himself (*a*2) and his image's image of himself (*a*3). The subject's state *a*1 will be a composition of the contradictory statements *a*2 and *a*3. Thus, the subject will correspond to a character *A*1 ≡ *a*1*a*2*a*3. The labor activity of humans is accompanied by the semiotic internalization of tools in the language. The thesis of Vygotsky [135] about the internalization of labor tools in the signs of language is incorporated into this paradigm. To link the labor activity to mental development, the internalization factor is necessarily similar to the "organizational invariance" β in Rosen's theory. This transition reflects the ideas of Vygotsky on development as a process of internalization. The bodies of knowledge and tools of thought evolve and are linked together to form a new dynamic entity of the human culture—an ontolon—internalizing the environment. Development consists of the gradual internalization of the environment, primarily through the language, to form cultural adaptation. Piaget [136] considered that several stages of such internalization during the development of the individual child reflect an evolutionary succession. In other words, such internalization proceeds via the establishment of a relation to the external reality.
