**5. Discussion**

In line with several other studies, this study found more rational, self-interested behavior among more *reflective* individuals and more prosocial behavior among *intuitive* individuals. Further, this study found the more prosocial behavior among *intuitive* individuals to carry over to the *third-party punishment task*, where these individuals were found more likely to sanction a selfish act. A contribution of the present study was that subjects were to complete multiple social dilemma task, which allows to investigate the consistency across choices. In this aspect, *reflective* individuals were found more likely to act rationally in accordance with their self-interest across all four decisions.

*Intuitive* subjects give more in the *dictator game*, which is consistent with the findings of [7]. Transferring a positive amount to the *receiver* in the *dictator game* could be interpreted as altruistic preferences [2]. However, the findings of more rational and self-interested behavior by *reflective* subjects should be interpreted carefully, as gender seems to be the significant factor that drives differences in behavior in the *dictator game*. This is consistent with the findings of women giving more in a meta study on the experiments testing for gender differences [18].

In the *ultimatum game*, *reflective* subjects offered less than those not *reflective*. The decision of the *proposer* can be explained either by a "taste for fairness" or a "fear of rejection" (or a combination of these motives) [22]. Including the *dictator game* allows the inference with which motive matters for which group. However, the results indicate that both groups seem to act on a "fear of rejection". These findings contradict the findings of difference in transfer/offer being driven mostly by *reflective* individuals [10]. Even though "strategic fairness" appears to exist among both groups, the offers of the *intuitive* individuals are larger than those of the *reflective*. Thus, *intuitive* individuals appear to expect their offers in the *ultimatum game* to more likely be rejected. This is consistent with the consensus effect [23]. *Intuitive* individuals require a larger amount to accept an offer themselves.

*Reflective* subjects are more likely to accept offers in the *ultimatum game*, which confirms the findings of [8,9]. In those studies, the "strategy method" was not applied to the recipient's decision. Thus, *reflective* individuals exhibit a greater willingness to accept an unfair *ultimatum game* offer even when they are not directly faced with and possibly offended by the offer. Whether or not the strategic version of the *ultimatum game* induces lower acceptance thresholds is to some degree addressed in [24]. In this study, besides from playing the extensive form of the game, the subjects were required to state the minimum offer she would be willing accept. They found a significant negative correlation between the acceptance threshold and proposed offer which can be interpreted in light of *reflective* behavior. These individuals understand the bargaining position of the game as well as the risk of being rejected. Considering "negative reciprocity" as the motive for rejecting unfair offers in the *ultimatum game*, *reflective* individuals are more capable of overcoming their *intuitive* desire to *punish* the selfish act by the *proposer*. The willingness to accept an unfair offer is related to the ability to reflect further upon the decision and realize that accepting the offer is the better option.

*Intuitive* subjects are more likely to engage in *third-party punishment* and *reflective* subjects appear again more likely to act rational and self-interested. Thus, *intuitive* individuals are interpreted to be more likely to act reciprocally.
