*3.2. Role of the Regulator*

By way of extending on the foregoing theme, Table 4 decomposes the findings associated with the perceived *role of the regulator*, which invited much critique from participants. Most in this theme commented on *auditing and bureaucratization* where the level of auditing was considered to be *excessive*, *"rigged,"* and with results that *undermined* the safety role:

... *we get audited constantly, and you know just picking up little things like where it tool—we used a tool tag system for tool control, one of the numbers was a bit worn o*ff *on a tool tag, it then becomes an audit finding [* ... *] at the end of the day that bit of paint worn o*ff *a tool tag is not going to make an aircraft come down [* ... *] I've never seen an audit come through with a clean slate*. (P\_1)


**Table 4.** Summary of findings for the Role of the Regulator theme.

The regulator was also perceived to be too bureaucratized, where this excessive bureaucracy was viewed to eclipse work quality/safety and made work unprofitable for many in the sector:

*Paper work's always good. You have to have it but, jeez, it's gotten ridiculous now. Back in the day, you'd change a light bulb and go to the pilot, "Yep, you're good to go." I change a light bulb and now, is still takes me ten minutes to change it, but it is an hour of paperwork*. (P\_5)

*The regulatory body is less concerned about the quality of the work that the engineers are doing and more concerned about the paperwork that they're producing*. (P\_4)

In many ways, these perspectives resonate with notions of a general bureaucratization of safety and bureaucratic accountability, which have gained force in recent years, and refer to the types of activities that are expected of organization members which account for the safety performance of those they are responsible for [30].

*A lack of clarity and support* from the regulator were also shared, with some participants highlighting perceived deficiencies around the regulator's responsibility, level of experience and understanding, and its provision of information:

... *recently, we had three airworthiness inspectors [from the regulator] turn out at a local airfield. They spent three days going over a flying school. They called up the LAME, and they were standing there with a fistful of papers saying, "Blah blah blah blah blah blah blah. You've done wrong. You've done wrong." The [LAME] turned around and said, "Well, actually no, what you're citing as a reference isn't applicable, because that's for an airline. These aircraft are a lesser weight"*. (P\_10)

*It's a lack of education. It's like when I registered the aircraft in my name, or put my name down as a registered operator, did I get a leaflet from [the regulator] saying, "as the registered operator you are required to bang, bang, bang?" I think there's a misunderstanding in the industry, particularly in the private aircraft sector of who holds responsibility and what those people are required to do [* ... *] It's law you should know it. I personally think there should be some onus on CASA too, you're the registered operator of this aircraft*. (P\_4)

There was some uncertainty about the regulator's overall role, and feelings that regulation kept changing, *"A few of the dramas we have is that it's just the changing regulations. It's hard to keep up with all of that"* (P\_9). Concerns were also shared about little to no oversight from the regulator on certification and engineering standards:

*I have a lot of concerns, not only about the engine. I have a lot of concerns about, first of all, the certification of the aircraft, I have a lot of concerns about the engineering of the aircraft, the standards of the engineers. How they check the engineering standards, there was no oversight happening from [the regulator] at all*. (P\_4)

In a stark contrast to the overall growth in safety culture construed by the previous theme, the regulator itself was suggested to be contributing to the generation of a *negative safety climate*, particularly around compliance on issues that were viewed to not be safety-related:

*[The regulator] impacts the industry because [maintenance engineers] will then do things that they shouldn't do. They know [what to do] they've done it that way for years. They know that it isn't a safety case, it's more a compliance issue, but they just do it because they've done it that way for years. Then, the regulator comes in and smacks them down, so then they don't do it. That increases the cost. It increases the time. People don't want to own aircraft. They sell aircraft, so we see these gradually diminishing infrastructure and system that shouldn't need to be that way [* ... *] we have a regulator who sees it's better to regulate than to educate and to assist*. (P\_10)

Central to perceptions of mixed-messaging and excessive regulatory oversight were notions that *regulation* had *turned into a profiteering exercise* and paid advertising service:

*It's this regulatory oversight that's happening on everything all the time. Every time I pick up the phone and talk to [the regulator] they want to send a bill, so the government funded safety authority, that is also funded out of the levy that is put on fuel. Yet every time I do something, they want to charge me for it. I'm not sure how all of that works, are they double dipping? Are they now a profit center for the government? Yet they [are] supposed to be the safety authority [* ... *] at the moment it's as the authority and the regulator aren't telling you "you need to do this", [they are saying that] to do that you need to come to us and when you come to us we're going to charge you*. (P\_4)

This was accompanied by views that the regulator had negated its responsibility, created concerns, and ultimately, feelings of *no confidence* in the regulator for many:

*I've worked on the spinners with guys that were too lazy to do their LAME license. They were more than happy for me to sign for their work. Those people are now [working in the regulator o*ffi*ce], in regulatory roles, enforcing rules that they really don't have the privilege to [enforce]*. (P\_10)

### *3.3. (Re)calibration of Underlying Values and Philosophies*

Table 5 decomposes the findings associated with perceived *(re)calibration of underlying values and philosophies*. A large representation of this theme was within a subtheme highlighting that staff were now *working to live, not living to work* (i.e., working to survive rather than feeling highly motivated or enthusiastic to work). *Engineers* had purportedly *now become business managers*, *"There is no getting away, if you take on the role of chief engineer you're taking on a life of paperwork"* (P\_4)—a perspective that was ascribed various feeling and behaviours, including: no joy around administration, *"I don't particularly enjoy the days I'm sitting in an o*ffi*ce all day and trying to deal with issues with customers and trying to look after all the sta*ff *on the shop floor"* (P\_9); pre-occupation with non-skill-related activities and office work, *"those with the most skills and abilities and experience, rightly or wrongly, are ending up driving the o*ffi*ce and shu*ffl*ing the paperwork"* (P\_2), and dispassionate and distracted ways of work.

**Table 5.** Summary of findings for Calibration of Underlying Values and Philosophies theme.


These feelings were strongly advocated on the basis that maintenance work in *GA requires passion* and is more than just a job but something which should provide enjoyment, decision-making freedom and flexibility:

*Fault finding is what I love doing. I like having a customer come in and say I have a problem with this, and I go search the memory bank and you try and find a solution to it. That, to me, is the best part [* ... *] I enjoy being the chief engineer because I can make the decisions*. (P\_8)

In short, the sense of duty and responsibility to maintain the level of safety that behoves maintenance work was a by-product of real passion and enthusiasm:

*Engineers are either passionate and believe in what they're doing and want to do it the right way [* ... *] or they're tainted by the industry, they have no respect for the industry, they have no respect for what the industry is trying to achieve. Consequently, they'd rather spend more time on their telephone organizing the building of their new house, while they're charging the client*. (P\_4)

*Attitudinal stability* was a key emerging subtheme in the *(re)calibration of underlying values and philosophies*. For instance, attitudinal issues created a certain *licensing culture*; while on the one hand, it gave rise to individual accountability, on the other, it was also felt to produce arrogance:

*I've never come across such a toxic, mind state as aviation. Everyone's an expert. The only people they should listen to LAMES because they've earned their right, but anyone feels that, well, hey, I can work on a mower, I can work on an airplane. Why would I need to pay you 120 dollars, 150 dollars an hour to do something I can do myself? Then they will use commercial-grade hardware. We refer to it as "Bunnings Aerospace"*; (P\_10)

Note: "Bunnings Warehouse" is an Australian household hardware chain; and

*You, e*ff*ectively, really only start to learn when you become licensed. From that day, when you're accountable for you own action is when you actually start really learning*. (P\_10)

Attitudinal barriers were also encountered in *teamworking* and linked to attitudinal change associated with new training approaches, mismanaged expectations, and a broader "breeding" of disrespect:

*I've worked with some engineers that I've basically said, "I don't want those engineers working on my aircraft again [* ... *] I can see what they're doing, I don't like what they're doing, I don't like their attitude"*; (P\_4)

*[Trainees] have all sorts of funny preconceived ideas about what their first job's going to look like and how the industry actually is or is not*; (P\_2)

And

*The guys that come in for work experience, they've already done their one-year course and they don't want to be there. They already believe that they know more than you*. (P\_5)

Much of this was attributed to an entrenched *sense of entitlement in trainees*; this was based on a lack of respect and accountability which also made it more di fficult to trust, and therefore, provoked distrust in non-apprenticeship models of learning:

*[Trainees] have done their year course, they've paid all the money, they're ready to work on planes—and they're not*; (P\_5)

*I believe that there is no respect anymore. Kids these days, we see them coming through industry. They want to sit there with their thumbs on their phone [* ... *] There is certainly a lack of accountability amongst younger people these days. They want everything for nothing. They don't want any hard work to do it*; (P\_10)

and

*You can't put full trust in somebody straightaway as they walk in the door, but you need to trust that they can use a screwdriver or spanner properly and things like that. They don't seem to have that sort of thing when they come into the shop as an apprentice*. (P\_9)

### *3.4. Work as Imagined vs. Work as Done*

Many of the issues observed within the GA industry were thematically consigned as problems of a *Work as Imagined* vs. *Work as Done* mismatch (see Table 6), a category named after recent theoretical conceptualizations where explicit or implicit assumptions of how work should be done is di fferent to how something is actually done [31], [32]. A large category here was *theory* vs. *practical experience*, and in the true essence of this theme, illustrated some very varied perspectives of the *relevance of classroom teaching to the real-world setting*, as well as the value of *work experience*. The GA work as imagined was thought to bear little to no resemblance to work on the "shop floor". In this way, the classroom was thought to provide lower fidelity training, a lack of focus on practical work, and exams were seen to have little relevance:

*People coming from the college were a bit o*ff *with experience, and they've been working on an engine or aircraft that's in their facility, that's been pulled apart last month and put back together, whereas they come here and it's a plane that hasn't been pulled apart for ten years and everything's rusted and corroded*; (P\_7)

*Everyone that I've come across has come out without any knowledge of what we're actually doing on the floor*; (P\_8)

*When you get trained it's always this perfect picture, and then the real life. It's not so perfect. Definitely certain places have di*ff*erent methods to other places. Some I agree with, some I don't*; (P\_6)
