And

*Most of the maintenance goes abroad these days for the heavy stu*ff*. To the lower maintenance, you still have 2 or 3 engineers that are available to work on their airplanes, where in General Aviation, we generally have maybe 1 to 2 for the entire airplane. We have 25 multiple jobs happening at (any) one time*. (P\_9)

Going forward, there were also practical and operational challenges around *safety-risk and safety concerns*. An *over-modulation of safety* was attributed to tensions with the regulator and were peculiar to the GA industry, *"[the regulator has] potentially, maybe [gone] too far in some respects they've gone over what (level of safety) it has to be"* (P\_1), were perceived to leading to the development of a tauter system, where airworthiness was piece-meal and the compliance, counterproductive:

*[Aircraft owners] simply just can't a*ff*ord to repair their aircraft, so there's compromises need to be made in terms of, "Okay, we'll do these jobs this time. We'll stretch these other jobs out for another hundred hours for the next inspection," or what have you*. (P\_2)

Paradoxically, the product of this over-modulation was therefore the perceived creation of riskier situations and safety decrement leading to general lack of safety in GA:

*We're entering a very interesting time in the aviation industry, particularly in GA, where the best competent engineers are in the o*ffi*ce, o*ff *the tools, and the least competent engineers are operating hands-on on the aircraft*; (P\_2)
