**3. Hypotheses' Development**

Hayward and Hambrick (1997) used intermediary indicators of hubris, which captured a variety of presumed circumstantial and personality aspects, demonstrating the crucial need for a psychometrically grounded and approved construct for studying the extraordinary self-confidence in executives. Later, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) considered hyper-CSE to precisely measure that construct; the upper limit of CSE may be considered as an accurately certified 'hubris factor'. In sum, analysis on the conceptually comparable ideas of executive narcissism and hubris led our understanding of high-CSE executives. Especially, a significant level of CSE may precisely coincide to what is colloquially pointed out as hubris. Hubris, or hyper-CSE, has a grea<sup>t</sup> connection with intuitive thinking, as advanced by Claxton et al. (2015) who claimed that hubristic leadership is usually connected with intuition.

Jordan et al. (2007) examined both intuition and the correlation between tacit and explicit self-esteem, one of the four fundamentals of CE, testing whether the grasped e ffectiveness of the intuition increases the congruity between tacit and explicit self-esteem. It appeared that individuals who persistently consider their instinct as predominant are more inclined to tacit and explicit self-esteem. Contrarily, individuals with moderately intuitive thinking inclination had a negative correlation between tacit and explicit self-esteem, proposing that they may overcorrect their explicit self-views. Translating the above mentioned at the collective level:

### **Hypothesis 1.** *Teams with high CSE are more intuitive compared to teams with low and average CSE.*

Kramer et al. (1993) explored the influence of motivational and emotional mechanism on negotiator judgment. They considered whether positive disposition and the inspiration to preserve high self-esteem lead the negotiator to be overconfident and to make excessively positive self-evaluation. A research test using dyadic bargaining was organized to test this hypothesis and outcomes supported Kramer's forecasts that high self-esteem and positive attitude influenced negotiators' determination and confidence preceding to negotiations, as well as their post-negotiation assessments of conduct. Similarly, Baumeister et al. (1993) analyzed the inclination for individuals with high self-esteem to judge themselves about their ability to make commitments; it resulted that subjects with a high level of self-esteem end up setting inappropriate, risky goals that were beyond their capabilities, so they finished with smaller rewards than subjects with low self-esteem. Yet, Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) analyzed whether Venture Capitalists (VCs) are victims of overconfidence when evaluating firms' potential, as well as the elements surrounding the choice that lead to overconfidence. The outcomes of their experiment demonstrated that VCs are undoubtedly overconfident (96% of the 51 VCs showed a critical level of overconfidence), which negatively influences VC's decision e fficiency. In particular, they found that when VCs are familiar with decision-making processes, such as the evaluation of venture success, and the structure of the data included that choice, they resort to automatic information processing; they rely on limited information, leading them to fall victim to overconfidence. This has also been developed by a few later articles on the relationship of General Managers' dispositions and their capacity to carry on sustainability practices; specifically, Abatecola and Cristofaro (2019) demonstrated, through a literature review, that CEOs with large CSE are mostly certain in their analysis in carrying out unsustainable business practices. Translating the above mentioned at the collective level:

**Hypothesis 2.** *Teams with high CSE are more inclined to be victims of the overconfidence bias compared to teams with low and average CSE.*

As already mentioned, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) found that a high level of CSE is close with what is routinely called "hubris". They have also explored the connections between executive distinctiveness and factors of organizational technique, structure, and execution; from that, they anticipate that hyper-CSE managers will display this characteristic in their work attitude. They state that executives with large CSE are beyond any questioning of their skills, and they consider significantly that the application of their competences will bring positive outcomes. CEs outlined that people who are extraordinarily beyond any doubt in their claim abilities, and make continued effort over time towards their targets, are persuaded to ge<sup>t</sup> compelling results in their career by picking up essential compensations and important roles in society. Yet, the link between CSE and performance has also been proved to work when judging candidates for job vacancies. In particular, Cristofaro (2017b) found, through a laboratory experiment involving personnel selection executives, that candidates who are perceived to have high CSE are also those that will achieve grea<sup>t</sup> performance; in contrast to low CSE candidates that are perceived as low performers. Translating the above mentioned at the collective level:

**Hypothesis 3.** *Teams with high CSE reach higher positive performance compared to teams with low and average CSE.*
