**5. Action**

"I always like to picture the game the night before: I'll ask the kitman what kit we're wearing, so I can visualize it. It's something I've always done, from when I was a young boy. It helps to train your mind to situations that might happen the following day. I think about it as I'm lying in bed. What will I do if the ball gets crossed in the box this way? What movement will I have to make to ge<sup>t</sup> on the end of it? Just different things that might make you one percent sharper," said Wayne Rooney [28].

The foundation for one's mental model of the world is coded in the central nervous system, which, among its many functions, represents the perceived and imagined worlds in various modalities of sensory-affective imagery. Visual imagery is understood to be a quasi-sensory experience which shares at least some of its generating processes with perception [29,30]. It is accepted that the perceptual system is inextricably linked to the action system, such that perceiving something often leads to some corresponding activity, either covert or overt [31]. Perceiving and imaging are not merely processes of identification brought about by looking and listening, but active performances in which specific intentions, purposes, and actions need to be fulfilled [32] (p. 6). In part, this is the distinction between "seeing what" and "seeing as". What something is seen as has implications for action. This fact is problematic for any theories in which perception and action are not functionally interlinked. If I am feeling thirsty in the desert and I see a reflection as a lake, I will move as rapidly as possible toward it feeling hopeful and encouraged. If I see the reflection as a mirage, I will try to ignore it and continue slowly on my way feeling discouraged. Note that the example includes an affective-motivational component, which is a characteristic of all types of activity and not just a selected example. We arrive at the activity cycle theory (ACT) [32,33] (Figure 5). The arrows in this and all the other figures in this article represent cause-and-effect connections, not correlational associations.

**Figure 5.** Activity cycle theory (ACT) consists of four systems, three representing a functional module for a psychological domain (affect, schema, activity) and one (object) representing physical objects or internal images and ideas. Private (internal) and public (external) processes are executed across the meta level, object level, and social level of organization. The system enables outcomes of alternative future actions to be appraised prior to committing to any course of action. Conscious imagery serves as a mental "toolbox", providing its internal contents for the user to explore in the selection and preparation of future physical and social activity. The affect system co-activates goals and schemata enabling the organism to strive toward desired outcomes. Please note that psychological homeostasis was not included in the ACT. However, the ACT formulation was a crucial step in formulating the General Theory of Behavior. Reproduced from Reference [33] with permission.

The activity cycle theory of conscious imagery claims that a primary function of consciousness is the mental rehearsal of adaptive, goal-directed action through the experimental manipulation of perceptual-motor imagery [33]. As predicted by this theory, meta-analyses [5,25] showed that the vividness of conscious mental imagery is strongly associated with precisely those performances most likely to benefit from the use of perceptual-motor imagery and mental practice. ACT helps to explain the existence and function of conscious experience.

The image is a cycle of activity triggered by any of four processes: object, a ffect, schema, and activity. As the evidence shows, the more vivid the image is, the more closely neural activation resembles that activated in real physical activity with actual objects. Covert actions are similar in neural terms to the state of execution of that action overtly. Mental imagery can be as simple as imagined looking, listening, or touching, or as complex as preparing a gourme<sup>t</sup> dinner or designing a scientific theory. The triggering schemata can be activated top-down or bottom-up. A cycle of mental activity always must include a goal, the means to reach it, and the consequences on the organism and objective world.

Evidence for the a ffective and somatic components of mental imagery is strong and was discussed for at least a century. In 1907, Wundt [34] wrote the following:

"When any physical process rises above the threshold of consciousness, it is the a ffective elements which, as soon as they are strong enough, first become noticeable. They begin to force themselves energetically into the fixation point of consciousness before anything is perceived of the ideational elements ... They are sometimes states of pleasurable or unpleasurable character, sometimes they are predominantly states of strained expectation ... Often there is vividly present ... the special a ffective tone of the forgotten idea, although the idea itself still remains in the background of consciousness ... In a similar manner ... the clear apperception of ideas in acts of cognition and recognition is always preceded by feelings" [34] (pp. 243–244).

Silvan Tomkins taught us that the primary motivational system is the a ffective system, and that biological drives have impact only when amplified by the a ffective system [35]. A similar view was reached by Robert Zajonc [36]. When subjects imagine happy, sad, and angry situations, di fferent patterns of facial muscle activity are produced that can be measured by electromyography [37]. People see objects with feeling. A ffective representations of visual sensations are included in the brain's predictions of what sensations stand for and how to act on them in the future [38]. Similar a ffective responses occur when people mentally image not only faces, but more complex objects, scenes, and activities; however, the physiological responses are generally less intense in mental images [13].
