*Article* **From** *L¯ıla¯* **to** *Nitya* **and Back: Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. <sup>a</sup> and Vedanta ¯**

#### **Arpita Mitra**

Assistant Professor, Kazi Nazrul University, Asansol 713340" India; arpitamitra2016@gmail.com; Tel.: +91-837-782-6551

Received: 10 October 2020; Accepted: 26 October 2020; Published: 30 October 2020

**Abstract:** There has been a long-standing academic debate on the religious orientation of Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a Paramahamsa (1836–1886), one of the leading religious figures of modern India. In the ˙ light of his teachings, it is possible to accept that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas were Vedantic, albeit not in a ¯ sectarian or exclusive way. This article explores the question of where exactly to place him in the chequered history of Vedantic ideas. It points out that R ¯ amak ¯ r.s.n. a repeatedly referred to different states of consciousness while explaining the difference in the attitudes towards the Divine. This is the basis of his harmonization of the different streams within Vedanta. Again, it is also the basis of his ¯ understanding of the place of *sakti ´* . He demonstrated that, as long as one has I-consciousness, one is operating within the jurisdiction of *sakti ´* , and has to accept *sakti ´* as real. On the other hand, in the state of *samadhi ¯* , which is the only state in which the I-consciosuness disappears, there is neither One nor many. The article also shows that, while Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a accepted all of the different views within Vedanta, he was probably not as distant from the Advaita Ved ¯ anta philosopher ¯ Adi ¯ Sa´ mkara as he ˙ has been made out to be.

**Keywords:** Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a; Vedanta; ¯ Adi ¯ Sa´ mkara; Advaita; Upani ˙ s.ads; *brahman*; *atman ¯* ; *Sakti ´* ; *vijñana ¯* ; *samadhi ¯*

#### **1. Introduction**

There has been a long-standing academic debate on the religious orientation of Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. <sup>a</sup> Paramahamsa (1836–1886), one of the leading religious figures of modern India. He looked upon ˙ himself as a devotee and child of Kal¯ ¯ı; many of his sayings and spiritual experiences attest great devotion to Vais.n. ava figures such as Rama, K ¯ r.s.n. a and Sr´ ¯ı Caitanya; a more engaged reader is likely to find in his ideas a substratum of Vedantic thought—the idea of the transcendence, as well as immanence ¯ of the absolute Godhead; and finally, he had something of his own to add to all of this. Given the richness of his teachings, it has been variously argued, for example, that he was a follower of Tantra (Neevel 1976; Zimmer 2008), at best a form of *tantric advaitism ¯* (Neevel 1976), or that the core concept taught by him was *vijñana ¯* , which was both 'mature bhakti' and 'fuller knowledge' (Devdas 1966), or that he proffered a kind of *samanvay¯ı vedanta ¯* , harmonizing the various strands within Vedanta itself (Chatterjee 1963). It has also been argued recently that Ramakrishna's teachings can be best described with the capacious and non-sectarian concept of *vijñana ved ¯ anta ¯* , which, among other things, accepted the immanent aspect of the Divine as being as equally real as its transcendent aspect (Maharaj 2018). In the light of his teachings, it is possible to accept that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas were Vedantic, albeit not ¯ in a sectarian or exclusive way. This is the point of departure in this article, which focuses on where exactly to place Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a in the chequered history of Vedantic ideas. ¯

In order to demonstrate that the question at hand is not an isolated question, but rather has broader implications for the history of Hinduism, the following pointer is in order. In Hinduism, what is the room for creativity without losing authenticity? As pointed out by Carl Ernst: "Since the Protestant

Reformation, the dominant concept of religions has been one of essences unconditioned by history. The nature of religious traditions can best be understood, from this perspective, by analysing religions into their original components." (Ernst 2005, p. 15). This model of understanding religion in terms of its 'original' components is also applicable to the way in which the history of Hinduism has been looked upon by certain scholars. A case in point is near at hand: the label 'Neo-Vedanta', which has been used for a long time by both critics and admirers to describe the teachings of Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's own disciple, Swam¯ ¯ı Vivekananda (1863–1902). The term was used from di ¯ fferent vantage points—critics used it to describe what they considered to be a departure from 'original' Vedanta, and admirers used ¯ it to highlight Vivekananda's unique contribution in re-defining the scope of Ved ¯ anta. The point that ¯ was nonetheless missed is: "Neo- has been the 'Hinduism' of each century now for the last thirty-five" (Smith 1979, p. 216), and so is the case with Vedanta ¯ 1—'Neo-' has been the Vedanta of each age for ¯ the last several centuries. In other words, this model does not recognize that Vedantic ideas too have ¯ evolved over time, albeit keeping the Upanis.ads as the constant reference point. Hence, the prefix 'Neo-' only serves as a tool to delegitimize the historical transmutation of religious ideas, but does not help in understanding the dynamics of the historical evolution of religion.

Without creativity, no new spiritual wave can be potent; we thus have to concede some kind of newness in Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings. On the other hand, emerging traditions within Hinduism, in order to have lasting appeal and legitimacy, also have to be based on what practitioners recognize as the *philosophia perennis* of Hinduism. This paper will, thus, explore the ways in which Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas relate to the long history of Vedanta, and what new light he had to shed on it, especially in the light of ¯ his own spiritual experiences.

The article is divided into the following sections: the next section discusses what Vedanta is; ¯ the section after that gives a brief overview of Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's core teachings and scholarly opinions about them, with reference to their Vedantic orientation; and the penultimate section will attempt to ¯ locate Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a in the history of Vedantic ideas. ¯

#### **2. What Is Vedanta? ¯**

Vedanta is an internally diverse and constantly evolving philosophico-theological tradition within ¯ Hinduism. The term 'Vedanta'—which literally means the end portion of the Vedas—originally referred ¯ to the Upanis.ads, which indeed formed the later portions of the Vedas (Chatterjee and Datta 1948, p. 395). Gradually, the meaning of the term expanded to include all thought that developed on the basis of the Upanis.ads. Today, Hindu tradition understands by the term 'Vedanta' a particular corpus of ¯ texts: the *prasthana traya, ¯* or the three authorities; that is, the Upanis.ads, which form the *sruti prasth ´ ana ¯* ; the *Brahmasutras ¯* , attributed to Badar ¯ aya ¯ n. a, which form the *nyaya prasth ¯ ana ¯* ; and the *Bhagavad G¯ıta*, which forms the *smriti prasthana ¯* . Even this categorisation developed over time. In his *prakaran. a grantha*, *Vedantas ¯ ara ¯* , Sadananda refers to the Upani ¯ s.ads, as well as the *S´arirakas ¯ utras ¯* (the *Brahmasutras ¯* ) and other texts (unspecified) that help in understanding the Upanis.ads, as constituting Vedanta ( ¯ *vedanto ¯ namopani ¯ s.atprama¯n. am tadupakar¯ın. i ´sarirakas ¯ utr ¯ ad¯ ¯ıni ca*—*Vedantas ¯ ara ¯* I.3). The *Vedantas ¯ ara ¯* might have been composed sometime around the 15th century AD (Nikhilananda 2014, p. 10). Loosely speaking, all of the other treatises, like the *bha¯s.yas* (commentaries), *varttik ¯ as¯* (sub-commentaries), *prakaran. a granthas* (explanatory treatises), and so on, that were composed to aid the understanding of the *prasthana traya ¯* are also referred to as Vedanta. Besides these, there are several other texts—like the ¯ *Yoga Va´¯sis.t.ha*, the *Adhy ¯ atma R ¯ am¯ ayan ¯ . <sup>a</sup>* and others—that articulate Vedantic ideas. ¯

As mentioned, of the *prasthana traya ¯* , the Upanis.ads form the *sruti prasth ´ ana ¯* ; that is, they contain the revelation of supersensuous knowledge. The Upanis.ads cannot be reasonably dated. They contain many statements that appear contradictory. In order to demonstrate the coherence of these statements,

<sup>1</sup> I do not use the terms 'Hinduism' and 'Vedanta' interchangeably. This paper will only focus on Ved ¯ anta, but at the same ¯ time, the history of Vedanta is a part of the history of Hinduism. ¯

the *Brahmasutras ¯* were composed as a systematic exposition of the philosophy and theology articulated in the Upanis.ads. This belongs to the category of the *sutra ¯* literature that developed as a particular genre of texts meant for the systematization of philosophical views. The *Brahmasutras ¯* were composed anytime between the 3rd century BC and the 1st century AD. The concise style of this aphoristic literature again led to the need for the writing of commentaries and sub-commentaries for further explanation. In due course, there developed divergent opinions about the content of the *Brahmasutras ¯* and the Upanis.ads. As philosophical views proliferated in India, both within the tradition of Vedanta ¯ and outside it, doxographical works were composed. By the medieval period, Indian philosophy, designated by the term *dar´sana*, came to be divided into several schools, one of which was 'Vedanta'. ¯ In the context of the philosophical schools, the word Vedanta refers to the school that grounds itself ¯ completely in the philosophy of the Upanis.ads. 'Vedanta', as referring to this philosophical school, ¯ is the most commonplace use of the term, but it is nonetheless a narrow usage. Again, there are divergences within this school as well; there are various sub-schools, whose key ideas and differences will be discussed below.

What is the mainstay of Vedantic thought? The true self of the human being is designated by ¯ the word *atman ¯* , which literally means 'self'. This *atman ¯* is neither born, nor does it die; it is unborn, constant, eternal and primeval; it is not killed even when the body is killed (*Kat .ha Upanis.ad* II.18). It knows no old age or decay (*Chandogya Upani ¯ s. ad* VIII.1.5, *Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis. ad* III.5.1, *Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* IV.5.15). It is eternal because it is not the effect of any cause. It does not originate from anything (*Kat.ha Upanis. ad* II.18). It is "pure and effulgent" (*Mund. aka Upanis. ad* III.1.5). It is free from all evils (*Chandogya Upani ¯ s. ad* VIII.1.5), and is beyond hunger, thirst, pain, sorrow and delusion (*Chandogya ¯ Upanis. ad* VIII.1.5, *Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis. ad* III.5.1, *Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis. ad* IV.5.15). It is ever unattached and free (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* IV.5.15). This *atman ¯* is subtler than the subtle and greater than the great (*Kat.ha Upanis. ad* II.20). This *atman ¯* is omniscient and all-knowing (*Mund. aka Upanis. ad* II.2.7). It is of the nature of bliss (*anandar ¯ upam ¯* ) (*Mund. aka Upanis. ad* II.2.7).

What is the locus of this self? It has entered into the bodies up to the tip of the nails (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* I.4.7) and resides there (*Mund. aka Upanis.ad* III.1.5). The *atman ¯* in the body is homologous to a razor in a case (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* I.4.7). Just as the fire which sustains the world is at its source, similarly the *atman ¯* is at the source of the body (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* I.4.7). This self is within all (*es.a ta atm¯ a sarv ¯ antarah ¯* ) (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* III.5.1). In every being, it is innermost (*antarataram*) (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* I.4.8); it lies deep within one's heart (*antarhr.daye*) (*Chandogya ¯ Upanis. ad* III.14.3–4), and it is hidden in the heart of every being (*nihito guhay¯ am¯* ) (*Kat.ha Upanis. ad* II.20).

How do we know this self which is hidden? This self has been described as '*neti*, *neti*' ('not this, not this') (that is, no direct description is available); it is imperceptible (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis. ad* IV.5.15). Nobody can see the *atman ¯* (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis. ad* I.4.7). When it is viewed, it is seen only in its aspects, performing certain functions (like speaking, seeing, etc.); therefore, all such vision is incomplete. This self cannot be known through the senses, the mind, or the intellect, because it is not an object. All knowledge presupposes a split between the subject and object of knowledge, where the knower is the subject and the known the object. But the *atman ¯* is not an object of knowledge (for instance, like a table or a chair). It can, therefore, never be known in the same way as we know an object. On the other hand, it is through the self that objects of knowledge are known. It is through the self that all is known (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis.ad* I.4.7). The self is, therefore, the eternal subject of all knowledge. As Yajñavalkya put it to U ¯ s.asta: one cannot see that which is the witness of the seeing; one cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing; one cannot think that which is the thinker of thought, know that which is the knower of knowledge—this is the self that is within all (*Br.hadaran ¯ . yaka Upanis. ad* III.4.2).

There then arises the question: how do we know the Knower (*vijñat¯ aramare kena vij ¯ an¯ ¯ıyat¯* )? Yajñavalkya tells Maitrey ¯ ¯ı that one smells, sees, hears, speaks, thinks, or knows something when there is duality; when oneness is realized, what should one smell and through what, what should one see and through what, etc.: "through what should one know That owing to which all this is known—through what, O Maitrey¯ı, should one know the Knower?" (*Br.hadara ¯ n. yaka Upanis. ad* II.4.14). The self-existent

one (*svayambhu*) made the senses outgoing; that is why one sees the outer objects but not the inner self (*antaratman ¯* ); a certain wise man (*dh¯ırah*) desiring immortality turns his sight inwards and sees the self within (*Kat.ha Upanis. ad* IV.1). The self cannot be attained through study, intellection, or hearing; it can be known only through the self to which the seeker prays; it is known when the self reveals its true nature (*Kat.ha Upanis. ad* II.23). It is the desireless man who perceives the glory of the self (*Kat.ha Upanis. ad* II.20). It is by knowing the self that one knows all. *Chandogya Upani ¯ s.ad* VI.1.4 gives the analogy of knowing all that is made of clay by virtue of knowing a lump of clay. *Chandogya Upani ¯ s.ad* VI.1.5–6 repeats the same point by using the analogies of gold and objects made of gold, and a (iron) nail cutter and all other iron objects. In all these verses, Uddalaka ¯ Aru ¯ n. i's refrain to his son Svetaketu is that all ´ transformation (*vikara ¯* ) is in name (*nama ¯* ) only; the reality in these three cases are clay, gold, and iron, respectively. In other words, names and forms are ever changing, but the substance is the same; it is constant, and therefore, it is the only reality (*satyam*).

What is the relationship between *atman ¯* and *brahman* (the ultimate indivisible cosmic being)? *Brahman*, after having created (the universe) entered into that very thing; it became the formed and the formless, the sentient and the insentient, etc. (*Taittir¯ıya Upanis. ad* II.6.1). Since there cannot be two infinite, eternal, omnipotent entities, there is, in effect, only one reality (*ekam sat*), which is the reality of all that exists. Hence, the Upanis.adic *mahav¯ akyas ¯* like "*tat tvam asi*" ("that art thou") declare the identity of *brahman* and *atman ¯* . The same qualities and attributes are used to describe both *brahman* and *atman ¯* . *Brahman* is the ear of the ear, mind of the mind, speech of the speech, eye of the eye, etc. (*Ken. a Upanis.ad* I.2). *Brahman* is that on account of which knowledge itself is possible. The ancient people say that *brahman* is indeed different from the known and above the unknown (*Ken. a Upanis. ad* I.4). It is neither known nor unknown, because anything that is known is limited, and on the other hand, *brahman* being unknown would make knowledge itself an impossibility. *Brahman* cannot be uttered by speech, comprehended by the mind, seen with the eyes, and so on (*Ken. a Upanis.ad* I.5–9). The indivisible *brahman* can only be perceived by the one, engaged in meditation, whose mind has become pure and whose intellect is favorable (*Mund. aka Upanis. ad* III.1.8).

It is mainly regarding the nature of *brahman* and the nature of its relationship with *j¯ıva* (embodied soul) that the various sub-schools of Vedanta di ¯ ffer in opinion. Among the many schools of Vedanta, ¯ the most well-known are Advaita, Vi´sis.t.advaita, and Dvaita. According to Advaita, ¯ *brahman* is not only the 'efficient cause', or the *nimittakara ¯ n. a,* but also the material cause (*upad¯ anak ¯ ara ¯ n. a*) of the universe. In other words, *brahman* is not merely the cause behind creation; *brahman* is also the very stuff out of which the universe is made. *Brahman* is pure consciousness (*jñanasvar ¯ upa ¯* ), devoid of all attributes (*nirgun. a*) and beyond all categories of the intellect (*nirvi´ses. a*). Advaita does not reject personal theism: it merely says that the personal God is not the ultimate truth. According to Advaita, *brahman*, in association with its power *may¯ a¯*, appears as being qualified (*sagun. a* and *savi´ses. a*), that is, as *¯ı´svara* (the Lord), who is the creator, preserver and destroyer of this world which is His appearance. The Advaita Vedanta ¯ *prakaran. a grantha*, *Vivekacud. ama ¯ n. i* describes *may¯ a¯* as the power of the Lord (*parame´sa´sakti*), as beginning-less (*anadi ¯* ), and as being made up of three *gun. as* (*trigun. atmik ¯ a¯*). It is *may¯ a¯* by whom the phenomenal universe is produced. She can only be inferred from the effects she produces. She is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both; she is neither the same, nor different, nor both; she is neither composed of parts, nor an indivisible whole, nor both. She is indescribable (*anirvacaniyarupa ¯* ). Just as the mistaken idea of a rope as a snake is removed by the discriminative discernment of the rope, similarly, *may¯ a¯* is destroyed by the realization of the pure (*sud ´ d. ha*) and one-without-a-second (*advaya*) *brahman* (*Vivekacud. ama ¯ n. i*, verses 108–110). *May¯ a¯* has two aspects: one that obscures (*avara ¯ n. a*) the real Self, and the other that projects (*viks.epan. a*) the non-self.

Ram¯ anuja of the Vi´ ¯ sis.t.advaita tradition did not accept this doctrine of ¯ *may¯ a¯*/*avidya,¯* and offered a seven-fold objection (*saptavidha-anupapatti ¯* ) to it. *Brahmasutra ¯* IV.1.3 says "*brahman* is realized as one's own *atman ¯* ". Both Advaita and Vi´sis.t.advaita accept this aphorism, but they interpret the meaning ¯ differently. Advaita claims the absolute identity of *brahman* and *atman ¯* ; Vi´sis.t.advaita pro ¯ ffers an organic unity that preserves both unity and difference. Ram¯ anuja thus gave the concept of 'identity in and ¯ through and because of difference'. For him:

... unity means realization of being a vital member of [the] organic whole. God or the Absolute is this whole. He is the immanent controller ... God is the soul of nature. God is also the soul of souls. Our souls are souls in relation to our bodies, but in relation to God, they become His body and He is their soul. The relation between the soul and the body is that of inner separability ... (Sharma 1987, p. 346)

In *Vedarthasa ¯ mgraha ˙* verse 93, Ram¯ anuja states: " ¯ *Brahman*, whose body is formed by animate and inanimate beings, who in his gross form is divided by distinctions of names and forms, is presented in the effect. This disunited and gross state of Brahman is called the creation." On the other hand, for Madhva of Dvaita Vedanta, God is only the e ¯ fficient cause of the universe, but not its material cause. For him, difference is so great a fact that he advocates five kinds of differences—that between soul and God, between soul and soul, between soul and matter, between God and matter, and finally, between matter and matter. According to Dvaita Vedanta, God is the repository of infinitely good ¯ qualities; He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer; He is transcendent, as well as immanent as the inner controller; the human soul is, by its nature, conscious and blissful, but is subject to pain and imperfections on account of its association with the body, sense organs, and minds, etc. In the Dvaita scheme, matter, souls, and God are three distinct entities.

It is important to note that many schools (*sampradaya ¯* ) of Vedanta are in fact theistic. Vi´ ¯ sis.t.advaita, ¯ Dvaitadvaita, Dvaita, ¯ Sud ´ d. hadvaita and Acintyabhed ¯ abheda belong to the Vai ¯ s.n. ava lineage. The Advaitin, Madhusudana Sarasvat ¯ ¯ı, was a devotee of Kr.s.n. a. The Advaitin, Appayya D¯ıks.ita, was an avowed Saiva. N ´ ¯ılakan. t.ha D¯ıks.ita, on the other hand, attempted a fusion of ˙ Sr´ ¯ı Vidya ritualism ¯ with Advaita Vedantic theology. Hence, in the case of R ¯ amak ¯ r.s.n. a too, it would be helpful not to look at Vedanta and ¯ *bhakti* as competing categories. Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a was both Vedantin and ¯ *bhakta*, and there is no contradiction between the two.

### **3. Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a's Core Teachings**

Before discussing Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's core teachings, let us briefly discuss his spiritual practices. As is well-known, he performed *sadhan ¯ a¯* (spiritual training and practice) according to Tantra (with Bhairav¯ı Brahma ¯ n.¯ı as *guru*), Vais.n. avism (five-fold attitude of *s´anta ¯* , *dasya ¯* , *sakhya*, *vatsalya ¯* and *madhura* towards God), as well as Vedanta (with Tot ¯ a Pur ¯ ¯ı as *guru*). During his Vedanta ¯ *sadhan ¯ a¯*, he attained *nirvikalpa samadhi ¯* with great ease, and also received *sannyasa ¯* from Tota Pur ¯ ¯ı. Thereafter, he also took initiation from the Suf¯ı Govind Rai, and performed *sadhan ¯ a¯* according to Islam. All of his various spiritual practices came to fruition in spiritual experiences and visions of the highest order. He also had visions of spiritual figures like Jesus Christ.

Since Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's core teachings are well-known, I will only summarize them briefly here. Firstly, both *nitya* (eternal, not subject to change) and *l¯ıla¯* (play, representing that which is changing all the time) belong to the same entity; the one who is *akhand. a sacchidananda ¯* (indivisible Existent-Consciousness-Bliss) assumes different forms for *l¯ıla¯*. The same idea is expressed in a different way: *brahman* and Kal¯ ¯ı are identical and inseparable; when it is static, we call it *brahman*, when it is active in play, we call it *sakti ´* . *Brahman* is *at .ala*, *acala*, *sumeruvat*—that is, unmoving. But the one who has an unmoving aspect also has a moving aspect—that moving aspect is *sakti ´* . Secondly, God is both *sagun. a* (with qualities) and *nirgun. a* (beyond all qualities); *sak¯ ara ¯* (with form) and *nirak¯ ara ¯* (without form); and much more. Thirdly, it follows from the preceding idea that God can be reached through a variety of paths, and all paths are equally salvific.

Fourthly, one first reaches the *akhand. a* by the process of '*neti, neti'* ('not this, not this'): God is not this world, not the creatures, not the 24 cosmic elements; after reaching the *akhand. a*, one sees that it is God who has become all this—the world, the creatures and the 24 cosmic elements. The analogy is given that one climbs to the terrace using the stairs and leaves one step behind every time; after one reaches the terrace, one sees that the terrace and the stairs are made of the same material. Lastly, after one has climbed up to the terrace, it is possible to climb down and be at a lower storey. This is true of the *vijñan¯ ¯ı*, who knows God in a *vi´ses.a* manner. There are exceptional souls (*¯ı´svarakot.is*), who can remain in the body even after *samadhi ¯* (in the case of others, the body dies after 21 days of *nirvikalpa samadhi ¯* ). A *vijñan¯ ¯ı* is one who comes back from *samadhi ¯* , and sees God as being immanent in this world, and lives in this world whilst assuming a personal attitude of being a devotee ('*bhakter ami ¯* '), servant ('*dasa ¯ ami ¯* '), or child of God. A *vijñan¯ ¯ı* comes back from *samadhi ¯* mainly for the purpose of *loka´siks.a,* or the dissemination of spiritual knowledge among the people. *Vijñan¯ ¯ıs* are mostly *bhaktas*. Examples of *vijñan¯ ¯ı* are Narada, Sanaka, San ¯ atana, Sananda, Sanat Kumar, ¯ Sukadeva, Prahl ´ ada, Hanum ¯ ana, ¯ and Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a himself. Sr´ ¯ı Caitanya had both *brahmajñana ¯* in *samadhi ¯* and *premabhakti ¯* (a higher form of love for God). Sa´ mkara also came back after ˙ *samadhi ¯* with the I-consciousness of knowledge ('*bidyar¯ ami ¯* ') for the purpose of *loka´siks.a*. A *vijñan¯ ¯ı* sees God not only within, with eyes shut in meditation, but also all around, with eyes open—a *vijñan¯ ¯ı* moves effortlessly from *l¯ıla¯* to *nitya* and back. Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a contrasts the state of the *vijñan¯ ¯ı* with that of the *jñan¯ ¯ı*, who merely realizes the transcendent *brahman*. These are Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a's principal theological teachings.

Scholars find it difficult to accept that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings were completely aligned with those of the philosophical school of Advaita Vedanta. For instance, Heinrich Zimmer is of the following opinion: ¯

Both the Tantra and popular Hinduism accept the truth of Advaita Vedanta but shift the accent ¯ to the positive aspect of may¯ a. The world is the unending manifestation of the dynamic ¯ aspect of the divine, and as such should not be devaluated and discarded as suffering and imperfection, but celebrated, penetrated by enlightening insight, and experienced with understanding. (Zimmer 2008, p. 570)

In this sense, Zimmer considers Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a to be a follower of Tantra. Walter Neevel, too, is of the opinion that "Ramakrishna is an advaitin but ¯ ... his non-dualism must be viewed from the perspective of a tantric *advaita*, not that of Sa´ nkara." ( ˙ Neevel 1976, p. 86). Nalini Devdas, however, takes the opposite view, and finds Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings about the supreme *brahman* to be closer to Advaita than to Tantra (Devdas 1966). This article will not deal with the question of Tantric elements in ¯ Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings. However, it should be noted that, while Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a performed full *sadhan ¯ a¯* in the Tantric fold as well, he never prescribed T ¯ antric methods in his teachings. On the other hand, ¯ he had reservations about certain Tantric practices as being unsuitable for most spiritual aspirants. ¯

Devdas identifies *vijñana ¯* as the core concept in Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings (Devdas 1966). Recently, Ayon Maharaj<sup>2</sup> argued that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's Vedanta can be best described as Vijñ ¯ ana Ved ¯ anta, ¯ characterized by the acceptance of both the transcendence and immanence of God, among other things. I will not debate about the nomenclature 'Vijñana Ved ¯ anta'—whether we should give R ¯ amak ¯ r.s.n. a's Vedanta a new name at all, or not. As far as the conceptual content of Vijñ ¯ ana Ved ¯ anta is concerned, ¯ I accept all of the six central tenets of it, as identified by Maharaj (Maharaj 2018, pp. 27–45). However, Maharaj posits this Vijñana Ved ¯ anta as being sharply in contrast with ¯ Sa´ mkara's Advaita Ved ˙ anta: ¯

Sri Ramakrishna's Vijñana Ved ¯ anta ¯ ... is a *world-a*ffi*rming* Advaitic philosophy that contrasts sharply with Sa´ nkara's world-denying Advaita Ved ˙ anta. For ¯ Sa´ nkara, the sole reality is ˙ the impersonal nondual Brahman, so *j¯ıva*, *jagat*, and *¯ı´svara* are all ultimately unreal. For Sri Ramakrishna, by contrast, the sole reality is the Infinite Divine Reality, which is equally the impersonal Brahman and the personal Sakti. Unlike ´ Sa´ nkara, Sri Ramakrishna maintains ˙ that both *j¯ıva* and *jagat* are *real* manifestations of Sakti, which is itself an ontologically real ´ aspect of the Infinite Reality. (Maharaj 2018, p. 40, emphasis in original)

The following section of the essay will mainly engage with this argument and test its validity. This question has special significance in the debate on Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a Vedanta, because it will help in ¯

<sup>2</sup> Now known as Swami Medhananda.

ascertaining a correct understanding of Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas, as well as determining his proper place in the history of Vedanta. ¯

While Ayon Maharaj includes, in his concept of Vijñana Ved ¯ anta, a harmonizing approach to all ¯ theological views within and outside Vedanta, it is worthwhile to examine this 'harmonizing' aspect of ¯ Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's Vedanta separately. Satis Chandra Chatterjee used the expression ' ¯ *samanvay¯ı vedanta ¯* ' to describe Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas as "being a synthesis of all schools of Vedanta" ( ¯ Chatterjee 1963, p. 105). Chatterjee, too, engages with a comparison of Sa´ mkara's and R ˙ amak ¯ r.s.n. a's views on the impersonal (Absolute) and personal God, that is, *nirgun. a* and *sagun. a brahman* (Chatterjee 1963, pp. 109–12). He, too, is of the opinion that, according to Sa´ mkara, ˙ *sagun. <sup>a</sup>* or lower *brahman* is real only empirically, but unreal in relation to the Absolute, which is beyond all *upadhis ¯* . On the other hand, Chatterjee explains that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a considered *brahman* and *sakti ´* to be non-different. There should be no difficulty in accepting the validity of both these arguments independently. However, I would like to argue that, when they are contrasted against each other, they do not give us the correct assessment, because firstly, they do not represent Sa´ mkara's and R ˙ amak ¯ r.s.n. a's views on a strictly corresponding subject, and secondly, both of the views presented are but partial. A few pages later, Chatterjee refers to the fact that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a showed the validity of all of the views that depend on the level of consciousness from which it was perceived. In this, Chatterjee finds a 'rational basis' for Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's reconciliation of the conflicting systems of Dvaita, Vi´sis.t.advaita and Advaita ( ¯ Chatterjee 1963, p. 122). This is, I would like to argue, key to understanding Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas. It will be taken up for elaborate consideration in the next section.

Before proceeding with a fuller engagement with these issues in the next section, a few words of qualification are in order. Ayon Maharaj also provides a set of Interpretive Principles that one should follow while analysing Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings. Of these, Interpretive Principles (1) and (4) directly concern us here. The first principle states: "Instead of appealing to external philosophical doctrines or frameworks, we should strive to understand Sri Ramakrishna's philosophical teachings on their own terms." (Maharaj 2018, p. 19). I agree with this principle so long as we do not forget what was pointed out in the Introduction to this essay: despite the room for creativity, emerging traditions within Hinduism have to be based on what practitioners recognize as the *philosophia perennis* of Hinduism. Here, it would be useful to remember Vivekananda's remark about his ¯ *guru*: "Ramakrishna came to teach the religion of today ... He had to go afresh to Nature to ask for facts ... Shri Ramakrishna's teachings are 'the gist of Hinduism'; they were not peculiar to him. Nor did he claim that they were ... " (Vivekananda 1921, pp. 75–76). Vivekananda seems to be making two contradictory statements, ¯ but when one understands the balance between the two, one would understand Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a correctly both in his individual capacity and in terms of his proper place in the history of Hinduism.

Maharaj's Interpretive Principle (4) says: "Sri Ramakrishna's nonsectarian attitude allows him to accept the spiritual core of various philosophical sects without subscribing to all the doctrines of any sect in particular." (Maharaj 2018, p. 23). Agreeing with this in principle, my attempt here is not to prove whether Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a was ultimately an Advaitin or not. He did harmonize various seemingly contradictory elements, but I doubt if this act of reconciling or combining different systems was deliberate. Perhaps a better way of understanding him is to recognize that he followed different paths and discovered the underlying principles of each system, the harmony of which he was able to recognize in the light of his own spiritual experiences. This last point about the centrality of his spiritual experiences is acknowledged by Maharaj too, and this is what we need to keep in mind while reading Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a.

It is possible to argue that, instead of refuting any accepted teaching within Hinduism, Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a showed the proper place of each and explained the factors owing to which there seem to be differences. Two contradictory teachings can be equally accepted only when the differences in their underlying perspectives can be understood.

### **4. Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a's Vedanta ¯**

Ayon Maharaj clearly interprets Sa´ mkara Advaita Ved ˙ anta as world-denying; that is, according to ¯ this framework, the universe, living beings and the personal God are empirically real but ontologically unreal (this is a reference to the *vyavah ¯ arika ¯* and *param ¯ arthika ¯* levels of reality in Advaita Vedanta). In other words, Sa´ mkara does not give ontological parity to ˙ *nirgun. a brahman* on the one hand, and *jiva*, *jagat* and *sagun. a brahman*, on the other hand. This is Maharaj's principal premise for distinguishing between Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's position and that of Advaita Vedanta. While this is the standard accepted ¯ view about Advaita Vedanta, there is some room for disagreement. I would like to argue that ¯ the idea of a devaluation of *sagun. a brahman* in the thought of Sa´ mkar ˙ acarya ¯ <sup>3</sup> has generally been an over-interpretation.

The Upanis.ads talk about both transcendence and immanence in the context of *brahman*. Therefore, firstly, let us see what Sa´ mkara has to say in his commentary on a few such representative verses. Let us ˙ see, for instance, *Taittir¯ıya Upanis. ad* II.6.1, which says that *brahman*, after having created (the universe), entered into that very thing; it became the formed and the formless, the sentient and the insentient, etc. Sa´ mkara says in his ˙ *bhas¯.ya*:

... it is *the one Brahman* ... *that became* ... *all this* that there is—all modifications, without any exception, starting with the visible and the invisible, all of which are the features of the formed and the formless—, there being no existence for any of these modifications of name and form *apart from* that Brahman. (Gambhirananda 2009, p. 358, emphasis added)

In other words, the world of name and form has no existence independent of *brahman*, which is one, and which itself has become this world of name and form. Finally, Sa´ mkara summarizes: " ˙ ... this Self must be accepted as existing, since It is the cause of space etc., *exists in this creation*, is lodged in the supreme space within the cavity of the heart, and is perceived through Its diverse reflections on the mental concepts." (Gambhirananda 2009, p. 359, emphasis added). Then, there is *¯I´sa Upani ¯ s. ad* 8, which says: "He is all-pervasive (*paryagat¯* ), pure, bodiless ... transcendent (*paribhu¯*), and self-existent (*svayambhu¯*) ... " (Gambhirananda 2009, p. 15). Sa´ mkara, in his commentary, accepts that the Self is ˙ all-pervasive, 'like space', and explains the concepts of *paribhu¯* and *svayambhu¯* thus: "*Paribhuh¯* is one who exists above all (transcendent). *Svayambhuh¯* means he who exists by himself. He, the all, becomes (*bhavati*) by Himself (*svayam*) all that He transcends, and He is also the Transcendental One. In this sense He is *svayam-bhuh¯* , self-existent." (Gambhirananda 2009, p. 16). Do these explanations speak of a denial of the immanence of *brahman*?

In support of his argument, Maharaj cites Sa´ mkara's ˙ *Brahmasutrabh ¯ a¯s.ya* I.i.114, where Sa´ mkara ˙ "distinguishes the "*upasya ¯* " Brahman, the personal God who is worshipped and contemplated, from the "*jñeya*" Brahman, the impersonal nondual Reality which can only be known", and also claims that "the *upasya ¯* Brahman is associated with unreal "*upadhis ¯* " (limiting adjuncts), while the *jñeya* Brahman is entirely devoid of *upadhis ¯* ." (Maharaj 2018, p. 36). Let us examine the verse. In the context of a discussion about *brahman* being the cause of the universe, Sa´ mkara says: ˙

Brahman is known in two aspects—one as possessed of the limiting adjunct [*upadhi ¯* ] constituted by the diversities of the universe which is a modification of name and form, and the other devoid of all conditioning factors and opposed to the earlier ... it is *in the state of ignorance* that Brahman can come within the range of empirical dealings, comprising the object of meditation, the meditator, and so on ... Although *the one God*, the supreme Self,

<sup>3</sup> Whether or not Sa´ mkara considered ˙ *sagun. a brahman* as unreal, it did not hinder him from saluting *sagun. a brahman* (usually Sr´ ¯ı Hari) at the beginning of many of his treatises. Even if we consider these as "attributed" works, it clearly demonstrates that the Advaita tradition accepts such salutations. Such intellectual inconsistency is unlikely in the case of Sa´ mkara. ˙

<sup>4</sup> Maharaj cites 1.i.12, but he is, in fact, discussing 1.i.11. The verse number cited is erroneous. Here, we shall follow the correct verse number, that is, 1.i.11.

is to be meditated on as possessed of those qualities, still the results differ in accordance with the quality meditated on, as is stated in the Vedic texts ... one hears about the Self—unchanging and ever homogeneous though It is—that there is a difference in the degrees of Its manifestation of glory and power, that being caused by *the gradation of the minds by which It becomes conditioned* ... Thus also it is a fact that, although the knowledge of the Self results in instantaneous liberation, yet its instruction is imparted with the help of some relationship with some conditioning factor. Accordingly, although the relationship with the conditioning factor is not the idea sought to be imparted, still from the reference to the superior and inferior Brahman the doubt may arise that the knowledge refers to either of the two ... although *Brahman is one*, It is spoken of in the Upanis.ad as either to be meditated on or known (respectively) with or without the help of Its relation with the limiting adjuncts. (Gambhirananda 2011, pp. 62–64, emphasis added)

Instead of focusing on the unreal nature of *upadhis ¯* , let us look at what Sa´ mkara is trying to say in ˙ its totality, and in context. Firstly, he clearly says that *brahman* is one; that is, whatever is appearing as *sagun. a brahman* is nothing else but *nirgun. a brahman* in a particular form. In essence, *brahman* is *nirgun. a*; when it manifests itself, it takes a form—this form (including the *upadhis ¯* ) is unreal, but the substance itself is not unreal, because the substance is none other than *brahman* itself. Elsewhere, Sa´ mkara ˙ gives full legitimacy to both the 'higher' and 'lower' *brahman*, which are in reality only one. *Mund. aka Upanis. ad* II.ii.8 says: "When that Self, which is both the high and the low, is realized, the knot of the heart gets untied, all doubts become solved, and all one's actions become dissipated" (pp. 131–32). Here, one is talking of the Self that is both high and low (*paravare ¯* ). Sa´ mkara's commentary on this ˙ part says: "when that One, the omniscient and transcendent—who is both *para*, the high, as the cause, and *avara*, the low, as the effect—is seen directly as 'I am this'"; it is then that all this happens (the knot of the heart gets untied, doubts are quenched etc.) (Gambhirananda 2012, p. 132).

Secondly, in his *Brahmasutrabh ¯ a¯s.ya* I.i.11, Sa´ mkara is also referring to a gradation of minds and ˙ a state of ignorance, as opposed to a state of knowledge. This is about differences in levels of consciousness. The gradation of minds leading to a difference in the perception of the *sagun. a brahman* clearly indicates that even *sagun. a brahman* is perceived differently by different aspirants. The state of ignorance that Sa´ mkara refers to is the state before God-realization. We will have the occasion to return ˙ to these issues in the following discussion on Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a.

Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's core teachings are clearly Vedantic (not in an exclusive sense though), and are ¯ especially similar to those articulated in the Upanis.ads, which are also based on the spiritual experiences of the *r.s.is*. As mentioned in the scriptures, he too said that one cannot describe *brahman* in words; *brahman* can only be described in terms of *tat.astha laks.an. a*; for example, Ghos.apall¯ı can only be described as being situated by the bank of the Ganga ( ¯ Gupta 1990, p. 582). *Nirgun. a brahman* is beyond description, because description entails the use of adjuncts which are limiting, and *brahman* is, in essence, infinite. He says: "What Brahman is cannot be described. Even he who knows It cannot talk about It. There is a saying that a boat, once reaching the 'black waters' of the ocean, cannot come back." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 268) He also gives his well-known analogy of the salt doll which went to measure the sea and never came back, because salt got dissolved into the sea (Gupta 1990, p. 53). In other words, after *saks. atk ¯ ara ¯* (in *samadhi ¯* ), who is left to describe *brahman*? What exactly happens in *samadhi ¯* ? Referring to the *saptabhumi ¯* (seven planes of existence) as mentioned in the Veda, Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a says that *samadhi ¯* occurs in the seventh plane, where the mind is annihilated (*maner na´¯sa*) (Gupta 1990, p. 136). The mind, according to Vedanta, is subtle body, that is, finite matter. In ¯ *samadhi ¯* , this finite mind gets dissolved. What exactly happens in *samadhi ¯* cannot be described in words (Gupta 1990, p. 136). The very instrument by which to describe it—that is, the mind—is itself annihilated. In the state of *samadhi ¯* , body-consciousness (*dehabuddhi*) disappears, and so does the perception of multiplicity (*nan¯ a jñ ¯ ana ¯* ) (Gupta 1990, p. 249).

Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a says elsewhere:

As long as a man analyses with the mind, he cannot reach the Absolute. As long as you reason with your mind, you have no way of getting rid of the universe and the objects of the senses—form, taste, smell, touch, and sound. When reasoning stops, you attain the Knowledge of Brahman. Atman cannot be realized through this mind; ¯ Atman is realized ¯ through Atman alone. Pure Mind ( ¯ *suddha mana ´* ), Pure Buddhi (*suddha buddhi ´* ), Pure Atman ¯ (*suddha ´ atm¯ a¯*)—all these are one and the same. (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 802)

He is in effect saying the following: firstly, the mind is not the instrument for the realization of *brahman*, because the mind perceives objects, and *brahman* is not an object (refer to the discussion in Section 2, above). Secondly, *atman ¯* can only be realized through *atman ¯* . This is an Upanis.adic teaching (see Section 2). He mentions elsewhere that the *r.s.is* of yore had the *saks. atk ¯ ara ¯* of *suddha ´ atm¯ a¯* through the *suddha ´ atm¯ a¯* (Gupta 1990, p. 897), and again, that the *r.s.is* had the *saks.atk ¯ ara ¯* of *caitanya* (pure consciousness) through *caitanya* (Gupta 1990, p. 889). Thirdly, he is saying that *suddha mana ´* , *suddha buddhi ´* and *suddha ´ atm¯ a¯* are the same thing. The ordinary mind is impure (due to the presence of desires) and finite; it cannot be the same as *atman ¯* . It is only when this mind undergoes a particular kind of transformation through purification that it can be said to be the same as *atman ¯* . Fourthly, *atman ¯* cannot be known through the ordinary mind, but it is accessible to the pure mind: the Infinite cannot be known through this mind, but it can be known through the pure mind (Gupta 1990, p. 889). Elsewhere, Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a says: "God is realized as soon as the mind becomes free from attachment [*asakti´ ¯ sunya ¯* ]. Whatever appears in the Pure Mind is the voice of God ... because there is nothing pure but God." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 178). Therefore, fifthly, whatever occurs in the purified mind is the voice of God, because God is the only pure entity in this world. By implication, this means that, after God-realization, one's embodied I-consciousness disappears; what remains is only the reality of God. Lastly, a mind that is free from desire and its resultant attachment is the pure mind.

Now, let us turn to the other aspect—which is '*ami ¯* ', that is, embodied or subjective I-consciousness. In ordinary contexts, Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a advises common people to adopt the attitude of *bhakti* and retain the I-consciousness of a devotee, child or servant of God, because it is very difficult to get rid of this I-consciousness, especially for ordinary people in the *kali yuga,* where materialism is naturally heightened. When he speaks of I-consciousness in the context of *vijñan¯ ¯ıs*, he is speaking about the same thing in a different context. In such instances, he says that if the body remains after *samadhi ¯* , the *vijñan¯ ¯ı* has to live with something, so he lives by adopting a particular or a variety of *bhavas ¯* (attitudes) towards God: *bhakter ami ¯* (the I of the devotee), *bidyar¯ ami ¯* (the I of knowledge), *balaker ¯ ami ¯* (the I of a child), *dasa- ¯ ami ¯* (the I of a servant vis-à-vis God as the master), or *rasika-ami ¯* (the I of an enjoyer of God) (Gupta 1990, p. 870). He explains:

Why does such a lover of God retain the 'ego of Devotion'? There is a reason. The ego cannot be got rid of; so let the rascal remain as the servant of God, the devotee of God. You may reason a thousand times, but you cannot get rid of the ego. The ego is like a pitcher, and Brahman like the ocean—an infinite expanse of water on all sides. The pitcher is set in this ocean. The water is both inside and out; the water is everywhere; yet the pitcher remains. Now, this pitcher is the 'ego of the devotee'. As long as the ego remains, 'you' and 'I' remain, and there also remains the feeling, 'O God, Thou art the Lord and I am Thy devotee; Thou art the Master and I am Thy servant.' You may reason a million times, but you cannot get rid of it. But it is different if there is no pitcher." (Nikhilananda 1942, pp. 708–9)

Elsewhere, he gives this important analogy: "Water appears to be divided into two parts if one puts a stick across it. But in reality there is only one water. It appears as two on account of the stick. This 'I' is the stick. Remove the stick and there remains only one water as before." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 170)

The I-consciousness, in the ordinary context, refers to the I-consciousness before God-realization. This is what Sa´ mkara refers to as the 'state of ignorance' (see above). On the other hand, the case of ˙

the *vijñan¯ ¯ı* refers to the I-consciosuness after God-realization. Sa´ mkara has an equalivalent concept in ˙ the *j¯ıvanmukta*. This is a well-known Advaita Vedantic concept. Ayon Maharaj equates the dry ¯ *jñani ¯* with a Sa´ mkara Advaitin ( ˙ Maharaj 2018, p. 39). What about the *j¯ıvanmukta* then? Does the *j¯ıvanmukta* not perceive immanence of God? If we consider the case of the *j¯ıvanmukta*, we shall see that, in this framework, *nirvikalpa samadhi ¯* is not the last word, it is not the *final* stage; it is simply the method through which to reach *advaita brahmajñana, ¯* which enables one to perceive God in everything. It would also be wrong to conceive of the *j¯ıvanmukta* in association with *nirgun. a brahman* alone. One may refer to *J¯ıvanmuktanandalahari ¯* verse 7, which clearly states that the *j¯ıvanmukta,* at times, chants the name of *Sakti ´* , at times that of Siva, at times that of Vis ´ .n. u, at times that of Gan. apati, and so on.

Coming back to the issue of the two kinds of I-consciousness, it should be noted that these are clearly two different states. It is necessary to mention that, in *bhakti yoga*, the process is two-way. Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a clearly says that 'I am devotee, you are God', 'I am your servant, you are my master'—these are attitudes towards the divine by the adoption of which one attains God. Again, after attaining God, one cultivates similar attitudes towards God (Gupta 1990, p. 138). Secondly, the 'I' of a *vijñan¯ ¯ı* after God-realization is different from the ordinary I-consciousness. The latter is a materialist 'I', embroiled in attachment to *sams˙ ara ¯* ; whereas the *vijñan¯ ¯ı* only has the form of an 'I', it is in effect insubstantial, and has undergone a complete transformation. After coming into contact with the philosopher's stone, the sword becomes a golden sword—only the form remains that of a sword, but it is not possible to cut anything with that sword anymore (Gupta 1990, p. 138). Only a mark of 'I' remains (*ahamk˙ arer ¯ dagam ¯ atra th ¯ ake ¯* ) (Gupta 1990, p. 138). When one has seen God, his/her entire being is transformed after that experience.

The only state in which I-consciousness is absolutely erased is *jad. asamadhi ¯* (even in *cetansamadhi ¯* or *bhavasam ¯ adhi ¯* , a little bit of 'I' remains so that God can be 'enjoyed'). When asked if the "I of the devotee" never goes, Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a replied:

Yes, it disappears at times. Then one attains the Knowledge of Brahman and goes into samadhi. I too lose it, but not for all the time. In the musical scale there are seven notes: s ¯ a, ¯ re, ga, m¯ a, p ¯ a, dh ¯ a, and ni. But one cannot keep one's voice on 'ni' a long time. One must ¯ bring it down again to the lower notes. (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 481)

The reason for discussing I-consciosuness is that it is really this that makes all the difference. In the state of *samadhi ¯* , where there is no I-consciosuness, there is no world either, and no attribute of *brahman*. Either one leaves the body after this experience, or one comes back. Now, if one comes back, one again enters the field of I-consciousness. So, again, one has to come back to the domain of name and form (*namar ¯ upa ¯* ), and attributes of God. On the other hand, since this is a transformed I-consciousness, it enables one to see God as being immanent in this world. We have available from Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a's own words the description of such an experience:

Kacha<sup>5</sup> had been immersed in nirvikalpa samadhi. When his mind was coming down to the ¯ relative plane, someone asked him, 'What do you see now?' Kacha replied: 'I see that the universe is soaked, as it were, in God [*jagat jena tante jare rayeche ¯* ]. Everything is filled with God. It is God alone who has become all that I see. I do not know what to accept and what to reject.'" (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 851)

This is the perception of a *vijñan¯ ¯ı*. Thus, Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's definitive position was the following: " ... one should realize both the Nitya and the L¯ıla and then live in the world as the servant of God. ¯ Hanuman saw both the Personal God and the formless Reality. He then lived as a devotee of God, ¯ as His servant." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 851).

Therefore, the difference in the attitude towards the Divine—even in the case of the same person—is owing to the difference in the levels of consciousness. This is the real meaning of the different states

<sup>5</sup> An ancient sage, son of Br.haspati.

of consciousness, as expressed in the analogies of Prahlada and Hanum ¯ ana. When Prahl ¯ ada had ¯ *tattvajñana ¯* , he would be in the state of '*soham*' ('I am He'); when he had *dehabuddhi*, he would have the attitude of 'I am your servant' towards God (Gupta 1990, p. 983). Again, "Once Rama asked Hanuman, 'How do you look on Me?' And Hanuman replied: 'O Rama, as long as I have the feeling of 'I', I see that Thou art the whole and I am a part; Thou art the Master and I am Thy servant. But when, O Rama, I have the knowledge of Truth, then I realize that Thou art I, and I am Thou.'" (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 105) Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a also explains his own case:

But, my dear sir, I am in a peculiar state of mind. My mind constantly descends from the Absolute to the Relative, and again ascends from the Relative to the Absolute ... The manifold has come from the One alone, the Relative from the Absolute. There is a state of consciousness where the many disappears, and the One, as well; for the many must exist as long as the One exists. Brahman is without comparison ... Again, when God changes the state of my mind, when He brings my mind down to the plane of the Relative, I perceive that it is He who has become all these—the Creator, maya, the living beings, and the universe. Again, sometimes he shows me that He has created the universe and all living beings. He is the Master, and the universe His garden. (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 307)

Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a says elsewhere:

You see, in one form He is the Absolute [*nitya*] and in another He is the Relative [*l¯ıla¯*]. What does Vedanta teach? Brahman alone is real and the world illusory. Isn't that so? But as ¯ long as God keeps the 'ego of a devotee' [*bhakter ami ¯* ] in a man, the Relative is also real. When He completely effaces the ego, then what *is* remains. That cannot be described by the tongue. But as long as God keeps the ego [*ami ¯* ], one must accept all. (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 801)

Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a repeatedly gives the caveat: " ... as long as 'I-consciousness' [*ahambuddhi*] remains, one cannot but feel that it is God Himself who has become everything." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 652). Again: "So long as 'I-consciosuness' exists, a man cannot go beyond the Relative." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 851). *Ahambuddhi* goes only in *samadhi ¯* . Now, how many people can go into *samadhi ¯* , and how many can continue to stay in *samadhi ¯* ? Thus, the one who has had God-realization and those who haven't all have to accept the play of *sakti ´* as real. Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a explains:

The jnanis, who adhere to the non-dualistic philosophy of Ved ¯ anta, say that the acts of ¯ creation, preservation, and destruction, the universe itself and all its living beings, are the manifestations of Sakti ´ 6, the Divine Power. If you reason it out, you will realize that all these are as illusory as a dream. Brahman alone is the Reality, and all else is unreal. Even this very Sakti is unsubstantial, like a dream. But though you reason all your life, unless ´ you are established in samadhi, you cannot go beyond the jurisdiction of ¯ Sakti [ ´ *saktir el ´ ak¯ a¯*]. Even when you say, 'I am meditating', or 'I am contemplating', still you are moving in the realm of Sakti, within Its power. ( ´ Nikhilananda 1942, p. 134)

The very next statement is "Thus Brahman and Sakti are identical. If you accept the one, you must ´ accept the other. It is like fire and its power to burn." Therefore, we see two things. Firstly, he simply shows that, with the singular exception of the state of *samadhi ¯* , we are—all the time—operating within the jurisdiction of *Sakti ´* . So long as that is the case, how can we say *sakti ´* is unreal? Secondly, *brahman* and *sakti ´* are not two different entities—they cannot be—even according to Advaita, because that being the case would negate the *ekamadvitiyam* quality of *brahman*. That would, in fact, come close to Sa¯mkhya philosophy, positing the separate entities of ˙ *purus. a* and *prakr.ti*, and no longer remain within the scope of Vedanta. If we add up these two points, what we get is: there is only one Reality, ¯ *brahman*,

<sup>6</sup> The Vedantins call it *may¯ a¯*.

which—when it becomes active in play—we call *sakti ´* , and unless we reach this *brahman* in the state of *samadhi ¯* , we are always operating within the domain of *sakti ´* .

One more point before we move to our conclusion. Let us consider this dialogue from the *Katham¯ r.ta*:

[Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a]: Each ego may be likened to a pot. Suppose there are ten pots filled with water, and the sun is reflected in them. How many suns do you see?

A Devotee: Ten reflections. Besides, there certainly exists the real sun.

Master [Sr´ ¯ı Ramakr ¯ .s.n. a]: Suppose you break one pot. How many suns do you see now?

Devotee: Nine reflected suns. But there certainly exists the real sun.

Master: All right. Suppose you break nine pots. How many suns do you see now?

Devotee: One reflected sun. But there certainly exists the real sun.

Master (*to Girish*): What remains when the last pot is broken?

Girish: That real sun, sir.

Master: No. What remains cannot be described. What *is* remains. How will you know there is a real sun unless there is a reflected sun? (Nikhilananda 1942, pp. 776–77)

What is the purpose of this analogy? It is always with reference to the Relative that we speak about the Absolute as being real and the Relative itself as being unreal. However, in a state where the Relative ceases to exist (in *samadhi ¯* , for instance), there exists only one indescribable entity. Then, with reference to what should we say that it is the opposite of unreal? The Absolute also needs the Relative in order to be deemed as Absolute; where there is no Relative, there is only one Existence, and neither a real Absolute nor an unreal Relative. This is also what was meant in the quotation above: "There is a state of consciousness where the many disappears, and the One, as well; for the many must exist as long as the One exists." (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 307).

Thus, we clearly see that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a repeatedly refers to different states of consciousness while explaining the difference in attitude towards the Divine. As was rightly pointed out by Chatterjee (1963), this is precisely how he harmonized the various strands within Vedanta, that is, by showing the proper ¯ place of each idea, and by providing an explanation for the differences. This may be called Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's original contribution to Vedanta. The concept of ¯ *vijñana, ¯* too, is remarkable, but it is possible to trace the precedents of this concept (for instance, *j¯ıvanmukti*) and, more importantly, actual examples. It should be noted that most of the examples of *vijñan¯ ¯ıs* that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a himself gave are really from long, long ago. As such, it may be surmised that the experience and the practice already existed: he simply gave them a name and an explanation.

Secondly, he also showed that—so long as one has I-consciousness—one is operating within the jurisdiction of *sakti ´* , and has to accept *sakti ´* as real. On the other hand, in the state of *samadhi ¯* , which is the only state in which the I-consciosuness disappears, there is neither One nor many. I do not claim that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a was exclusively an Advaitin. He accepted all of the different views within Vedanta. He was grounded in the spiritual experience of ¯ *advaita* or non-dual consciousness as it is obtained in the state of *nirvikalpa samadhi ¯* , but that is not the only state in which he remained—he moved effortlessly from *l¯ıla¯* to *nitya* and back. However, I argue, it is possible that Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. <sup>a</sup> comes closer to Sa´ mkara than most scholars are willing to concede. Their ideas may not be ˙ *absolutely* identical, but there seems to be greater correspondence than is usually acknowledged owing to a partial understanding of Sa´ mkara. It is possible to argue that the di ˙ fference between Sa´ mkara and ˙ Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a is one of emphasis. Sa´ mkara's focus seems to be more on the transcendental aspect of ˙ *brahman*, and this could be owing to his historical circumstances. However, he never denies immanence. We saw above that, in his commentary on the *¯I´sa Upani ¯ s. ad*, he says "He, the all, becomes by Himself all that He transcends." In other words, transcendence and immanence, Absolute and Relative—we cannot think of one without thinking of the other. Transcendence implies immanence; otherwise, it would indicate two realities—one that transcends and another that is transcended. Coming back to

Sa´ mkara, he himself was an ˙ *¯ı´svarakot.i* who had come back from *nirvikalpa samadhi ¯* . The same Sa´ mkara ˙ who was the Advaita Vedantin commentator on the ¯ *prasthana traya ¯* was also the organizer of the Hindu religion on the ground, and is believed to have himself installed the *sr´ ¯ı cakra* at Devi Kam¯ ak¯ s.i's feet in the Kam¯ ak¯ s.i temple in Kanchipuram. Sa´ mkara himself was a great harmonizer of many apparently ˙ contradictory elements within Hinduism. It may not be far-fetched to argue that we, in fact, need a better assessment of Sa´ mkara now—a better assessment of his contribution to the development of ˙ Hinduism, as well as a better understanding of his philosophy. It is possible to do the latter especially in the light of Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings, rather than the common approach which is vice versa (that is, interpreting Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a with reference to Sa´ mkara), because R ˙ amak ¯ r.s.n. a's explanations shed invaluable light on all of the ideas that preceded his.

#### **5. Conclusions**

The following observations may thus be made in conclusion. Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's ideas are clearly Vedantic, as it would be possible to show through a comparison of his teachings and the key Ved ¯ antic ¯ ideas elaborated above. Firstly, as is found in the Upanis.ads, he accepted the transcendent–immanent one-without-a-second Reality which cannot be known through the ordinary mind. Secondly, while it has been generally accepted that Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a's teachings are aligned with those of the Upanis.ads, many scholars think his ideas are different from those of Sa´ mkara. However, it was shown above that ˙ they are not as different from each other as is generally believed. Thirdly, Sr´ ¯ı Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a was grounded in the experience of *advaita* or non-dual consciousness, but he accepted all other states of consciousness vis-à-vis the Divine as equally true; as such, he found the doctrines of the competing philosophical schools of Vedanta acceptable. He harmonized these mutually-conflicting statements in the light of ¯ the fact of different states of consciousness. Finally, recognizing this idea of differences in states of consciousness is crucial not only for understanding this harmonization, but also for understanding his complete position regarding the nature of *sakti ´* . According to Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a, so long as one is within the realm of I-consciousness, one is within the scope of *sakti, ´* and cannot consider it to be unreal. This *sakti ´* is non-different from *brahman*. Hence, the same Reality which the Upanis.ads call *brahman*, Ramak ¯ r.s.n. a endearingly called Kal¯ ¯ı.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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