And

*Those that are trying to do it the right way can't a*ff*ord to stay in business, so they fall out of business. Which means that all you end up with is are those that have cut the corners and you now have an unsafe engineer environment in General Aviation. End of story*. (P\_4)

*Safety-risk and concerns* were also forecast based on a *loss of skills* within the industry, and the level of experience, *"the safety aspect [of concern] would be the experience level of the people*" (P\_8), and the notion that there will continue to be no perceived consequences for trainees:

*Back in my day, you were taught, you were given a competency, when you expressed that you knew what you were doing, you were examined and tested on that. You were then given that privilege. If you didn't know and you made a mistake, you got a thick ear. You were o*ff *your machine, you were out sweeping floors. There was a consequence for you not putting that e*ff*ort in. These days, there's no consequence*. (P\_10)

A series of problematic *workforce development* issues were also perceived to be a major practical and operational challenge going forward. An intergenerational *loss of knowledge and skills* from an ageing workforce was perceived to be a major industry a ffliction, where the acquisition of the knowledge required to identify problems was being lost:

*If I could know half of what [my Dad] knows [about aviation maintenance engineering] I'd be doing well, you know? I think there's still a bit of a concern now that there's not that much experience coming out of the schools and apprentices and stu*ff ; (P\_3)
