**Yvonne Chiu 1,2**

1 Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI 02841, USA; yvonne.chiu@usnwc.edu

2 Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; yvonnechiu@stanford.edu

Received: 19 February 2020; Accepted: 25 August 2020; Published: 16 September 2020

**Abstract:** Contemporary Buddhist violence against minority Muslims in Myanmar is rightfully surprising: a religion with its particular moral philosophies of non-violence and asceticism and with its functional polytheism in practice should not generate genocidal nationalist violence. Yet, there are resources within the Buddhist canon that people can draw from to justify violence in defense of the religion and of a Buddhist-based polity. When those resources are exploited in the context of particular Theravada Buddhist practices and the history of Buddhism and Buddhist identity in Burma ¯ from ancient times through its colonial and contemporary periods, it perpetuates an ongoing tragedy that is less about religion than about ethno-nationalism.

**Keywords:** nationalism; Buddhism; Theravada; non-violence; asceticism; polytheism; Burma; Myanmar ¯

What accounts for a non-violent religion's turn to nationalist violence? This question is prompted by persistent and shocking genocidal violence by Buddhist groups in Myanmar (Burma) against minority Muslim Rohingya over the past decade.

In the West, the virulence with which religion and nationalism converge is associated primarily with the fervor of Abrahamic religions, which only heightens the incongruence of Buddhism's teachings of and reputation for non-violence with grotesque uses of force in its name.

I argue that Buddhist nationalist<sup>1</sup> violence in Myanmar should be both more and less surprising than it is, and address two major elements of Buddhist philosophy at the root of this incongruity: non-violence and asceticism. To be clear, Buddhism is not unique in espousing these philosophies—these elements can also be found, singly or in some combination, in various strands of all the other major world religions (Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Sikhism)—but Buddhism is the only major religion whose dominant strands make both philosophies the centerpieces of its belief system.

This article first looks at the precept of non-violence in Buddhism and the function of asceticism in overcoming inevitable human su ffering and avoiding the entrapment of worldly concerns, and discusses these philosophies in light of historical texts and experiences. Then, it explores these elements within the context of Theravada Buddhism in colonial Burma and contemporary Myanmar. ¯

### **1. The Precept of Non-Violence and the Philosophy of Pacifism**

Buddhism's first precept is to avoid killing any living being, not just people but even the most insignificant of animals. This pushes adherents toward vegetarianism, of course, as well as pacifism, and this precept is commonly interpreted to prohibit suicide, abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment. Yet, the resulting positions—vegetarianism, anti-abortion, pacifism, etc.,—are not absolutes. For example, Buddhists are not to intentionally harm animals, but if mendicant monks who

<sup>1</sup> In this article, I rely on Anthony D. Smith's definition of nationalism as "an ideology and a movement, seeking to attain and maintain autonomy, unity, and identity for a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (A. Smith 1999, p. 46).

beg for their food are given meat, they are permitted to eat it so long as the animal was not slaughtered specifically to feed them.

The Buddha's directive of non-violence intends to guide individuals in their moral development: it helps free people's minds from thoughts and emotions that would prompt violence as much as it directs them to act in accordance with empathy that all beings fear death. While the precept of non-violence is commonly interpreted to mean pacifism and the rejection of warfare, the edict is complex. Buddhism does overwhelmingly reject the use of violence; but non-violence as a political and social philosophy—pacifism—is a separate matter, and there, Buddhist doctrine and history are more ambiguous.

Buddhist lore, for example, is not devoid of violence or warfare. The *Arya-Satyakaparivarta ¯* , 2 an early<sup>3</sup> Indian Mahay¯ ana Buddhist ¯ *sutra* of some influence, describes various kings as righteous, including the legendary A´soka and King Hars.a who killed tens of thousands of non-Buddhists.<sup>4</sup> After A´soka, in India, converted to Buddhism in the 3rd century bce, he rejected future violent conquest, decreeing that:

all my sons and grandsons may not seek to gain new [military/territorial] victories, that in whatever victories they may gain they may prefer forgiveness and light punishment, that they may consider the only victory the victory of Righteousness, which is of value both in this world and the next ... [From Thirteenth Rock Edict]<sup>5</sup>

Yet, domestically, A´soka never abolished the death penalty.<sup>6</sup>

Other works, including influential Theravada text ¯ *Milinda Pañha* (circa 2nd century bce), interpret some acts of violence and punishment as resulting from one's karma and consider the actor who imposes violent punishment a mere facilitator of that karma.<sup>7</sup>

Far from being completely pacifist, Buddhist teachings make some allowance for war, albeit under limited conditions, including first attempting to win through intimidation rather than actual force, trying to capture enemies alive, and not harming non-combatants or those who have surrendered or are fleeing.<sup>8</sup>

### *1.1. Religious Competition, Political Realities, and Geopolitical Pressures*

Although the Pali canon recounts the Buddha as a compassionate tamer of animals, the epic poem *Mahava ¯ m . sa* ("Great Chronicle", written in the 5th or 6th century ce)<sup>9</sup> calls the Buddha a "conqueror" who forcibly expelled the powerful but sometimes dangerous nature-spirits (yakshas, yakkhas,<sup>10</sup> or yakkas) from the Lanka island by cursing them with "devious afflictions", in order to prepare the land for the later introduction of Buddhism; this story is frequently interpreted to justify defensive war to protect Buddhists.<sup>11</sup>

This mythical tale reflects a historical truth, however, that there is vigorous competition between religions for a population's devotion; individualistic religions, too, will attempt to convert adherents and even non-violent religious groups will resort to assault to secure their dominance. The Gelug sect,

<sup>2</sup> Complete name: *Arya-Bodhisattva-gocara-up ¯ ayavis ¯ . aya-vikurvan¯. a-nirde´sa Sutra ¯* .

<sup>3</sup> Timeframe of origin is uncertain, but it was cited by another work by 2nd century ce.

<sup>4</sup> (Jenkins 2010).

<sup>5</sup> (de Bary 1972, p. 53).

<sup>6</sup> (de Bary 1972, p. 54).

<sup>7</sup> (Jenkins 2010, pp. 64–65).

<sup>8</sup> (Jenkins 2010, p. 67).

<sup>9</sup> (Geiger 1912) This Pali-language chronicle of Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) was written in the 5th or 6th century ce, and recounts the history of Buddhism.

<sup>10</sup> Not to be confused with the Yakkha people, an indigenous ethnic group on the Indian subcontinent (mostly in modern-day Nepal and India).

<sup>11</sup> Sinhalese Buddhists will also refer to the canonical *Cakkavatti S¯ıhanada Sutta ¯* to justify defensive war. (Bartholomeusz 2002, p. 22).

for example—the prevailing strand of Mahay¯ ana Buddhism in Tibet and the school of the Dalai Lama, ¯ whose contemporary incarnation has a sterling reputation for his teachings on ethics, compassion, and non-violence—fought extensively with competing sects in the 14th through 16th centuries to become the principal religious order in the region.<sup>12</sup> Militancy in Buddhism has, unfortunately, ample historical precedence.

Religious competition can take place at the levels of individual and/or private proselytization and does not have to be political in nature, but the realities of political society and social attachments mean that it often becomes so. Like other religions, Buddhism can both be exploited by political forces or attempt to exploit available political tools, and religious practice commonly intertwines with political goals.

For centuries after A´soka, in kingdoms run by adherents of Theravada Buddhism, political ¯ and religious elites promoted the interdependence between the political entity's strength and the religion's well-being. To defend the religion, therefore, one must also—perhaps, first—defend the state, and textual evidence can be found for this position and for defensive wars.<sup>13</sup>

To that end, Buddhist monks in many societies throughout history have been known to serve in various political positions, and have sometimes developed prayers and rituals for the well-being of the nation or country.<sup>14</sup>

Buddhism is hardly the first or last religion to be co-opted for political purposes, and like every other faith, it has varied practices and diverse doctrines. So one finds many stories of compassion and pacifism—but militancy and violence are also available in the history and literature for people to draw on if they so wish.

In the contemporary period, Buddhists continue to grapple with the dilemma posed by non-violence in the face of unavoidable geopolitical pressure, which has sometimes led them to massage the doctrine to accommodate.

For example, during the Sino-Japanese war (1930s–1940s) and the Korean War (1950–1953),<sup>15</sup> Buddhism struggled to come to terms with authoritarian governmen<sup>t</sup> mandates and became entangled with nationalism, for example when the threat from Japanese invasion superseded existing conflicts between Buddhist orders and the Chinese governmen<sup>t</sup> (including over property seizures, taxes, and religious freedom), and Buddhist survival became dependent on China's national survival. Some Buddhists thought they could better protect Buddhists and Buddhist institutions by working with the government, and were driven by pragmatic calculations of survival to reinterpret sacred texts to argue for compassionate killing.<sup>16</sup>

In the 1970s, communist victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia spawned a militant anti-communist Buddhist nationalist movement in Thailand, led by monk Phra Kittivuddho, whose "Nawaphon" movement considered it a monk's sacred duty to defend the Thai nation and religion with violence if necessary. His slogan "Killing Communists is Not a Sin" was an exception due to national emergency, he contended, as communists were "not complete persons" but rather "destroyers of nation, religion, or monarchy who are bestial"; and he also o ffered a form of "double e ffect" argumen<sup>t</sup>

<sup>12</sup> As calculating as it may be to put it in these terms, religions compete with each other for "market share," and they will use violence to both expand their presence and protect their membership. For example, (McCleary and van der Kuijp 2010) found that the Gelug religious sect operated like a "club" in that it sought to generate benefits for members through greater participation and size of membership. It utilized doctrinal innovation—including imitating its major competitor the Karmapa sect by creating an incarnate Dalai Lama and developing its own unique practices such as allowing only ordained abbots, in order to reinforce religious activity and monastic community—and, in the absence of a political authority, fought and killed in order to become the monopoly religion and thereafter maintain "club benefits" for its members.

For more on the Gelug school's historical rise to prominence, see also (Maher 2010). On club models of religion and "participatory crowding", see also (Iannaccone 1992).

<sup>13</sup> (Walton and Hayward 2014, p. 21; Bartholomeusz 2002).

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., (Yu 2005, pp. 54–55).

<sup>15</sup> (Yu 2005; Yu 2010).

<sup>16</sup> (Yu 2005, pp. 52–53).

in advising that monks "must not intend to kill people, only to kill the Devil" presumably residing within the o ffenders.<sup>17</sup>
