**3. Hypotheses**

Looking to replicate previous findings of fair behavior by individuals relying on *intuition* in decision-making and that it takes *reflection* to pursue a self-interested objective gives three hypotheses in the *dictator-* and *ultimatum game* decisions.

**Hypothesis 1.** *Reflective individuals transfer less in the dictator game compared to intuitive individuals.*

**Hypothesis 2.** *Reflective individuals offer less as proposer in the ultimatum game compared to intuitive individuals.*

**Hypothesis 3.** *Reflective individuals require a smaller share to accept the offer as ultimatum game recipient compared to intuitive individuals.*

Including both the *proposer* decision in the *ultimatum game* and the transfer decision in the *dictator game*, it is possible to detect whether strategic considerations drive the *ultimatum game* offer. In the *dictator game,* such strategic considerations are absent, because it is a pure decision problem without strategic interaction. Expecting the *intuitive* action to be fair and *reflection* to lead to rational, self-interested decisions generates two hypotheses for *proposer* and *dictator* behavior.

**Hypothesis 4a.** *Reflective individuals offer more in the ultimatum game relative to their transfer in the dictator game.*

**Hypothesis 4b.** *Intuitive individuals do not offer more in the ultimatum game relative to their transfer in the dictator game.*

A main contribution of this study is the investigation of whether the *intuitive* action is to sanction those who violated the norm of fair behavior.

**Hypothesis 5.** *Intuitive individuals exhibit a greater willingness to punish a selfish dictator than reflective individuals.*

The other contribution to the existing literature is that this study investigates the behavior across four social dilemma decisions.

**Hypothesis 6.** *Reflective individuals act consistently more rational and self-interested in the four social dilemma decisions compared to intuitive individuals.*
