**5. Conclusions**

The goal of this study was to test for the link between compliance and company value in a specific context of concentrated ownership and post-transition corporate governance. The results show a negative correlation between compliance with the code provisions on board practice and company value, as measured by Tobin's Q, suggesting that investors do not find the adoption of board practice a plausible solution for the principal–principal conflict in an environment of concentrated ownership.

The study adds to the debate on corporate governance compliance, in general, and its effects on market valuation in emerging and post-transition countries, in particular. For practitioners and policymakers, the results of our analysis deliver important insights into the limitations of code provisions, which are transmitted across countries with differing institutional environments and ownership structures, and results in different agency problems.

We acknowledge the limitations of our research—we focused on board best practice and in one country. Further research should address a wide scope of code provisions and cover a larger sample of companies from different economies. Adding variables to cover the institutional environment, such as measures of investor protection or rule of law, would aid in understanding the effect of the regulatory context on the efficiency of corporate governance provisions.

**Author Contributions:** Formal analysis, writing T.K.; Writing—original draft, concept, discussion, M.A. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **References**


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