**Appendix A**


**Table A1.** The Modified Jones model (1).

**Notes:** The equation for the Modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (1995): TAit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>=</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>0</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> β2 ΔREVit−ΔRECit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>3</sup> PPEit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>ε</sup>it(1). Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* *<sup>p</sup>* <sup>&</sup>lt; 0.01.


**Table A2.** The performance matched model (2).

**Notes:** The equation for the performance matched model by Kothari et al. (2005): TAit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>=</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>0</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> β2 ΔREVit−ΔRECit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>3</sup> PPEit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>β</sup><sup>4</sup> ROAit Ait−<sup>1</sup> <sup>+</sup> <sup>ε</sup>it(2). Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* *<sup>p</sup>* <sup>&</sup>lt; 0.01, \*\* *<sup>p</sup>* <sup>&</sup>lt; 0.05.



**Notes:** Test of H0: difference in coefficients is not systematic. The random effects estimator is chosen if the *p*-value is > 0.05, and the fixed effect estimator is chosen otherwise.

**Table A4.** Correlation matrix.


**Notes:** According to Brooks (2019) a correlation between two variables that exceeds 0.80 indicates severe multicollinearity. The variables are defined as: abs\_DA = absolute value of discretionary accruals, BISE = board independence, DER = employee representatives, SOD = share ownership by directors, MJS = directors as majority shareholders, BA = board activity, AC = audit committee, FS = firm size, ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity.



**Notes:** According to Brooks (2019) a VIF index over five indicates severe multicollinearity. The variables are defined as: abs\_DA = absolute value of discretionary accruals, BISE = board independence, DER = employee representatives, SOD = share ownership by directors, MJS = directors as majority shareholders, BA = board activity, AC = audit committee, FS = firm size, ROA = return on assets, ROE = return on equity.


**Table A6.** Regression results of model (3) without corporate governance variables.

**Notes:** The equation used to test the robustness: absDAit = β<sup>0</sup> + β1(FSit) + β2(ROAit) + β3(ROEit) + εit(3). \*\*\* and \* indicate the significance level at 1% and 10%, respectively (two-tailed). All numbers reported in NOK million. Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01, \* *p* < 0.1

#### **References**


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