*4.2. Implications for Realizing Aspirations of IWRM*

We noted at the outset that IWRM-based river basin planning is a project with high aspirations, such as formulating a stakeholder-agreed development plan for the Ayeyarwady basin in Myanmar [17], or producing a river basin development strategy for the Kamala to realize an optimal set of economic, social, and environmental benefits [60].

Our attempts to further such aspirations led us to adopt analytic, deliberative methodologies, consistent with collaborative and co-productive models of decision-making. However, these are not without constraints. For example, authority and influence in water policy are concentrated among actors who are familiar with stakeholder consultation in the form of roundtable or town hall style meetings, but less familiar with the notion of empowering stakeholders to formulate strategy-based on analytic, deliberative methods. Furthermore, the institutions of river basin planning are nascent in developing, post-conflict settings.

A more subtle constraint arises from the fact that IWRM-based planning is logically consistent with a co-productive model of decision-making (and a collaborative style of governance)—yet, at a global level, development partners promoting IWRM-based planning predominately subscribe to a rational choice model of decision-making (and a hierarchical style of governance). They recognize the instrumental value of stakeholder consultation, but ultimately assign to specialists the task of formulating the options presented to decision takers (see e.g., design documents for the Myanmar BESS project [53] and the DSS/Basin Master Plan project [17]).

This presents a tension for development donors. On the one hand, a state-centric and hierarchical interpretation of IWRM is expedient, and may appear to be the only overarching model of technical assistance acceptable to recipient states. One the other hand, we have shown that contrasting understandings of how expertise links to action, and of what expertise should be prioritized, have important socio-political effects, some of which can undermine the inclusive aspirations of IWRM.

#### **5. Conclusions: Advancing Collaborative, Co-Productive IWRM**

This paper focussed on IWRM-based planning in Myanmar and Nepal, during a period in which we had the privilege of co-designing and implementing river basin planning initiatives (2016–2019).

During this period, the politics and institutions related to water resources development were dynamic and contested in both countries. We did not attempt a comprehensive diagnosis of the institutional and political constraints to realizing IWRM aspirations. Instead, by focusing on planning methodology *in action*, we offer insights to improve river basin planning practice in democratizing settings.

Both our planning initiatives made use of participatory, deliberative, analytical designs. Although such designs are consistent with a co-productive model of decision-making, they are complex. In a context of hierarchical governance, such designs offer many intervention or veto points. From the standpoint of realizing the aspirations of IWRM in democratizing settings, such points of interception have desirable and undesirable implications (Section 4.1). Nonetheless, when they apply co-productive knowledge production in and beyond the project cycle, donors and designers advance IWRM-based river basin planning.

Sponsors uncertain of participatory deliberative processes might draw confidence from the relative success of the multi-stakeholder visioning ("development pathways") components in our planning initiatives. In both cases, participants articulated broad development agendas for their river basins [3,56]. They expressed concern for marginalized people (e.g., landless farmers; people in conflict zones), and recommended equitable and ecologically sensitive investment in upland natural resources and farming. They proposed multiple water resources development options (and, in the Kamala, Nepal case, subsequently deliberated on them in detail). They believed their understanding of strategic issues improved, and that co-participants gave reasoned arguments for positions. Participants considered it important to contribute to river basin planning beyond their specific expertise—that is, beyond their instrumental value. They explicitly valued a collaborative multi-stakeholder approach to planning. Participants' evaluations from the Kamala development pathways and MCA workshops are consistent with evaluations obtained by the BESS project [3] (Annex 3).

Donors and designers can scrutinize IWRM technical assistance for the presence of rational choice models of decision-making, in order to reflect on advantages and limitations of their specific models. Sophisticated rational choice models recognize the potential for non-rational influences on decision-maker cognition. They recognize that it is not enough to present credible analysis to public actors who are assumed capable of acting on such knowledge to further their interests, in accordance with their values. However, even sophisticated rational choice models may underestimate the effect of power imbalances between actors, and externalize the challenges of political accountability (e.g., by assuming that elections or other accountability processes will ultimately steer authorities to maximize societal utility).

In the wider Mekong region, much authority to take decisions remains with agencies with the expertise to control floods, irrigate arid land, and otherwise meet water demand through infrastructural means [21]. However, consistent with IWRM principles, water resources development has grown considerably more complex in recent decades. It is evolving from technical optimization to integrated, systemic, foresight-oriented concerns [1]. Yet, state water agencies in the Mekong continue to privilege the original set of engineering and hydraulic expertise.

A co-productive model of knowledge production widens the scope of relevant expertise. The collaborative mode of governance underpinning it explicitly seeks to empower and mobilize civil society and private sector actors. We found that actors thus empowered can set the planning agenda. In the Ayeyarwady case, we found that co-production allows stakeholders to mitigate certain challenges encountered in scenario modelling (Section 3.3.3), and helps shape a planning process that can start immediately, even as data collection and model development continue in parallel. By working with planning stakeholders, we discovered more effective ways to combine and sequence disciplinary knowledge (Figure 2).

Our experiences in Myanmar and Nepal show that, with adequate support, stakeholders can co-design more vigorously, for example providing guidance for which disciplines are necessary and sufficient to address their agenda. We have shown the difficulties of trying to implement co-productive and collaborative models. Yet the alternative—managing complexity and contestation via bureaucratic modes of governance—offers no greater likelihood of planning outcomes legitimized by society (cf., [18]). Development partners instead can point to longstanding practices of collaborative planning in their own contexts. Australia, for example, can offer diverse models of collaborative governance, as reflected in the work of Landcare, Catchment Management Authorities, regional natural resource management bodies, and participatory urban planning initiatives. Such domains have yielded productive multi-stakeholder deliberative initiatives [47,61,62]; comparative insights on collaborative management [63,64]; insights on the challenges of integrating Indigenous knowledge into river basin planning [65]; and reflections on the interaction between collaborative and hierarchical governance [66,67].

In conclusion, methodologies are not neutral in their effects—they empower some actors at the expense of others. IWRM initiatives in democratizing developing countries face multiple challenges. While the rational choice model of decision-making which persists in IWRM-based planning offers an administratively simpler approach to development assistance, it runs the risk of unduly concentrating expertise and power. In so doing, it undermines the ultimate aspirations of IWRM, which require co-productive approaches. We hope the insights offered as a result of our experience can guide improved IWRM investments and outcomes.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, T.F.; methodology, T.F.; writing—original draft preparation, T.F.; writing—review and editing, T.F., D.J.P., M.S. (Nepal), T.K., E.J.B., N.G., L.L., H.O., A.A., N.L.; project administration, T.F., M.S. (Nepal), D.J.P., A.A., N.L.

**Funding:** This perspective piece contributes to the South Asia Sustainable Development Investment Portfolio supported by the Australian Aid progam. It was co-funded by CSIRO Land and Water.

**Acknowledgments:** We thank three anonymous reviewers, Saumitra Neupane, William Young, S.M. Wahid, and Susan Cuddy, for comments provided during the writing process. We acknowledge the Advisory committee for Kamala Basin Initiative, the Australian Water Partnership, eWAter Ltd., Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha, and Policy Entrepreneurs Inc.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design of this communication piece; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, or in the decision to publish the results. Research carried out in the Kamala basin is a collaborative work between WECS and CSIRO.

#### **References**


*Basin Exploratory Scoping Study (BESS). Final Report*; eWater Ltd. (Australian Water Partnership): Canberra, Australia, 2019; Available online: https://www.airbm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Ayeyarwady-Basin-Exploratory-Scoping-Study-BESS-Final-Report.pdf (accessed on 25 November 2019).


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