**5. Discussion**

#### *5.1. An Emergent Evolutionary Model of Island Waste Metabolism*

Trinidad and Tobago's current approach to waste managemen<sup>t</sup> can be described as a "top-down" or state-centric model that makes use of traditional land-filling. Reducing and recycling waste has always been a central message but has not received as much focus as disposal and treatment. If the twin-island nation is to transition to an approach that is more democratic in nature and utilizes public-private partnerships along with incentive-based regulations that seek to allow non-governmen<sup>t</sup> agencies to participate in plastics recovery and recycling, simplification of the current approach to governance as it relates to waste managemen<sup>t</sup> may be necessary. At present, there is a lack of appropriate or adequate incentives for the private sector or even citizens to participate in the recovery of plastics. In addition, while avenues for public-private partnership exists, a simplified policy landscape would make such ventures easier to pursue. Figure 7 summarizes the institutional evolution of waste in Trinidad and Tobago.

**Figure 7.** Summary of the institutional evolution of waste, particularly plastics, metabolism in Trinidad & Tobago.

We identified three temporal phases of policy evolution that have altered the waste metabolism trajectory to date: (1) governmen<sup>t</sup> led patriarchal approach of traditional landfilling combined with behavioral change campaigns to reduce, reuse and recycle, (2) to a more democratic, shared burden, public-private partnership approach combined with attempts at incentive-based regulations, (3) to the present, more private sector-led voluntary bans on production and use of plastics. The latter initiatives now have a positive feedback effect on the governmen<sup>t</sup> to promote such interventions. The figure below illustrates the three phases proposed.

In the first phase, which is approximated to the late 1980s to the late 1990s, almost sole emphasis was placed on legislative declarations, regulations, and the building of institutions to implement the legislated intents. Coercive pressure was derived from the central governmen<sup>t</sup> and targeted not only the general public but perhaps more decisively, local and municipal governments. Implementation was shared through mandates in accordance with the respective legislation. One prime piece of legislation that was designed to promote recycling, especially of beverage containers (plastics and glass) has been a 'political football' for near twenty years, with background opposition by major business and manufacturing interests. In public forums, however, both the business sector and governmen<sup>t</sup> have voiced support for getting the Bill passed but bemoan its 'considerable complexity' and the need to simplify in order to properly implement. The business sector coalesced around an unsaid position of resistance to the Bill, exerting normative group pressure on governmen<sup>t</sup> through political means, essentially diluting coercive pressures on the business sector and redirecting attention to the inefficiencies in the local governmen<sup>t</sup> waste managemen<sup>t</sup> system.

By the early to the mid-2000s, the institutional landscape, public views, and cultural norms were changing. The EMA was now fully functional and overseeing broad policy direction including waste managemen<sup>t</sup> that was being implemented by SWMCOL and others. There was increasing environmental education and awareness of the public strengthening cognitive pressure on polluters generally. This, coupled with increasing flood events at least partially attributed to refuse clogged drains as well as reports of governmen<sup>t</sup> attention related to the saturation of existing managed landfills on the island. The context of these conditions and pressures gave rise to a more informed and energized environmental advocacy sector interested in moving beyond the slow-moving governmen<sup>t</sup> bureaucracy. This ushered in a second phase of sharing the administrative burden of waste managemen<sup>t</sup> with non-governmental partners through collaborative partnerships. [58] suggests that this is often a natural progression of 'problem-solving', as evidence that the problem faced is indeed a wicked one. It is also pointed out that this route of dealing with the problem through stakeholder collaboration with stakeholders with whom power is dispersed is particularly relevant when at least part of the challenge is the behavioral change among stakeholders or the public. Partnerships, joint ventures, whole of (or joined up) government, international treaties and information campaigns to influence lifestyle choices are all variations on this strategy. More collaborations and larger ones revolved around making progress on reducing and recycling waste. The Plastikeep collaboration between the governmen<sup>t</sup> and the non-governmental sector was the largest and for nearly a decade, the most successful e ffort. However, the model was never profitable, as was intended, nor was it even self-sustaining as a business model. It could not attain financial viability without 'crutches' of governmen<sup>t</sup> aid and financial assistance. That was not the intent and by 2018 it was shuttered by governmen<sup>t</sup> despite the gains made in collecting and recycling plastics, setting up a national bin system and putting a dent in public behavior with respect to plastics collection for recycling by the public.

The public and the business sector watched on with interest at the increasingly visible successes of the Plastikeep partnership in collecting and recycling plastics. As the finances behind the success were not as visible, it was shocking to most when the governmen<sup>t</sup> e ffectively pulled out. By this time, however, the public thought they were seeing a solution in motion and would start being more conscious of their own plastics usage as well as the waste managemen<sup>t</sup> practices and reputation of the business and manufacturing sectors. The latter would pick up on the increasing coercive pressures from those that mattered to their bottom lines—the consumer public. Growing public comments and the increasingly negative press after flooding events that revealed photos of massive heaps of plastics clogging waterways questioned the legitimacy of business stalwarts as responsible societal actors. The increasing media reports of marine fauna with plastics in and on their bodies reinforced motivation by the business sector including business associations, to change the narrative, if not also their practices and waste managemen<sup>t</sup> performance. The abundant goodwill that the public seemed to have with the Plastikeep partnership was also an incentive for businesses to take action. This is where we propose that Trinidad and Tobago are entering the third phase in the waste managemen<sup>t</sup> evolution—voluntary corporate responsibility. The initiatives of Massy Group described above, provide the early prototype of such an evolution in corporate strategy, even as it starts with addressing only plastic bag usage.

The initiative is arguably driven by several factors, not the least of gauging the swirling institutional forces. Factors include the failure of the Plastikeep partnership placing the governmen<sup>t</sup> in a position again to have to pursue the Beverage Container Bill among other regulatory approaches for waste management. A voluntary e ffort by such a large conglomerate could dissuade the governmen<sup>t</sup> that pushing the legislation, which is already an uphill battle with the business sector, may not be a necessary fight. It can also be a new prong in the e ffort of corporate social and environmental responsibility that can potentially increase brand and corporate reputation value while contributing to a front-burner environmental problem that is in the public eye.

#### *5.2. Learning from the Institutional Evolution Model Observed*

If private sector firms and community-based groups are to become more involved in plastics recovery and recycling, the current policy landscape requires clarity and simplification. Not only is there no singular guiding policy that seeks to incentivize the collection and recycling of plastics, but at present, a number of ministries and state agencies have related responsibilities which could make collaboration unnecessarily complex. Stakeholders wishing to engage in collaborative projects with the governmen<sup>t</sup> first need to engage in research to ascertain the appropriate agencies to be approached in order secure the required permissions and agree upon the terms of cooperation (possibly via a Memorandum of Understanding) before project execution can commence.

In practice, therefore, state agencies must consider how to incentivize the private sector and civil society to participate or even initiate policy dialogues on matters related to waste managemen<sup>t</sup> governance. Funding has proven to be a limiting factor to NGOs to invest in infrastructure and/or in educational material and campaigns related to improving waste management. It should be noted that while the attempt to provide such a facility via the Green Fund in Trinidad and Tobago is laudable, funding mechanisms of this nature should ultimately encourage financial self-sustainability of NGOs and facilitate the participation of the private sector (particularly as beneficiaries of financial and technical resources). In addition, funding mechanisms should also support long-term partnerships between the public sector and non-governmental organizations (including private firms) on programs that aim to enhance waste managemen<sup>t</sup> governance. Certainly, if plastics metabolism and wider waste managemen<sup>t</sup> are to be strengthened within island environments, policy and funding mechanisms that support long term partnerships across di fferent sectors will be required to facilitate joint policy planning and implementation as well as large-scale execution of recycling and waste managemen<sup>t</sup> initiatives.

While there are a number of policies that relate to waste managemen<sup>t</sup> governance in Trinidad and Tobago, there is an inadequate comprehensive framework that e ffectively provides guidance for public, private, or civil society stakeholders willing to enhance the e fficient waste collection, disposal, and treatment on the island. Certainly, the absence of a clear framework also makes the formation of strong partnerships between the public and private sectors more di fficult. This is noteworthy, as partnerships between private, public, and civil society stakeholders are critical to reforming the current top-down approach to policy formulation within the twin-island republic. To add to this, an enabling policy environment is necessary to promote the participation of the private sector and civil society in the development of programs that actively engage and encourage members of the public to decrease their ecological footprints, especially as it relates to waste.

Programs aiming to introduce practical measures or infrastructure that improves the ability of the population to enhance the e fficacy of waste collection and treatment (inclusive of recycling) are likely to be equally as di fficult in the absence of clear policy support and guidance. Indeed, the ultimate collapse of the Plastikeep program that was piloted by GLN following the cessation of funding from the State, may be symptomatic of a larger problem related to waste managemen<sup>t</sup> governance. In the case of the Plastikeep, not only was the project almost entirely dependent on continuous support from the GORTT but perhaps, more importantly, there were no legislative or policy regulations that would have allowed the organization to continue the initiative or introduce a similar project in a commercially viable manner. The absence of policies to support such activities makes bottom-up approaches to waste-management, on the part of individuals, the private sector or civil society, largely untenable.
