**1. Introduction**

Recent years have seen regular media reports about the activities of Sikhs in diaspora, ranging from concerns about "Sikh radicalisation" (Singh 2015b) and "Sikh extremism", particularly in Britain and Canada (Majumdar 2018), to the role played by Sikh aid organisations around the world (Dalton 2020). Using data gathered for a research project examining "Sikh radicalisation in Britain" (Singh 2017),<sup>1</sup> in this article I develop a typology of different types of activism among Sikhs in diaspora<sup>2</sup> by examining the incidents, narratives and issues which drive Sikhs to participate in this activism. I use the term "activism" with reference to the work of Moskalenko and McCauley (2009, p. 240), who distinguish between radicalism, which indicates a "readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action", and activism, which is a "readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action".

Data were gathered from historic and contemporary media sources (newspapers, radio, television)<sup>3</sup> , online media sources (social media, internet discussion forums), the academic literature, ethnographic

<sup>1</sup> This article further develops my analysis of the types and drivers of Sikh activism in Diaspora as contained in my 2017 CREST research report (Singh 2017).

<sup>2</sup> I am avoiding using the umbrella term 'Sikh diaspora' following Dusenbery (1995), who argues that there is a danger that this term treats Sikhs as a homogeneous group. Instead, I will refer to "Sikhs in diaspora" and "Sikh activism in diaspora" following Grossman, who argues that characteristics of members of a diaspora are that they are "outside the homeland due to dispersal or immigration. Group identity is among the things that render them a community. Their homeland orientation involves transnational exchange" (Grossman 2019, p. 1269).

<sup>3</sup> This analysis examined English language historical and contemporary newspapers, television reports and radio programmes. Television programmes were located using Box of Broadcasts (https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand), the ITN archive (http://www.itnsource.com/en/) and online video hosting websites. Similarly, radio programmes were located through Box of Broadcasts, BBC iPlayer and online searches. For all of the media analysis listed above, the following search terms were used to find data and examples of relevant incidents, Sikh extremist(s), Sikh extremism, Sikh fanatic(s), Sikh fanaticism, Sikh radical(s), Sikh radicalism, Sikh radicalisation, Sikh fundamentalist(s), Sikh fundamentalism, Sikh terrorist(s), Sikh

field visits and a series of semi-structured interviews with self-identifying Sikh activists. Media evidence was gathered from English language open source materials using bibliographical and electronic searches. In total, 20 interviews were conducted with a range of respondents who were selected due to their currently being or having previously been involved in (a) the managemen<sup>t</sup> of Sikh organisations or gurdwaras and/or (b) incidents reported in mainstream media involving Sikhs and/or (c) organizing, promoting and participating in events and protests relating to Sikh issues. Respondents were recruited via social media or email based on their involvement in Sikh activism. In order to ensure the anonymity of the participants, which was a condition of their participation, interviewees will be referred to as Respondent 1, Respondent 2, etc., with no details of their location or role in the Sikh community being disclosed. As the protection of the respondents is paramount, the only quotations used will be those from which there is no risk of identifying respondents. In addition, although field visits were made to gurdwaras and events, these will not be named in order to maintain anonymity. Any events and incidents named are readily available in the public domain.

## *Religiously Motivated Action*

To date, scholars have examined "religiously-motivated action" from a variety of di fferent standpoints including through studies of "religious activism", "faith-based activism" and "religious terrorism", although it is important to recognise that the meaning of these terms varies by context. Although Smilde (1998, p. 290) defines "religiously-motivated action" as "secular action that is inspired by religious beliefs", the linking of actions with specifically "religious" motivations has been challenged by some, including by Gunning and Jackson (2011), who argue, for example, that although "religious terrorism" is often shorthand for "violence perpetrated in the name of religion by religiously motivated militants" (Gunning and Jackson 2011, p. 369), this is based on a particular historical understanding of "religion", which assumes that religion is "clearly definable and distinguishable from the secular and political realms" (Gunning and Jackson 2011, p. 374). In summary, scholarly examinations of "religiously-motivated actions" make clear distinctions between "religious" and "secular" motivations, and highlight several possible characteristics of "religiously-motivated actions", including:


terrorism, Sikh militant(s), Sikh militancy, Sikh separatist(s), Sikh separatism, Sikh protester(s), Sikh protests, Sikh activist(s), and Sikh activism.

(h) A shared religious identity which acts as a valuable resource for collective identity construction, providing a "basis upon which strangers can work together with relative ease in common purpose" (Smith 1996, p. 18).

To date, there has been little examination of activism among Sikhs in diaspora, beyond Takhar's (2018) exploration of social and political activism amongs<sup>t</sup> British Sikhs in relation to the impact of caste legislation and revelations about Britain's involvement in the events of 1984 (Doward 2017), Mooney's (2018) study of Sikh millennial environmental activism, and Luthra's (2018) analysis of Sikh activism and institution building in the US, in response to 9/11 and the murder of seven Sikhs in a gurdwara attack by a white supremacist in Oak Creek in August 2012 (Curry et al. 2012). Although these studies highlight that narratives from the Sikh tradition play an important role, they also raise a number of questions, with Takhar observing that "there is a need for further research into the current British Sikh political activist environment in order to be able to gather and analyse why young millennial British Sikhs become involved in political activism" (Takhar 2018, p. 312). In this article, I analyse my previously gathered empirical data to explore the ideas, narratives and drivers behind Sikh activism in diaspora, examining the extent to which these drivers can be viewed as being "religious" and/or "political" in nature.

#### **2. The Continuing Impact of 1984**

As Singh and Tatla (2006, p. 127) observe, "wherever Sikhs have settled in large numbers, sooner or later one demand always comes to the fore: the right to wear a turban". Mobilisations around turban wearing among Sikhs in diaspora began in the 1960s, as Sikhs in Britain campaigned for the right to wear turbans in the workplace and on motorcycles (Singh and Tatla 2006, pp. 127–35). Mandair argues that these campaigns were regarded by the state as being "religiously-motivated", as were other campaigns including, for example, the Multani case in Canada, where the kirpan was defined primarily as a "religious symbol" (Mandair 2015, p. 135).

Activism among Sikhs in diaspora changed significantly following the storming of Harmandir Sahib by the Indian army in June 1984 (for a concise account of the leadup to these events see Mandair 2015) during Operation Blue Star. Sikhs around the world "reacted with extreme anger and sadness to the Indian army's action in the Golden Temple" (Tatla 1999, p. 113), with many viewing this event "as an act of sacrilege, a premediated brutality, a gesture of contempt, the beginning of a process to destroy Sikh traditions" (Tatla 1999, p. 92). Sikhs immediately took to the streets in Vancouver, New York, Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto, San Francisco, Los Angeles and in Hyde Park, London, to protest (Tatla 1999).

For Tatla, Operation Blue Star ignited support among Sikhs in diaspora for a separate Sikh state, Khalistan, as until this incident "the theme of a Sikh homeland attracted no more than a fringe audience and only the Indian state's blunder in ordering armies into the Golden Temple forced the issue into ordinary Sikhs' homes and minds" (Tatla 2012, p. 71). The authorities in Canada were clearly unprepared for the emotional impact of Operation Blue Star on Canadian Sikhs with Bob Burgoyne, who worked for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) at the time, noting how "it was our lack of understanding of Sikhs and how very emotional ... [they were] and how this single issue is what propelled us into what was a very tumultuous year" (Brennan 2007). The emotional impact of Operation Blue Star was echoed by respondents, with Respondent 3 reflecting on the attack as being

"a life changing moment, you know, certain triggers in your life when you look back and they still stand out, and an attack on the Sikhs' most holy shrine looked like a personal attack on Sikhs themselves"

Interviewees expressed a sense of humiliation after the attack, with Respondent 3 explaining how "it feels like the Indian governmen<sup>t</sup> at that time wanted to teach the Sikhs a lesson". The need for Sikhs in diaspora to "do something" in response to Blue Star led many to re-engage with the Sikh tradition, with Respondent 7 remembering how "after 84 [there] was a big influx into the Sikh faith. I saw people

who were drinking in pubs one night, and then becoming Amritdhari [initiated] the next day." Four narratives around the events of Operation Blue Star emerged from the interviews:


It is clear that even Sikhs with no direct familial link to the Punjab continue to be emotionally impacted by the events of June 1984, with Respondent 1 explaining how he would "always have that connection to Punjab, because our Harmandir Sahib [Golden Temple] is in our Punjab", while Respondent 18 described how "rather than Punjab as a whole, it is the historical gurdwaras that most feel like home".

Sikh outrage about Operation Blue Star led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984, which was "followed closely by violence against Sikhs in Delhi and other parts of north India on the evening of 31 October 1984 lasting through 4 November, 1984" (Devgan 2013, p. 207). Respondents highlighted how the lack of recourse for this anti-Sikh violence (Saluja 2015, p. 344) was another issue in their continuing activism, with Respondent 3 reflecting how "it's been 33 years and still no justice for all the Sikhs that lost their lives, innocent Sikhs who had nothing to do with what happened in Delhi". Indeed, despite an extensive body of academic literature and numerous reports which have examined the November 1984 violence against Sikhs, including Grewal (2007) and Mitta and Phoolka (2008), for Ahluwalia, "there remains a deep scepticism amongs<sup>t</sup> Sikhs in both India and the diaspora about real justice and adequate reparations" (Ahluwalia 2010, p. 108). As a Sikh female who interviewed victims of the November 1984 violence for her undergraduate dissertation explained,

I was only perhaps 20, 21 when I became fully aware of what had happened in 1984. It wasn't something that was discussed in my household ... [and] I have to say ... it shapes me personally, academically and professionally ... [as] there isn't anything positive I can really say when I hear the eyewitness accounts.

#### (BBC Asian Network 2012)

Respondent 3 highlighted how November 1984 was "very hard, very traumatic ... my in-laws live in Delhi, so we were trying to contact them, and all phone lines were dead ... they're memories that are, they're still in your head." The main narratives which emerged from respondents in relation to the events of November 1984 were


The post-1984 period saw clashes between Sikhs in diaspora based on their support of, or opposition to, Khalistan. As reported in the Times of London on 20 March, 1989, "at least seven Sikhs living in Britain, all moderates opposed to the violence of the Khalistan separatist movement, have been shot in past three years, four fatally" (Sapsted 1989), including the murder of Darshan Das in 1987 (Tatla 1999, p. 135). The post-1984 period also saw Sikhs, particularly in the UK and Canada, being accused of plotting against visiting Indian state o fficials, especially those o fficials implicated as being involved

in orchestrating the anti-Sikh violence in November 1984 including Kamal Nath, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler, all three of whom were named in the "Who are the Guilty?" report (Kothari 1984) published by the People's Union For Civil Liberties. In October 1985, four members of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) were arrested for plotting to murder Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister at the time (Tatla 1999, p. 123). Sikh activists also protested Kamal Nath's visit to Toronto in March 2010 (Aulakh 2010) and New York in April 2010 (PTI 2010). The most recent incident against an Indian state o fficial was the attack on General K.S. Brar in London on 30th September 2012 (CPS 2013).

As in Britain, the aftermath of 1984 saw a number of peaceful protests across Canada, while some acts of violence also occurred related to Khalistan issues, including the 1985 attack on former B.C. premier Ujjal Dosanjh (CBC n.d.) and the murder of Canadian journalist Tara Singh Hayer (Matas 2012). There were also various plots and protests against Indian state o fficials, including the 1986 assassination attempt on Malkiat Singh Sidhu (CBC News 2019). The bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985, Canada's worst mass murder to date, led to the banning of two Sikh organisations, the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) and Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), who remain on the current list of Terrorist Entities in Canada (Public Safety Canada 2019). Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine this deplorable act, which was widely condemned by Sikhs at the time (Auerbach 1985), a wealth of analysis about the bombing is readily available in the literature.

Sikh activists have also focused on the plight of Sikh political prisoners in India, in particular those imprisoned under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) an anti-terrorism act enforced between 1985 and 1995 and more recently the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) (Singh 2019a). The scheduled execution set for 31 March, 2012, of Balwant Singh Rajoana, who openly confessed to being an accomplice in the assassination of Beant Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab in the early 1990s, led to the emergence of a worldwide #IPledgeOrange movement, with the corresponding grassroots "Kesri Lehar" campaign maintaining a presence outside 10 Downing Street, the residence of the British Prime Minister, for six months from April 2013. Following this, high profile hunger strikes by Gurbaksh Singh and Surat Singh have sought to further raise the profile of Sikh political prisoners in India.

The shooting in October 2015 by the Punjab police of Sikhs protesting against beadbi (desecrations) of the Guru Granth Sahib (BBC News 2015a) led to a number of protests including a televised protest by Jagmeet Singh who was appearing as a gues<sup>t</sup> on the live BBC "Sunday" programme (BBC News 2015b) and also to a large demonstration outside the Indian High Commission in London in the same month (Gander 2015). At the time of writing, a Scottish-born Sikh, Jagtar Singh Johal, has been held in India for over 1000 days without charge over his alleged involvement in a series of murders in 2016 and 2017 (Paterson 2020). In response, a #FreeJaggiNow campaign has been running since Johal's arrest in November 2017 and is continuing to mobilise Sikh activists in diaspora around the issue. It is clear, therefore, that the events of 1984, and concerns among Sikh activists about the treatment of Sikhs in India, continue to have an important impact, with Respondent 10 explaining how he saw his main role as an activist being to "work towards highlighting the injustices".

#### **3. Narratives from the Sikh Tradition**

Beyond 1984, various incidents have occurred involving Sikhs, relating to gurdwara governance, the contested nature of religious authority and local factional politics (Singh and Tatla 2006, p. 83). I now analyse which narratives from the Sikh tradition were most frequently cited by respondents and highlighted in the media as contributing to Sikh involvement in these incidents. It is important to state that these narratives do not drive particular types of Sikh activism in themselves, or guarantee that an individual will participate in activism, but that the highlighted narratives frequently appeared in interviews, media analyses and the literature.

## *3.1. Beadbi (Disrespect)*

One of the most high-profile incidents involving Sikhs in Britain occurred on Saturday 18th December, 2004, in Birmingham, United Kingdom, when over 400 Sikhs protested at the Birmingham Repertory (REP) theatre against the staging of a play, Behzti, and its depiction of rape and murder in a gurdwara. In the days leading up to Saturday 18 December, Sikhs protested peacefully; however, the weekend protest turned violent leading the REP to cancel all performances of the play. Speaking about the protest during an ITN report broadcast on 19th Dec, 2004, (ITN Source 2004), Mohan Singh highlighted the importance to Sikhs of ensuring the respect of the Guru Granth Sahib and of counteracting any incidents of beadbi (disrespect):

by setting the play inside the gurdwara it was actually not just tarnishing a person but was tarnishing the whole religion ... we treat the holy scriptures as our living, breathing Guru ... we never asked for it [the play] to be stopped—all we've asked is take it outside the gurdwara, set it in a community hall, put it in a park, put it in a school whatever you feel like.

Though the REP claimed that they had consulted with Sikh community leaders who had requested that the play be altered to change the setting of controversial scenes from a gurdwara to a community centre (O'Neill and Woolcock 2004), this consultation was somewhat limited in scope; as the theatre director Stuart Rogers explained, the consultation "wasn't about how would you like us to change the play because we made it clear also that we'd never change the play ... it was about how can we work together to minimise any offense this might cause to some members of your community" (Channel 4 2005). Although media reports focused on the violence that occurred, as Gurharpal Singh notes, "these simplistic characterisations overlooked the range of responses from Sikhs themselves, some of which, incidentally, were opposed to the cancellation" (Singh 2005, p. 169).

Analyses of the Behzti affair have tended to disregard the impact of the concept of beadbi (disrespect) in the Sikh tradition. More than simply a "Holy Book", the Guru Granth Sahib is seen by Sikhs to contain the jot (light) of the 10 Gurus in a scriptural body and is respected and treated accordingly. The pages of the single continuous volume are often referred to as angs (limbs) further highlighting how many Sikhs regard the Guru Granth Sahib as a living Guru who should be treated as such. Various "Maryadas" or codes of conduct place a responsibility on Sikhs to ensure that the Guru Granth Sahib is treated respectfully. The Sikh Rehit Maryada (SRM) for example states that "No book should be installed like and at par with the Guru Granth. Worship of any idol or any ritual or activity should not be allowed to be conducted inside the gurdwara. Nor should the festival of any other faith be allowed to be celebrated inside the gurdwara." (Sikh Rehat Maryada, Chapter IV, Article V, Section e). Several recent incidents and campaigns have centred on the importance of maintaining the sanctity and respect of the Guru Granth Sahib and of counteracting any incidents of beadbi (disrespect) (e.g., Singh 2009), with examples being


To date, there has been little examination of the impact of the narrative of beadbi in analyses of instances of Sikh activism. The strength of feeling towards the Guru Granth Sahib was regularly highlighted in interviews, with Respondent 1 stating that:

we will die for our guru. If you're putting our guru in any disrespect, you might as well chop off our arm. We're not going to do nothing ... you're taking a part of us. The guru's light is shining into us, and we'll do anything for the guru.

Varying notions of what is and is not "inappropriate" and "disrespectful" have led to several recent incidents and campaigns. In June 2010, the Satkaar ("respect") campaign emerged in the UK in response to the gurdwara in Grays, Essex, allowing alcohol, meat and tobacco to be served in a hall owned by and located next to the gurdwara. This led to a demonstration on 16 October, 2010, against a party due to be held in the hall. Since the incident in Grays, the Satkaar campaign has campaigned against the serving of meat and alcohol in halls owned by various gurdwaras in Britain (Satkaar 2011) following on from the earlier R4G (Respect for Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji) campaign of 2005, during which Sikhs demonstrated against the practice of taking the Guru Granth Sahib to party halls or hotels for wedding ceremonies (Booth 2005). Operation Blue Star was also regarded as an act of beadbi by many respondents, as the Harimandir Sahib Gurdwara and Guru Granth Sahib were seen to have been desecrated.

In participating in the beadbi campaigns, Respondent 8 found "elders questioning 'why are you doing this?' and I was thinking 'we're only doing what you told us to do, respect Guru Granth Sahib Ji' ... you were telling us to do this, now we're doing it, you're telling us what we're doing is wrong." Although many respondents clearly respected the first generation of Sikh migrants for establishing gurdwaras and organisations, Respondent 8 "felt that complacency had kicked in and it was almost like shaking the system a bit ... you can use the word "extremist" or whatever but I call it duty bound."

#### *3.2. Diversity: Doctrinal and Factional*

As per the incident in Grays, doctrinal and factional disputes have led to several incidents where Sikhs have protested at Sikh institutions. One of the main issues relates to the status of the Akal Takht, the headquarters of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandak Committee (SGPC), or "Central Gurdwara Management Committee", located inside the Harmandir Sahib complex in Amritsar. The Akal Takht is often described as the "Parliament of the Sikhs", which acts as "a forum to legislate on all issues concerning the community" (Shani 2008, p. 317). The status of the Akal Takht as the temporal throne of the Sikh tradition further explains why its destruction by the Indian Army in 1984 led many Sikhs to regard this as a challenge to Sikh sovereignty.

Having been established by the sixth Guru, the Akal Takht is important because of the status of its Jathedar (head) who is often described as the "Pope" of the Sikhs, despite the fact that the Jathedar is answerable to the SGPC and is not seen to possess the gift of infallibility (Shani 2008, p. 317). The Jathedar regularly makes pronouncements which "although not binding, have a normative status within Sikhism" (Shani 2008, p. 317). For some Sikhs, however, as the Jathedar of the Akal Takht is appointed by the SGPC which is controlled by the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), a political party (Shani 2008, p. 37), there is a risk of these edicts being overly influenced by the political status quo. Additionally, as there is no clear process through which Sikhs are made aware of new edicts or amendments to previous edicts, edicts are not respected or adhered to by all Sikhs or followed in all Sikh institutions. Nevertheless, many recent campaigns have highlighted the wish for Sikh activists to uphold edicts issued by the Akal Takht Jathedar. A Sikh female from Birmingham, who participated in the protest at the Dudley Sikh Cultural Centre in May 2011, explained that she had protested to uphold the sanctity of the Akal Takht:

So, recently in 2006, Akal Takht actually made an order that there would be no meat, alcohol or tobacco in any gurdwara premises or any premises associated with a gurdwara ... so on a total faith level, to step above Akal Takht Sahib is to then take yourself out of the Sikh faith because there is no higher authority than that. (BBC Asian Network 2011)

Given the variety of models of gurdwara managemen<sup>t</sup> (Singh 2014), not all gurdwaras necessarily follow Akal Takht edicts. This often brings them into conflict with Sikhs who regard Akal Takht edicts as binding for all Sikhs, leading to incidents such as the Dudley protest above. Although many Sikhs do regard the Akal Takht as the supreme temporal authority for Sikhs, others may instead regard a Sant ("charismatic individual") or a leader of a jathabandi ("ideological group") as their main authority and may, therefore, not be concerned about Akal Takht edicts at all (Singh 2014). Linked to the Akal Takht is the Sikh Rahit Maryada (SRM), a document described as "the Official Sikh Code of Conduct and Conventions" was published by the SGPC in 1950. A poster published by the "Karaj Campaign", a group of Sikh activists campaigning against interfaith Anand Karaj ceremonies in gurdwaras, highlights how Sikh activists often reference the Sikh literature to support their claims:<sup>4</sup>

"The Sikh Rehat Maryada Article XVIII clause k states that ... persons professing faiths other than the Sikh faith cannot be joined in wedlock by the Anand Karaj ceremony. Also at XVIII clause b ... meaning a Sikh's daughter must be married to a Sikh. In the Sikh spirit of gender equality, it is implied that a Sikh's son must also be married to a Sikh."

"Guru Gobind Singh Maryada 38/52: The daughter/son of a Sikh should be given in marriage to a Sikh. Give their hand in a house where God's Sikhi exists. Where the household is of a good nature, disciplined and knowledgeable."

To date, I have found evidence of five protests taking place at gurdwaras in Britain against interfaith Anand Karaj5, although several related incidents of intimidation have also occurred.<sup>6</sup> Those protesting argue that the main focus was to uphold the edicts of the Akal Takht (Sawer 2015) with an ex-president of the gurdwara in Swindon, Mr. Mudhar explaining that "we are not militants, we are standing up for what was right and to uphold the law [of the Akal Takht]" (Swindon Advertiser 2012). However, commentators have observed that as protests have most often been targeted against Sikh women marrying non-Sikhs and rarely against Sikh men, protestors appear to be primarily concerned with controlling the behaviour of Sikh women (Hundal 2015; Dhaliwal 2016; Jhutti-Johal 2017).
