**5. Conclusions**

In this comment, I revisited the claims put forward by Pinna and Conti. First, they argued that simplicity and likelihood approaches cannot account for the contrast polarity phenomena they presented. I showed, however, that their argumen<sup>t</sup> was based on incorrect assumptions and that simplicity and likelihood approaches are far more flexible than they assumed them to be—without claiming, by the way, that they can account for all contrast polarity phenomena. Second, even though it did not seem essential in their article, they argued that simplicity and likelihood are equivalent. I showed, however, that, although this issue is prone to confusion, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that simplicity and likelihood might be equivalent. Considering that this is a matter of formal facts rather than psychological opinions, it is, in my view, worrying that—in spite of refutations—unsubstantiated equivalence claims linger on in the literature.

**Funding:** This research was supported by Methusalem gran<sup>t</sup> METH/14/02 awarded to Johan Wagemans (www. gestaltrevision.be).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.
