**7. Conclusions**

In this paper, we examined the challenges associated with autonomy-enhancing technology used in a military context, particularly a soldier's right to say no to these types of technologies. Some parallels can be drawn between enhancements used in the military and similar interventions used in medical or therapeutic contexts. However, we propose that the *nature, purpose, and context* of the enhancements used in the military raise special concerns regarding the impact on individual autonomy, informed consent, and the ability to say no to such enhancements.

Examination of current technologies indicated that the nature and function of the technologies require further evidence to ascertain that, as a blanket rule, autonomy would be enhanced to the extent that it would override a soldier's right to autonomy and informed consent rule. In addition, challenges to obtaining informed consent become more complex when in a military context. We propose that soldiers can be considered an especially vulnerable group due to contextual elements that highlight institutional and di fferential vulnerability. A system in which power imbalances are formalised in authority relationships and hierarchical command structures, where a higher priority is given to the success of the operations and safety of the unit as a whole over individual rights, could impact a soldier's ability to refuse an enhancement that is considered to be beneficial to the very aspects considered a higher priority. Further to this, the lack of individual privacy that would otherwise be a fforded to civilians (in a medical context) could also diminish a soldier's capacity to say no to an enhancement.

Looking at possible situations that could compel a soldier to accept enhancements, we examined the argumen<sup>t</sup> where soldiers potentially owe it to themselves to accept an intervention that could benefit them in the future. Unpacking the concepts of numeric identity and potentially denying one's future self from a benefit, we propose that the current enhancements and the benefits they o ffer at this stage are unlikely to enhance a soldier to the extent that the rights of their future self takes precedence over their current self.

Another scenario in which a soldier may be compelled to accept an enhancement is the possibility of making better moral decisions. In this case, we propose that soldiers, by the nature of their work in making life and death decisions, could possibly be compelled to accept an enhancement if it is *certain* that said enhancement would guarantee a better *moral* outcome in line with *jus in bello* and Laws

<sup>15</sup> We are thinking here of a parallel argumen<sup>t</sup> that remote weapons like drones should be used if, all other things being equal, these remote weapons reduce risk to one's own soldiers [70].

Of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This is not a blanket claim to all enhancements, but to those that only produce a better moral decision and a better moral outcome. However, even in this scenario, potential side e ffects of the enhancement and likelihoods of outcomes need to be taken into consideration. Even then, it does not warrant an override of autonomy and informed consent, but rather a need to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect soldiers' rights even if they are compelled to accept such enhancements.

Finally, we looked at the argumen<sup>t</sup> that claims that soldiers sign up to follow orders when they join the military; hence, they have foreknowledge that they are committing to a job that comes with certain risks and sacrifices. Considering the focus of this paper—the question of whether a soldier can say no to an autonomy-enhancing technology, provided that the technology is non-invasive, not permanent, and explicitly used to enhance a person's decision-making capacity—we propose that a soldier could be compelled to accept said technology with their right to say no being considerably diminished. However, a caveat here is that not everyone joins the military freely, without exploitation, and with su fficient knowledge of what their roles would entail.

Whilst there are narrowly focused scenarios in which a soldier could be compelled to accept autonomy-enhancing technologies impacting their right to say no, this would need to meet the thresholds highlighted in scenarios in this paper. Even so, rights to individual autonomy and obtaining informed consent should not be forgone; rather, an understanding of the nature, purpose, and context of the use of such enhancements in the military context is warranted, as is identification of the appropriate measures that could be implemented to ensure that individual rights are not corroded. Adding to that the risks of exploitation and issues like conscription, we need to be explicit that our argumen<sup>t</sup> is one that comes with a series of important caveats and restrictions. We are not saying that a soldier loses any right to say no to an enhancement.

**Author Contributions:** Both authors contributed equally to this paper. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** Initial research for this paper was supported by the Brocher Foundation.

**Conflicts of Interest:** Sahar Latheef works for the Australian Government, Department of Defense. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect any o fficial policy or position of any agency. The authors have no other conflicts of interest.
