**5. Conclusions**

Even prior to the emergence of CRISPR, around 2012, philosophers and bioethicists had been discussing the ethical implications of the quest for GCE. However, most contributions in this area have focused on gene-editing and germline modification. Far less attention has been given to GCE by means of ES. Recent developments in human genomics, including the further development of GWAS and the prospect of using IVG for the generation of human gametes in the future, open up new possibilities for parents who would like to have a child with increased intelligence. In assessing the ethics of GCE, philosophers should be cautious not to rely uncritically on *our* moral intuitions, for human attitudes to human enhancement technologies and research on the genetics of human intelligence vary greatly across di fferent economic, cultural, and social landscapes, as some recent findings published by the SIENNA Project reveal. And even when our moral intuitions are supported by the best possible philosophical arguments, philosophical arguments cannot be the only source of reason in a broader societal debate on how to regulate new technologies such as CRISPR and IVG.

**Funding:** This research was funded by the Alexander-von-Humboldt-Foundation (Germany, 2018), CNPq (The National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, Brazil, 2019–2023), and FAPERJ (Research Support Foundation of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2019–2022). The author is a member of the SIENNA Project (Stakeholder-Informed Ethics for New technologies with high socio-ecoNomic and human rights impAct) funded by the European Union's H2020 research and innovation program under gran<sup>t</sup> agreemen<sup>t</sup> No 741716). This article and its contents reflect only the views of the author and does not intend to reflect those of the European Commission. The European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

**Acknowledgments:** An early draft of this paper was presented at the Philosophy Department of the University of Graz (June 2019), at the Philosophy Department of the University of Konstanz (July 2019), at the Institute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine in Zurich (September 2019), and in a workshop at University of Bochum (*New Perspectives on the Ethics of Human Enhancement*, February 2020). The author thanks the participants for their critical comments. The author also thanks Peter Stemmer (University of Konstanz) and Philipp Stehr (University of Bochum) for reading and commenting on an earlier version of the present article.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, or in the decision to publish the results.
