**1. Introduction**

The subject area of cyborgs and posthumanism has been well developed in the social sciences and humanities for many years now [1]. This has been influenced strongly by the general trend of humans to embrace technology in their everyday lives and depend on it for their existence [2,3]. At the center of the discussion is 'Homo technologicus, a symbiotic creature in which biology and technology intimately interact', with the overall effect that the end result is 'not simply "Homo sapiens plus technology", but the original Homo sapiens morphed by the addition of technology into 'a new evolutionary unit, undergoing a new kind of evolution in a new environment' [4,5].

But we must consider what, in practice, we mean by Homo technologicus. The critical element here is the concept of boundary. As has been pointed out by many researchers, e.g., [6,7], the human brain is affected by the technology around us. It develops over time to interact more efficiently with that technology. However it is perhaps somewhat flippant to sugges<sup>t</sup> [7] that we are therefore all cyborgs, even though there may well be a gradual change in our neural make up over a period as a result of the environment around us. Some have gone further and suggested that a blind man with his cane [8] is a cyborg, on the basis that the cane feeds important information to the man about his local environment. Meanwhile a pair of glasses or a hearing aid for a deaf person could be regarded in the same way. In recent years many researchers in the field of wearable computers have become self-professed cyborgs (e.g., [9,10]) whilst, in some instances, having much less interaction with the object worn than the blind man with his cane.

So we have case 1 in which the human body in its entirety remains intact whilst some form of technology is positioned close to or attached to the body for some reason as mentioned. Such a situation includes military examples: infra-red night sight incorporated into weapon sighting systems or voice controlled firing mechanisms in the helmet of a fighter pilot. This case (case 1) could also include those who use their cell phone almost constantly or perhaps even those playing games on a Tablet. It may well be that some researchers wish to define such or all people as cyborgs and it may be that the

individual brains are gradually modified due to external pressure. However the consideration is that they remain as Homo sapiens and do not come into the category of Homo technologicus. In saying this it is recognised that the technology in question may be for therapeutic purposes, for gain or benefit or it may be simply for pleasure.

On the other hand we have witnessed many intrusions of technology into the human body. As examples hip replacements and heart pacemakers are now relatively frequently encountered. They continue a trend in which technology is readily accepted as being a necessary intrusion. Each of these represent modifications intended to compensate for deficiencies [11]. Even in these instances however the establishment of conceptual limits and boundaries becomes a complex process.

The situation lands up on more difficult terrain when, rather than repairing the ineffective parts of a human body, technology is implanted to enhance normal functioning. The situation where technology is implanted into the body but not into the brain/nervous system, whether it is for therapy or enhancement, we refer to here as case 2. In "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Social Feminism in the 1980s" [12], Donna Harraway discussed these issues as the disruption of traditional categories. But why should such entities present an ethical problem?

In each case, although the individual's physical capabilities take on a different form and their abilities are possibly enhanced, their inherent mental state, their consciousness, their perception, has not been altered other than to the extent of itself concluding what the individual might be capable of accomplishing. Where the ethical dilemma appears is in the case when an individual's consciousness is modified by the merging of human and technology. Essentially it is not so much the physical enhancements or repairs that should be our cause for concern but where the nature of an individual is changed in certain ways by the linking of human and technology mental functioning. In the case of a human this means linking technology directly with the human brain or nervous system, rather than by a connection which is either external to the nervous system but internal to the body (case 2) or even one which is external to both (case 1).

Even with technology linked directly to the human brain/nervous system this can be merely for therapeutic purposes as is the situation with deep brain stimulation for Parkinson's disease [13]. This is referred to here as case 3. As a result, Homo technologicus is considered in this paper to be one in which the entity is formed by a human-technology brain/nervous system coupling in which the complete entity goes well beyond the norm in terms of Homo sapiens performance (case 4). Whilst this does refer to a relatively narrow definition with respect to all human-technology possibilities, the arguments that follow are dependent on such a definition.

Connections between technology and the human nervous system not only affect the nature of the individual, raising questions as to the meanings of 'I' and 'self' but they also directly influence autonomy. An individual Homo sapiens wearing a pair of glasses, whether they contain a computer or not, remains an autonomous entity. Meanwhile a human whose nervous system is linked directly with a computer not only puts forward their individuality for questioning but also, when the computer is part of a network or at least connected to a network, allows their autonomy to be compromised. It has to be accepted that when this is merely for therapeutic reasons (case 3) there is not, under normal circumstances, an issue. However it is when the individual is enhanced by such an arrangemen<sup>t</sup> (case 4) that is the principle subject of this paper.

The main question arising from this discourse being: when an individual's consciousness is based on a part human part technological nervous system/brain, in particular when they exhibit enhanced consciousness, will they hold to the values of Homo technologicus? These being potentially distinctly different to the values of Homo sapiens. Importantly, as a consequence, will such a Homo technologicus entity regard Homo sapiens in a Nietschian way [14], i.e., how humans presently regard cows or chimpanzees?

Some may prefer to look through philosophical pink glasses [12] and see posthumans as being "conducive to the long range survival of humans." But surely it will be those who are members

of Homo technologicus and not Homo sapiens who will make the pro-Homo sapiens, anti-Homo sapiens decisions.

In this article we look briefly at some case 2 and case 3 practical examples as much to be clear as to which entities are not included in case 4. We then investigate case 4 in detail and consider some immediate possibilities, given the capabilities of intelligent machines. Finally we consider the future for both Homo technologicus and Homo sapiens. It is not thought to be worthwhile considering case 1 in any further depth than has been done already as this is merely the case of a human holding a pen, riding a bicycle or wearing a watch, no matter how some may wish to market their research [9,10].
