**5. Contemporary Myanmar**

Religion can play a key role in "the ritual legitimacy of traditional states",<sup>55</sup> as modern religion both is shaped by nationalism (as the nation-state is now the primary form of political organization) and shapes national identity (for example as a base for anti-colonial mobilization).<sup>56</sup> Burmese Buddhist nationalism presents both these dual phenomena.

Buddhism has long been an integral force in Burmese society. After A´soka's son Mahinda, a Buddhist monk, converted Sinhalese king Devanampiya Tissa, it expanded Buddhism's political and social/ethnic reach and solidified its place in Sinhalese national identity. When Theravada Buddhism ¯ was established centuries later (11th century ce) by Anawrahta Minsaw in the kingdom of Burma,<sup>57</sup> it looked to Ceylon's example for its role in society.<sup>58</sup>

Since then, for over a millennium, Theravada Buddhism has been the dominant religion in ¯ Burma, and there have been close ties between political and religious authority through to modern colonization. Over time, Buddhism in Burma abandoned its individualized monastic form in favor of more organized communities, which led to greater political control of the *sangha*, the Buddhist clergy.<sup>59</sup> Kings appointed the head of the *sangha*,<sup>60</sup> many kings were considered Bodhisattvas,<sup>61</sup> and kings' special role in defending and supporting Buddhist faith buttressed and confirmed their own political legitimacy.<sup>62</sup> Kings built monasteries, provided food and other patronage, and appointed and supported the *sangha* and settled its controversies, as well as suppressed internal schisms and heresies.<sup>63</sup> The *sangha*, in turn, was involved in political life, writing the most prominent lawbooks; some monks had governance duties; and the religious orders used their position in society to legitimize the king.<sup>64</sup> Overall, there was an "interdependence" between the king and the *sangha*,<sup>65</sup> although Donald E. Smith deems that the king interfered in religion more than the *sangha* was involved in politics.<sup>66</sup>

### *5.1. Colonial Rule and Buddhist Activism*

In the 19th century, Buddhists more broadly, not just in Burma, became more activist, and "anticipat[ed] the much more overtly political Buddhism that emerges in the mid-twentieth century. ... the line between lay Buddhist activism and the *sangha* was increasingly blurred over the course of the twentieth century (Seneviratne 1999; Tambiah 1992)," and this represented an "important shift in the public role of Buddhism," says Harshana Rambukwella.<sup>67</sup>

Even before Burma's colonial occupation began in 1824, the idea that Buddhism was being "restored" to its rightful place in Burmese society had emerged. For example, Pali, which is Theravada ¯ Buddhism's liturgical language, appears in and influences much of Burmese language, which only augments the association of Burmese identity with Buddhism.<sup>68</sup> This does not mean that Buddhism is

<sup>55</sup> (van der Veer 2015, p. 11).

<sup>56</sup> (van der Veer 2015, p. 19).

<sup>57</sup> King Anawrahta Minsaw founded the first united Burmese kingdom and empire in 1044 ce (Lewy 1972, p. 19).

<sup>58</sup> (D. Smith 1965, pp. 9, 11).

<sup>59</sup> (D. Smith 1965, p. 15).

<sup>60</sup> Political domination over religious matters continues to this day, with the government's appointment of monks to Mahana (State Sangha Mah ˙ a N¯ ayaka Committee), which was formed in 1980 to regulate the clergy. ¯

<sup>61</sup> (D. Smith 1965, p. 22).

<sup>62</sup> (Lewy 1972, pp. 20–21; D. Smith 1965, p. 23).

<sup>63</sup> (D. Smith 1965, p. 27). 64

(D. Smith 1965, pp. 31–32).65

(D. Smith 1965, p. 37).66

<sup>(</sup>D. Smith 1965, p. 36).67

(Rambukwella 2018, p. 42).68(D.Smith 1965,p.83).

the root cause of Burmese nationalism, but "rather, it provided an essential component in a national self-concept which helped di fferentiate the Burmese from the foreigner", says Donald E. Smith.<sup>69</sup>

Argues D. Smith, Burmese nationalism was more than simply anti-British and anti-colonial, as "traditional Burmese nationalism was based, among other things, on a common race, language, and religion."<sup>70</sup> Historically, non-Buddhists in Burma were considered alien, thus excluding them from Burmese identity, even under colonialism and into the periods of secular nationalism associated with Marxism or with Aung San's Thakin movement.<sup>71</sup>

During colonial rule, Buddhism remained an integral force in civil society and took on a di fferent form, as politically-oriented monks engaged in strikes, political agitation, and other independence-minded action—both peaceful and violent—from the 1920s onward, and continued alongside the more secular nationalist movement that emerged in the 1930s.72,73 Anti-colonial parties, which included Buddhist monks, sometimes targeted Muslims and Christians under British colonial rule (which began in 1824, but formally lasted from 1886–1948) as well as the ensuing short-lived parliamentary governmen<sup>t</sup> (1948–1962), and during the military dictatorship (1962–2012).<sup>74</sup>

Buddhist identity was also co-opted to bolster political legitimacy: for example, the ostensibly socialist military junta that came to power in 1962 via coup tried to ground its socialist platform in both Marxist dialectics and vaguely-Buddhist doctrine,<sup>75</sup> especially with its references to man's relationship with nature and its three material, animal, and phenomenal worlds.<sup>76</sup> So ethnic conflict with religious overlay is not new to the recently-parliamentary Myanmar.

Post-dictatorial Burmese nationalism further conflates with Buddhist religious identity by justifying violence against non-Buddhists as fighting ethnic insurgency and eliminating illegal immigrants.<sup>77</sup>

Thus, Burmese nationalism emerged both gradually under British colonial rule and in response to an event (democratization), to use Brubaker's framework, and has long intertwined with Buddhist religion as an identifying marker.

### *5.2. Religious Nationalism Under a Constitutional Republic*

In the contemporary period, Theravada Buddhism continues to provide a significant framework ¯ through which Burmese view politics.<sup>78</sup> Today, nearly 90% of Myanmar's population is Buddhist, almost all of them Theravada, although Buddhism has only briefly been Burma's o ¯ fficial state religion. In 1961, Burma's constitution was amended to make Buddhism the o fficial religion and to provide significant financial support to Buddhist institutions, and Prime Minister U Nu passed the State Religion Promotion Act which mandated the teaching of Buddhist scriptures in schools and prisons;<sup>79</sup> but this was largely undone shortly afterward by General Ne Win's military coup.

Myanmar's new constitution (2008)<sup>80</sup> provides for freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion "subject to public order, morality or health or the other provisions of this constitution" (Art. 34), and it "recognizes" that some of its population currently practice Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, or Animism (Art. 362).

<sup>69</sup> (D. Smith 1965, p. 86).

<sup>70</sup> (D. Smith 1965, pp. 84, 112).

<sup>71</sup> (D. Smith 1965, pp. 113, 115–16).

<sup>72</sup> (Lewy 1972, pp. 25, 28–37, 37–40).

<sup>73</sup> Due to their interest in religious rule, many politically-active monks sided with the Japanese during World War II, to their detriment after the war (Lewy 1972; Hobbs 1947). 74

(Walton and Hayward 2014, p. 6; Hobbs 1947). 75

(Walton 2016, p. 30).76

 (Burma Socialist Programme Party 1963).

<sup>77</sup> (Walton and Hayward 2014, p. 6; Walton 2013; Ibrahim 2016).

<sup>78</sup> (Walton 2016; Schober 2011; Jordt 2007; Houtman 1999; Spiro 1970; Sarkisyanz 1965).

<sup>79</sup> (Crouch 2015). U Nu deemed it a governmental responsibility to care for the population's present *and* future existences, which required that Buddhism be made the state religion (D. Smith 1965, pp. 25–26). 80

(Constitution of the Union of the Republic of Myanmar 2008).

At the same time, Buddhism occupies a "special position" in Myanmar as the religion of the overwhelming majority (Art. 361), and the religious freedom accorded does not extend to religiously-related "economic, financial, political or other secular activities that may be associated with religious practice"<sup>81</sup> and the governmen<sup>t</sup> may curtail religious freedom in accordance with "public welfare" (Art. 360).

In 1998 and 2007, groups of Buddhist monks mobilized politically against the military government, and they have continued to be active on a variety of issues (e.g., illegal land seizures, environmental protection) since the latest transition to more democratic rule. Unfortunately, this activism has included pogroms against Muslims (and especially the Rohingya)<sup>82</sup> in what is called the "969 movement", driven by a variety of forces but most prominently by the Patriotic Association of Myanmar, commonly abbreviated as MaBaTha (*A-myo Batha Thathana Saun Shauq Ye a-Pwe*, "Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion" or "Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion").<sup>83</sup> Their claims about not just personal safety but also the security of the Buddhist religion and Buddhist community (*sasana*), and therefore the state as a political entity as required for enlightenment,<sup>84</sup> echo historical Burmese conceptions of Buddhism's place in politics and the status of non-Buddhists as discussed above.

Despite nearly 90% of the Burmese population professing adherence to Theravada Buddhism, ¯ the perceived Muslim threat from its 4.3% of the population is often couched in existential terms, as a menace to the very existence of Buddhism. "If a man dies, it is acceptable, but if a race or religion dies, you can never ge<sup>t</sup> it back", some Burmese Buddhists will say as they justify their fears that Muslims will ultimately "swallow our country" as they expand beyond the borders of Rakhine state.<sup>85</sup> In this way, Muslim Rohingyas are seen and portrayed as a dual existential threat to both polity and religion.<sup>86</sup>

To date, the Myanmar governmen<sup>t</sup> rejects the existence of "Rohingya" as an ethnic group and does not mention their name in denying genocide attempts against them. In State Counsellor (prime minister) Aung San Suu Kyi's address to the International Court of Justice (Hague) on 11 December 2019, she rebu ffed charges of genocide, arguing that, at most, any violence might constitute "disproportionate force" but that it was part of "cycles of inter-communal violence going back to the 1940s".<sup>87</sup> In addition to government-sanctioned pogroms and gender-based violence against the

<sup>81</sup> I.e., freedom of conscience under the Myanmar constitution only covers the ability to hold a belief in one's own head, but does not come with freedom of associated actions (e.g., the right to set up a religious charity or welfare association).

<sup>82</sup> Myanmar's 2014 census identified 4.3% of its population as Muslim; up to 2% are Rohingya, whose "non-enumerated" population was controversially only estimated rather than counted by the census. (Republic of the Union of Myanmar—Department of Population, Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population 2016; Lynn 2016) Until 2017, the total Rohingya population, which has borne the brunt of the anti-Muslim attacks, was approximated to reach 1.3 million. Since recent government-sanctioned pogroms against the Rohingya began in 2016, however, up to 1.1 million have fled to refugee camps in neighboring Bangladesh.

The long-Muslim Rohingya claim that they are indigenous to the area, while the Myanmar governmen<sup>t</sup> says they illegally migrated during the colonial period from now-Bangladesh, considers them Bengalis, and denies them citizenship and proper documentation, thus rendering them effectively stateless. About 80% of Rohingya lived in the state of Rakhine, on the western coast. (There are other Muslims—including some Indian, Chinese, Malay, and others—as well as most Kaman, who also primarily live in Rakhine but are formally recognized as an ethnic group by the Myanmar governmen<sup>t</sup> and who hold citizenship.)

<sup>83</sup> While the Association may mean "ethnicity" where it says "race", its context is Myanmar's peculiar classification of races and ethnicities. Myanmar recognizes eight "major national ethnic races" that are grouped primarily by geographic region, with each race comprised of a subset of the 135 recognized "ethnic groups". Along with several others, the Rohingya are not among the recognized ethnic groups.

<sup>84</sup> (Walton and Hayward 2014, pp. 17–23).

<sup>85</sup> (Beech and Nang 2019; Freeman 2017).

<sup>86</sup> Even religions that reject worldly constraints will develop practices for adherents to demonstrate the sincerity of one's convictions (Weber, "Religious Communities", *Economy and Society*), and that necessarily injects social functions, practices, and institutions into those religions. Unfortunately, social reinforcement around bigoted and discriminatory movements often involves engaging in violence as ritualistic proof of commitment, such as is commonly found, for example, in criminal gangs everywhere, such as The Lord's Resistance Army (central Africa), etc.

The communal action (*Gemeinschaftshandeln*) of religion (Weber 1978, p. 399) has its own structures and laws (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*) with a logic of their own (Klaus Lichtblau, Hans Kippenberg) and whose rationality does not necessarily reference justice or correctness.

<sup>87</sup> (Simons and Beech 2019; Birnbaum and Mahtani 2019).

Rohingya, the 2015 Population Control Healthcare Law permits local authorities to enforce a mandatory 36-month "birth spacing" between children that is understood as an attempt by Buddhist nationalists to prevent a "takeover" by Muslims, who have higher birthrates.<sup>88</sup>

As a country, Myanmar has endured harsh oppression by colonial and domestic rulers alike and substantial upheaval in the transitional interstices, including recently. International observers often focus on the religious identities espoused in the conflict between Buddhist and Muslim Burmese, and while it is important to take the agents' own claims at face value initially, the repeated and persistent violence by Buddhists against minority Muslim Rohingya over the past decade appears to be less about religious competition strictly speaking, and rather seems inseparable from ethno-nationalist motivations. The former should prompt serious attempts at converting others to one's religion, for example, while the latter would provoke feelings of existential danger that lead more to expulsion, pogroms, and/or genocide, as we are seeing there.

Breaching Buddhist precepts of non-violence in defense of Buddhism has historical, liturgical, and doctrinal precedent, and the need to prevent Burmese Buddhist social and cultural erosion or elimination in the face of modernity and political change<sup>89</sup> can operate in the minds of its proponents somewhat like "supreme emergency" justifications in contemporary just war theory—the idea that one must sometimes violate the principles in order to save them.

Buddhist doctrine adds its own twist to that "supreme emergency" problem, however, because doctrinally, the fate of the *sasana* is to slowly disappear. That does not do much to alleviate worldly anxiety now about *sasana*'s future disappearance,<sup>90</sup> but this is the least of the inconsistencies between doctrine and practice.

One pressing question is why ethno-nationalist Buddhists groups in Myanmar have systematically waged violence against minorities *to such an extent*. A large reason has been the role of clerics in Myanmar in legitimating and encouraging nationalist sentiment, and especially the MaBaTha organization, which appeared to operate not only in conjunction with but also as a front for the military.<sup>91</sup> Some recruits to MaBaTha were, ironically, monks who had been arrested during the 2007 Sa ffron Revolution,<sup>92</sup> and were paid in money and state patronage to join and promote MaBaTha's anti-Muslim campaigns.<sup>93</sup>

Here, too, the state is not monolithic: there is an ongoing power struggle between the former dictatorial ruler (the military), which supported MaBaTha, and the new political parties for which it reluctantly (and incompletely) stepped aside. MaBaTha was banned in 2017 after three years,<sup>94</sup> by Aung San Suu Kyi's administration on the grounds of hate speech, and an arrest warrant was issued for extremist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu for sedition against Suu Kyi. At the same time, the military, MaBaTha, and Suu Kyi's administration seem to find common cause in the denial of Rohingya ethnic identity and their marginalization as illegal immigrants who cannot be Burmese citizens.<sup>95</sup>

To further complicate Myanmar's situation, the people themselves are not unified: there are Buddhist groups on both ends of the spectrum from MaBaTha, such as Buddhists who have assisted and protected Muslim Rohingya, as well as the Arakan Army, comprised of lay Buddhists in Rakhine

<sup>88</sup> (Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2015; White 2015; Deutsche Welle 2015).

<sup>89</sup> Modernization can corrode traditional communities and their values, while political change such as globalization, secularization, and economic development may eventually challenge Buddhism's primacy in Myanmar society. See also, e.g., (Gravers 2015).

<sup>90</sup> (Walton and Hayward 2014, p. 25).

<sup>91</sup> (Ibrahim 2016, p. 70).

<sup>92</sup> From August through October 2007, there were broad, non-violent protests (including by monks, whose colored robes came to represent the movement) against the ruling military junta's removal of subsidies on the fuel supply it monopolized. 93

(Ibrahim 2016, p. 70).

<sup>94</sup> MaBaTha reconstituted itself as the Buddha Dhamma Charity Foundation, which was similarly outlawed in 2018.

<sup>95</sup> (Ibrahim 2016; Beech and Nang 2019; Radio Free Asia 2017).

state fighting against the governmen<sup>t</sup> and other Buddhists for an autonomous state and who o fficially welcome those of other races and ethnicities to join their nationalist insurgency.<sup>96</sup>

Here, recall Theravada Buddhism's ¯ *tendency* toward excluding the laity in pursuit of enlightenment. In Myanmar, monastic orders attempt to alleviate Theravada's lesser attention to the laity and to ¯ create a bridge to them by playing a significant role in male education: in Theravada practice, many if ¯ not most males become novice monks for limited periods.<sup>97</sup> The *shinbyu* ceremony, which inducts young males into temporary monkhood, "both exalts the ideal of the monastic life and denies it absolute separation from the life of the laity", says D. Smith.<sup>98</sup> As he describes it, this practice of temporary monkhood does as much to keep the Burmese population attached to Buddhist religion as the other way around, to keep Buddhist elites tied to the population. It is somewhat ironic that this widespread ritual of temporary monkhood meant to alleviate the hierarchical tendencies of Theravada ¯ also broadens and strengthens the Myanmar population's investment in the Buddhist aspects of its identity, which are now being used to violently expunge non-Buddhists from the Burmese nation.

Buddhism is hardly the only moral philosophy and religion whose practices can deviate violently from its tenets. Religious doctrines can and usually do di ffer from religion as a lived experience, as every religion has demonstrated many times over. Even similarly ascetic moral philosophies such as Stoicism have seen their adherents struggle terribly with their duties, perhaps most famously Marcus Aurelius.

\*\*\*

One reason those internal contradictions ge<sup>t</sup> lost is because most religious adherents, having been raised in a particular religious faith, are immersed in their own inconsistencies between doctrine and practice, such that they usually do not notice them or have found practical accommodation with them. When they encounter other religions, however, the gap between doctrine and practice can seem glaring, because the alien religion's precepts are treated as reified doctrine instead of living philosophy and evolving practice.

Buddhism's non-violent and ascetic principles are fundamental to the religion, and their peaceful effect should only be reinforced by its functional polytheism in practice, so it can be especially di fficult (for many Buddhists as well) to acknowledge that Buddhism plays a role in Burmese nationalist violence against the Rohingya.

A muscular Buddhism is not unheard of, but attempts at genocide are especially shocking. Some would try to explain this by making "problematic distinctions between 'true' Buddhism and Buddhism corrupted by its contact with politics."<sup>99</sup> Yet, the resources for violence—including in defense of the religion and associated polities—are available in Buddhist canon and history from not long after its birth, so if corruption is to blame, then the thread of that defect is long.

This combines with the particulars of Theravada practice in Myanmar and the role and exploitation ¯ of Buddhist identity from ancient Burmese history through colonial and contemporary times to contribute to the ongoing atrocity. The persistence of current anti-Rohingya campaigns show that even non-violent religions and moral philosophies are not immune to and can be overtaken by political influence and nationalist sentiment and the violence they can engender.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

<sup>96</sup> (Emont 2019).

<sup>97</sup> Males become temporary novitiates (*sama ¯ n. era*) in these societies for many reasons, including to accumulate religious/spiritual "merit" for themselves and for others, and there is variation within Southeast Asia on the practice. In Burma/Myanmar, for example, usually boys will novitiate, sometimes for only a few days, and they can temporarily return to monkhood later as married men, whereas in Thailand, older boys or young men will commonly become monks for three-month periods. This practice is far less common in Sri Lanka (Gombrich 1984; Samuels 2013).

<sup>98</sup> (D. Smith 1965, p. 19).

<sup>99</sup> (Rambukwella 2018, p. 42).
