**2. Family Control and Firm Value**

Family control businesses have been debated over century by prior research that it enhances family firm value. Some classical research argues that the ownership structures in widely held firms create opportunities for conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. This can reduce the value of the firm since managers of such firms are more concerned about the maximization of private benefits at the expense of the owner of the firms (Agency Cost of Type I). Other school of thought claim that the most suitable instrument to correct the action of such sulphurous management behaviour is through concentrated ownership, (Ntoung et al. 2017, p. 127). For instance, in (Ntoung et al. 2016a) (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Sraer and Thesmar 2007) claim that separation between ownership and control can involveimportant costs and problems forshareholders. Their classical agency problem suggests that one way to resolve the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is to increase the proportion of shares in the hands of the controlling shareholder.

"In light of the above, minority shareholders are victimised as ownership becomes more concentrated, while controlling shareholders tend to engage in undesirable behaviours. In a similar way, Schulze et al. (2001) examine the consequences of altruism concept and pay of incentives by controlling shareholder, and their influence in the level family firm's performance. They affirm that family firms with concentrated ownership are more exposed to agency danger. Chrisman et al. (2004) conclude that agency cost affects the performance of family business. Researches in Austria, Italy, and Spain show a positive and signification relationship between incentive and performance", (Ntoung et al. 2016b).

Furthermore, Asghar Butt et al. (2018) add that most family owners are less likely to use derivatives for hedging purposes as compared to non-family owners. Examining corporate derivatives and the ownership concentration of 101 Pakistani non-financial firms over the period 2012–2016, they concluded that non-family firm are more likely to use derivativemeasures to increase the value of their stocks.

Meanwhile, Yang et al. (2018) conclude by attesting that in order to perform risk management practices in a way that will guarantee competitive position in the market, the top management need to have enough financial skills. Finally, "their findings suggest that these characteristics of family firms do influence their performance. In Europe, Barontini and Caprio (2006) provide similar evidence to those of Villalonga and Amit. According to them, family firms with a founder or descendants as CEO or Chairman outperform other firms. However, family firms with a founder as CEO outperform family firms with descendants as CEO. Also, if no member of the family is involved in the management (passive), then the firms perform worse" (Ntoung et al. 2017, p. 125).
