**3. Conclusions**

The Akal Takht has undergone many transformations since its inception by Guru Hargobind. The Gurus left behind no structure or instruction on the running of the institution, so Sikhs had to figure out how to run the institution ad libitum. The Akal Takht has had periods of supreme authority and periods of absolutely no authority. It is the relationship between the caretaker of the Akal Takht and the general populace that has determined the amount of authority that the Akal Takht is able to yield.

The institution gives caretakers and leaders the means to lead; however, it is the actions of the leaders and their relation to the populace that ultimately lets them retain, gain, or lose legitimate authority. Bhai Mani Singh was able to gain legitimate authority with his ability to mediate between the Bandai Khalsa and the Tat Khalsa. Nawab Kapur Singh used his charisma and leadership skills to maintain a grip and proper reciprocal conversation and compromises in tension filled Sarbat Khalsas; although after his death, without a suitable leader, the institution no longer operated in the same way, leading to the extinction of the Sarbat Khalsa in the Sikh Confederacy and the official banning of it by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Akali Phula Singh was able to regrasp the authority of the Takht, but without the same political standing that the Takht had during the confederacy. Without an official way to appoint a leader of the Akal Takht, the leadership was, in a way, random and sporadic.

It was when the mahants took over the Darbar Sahib complex that we started to see the norms of the Khalsa being challenged in the Takht. The mahants during the British Raj held no legitimate authority over the Khalsa. The British appointed Sarbrahs were even further from the group norms, thus causing Khalsa Sikhs to organize and overthrow the sarbrah system. The establishment of the SGPC allowed for the Khalsa to take back control of the Darbar Sahib complex and all other gurdwaras, while establishing acceptable *jathedars* of the Akal Takht, once again making the institution active, and adding legal-rational legitimization to the authority. However, with the increase of the internal politics of the SGPC, the *jathedars* did not continue to hold legitimate authority among the Sikh populace.

Bhindranwale's period in the Akal Takht reestablished the Akal Takht as the militia center and made the Akal Takht the literal political center of Sikh activism and armed conflict. Although he was not the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht, his charisma in his speeches lent him more legitimized authority than the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht himself. This shows that the authority of the Akal Takht was not limited to the appointed leader of the institution. Bhindranwale had more of a sway upon the Sikh population during his time in the Akal Takht than the *jathedar* did.

During the 1986 and 2015 Sarbat Khalsa, we saw a split in the leadership of the Akal Takht for the first time, with certain Sikhs aligning with one side over another. The SGPC *jathedar* had the legal authority over gurdwaras, and many individuals and gurdwaras still choose to align themselves with the leadership appointed by the Sarbat Khalsa, showing that not even the legalities enforced by the state can impact who people choose as their legitimate authorities.

Berger, Luckman, and Merton's theories help us understand the basis of where legitimate Sikh authority is derived from, and how it has been unstable throughout time. The symbolic universe keeps the Akal Takht within the loop of the Sikh psyche, even in uncertain times when the institution of the Akal Takht stepped outside of group norms. Even at the most dire stages, the Akal Takht continued to remain a central part of the Sikh tradition due to how embedded it is within the Sikh symbolic universe. It is through Merton's theory of group norms that we are able to understand why the authority invested the Akal Takht has not stayed static, but has had a spectrum of varying statuses among the community throughout history.

This is evidence of how fluid this institution has been and continues to be. When statements in the Panth are made about Sikh Rehat Maryada being the only acceptable maryada due to its endorsement by the Akal Takht, one must reference the history of the Akal Takht. Then, the realization is made that the power of the Akal Takht is invested in the agreemen<sup>t</sup> of the majority of the populace. When there is a large portion of the Khalsa that does not agree with the Sikh Rehat Maryada, the authority of the Takht no longer exists, as the Takht has pushed beyond the group norm. Rather than blanket statements about the sanctity and the authority of the Akal Takht being made, the history of the institution must be observed.

Today, the Akal Takht represents the Sikhs across the world, but only Sikhs in Punjab have the right to vote in the SGPC elections. This causes a bigger rift between the authority of the Akal Takht being accepted by all Sikhs. When the interests of Sikhs in India and abroad do not correlate and group norms between the two groups continue to grow apart, the disconnect of the Akal Takht with the greater Sikh populace will continue to grow. This may cause the need for the SGPC and the Akal Takht to reorganize in a way that allows Sikhs in the diaspora representation in the Akal Takht and the SGPC in order to continue a proper reciprocal relationship between the institution and the people, especially as the structures of authority and legitimacy continue to change as time passes.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.
