1.1.2. Authority

Authority is the legitimate and socially approved use of power. Although the legitimacy of the institution itself has been established in the Sikh tradition, it does not necessarily establish authority over the Sikh masses, although it does help aid in it. The authority itself is held by the *jathedar*, or leader, of the Akal Takht, as the *jathedar* is the person who holds the power invested by the Akal Takht, so the legitimacy of the Akal Takht alone is not enough to provide the formal institution with authority. Unlike the pope, the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht is not considered to have godly revelations, but is simply viewed as a mouthpiece for the Khalsa, who is also subject to fallibility. The *jathedar* of the Akal Takht is the highest recognized spokesman of the Sikhs, and, with the help and cooperation of four other Sikhs, can make commands and official decisions on behalf of the Sikh *Panth.*<sup>5</sup>

Weber's three types of authority are defined as below:


Although the established legitimacy in the symbolic universe does not establish authority for the Akal Takht, it does aid in legitimizing its authority. The authority of the Akal Takht is constantly supported by traditional authority, given the fact that the Akal Takht, being an authoritative institution, is a part of the symbolic universe of the Sikhs. Its existence and God-given status go unquestioned by the Sikh body. However, the legitimization of the authority of the Akal Takht has been swayed by both charismatic authority and rational-legal authority since its inception. I will discuss the various trends of this shift in section two of this article. The addition, or lack thereof, of Weber's other types have caused the authoritativeness the Akal Takht to fluctuate throughout its history.

It is important to keep in mind the difference between authority and coercive power. Authority is when a society voluntarily allows an institution to exert power, whereas coercive power does not need the permission of society to operate and relies solely on violence to operate its power. The Akal Takht itself has not relied on coercion to assert its power over the Sikh populace.<sup>6</sup> It has relied on its own authority and the faith of the Sikh populace to maintain control. In many instances, it has also relied on the state to carry out the Akal Takht's orders and decrees. In other cases, within and outside of India, individuals have taken it upon themselves to use coercion to implement the commands of the Akal Takht. They received this inspiration as they accepted the authority of the Akal Takht. The Akal Takht itself does not dispatch forces to enact its decrees through coercion, but rather, it is self-inspired people, who have accepted the authority of the institution, who have attempted to enact the order of the Akal Takht through coercion. Instances of all of these will be found in section two of this article.

Though these factors help to provide the Akal Takht with its initial authority, this legitimized authority is sometimes pushed back upon and even delegitimized by the Sikh body. As noted earlier, authority is the legitimate and socially approved use of power. Barnard (1968, p. 168) explains that authority is not within the hands of just those in charge, nor is it in the hands of the subjects of said authority, but it is a social relationship between the two entities. This means that the authority does not lie in the hands of the leading party but in the reciprocal relationship of communication between both sides. Merton (1968, p. 394) expands on this in his analysis, illustrating that authority does not come with unconditional power, but that it must exist within the norms of the group it exists in. The authority is allowed to push the boundaries of the group norms, so long as it stays consistent with the larger collection of previously existing norms, which allows for seamless cultural evolution over time. Merton explains that when those in authoritative positions act outside of the norms of the group, the leader(s) start to lose authority among the group. This leads people to start disregarding the authority, and can even lead into larger social movements to overthrow existing authority.

Applying the above theories to the Akal Takht, the institution of the Akal Takht was legitimized into the symbolic universe of the Sikhs. This allowed for the Akal Takht to have legitimized authority among the Sikh populace in accordance to Weber's traditional authority. Throughout history, the institution of the Akal Takht has been able to leverage charismatic and rational-legal authority to strengthen the legitimacy of its authority. However, as Barnard's and Merton's theories explain, the Akal Takht must act within the group norms to retain legitimate authority. The article will cover the evolution of the Akal Takht throughout history, and the fluctuations in its relationship with the Sikh community and beyond.

#### **2. Akal Takht in History**

#### *2.1. The Akal Takht from Guru Hargobind to the Execution of Bhai Mani Singh, 1606–1738*

In 1609, shortly after establishing the Akal Takht, Guru Hargobind was arrested on the orders of Jahangir for taking on royal attire, using the Akal Takht as a royal *darbar,* and creating a Sikh militia, although the official arrest warrant was for an unpaid fine that was imposed upon Guru Arjan (G. Singh 1949, p. 38). During the Guru's imprisonment, Bhai Gurdas was given control of the Akal Takht and the militia by the Guru (B. Singh 1997). However, with the Guru still being alive, Bhai Gurdas was not given the same authority as the custodians of the Akal Takht would be given once the guruship was given to the Guru Granth Sahib. Sikhs saw Guru Hargobind as the only authority of the Akal Takht and other Sikh shrines, regardless of his absence. With the Guru captive in Gwalior, activism from the Akal Takht did not end. Baba Buddha led processional chaunkis (singing of hymns) from the Akal Takht to protest the captivity of the Guru until his release from captivity in 1612 (P. Singh 2011, p. 118).

Guru Hargobind's reign in Amritsar and in the Akal Takht did not last long. In 1630, Guru Hargobind had to leave Amritsar for Kartarpur, near Jalandhar, and later went to Kiratpur in the Himalayan Sivalik foothills due to his battles with the Mughals, as Amritsar was constantly being attacked from nearby Lahore (Mandair 2013, p. 49). During this time, the descendants of Prithi Chand<sup>7</sup> had taken over the shrines of Amritsar, including the Akal Takht. His offshoot sect stayed in control of the Akal Takht well into the eighteenth century.

It is likely that Guru Har Rai and Guru Harkrishan never visited Amritsar and spent most of their time near and around Kiratpur. In November 1669, Guru Tegh Bahadur had attempted to enter the Darbar Sahib complex after receiving the guruship, but was stopped by the followers of Prithi Chand (Dilgeer 1980, p. 30). He paid his obeisance from the outside walls and rested right outside the Akal Takht. That place is now marked by Gurdwara Thara Sahib.

It is important to keep in mind that during this period, the institution of the Akal Takht did not hold any authority over practitioners of the mainstream Sikh tradition. The Sikhs viewed authority as being completely invested by God in the Guru and followed the authority of the Guru. It was the Guru's traditional and charismatic authority over the Sikhs that held supreme. Guru Tegh Bahadur's trip to Amritsar, even when it was under the control of a rival group, shows that the space itself was still considered sacred and a part of the Sikh symbolic universe, but the authority had left the institution. Merton's theory would explain that due to the mainstream Sikh group norms being violated by the absence of the Guru or Guru-appointed leader and the Prithi Chand's sect acknowledging of someone else as the successor of Guru Nanak's guruship, the authority of the Akal Takht was no longer valid; the institution had gone leaps and bounds beyond Sikh group norms by debarring the Guru from his rightful throne.

Not much is known about the history of Amritsar during the life of Guru Gobind Singh or during Banda Singh Bahadur's period in Punjab. It is likely that the Akal Takht stayed under the control of Prithi Chand's decedents. It was not until 1721 that Mata Sundri sent Bhai Mani Singh to Amritsar to become the custodian of the Akal Takht after tensions between the Bandai Khalsa and the Tat Khalsa<sup>8</sup> were taking place in Amritsar over the caretaking of the Darbar Sahib complex. When Bhai Mani Singh came to Amritsar as the custodian of the Akal Takht, he mediated the issues between the two groups and passed a *gurmata,* or decree of the Guru, in favor of the Tat Khalsa (Johar 1977, p. 57).

Bhai Mani Singh is the first person in history who could be considered the "*jathedar*" of the Akal Takht in the mainstream Sikh tradition. Though that was not an official title given to him, he fulfilled the duties of what the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht today would do. Bhai Mani Singh was a successful mediator between two contesting groups, and this was possible due to the legitimacy and authority that he had as a leader. Putting aside whether or not everyone present considered him to be the rightful leader of the Akal Takht, especially since the dispute was between two competing groups, Bhai Mani Singh was a person who had gained some clout throughout his lifetime. The fact that he was associated with four of the Gurus; was the father of five sons who had died in battle with Guru Gobind Singh; was the head scribe of the recompiling of the Guru Granth Sahib; and was the official representative sent to Amritsar by Mata Sundri, the wife of the Guru, gave him credit among the masses. These experiences gave Bhai Mani Singh authoritative legitimacy as per Weber's charismatic authority. Although there are no records of Bhai Mani Singh's personality, for someone with so much experience, the ability to solve a conflict that the people themselves could not solve, and an endorsement from the Guru's own wife must give some insight into the type of personality and charisma that Mani Singh must have possessed. With the authority that must have been granted by his charisma, and the endorsement of Mata Sundri, Mani Singh took leadership of the Akal Takht, and therefore the Khalsa, legitimizing his authority over the Sikh tradition even further with

the traditional authority that the Akal Takht brought along with it. This established the first legitimate control of the Akal Takht in the mainstream Sikh tradition.

Under the leadership of Mani Singh, the tradition of *Sarbat Khalsa* was started. Sarbat Khalsa was a deliberative assembly where the entire Khalsa was to gather at the Akal Takht to make decisions on behalf of the community. The Sarbat Khalsa allowed for the people to be involved in the proceedings of the Akal Takht, thus solidifying the reciprocal relationship between the people and the authority, making the Akal Takht's authority very stable. Sarbat Khalsa would take place twice a year at the Akal Takht on Vaisakhi and Diwali. The next major gurmata that was passed was in 1726, where it was decided that the Khalsa would raid and loot Mughal treasuries, armories, trade transport, and kill informers. This decision was made after a well-respected Sikh, Bhai Tara Singh, was killed by a Mughal official (Dilgeer 1980, p. 33). The Sikhs took the gurmata to heart and started to plunder Mughal property. This led to Zakariya Khan, the governor of Lahore, pushing back against the Sikhs. As the number of rebellious Sikhs continued to increase, Zakaria Khan attempted to calm the tensions by offering the Sikhs a *jag¯ır* and the choice to appoint a Nawab. At the Sarbat Khalsa of Vaisakhi 1733, the *jag¯ır* was accepted by the Khalsa and Kapur Singh was selected to be the nawab (Grewal 2002, p. 89).

With the patronage of the *jag¯ır,* the Khalsa reorganized into the Buddha Dal, consisting of older veterans, and the Taruna Dal, consisting of younger men, at the next Sarbat Khalsa. The Khalsa was flourishing in Amritsar, as Sikhs in hiding and from other parts of the subcontinent were beginning to move into Amritsar. With members increasing rapidly, Nawab Kapur Singh and other leaders had trouble keeping the Khalsa in control. Some fringe members of the Taruna Dal began to confiscate taxes from areas where the dues were for the Mughals. This act upset Zakariya Khan, which led him to confiscate the *jag¯ır* from the Sikhs and reinstate orders to oppress and kill Sikhs (Dilgeer 1980, p. 34). Many Sikhs left Amritsar but continued to raid Mughal properties in smaller groups (Grewal 2002, p. 90).

Mani Singh, still the custodian of the Akal Takht and Harmandir Sahib, attempted to organize Diwali in Amritsar in 1738. The governor of Punjab allowed the celebration to take place with a demand of 5000 rupees. When the Sikhs gathered, they felt that the Mughals were planning an attack on the celebration, so they dispersed before any festivities could commence. Bhai Mani Singh then refused to pay the 5000 rupees, as the event never took place. Zakariya Khan responded by sentencing Bhai Mani Singh to death by having his body cut limb from limb (Dilgeer 1980, p. 34). Even through hardships, the Khalsa continued to act upon the gurmatas passed by the Sarbat Khalsa at the Akal Takht. It shows the sacredness and validity of the authority that the Sikhs had placed in the institution, where they would go to dangerous levels to continue to live up to the gurmatas that were passed under its authority.

#### *2.2. The Misl Period 1738–1799*

The Akal Takht was without leadership for some time, as the Sikhs had dispersed from Amritsar in the face of persecution. Sikhs continued to plunder and raid the Mughals. In 1745, with the death of Zakariya Khan, the Sikhs had the opportunity to hold a Sarbat Khalsa on Diwali. The Sikhs regrouped and continued their battles against the Mughals. In 1746, the *Chhot¯ a Ghallugh ¯ ara,* or small genocide, took place. In the year after this, another Sarbat Khalsa took place where the decision to continue to fight the Mughals to fortify Amritsar was made. In 1748, another Sarbat Khalsa was held where the Khalsa was reorganized into 11 Misls, each with their own leadership and armies (Gupta 2001, pp. 89–90).

Sarbat Khalsa and the passing of gurmatas continued to happen until 1757. In 1757, Ahmad Shah Abdali's forces tore down Harmandir Sahib and the Akal Takht. Baba Deep Singh led an army towards Amritsar to attempt to rebuild the Harmandir Sahib and the Akal Takht. He was killed upon reaching the Darbar Sahib complex (K. Singh 1963, p. 145). The Akal Takht and Harmandir Sahib were eventually rebuilt by the Sikhs. It

was followed by back and forth battles between the Sikhs and Mughals, Sikh executions, battles with the Durrani empire, executions by the Durranis and Mughals, and numerous destructions and rebuildings of the Akal Takht and Harmandir Sahib. Regardless, the Sikhs continued to grow their militias and grow their control over the Punjab region. It is also during this period that the oldest written Hukamnama from the Akal Takht is found. It was addressed to the Sikhs of Patna requesting funds for the rebuilding of the shrines in Amritsar (Dilgeer 1980, p. 40). After Durrani's last defeat in Punjab, the Sikh confederacy became the uncontested rulers of Punjab. The Sikhs were holding uninterrupted Sarbat Khalsas at the Akal Takht for the first time in history.

Once the Misls were established, the practice of Sarbat Khalsa started to fizzle out. The initial change came from amending Sarbat Khalsa from being a gathering of the whole Khalsa to just the leaders of the Misls. Once inter-Misl feuds began, attendance at the Sarbat Khalsa slowly declined until they finally ended (*Brief History of Sikh Misls* n.d., pp. 13–14).

This period of history was the most concerning for the existence of the Sikhs. It is also when the power and authority of the Akal Takht was utilized the most to make decisions for the Khalsa. The gurmatas, cooperation, and consistent meetings allowed for the Sikhs to establish their rule in Punjab. There is a lack of evidence of a specific custodian or *jathedar* of the Akal Takht, and this might have to do with the Guru-centric nature of the gurmatas and Sarbat Khalsa. This idea is emphasized with the initial minting of coins by the Sarbat Khalsa, where the coins were Guru-centric, devoid of the names of any of the chiefs. Though the Sarbat Khalsas were attended by all, Dhavan (2011, p. 147) notes that those making decisions were the chiefs of the Misls, which proves that hierarchy within the system existed, and so some form of leader or mediator must have existed. I argue that the leadership of the Takht, as least during the Sarbat Khalsas, were under Nawab Kapur Singh during this period, given that he was often the chief leader of the various regroupings of the Khalsa and the fact that the Sarbat Khalsa dying out of practice coincides with the retirement and death of Nawab Kapur Singh. This theory does leave a blind spot on as to who was handling the day to day operations of the Takht; however, it is likely that it might have been under the custodianship of Udasi Mahants. Although history leaves us with a blind spot on his leadership, it is quite clear that it was because of Kapur Singh that the Khalsa was able to organize in the ways that it did. Kapur Singh may have derived his authority over the Khalsa from his initial appointing as nawab by Bhai Mani Singh, and the character that enabled him to ever reach that position. His authority would, then, be derived from both traditional and rational-legal authorities, as it was the initial *jag¯ır* that gave Kapur Singh any power at all. This is a shift from the lack of rational-legal authority under Mani Singh's tenure as the custodian of the Akal Takht. After Kapur Singh's retirement and the lack of a proper leader, they no longer had the means to or motivation to organize Sarbat Khalsas, as the Misls became more focused upon their individual autonomy and territories. With the Khalsa growing larger and a lack of centrality, Sarbat Khalsa most likely became too difficult to hold regularly. In its later years, the idea had become symbolic, where only the leaders higher in their ranks would attend, thus not even living up to the name *Sarbat Khalsa*. The Akal Takht's authority dwindled as the average Khalsa became less involved in the Sarbat Khalsas, as it had shifted the reciprocal relationship between the people and the instution into non-existence. Ranjit Singh officially abolished Sarbat Khalsa in 1805.

#### *2.3. Sarkar-e-Khalsa 1799–1849*

In 1800, Akali Phula Singh, along with an army of 2000 Akali Nihangs proceeded into Amritsar and took control of the Akal Takht (Kaile and Singh 2009, p. 43). During Akali Phula Singh's tenure as the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht, he punished Ranjit Singh twice, once for marrying a Muslim woman who did not covert and once for offering a used canopy to the Akal Takht. Ranjit Singh accepted the punishment both times. Only one Sarbat Khalsa took place during the Sikh Empire, which was for the settling of an issue between a Maratha refugee and the British in 1805. The Sarbat Khalsa issued a gurmata in favor of the British, and soon after, Ranjit Singh officially abolished Sarbat Khalsa (Hoti 1966, pp. 135–46). Akali Phula Singh is known to have been a very charismatic warrior and leader according to popular Sikh rhetoric. He led an army of thousands of nihangs and fought alongside the Sikh Empire. Phula Singh stopped a battle from taking place between the Sukerchakia and Bhangi Misls on the battlefield and mediated a negotiation instead (B. Singh 2010, p. 146). Though not recorded, it is likely that Phula Singh took care of day to day activities at the Takht and settling issues between Sikhs and Sikh groups as the leader of the Akal Takht. Oral history among Sikhs shows that Phula Singh was a charismatic person. With the help of the traditional authority that comes from holding the seat of the Akal Takht, Akali Phula Singh's tenure as *jathedar* was supported by charismatic authority. His authority in the Akal Takht remained mostly political and in relation to the larger *Sarkar-e-Khalsa*. It does not seem like the Takht handled many issues of the larger Sikh populace itself, at least in public ways.

After Phula Singh's death, a Khalsa Sikh did not take control of the Akal Takht. It was individuals from the Udasi sect who had become the caretakers of the Takht (Lorenzen 1997, p. 57). It is likely that they may have been appointed by Ranjit Singh himself, as the Udasis were the most patronized group by the Sikh empire (S. Singh 1985). The Udasi mahants came into control of almost all historic gurdwaras. During this time, a painting of Guru Hargobind was installed at the Akal Takht to be worshipped. Worshippers would regularly worship idols and pictures in the various gurdwaras in the Darbar Sahib complex (Oberoi 1994, p. 104). These caretakers of the Akal Takht did not hold any legitimate authority over the Khalsa, as their practices were outside of the group norms of the Khalsa. The Khalsa found its leadership amongs<sup>t</sup> their own *jathas*, or groups. However, the Udasis played a massive role in the pluralism of the various religious traditions in Punjab.<sup>9</sup> This is a point in time in which, although the Akal Takht existed in the symbolic universe of the Sikh psyche, the authority of the institution had diminished in the eyes of the Khalsa due to it stepping outside of the larger group norms of the Khalsa tradition.

#### *2.4. British Raj 1849–1947*

When the British conquered Punjab, they took control of historical Sikh shrines, including the Akal Takht. Until 1869, the caretaking of the shrine would stay with those already at the Darbar Sahib complex. In 1869, the British appointed a caretaker, called a Sarbrah, as the leader of both the Akal Takht and Harmandir Sahib. The Sarbrah had the authority to issue hukamnamas, or commands, to the Sikhs. Being appointed by the British, the Sarbrah would often be a mouthpiece of the British. The goal of the British was to keep the status quo at the Darbar Sahib complex, so the image and idol worship continued. Although idol and picture worship started before the British Raj, it was already a step outside of the group norm of Khalsa Sikhs. This idol and picture worship would be the first of many steps outside the group norms of the Khalsa that the Akal Takht would take (Dilgeer 1980, p. 54).

When reformists in the Singh Sabha started to rise, the Akal Takht was quick to react. The Sarbrah of the Akal Takht banished Gurmukh Singh of the Lahore Singh Sabha for opposing practices such as idol and picture worship in the Darbar Sahib complex and opposing Khem Singh Bedi<sup>10</sup> sitting on pillows in the congregation. Gurmukh Singh still continued his publishing and preaching. There are numerous instances of the caretakers of the Akal Takht and Harmandir Sahib refusing to let in, refusing to do ardas (prayer of request) for, and banishing members of the Lahore Singh Sabha<sup>11</sup> or its offspring organizations. People of lower caste were not allowed to give or receive prasad at the Darbar Sahib complex and were only allowed into the complex at certain times of the day.

The week after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, the caretakers of the Darbar Sahib complex honored and conducted the pahul ceremony for General Dyer. The pahul ceremony is the ceremony that initiates an individual into the Khalsa. Dyer was given permission to cut his hair and smoke tobacco by those that conducted the ceremony, even though those acts are major transgressions of the Khalsa code of conduct (Colvin 1929, pp. 201–2).

After this, General Dyer was given a *siropa*, or honorary scarf, by the Sarbrah of the Akal Takht. The pahul ceremony of General Dyer and the failure to do the seva, or service, of the Guru Granth Sahib one evening at the Akal Takht infuriated many Sikhs. A meeting took place in August 1920 in the Darbar Sahib complex, demanding the resignation of the Sarbrah. The Sarbrah apologized for his transgressions and resigned. Another Sabrah was appointed; however, the mistreatment of the lower castes and the continuation of idol worship still upset many Sikhs. Although the authority of the institution technically should have existed at this point in history, as the Takht had its original traditional authority and the legal-rational authority established by the British Raj, Merton's theory would explain how the caretakers of the Akal Takht had taken so many steps outside of Sikh group norms that no sense of authority in the institution remained among common Sikhs. The relationship between the Sikhs and Akal Takht had been startled by these steps outside of the group norms.

In October 1920, Khalsa reformers stormed and took over the Akal Takht from the Sarbrah and other caretakers of the Takht. Right after, the British appointed a 36-member committee, comprised of Sikh aristocracy, to take care of the Darbar Sahib complex. In order to negotiate a long-term solution, the Central Sikh League called a meeting in the Darbar Sahib complex, where ten thousand Sikhs attended. At this meeting, a 175-member committee was elected to form a committee to manage all gurdwaras across India. That committee was called the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (Grewal 2002, p. 158). The committee has controlled the Darbar Sahib complex and appointed the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht since then. The Akal Takht once again became the center of Sikh politics and activism, with frequent meetings and decision making taking place. The Akal Takht would be the home of the Sikh struggle throughout the Gurdwara Reform Movement. That same year, the Akali Dal was formed at the Akal Takht (Dilgeer 1980, pp. 161–62). The British formally accepted the SGPC as the caretakers of the Darbar Sahib complex in January 1922 (Grewal 2002, p. 160). The Akal Takht became even more active than it was during the Sikh Misl period.

Although the Sarbrah were the caretakers of the Takht, most Khalsa Sikhs did not accept their authority as legitimate. The Sarbrah were taking steps outside of the group norms by partaking in idol worship, caste discrimination, obeisance to the Bedi family, the honoring of the perpetrator of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, and the banishment of any Sikh who would speak against the practices of the Darbar Sahib complex. For the first time in history, the Sikhs mobilized against the caretakers of the Akal Takht and instated a new leadership structure. This new structure was legitimized by rational-legal authority, along with traditional authority, as the SGPC ran through legal structures. With the establishment of a controlling body made by the people, the Sikhs had a working reciprocal relationship with the Akal Takht where they felt that their input was valid and that the Takht was no longer taking major steps outside of Sikh group norms.

The SGPC continues to run through the legal system of India today. The charisma of the Akali leaders helped to solidify the support of embedding the Akal Takht into the legal system through the creation of the SGPC. Since the success of the Gurdwara Reform Movement, the Akal Takht is able to legally control the gurdwaras of Punjab, Chandigarh, Himachal Pradesh, and Haryana through the SGPC12. The other Takhts, in Anandpur, Patna, Talwandi Sabo, and Nanded, were also given positions of status; however, it remained the status quo that the Akal Takht reigned supreme.

#### *2.5. Partition of Punjab until Operation Bluestar 1947–1984*

Upon Indian independence, the Sikhs focused on establishing a Punjabi speaking Suba. With the banning of Punjabi Suba slogans, many Akalis, members of the SGPC, and the then *jathedar* of the Akal Takht were arrested. This led to the first invasion of the Darbar Sahib complex by the Indian state in 1955. Punjabi Suba agitations were centered around the Akal Takht up until the establishment of the Punjabi Suba in 1966 (Dilgeer 1980, p. 80) In 1975, the Akal Takht led agitations against the state of emergency enacted by Indira

Gandhi, which lasted two years, after the ban on political activates was lifted (Dilgeer 1980, p. 84). This authority was a continuation of what was established with the founding of the SGPC.

On Vaisakhi 1978, a group of Sikhs from the Akhand Kirtani Jatha and the Damdami Taksal, under the leadership of Bhai Fauja Singh, went to protest outside a Nirankari congregation, where the Sikh gurus and scriptures were being subject to disrespectful rhetoric. Attendees of the Nirankari congregation attacked the protesters, and thirteen of the protesters were killed (Mahmood 2010, p. 79). The Akal Takht released a hukamnama on the 10 June 1978 condemning the attack and instructing Sikhs to avoid and not to associate with individuals from the Nirankari sect (R. Singh 2003, p. 77). This hukamnama is still binding today, and practicing Sikhs continue to not associate themselves with Nirankaris.

In 1982, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale sponsored the Akalis through the *Dharam Yudh Morcha* to pressure the Indian state to accept the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.<sup>13</sup> A year later, Bhindranwale, with other armed Sikhs, moved into the Darbar Sahib complex to lead the movement from the Akal Takht. In December of 1983, Bhindrawale relocated to the Akal Takht itself. It was from here that Bhindranwale stockpiled the building with weapons and prepared for attacks from the Indian state. Bhindranwale and his followers, including men and women with small children, battled from the Akal Takht during Operation Bluestar, making the complex, once again, a battleground between the reigning governmen<sup>t</sup> and Sikhs. It was during Operation Bluestar that the Akal Takht was destroyed by the Army tanks. Although Bhindranwale was never the *jathedar* of the Akal Takht, nor ever claimed to be, he used the building of the Akal Takht as a way to establish legitimacy and help support his charismatic authority with the traditional authority of the Akal Takht.

#### *2.6. 1984 to the Present*

After 1984, the Sikhs were in a distressed situation. There was a group of people, predominantly from the Damdami Taksal, who had attempted to take control of the Akal Takht and the Darbar Sahib Complex after an attempted *Sarbat Khalsa* in 1986. Although partially successful, their control over the Akal Takht was handed back to the SGPC. Since 1984, there has been a tense relationship between various Sikh organizations regarding whether or not the SGPC is a valid group representing the issues of the Sikhs, especially among diasporic and radical Sikhs. This tension continues until today, especially with the new competing *jathedars* of the Takhts instated by an attempted *Sarbat Khalsa* in 2015.<sup>14</sup> These two *Sarbat Khalsas* had attempted to lay claim to the authority of the Akal Takht.

The tension in the community in regard to the Akal Takht and the SGPC stem from 1984 and the idea of whether or not the Akali Dal and the SGPC are partially to blame for Operation Bluestar. Sikhs, especially in the diaspora, have taken issue with the SGPC's managemen<sup>t</sup> of the Takht. On the other hand, the Akali Dal continues to win the SGPC elections, showing that the Akal Takht managemen<sup>t</sup> does have local approval, at least since the last election; however, there does seem to be more people standing in opposition to the Akali ticket in the forthcoming SGPC elections. The split in approval of the Akali Dal's control of the SGPC has been heightened since Gurbachan Singh forgave Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh, a sect leader who had impersonated Guru Gobind Singh and the Sikh initiation ceremony. However, the approval of the SGPC's managemen<sup>t</sup> of the Akal Takht has become more stable after Harpreet Singh was enacted as acting *jathedar*. With the disconnect between diasporic Sikhs and Sikhs in India, there seems to have also been a disconnect in group norms on what is acceptable for the Akal Takht and its authority, which has caused the disconnect between whether or not the authority of the Akal Takht can be considered legitimate.
