Reconsidering Voting Proportionality

How many "votes" should each being get, and should there be a difference based on country of citizenship, region or nationality—or based on whether the being is enhanced or non-enhanced (and the nature of the enhancement) or some other factors? In a direct model of "one being = one vote", an enhanced human might be able to clone themselves or, as noted above, they might distribute their consciousness in multiple human and/or siliconbased embodiments. If duplication of the identity and consciousness of an enhanced human was as simple (and unlimited) as making copies of digital works or computer programs, in theory such enhanced humans could "stack" the vote count in a manner that would not be viewed as fair to the other voters, whose votes could be rendered meaningless. A version of this problem has existed to some extent for every direct or representative democratic system of governmen<sup>t</sup> with minorities whose votes would count "less" than the majority. It was the reason the U.S. Constitution established a hybrid approach (based on the House of Commons and House of Lords model of England) with the House of Representatives having a number of elected representatives for each state based roughly on the population of the state, and the Senate having a fixed number where each state had two Senators. But the model of rights and voting is a very particular model, and may not be the only appropriate model to consider, either historically or under our ethical framework of responding to the appeal of the other. We can also consider a model of responsibility toward others in voting, not just an individual (or communal) right to vote.

A group of humans operating as a hive mind or a single human with an extended consciousness that extended throughout a global network (both on land and in satellites) might well feel that communal voting was preferable for their well-being (and even for their very sanity), despite the fact that having one vote for each participant or "node" in the network might give them more votes. Operating by consensus might be tremendously valuable to them. This was the case in Canada during the period in the 1800s when Indians were briefly enfranchised before being disenfranchised. Certain tribal voters "were deeply split between the Conservative and Liberal parties that transformed the differences managed by chiefly consensus into factions competing in public electoral contests."104 Thus, it is important not to make assumptions about what another person or group would want or would think is best. They need to be involved in such decisions, to the extent possible.

Reconsidering Political Geographical Borders as Determinants for Governance

While laudable and a tremendous advance for the time it was written, Article 21 is likely too narrow for a world of enhanced humans under the ethical framework we are applying. For one thing, it is very likely limited to citizens through the reference to "his country" and it unduly preferences votes of "people" in that country, which means humans with extreme enhancements likely would not qualify. They might not be citizens of any country. The issue of geographic borders played a major impact in the American

<sup>103</sup> The concept of "ancestry" itself, while frequently used as a proxy for race in discriminatory denial of enfranchisement as discussed above, may be legitimate when used by the group itself as a key cultural, social and/or religious requirement for membership in an indigenous group. See, for example, the struggle of the Hawaiian people or *Kanaka Maoli ¯* to assert their sovereignty and right to self-determination, including the very right to define group membership at least in part based on ancestral terms. Ref. [131] at 2605 (the "OHA [Office of Hawaiian Affairs] constituted an attempt by the State of Hawaii to enable Kanaka Maoli self-determination. By rejecting this model, the [United States Supreme] Court in ¯ *Rice* demonstrated a troubling inability to understand indigenous self-governance as possible outside of federally recognized tribal governments—an oversight that continues to stifle indigenous self-governance in the U.S. territories to this day. Ultimately, as Hawaiian scholar Noelani Goodyear-Ka'opua writes, ¯ by invalidating Hawaiian-only voting for OHA trustees, *Rice* eliminated "the small measure of electoral control over resources Kanaka Maoli could ¯ collectively exercise within the settler state system.") (citations omitted).

<sup>104</sup> Ref. [8] at 35.

Revolution, as discussed above, where American Colonists felt they should be entitled to the right to vote in England as citizens. Such questions continue to be of concern.

For example, in 2018, the following question was submitted to the European Parliament, "Six EU Member States (Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom) deprive their nationals of the right to vote in national elections on account of residence abroad, on the basis of the assumption that expatriates are not affected by political decisions taken in their country of origin. These Member States also disenfranchise their nationals in European elections if they live permanently in a third country, and two of them (Ireland and the United Kingdom) even do so in respect of nationals who are resident in the EU. In some Member States (e.g., Spain and Portugal) there are insufficient or no facilities to vote from abroad, which is an obstacle to the exercise of the right to vote" [132].

Individual voting only by country or region on issues that could lead to mass extinction is problematic even in the current world because certain countries have a disproportionate impact on the global climate. In our extended ethical framework, responding to the appeal of the "other" requires consideration of the appeal of other beings regardless of where they are physically located. This is particularly evident in the case of extreme human enhancements that could allow an individual voter to "reside" in multiple countries at the same time or instantaneously change their geographic residence. We are facing catastrophic climate change impacts:

"'We're eroding the capabilities of the planet to maintain human life and life in general," said Gerardo Ceballos, an ecologist at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. The current rate of extinctions vastly exceeds those that would occur naturally. Scientists know of 543 species lost over the last 100 years, a tally that would normally take 10,000 years to accrue. 'In other words, every year over the last century we lost the same number of species typically lost in 100 years,' Dr. Ceballos said. If nothing changes, about 500 more terrestrial vertebrate species are likely to go extinct over the next two decades alone, bringing total losses equivalent to those that would have taken place naturally over 16,000 years" [133].

As it becomes clear that humans live in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, geographic borders could become largely irrelevant for votes that would impact global well-being (and potentially the very survival of humanity and other living beings).<sup>105</sup> As will be discussed below, in an ethical theory of engagement, the answers to the questions of who can vote and where they can vote, even if necessarily imperfect, require the participation of and discourse among all affected humans, enhanced and non-enhanced.

As a final example of difficult/disturbing questions that require a response in an extended ethical framework of engagement, we will consider the temporality and cadence of voting.

### Reconsidering Temporality/Cadence of Voting and Ratification of the Framework of Government

The temporality of voting itself should also be subject to review and consideration by enhanced and non-enhanced humans. Voting annually, or after a variable number (*n*) years, could be ridiculous for an enhanced human who experienced time on a different scale, such as a human whose consciousness was embodied in an extended computer network. To such a human, a calendar year might be the subjective equivalent of millennia. If such humans were in the minority, the ethical theory of engagemen<sup>t</sup> being applied in this context would require that they have a voice in the design of the voting process itself and that other humans consider their needs and desires and not dismiss them. And if such humans became dominant in terms of wealth, numbers and political power, it would still be necessary to listen to and respect the wishes of humans without such

<sup>105</sup> An additional concern about using geographic borders to determine voting rights is that such borders too often reflect a legacy of violent appropriation of lands and divisions in which the dispossessed lacked a meaningful voice. Ref. [134] "'They make magic lines only they can see' noted a member of the Hupacasath First Nation of British Columbia, as colonial surveyors sliced up his ancestral lands into tidy parcels, a fraction of which would become the Hupacasath's reservation."

enhancements (whether due to poverty or self-determination that they did not wish to have such enhancements).

Looking to the future with hope that we have the opportunity to do better than the past, versus resignation that we are at or past the pinnacle of our achievements as the human race, we should periodically consider what form(s) of governmen<sup>t</sup> are available for an inclusive and diverse population of enhanced and non-enhanced humans. We should take into account current and historical disparities and discrimination and future possibilities and what "voting" even means or should mean. Even if they were the best options available to date, which may or may not be true, existing approaches are inherently unreliable when we try to consider the diverse and potentially unlimited possibilities of a world of human enhancements—moderate to extreme—and current and future beings. The reason is that the approaches that were not designed with the input and participation of such diverse groups are fundamentally illegitimate under the extended ethical framework we are applying. They were largely designed by people of a certain wealth, gender, and religion in a particular country at a particular time. They may not represent the wide variety of perspectives that are needed in order to make self-determination meaningful in a design "from the ground up" versus "from the top down"—either currently or in the future, when there may be beings (enhanced humans or otherwise) who do not even exist today. The governed should be entitled to a voice in the design of the very system of governance, not just in its execution or in a retrofit—such as, in the United States example, by giving voting rights to male former slaves, then to women, then to indigenous peoples etc. while keeping the core (two-political party) system intact.<sup>106</sup> They may inherit an existing system of governmen<sup>t</sup> as a practical matter but it should not be viewed as the best option available just by virtue of its age.<sup>107</sup> Thus, a foundational question that must be addressed in responding to the appeal of the "other" is when and how the very framework of governmen<sup>t</sup> warrants re-examination and potentially a fresh ratification by the beings who are impacted by such framework. There is no easy answer to that question, but an answer that would be incorrect would be for the decision to be made only by one group of beings (whether enhanced humans or non-enhanced humans) without the input of the other.

The need to include a diverse group of "others" (whether enhanced or non-enhanced humans or other beings) in the design of governmen<sup>t</sup> and what voting as a social and legal construct "means", is not a utilitarian argumen<sup>t</sup> or a prediction about what will result from diverse participation. The end result may not be "better" under some weighing method comparing costs and benefits. For one thing, any such weighing should be inherently suspect when the person or group doing the weighing does not represent the broader group because they tend to over-value their own interests and under-value or ignore the costs to others who are not participating in the weighing. But more fundamentally, the very premise of self-determination and enfranchisement means having the ability to make decisions that at the time or in hindsight will be seen as "bad" or "wrong." This is true at the individual level as well as at the broader citizen level.

We are responsible for the rights of others, but "at the same time we cannot point to evident legitimizing grounds—and if we do, we know that they are never enough for the ethical appeal that confronts us."108 The "other" remains "radically impenetrable or inaccessible as other" and therefore "brings subjectivity into an anarchical and asymmetrical relation with his infinite and radical transcendence."<sup>109</sup> This will be true in a world of enhanced humans, as it is already true today. We deceive ourselves when we believe we

<sup>106</sup> The two-party system in the United States has led to absurd extremes of partisan gerrymandering, such as the examples shown in *Rucho v. Common Cause*, in which the Supreme Court held involved "political questions" beyond the reach of the federal courts absent an equal protection (one person, one vote) violation or racial discrimination [135].

<sup>107</sup> Dr. Ambedkar "thought of the [India] Constitution as a work in progress. Like Thomas Jefferson, he believed that unless every generation had the right to create a new constitution for itself, the earth would belong to 'the dead and not the living.'" Ref. [130] at 46 (citation omitted).

<sup>108</sup> Ref. [1] at 18.

<sup>109</sup> Ref. [1] at 19.

truly understand another human being (enhanced or non-enhanced) in the way that we understand ourselves.
