**5. Discussion**

The presented research covers the whole country. Until now, the literature was dominated by research based on case studies, often related to individual investments. It did not ensure good comparability of the results. It is worth pointing out that our research is representative of a relatively large European country.

The basic empirical information resulting from the conducted research is the generally negative financial balance of spatial economics at the local level. It results from not using the instruments provided for in the law, including, in particular, obtaining very low fees based on the increase in the value of the real estate (planning rent mechanism). On the other hand, the costs associated with land use changes are high (land purchase, construction of roads, and other infrastructure costs). The balance of income and expenditure in Poland remains negative. It is different from other countries, which generally acquire a financial surplus due to land conversion [59].

In the context of the second aim, it should be concluded, that the research also revealed a very much mosaic (diverse) pattern of communes' regional structure in terms of balances resulting from spatial management. This lack of regularity may prove that the planning law is very "loose". Some communes in their "width" and "freedom" can rationally and profitably conduct spatial and land management, while others are characterized by a negative balance. As shown on the maps, these are often neighboring communes. Meanwhile, the situation is slightly better in the west of the country and worse in the eastern part. It can be hypothesized that this may result from the greater dispersion of settlement in the country's eastern and central parts [70]. On the other hand, the neighboring with each other of the communes with diametrically different financial results cannot be easily explained. However, it seems that the explanation may be cautiously related to the nature of the local economy and local development, based on the strong influence of local communities and elites.

It is worth noting that the research identified groups of communes with the highest incomes obtained based on the indicated types of incomes (these are communes belonging to the functional areas of voivodeship capital cities and sub-regional cities) and communes where the incomes balance the expenses related to local spatial development plans (mainly communes from the external zones of functional areas of sub-regional cities). This research direction will be continued. As indicated above, most income is related to the increase in property value caused by the local zoning plans.

As far as the second objective of the article is concerned, it is important to note the very wide range of expected financial results. Quite often they exceed the annual budgets of municipalities, and there are situations where this ratio exceeds 300%. Thus, it can be a source of big profits, but also a danger because of the problems related to the lack of funds for investments. In this case, the example of large agglomerations shows how diametrically different it is:


This confirms those research results which indicate financial instability of self-governments as a serious barrier of development, especially in post-communist countries [71–74].

Despite the diagnosed serious problems in this respect in the Polish spatial management system (which is also presented below in the context of governance failure), the research results lead to the conclusion that these problems can be reduced. Therefore, it is possible to analyze further regularities against this background, particularly the premises for differentiating communes in this respect.

Despite the rich conceptual, theoretical, and implementation achievements in public control and managemen<sup>t</sup> support in real estate markets (in the broadly understood spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> system), there is still a wide field for new solutions that help optimize investment and location processes changes in land allocation. Identifying further regularities in this regard seems to be essential for the whole concept of value capturing.

Based on the research, it is also possible to clarify the issue of public governance failure in the spatial economy system. Other areas of it have been identified, which may also be noticeable in other countries. High expenses, which are a consequence of adopting local plans in large part of communes, are a serious factor deterring communes from an active spatial policy. These expenses are usually a consequence of the actions of real estate market participants. It can be indicated that the governmen<sup>t</sup> failure is noticeable in various cases, including the planning and investment procedure in the land banking system [58]. Apart from the accusations of mismanagement, there were spatial conflicts concerning the very role of land banks (e.g., in the Netherlands farmers objected to giving land banks new functions). Therefore, the doubts concerned the form of use and exploitation of public resources (which inherently fits with the dilemmas concerning the concept of value capturing itself). In Poland, serious allegations of mismanagement and fraud appeared, especially in the re-privatization of land in the City of Warsaw [75]. On the other hand, when discussing Poland's local plans' economic consequences, such allegations (on such a scale) were not often expressed.

The creation of binding planning documents may be fraught with the "credible commitment dilemma" [76]. The local community members may not perceive the plans as a solution that is beneficial to them and may not support their implementation. Likewise, local politicians may not be convinced of the political and economic benefits of creating and applying planning documents. Therefore, they will not be interested in creating and implementing them. It is largely related to the understanding of property rights (which varies between countries).

In Poland, this understanding is closer to that of the United States, which more broadly emphasizes the need for compensation for planning restrictions in development [77] and the approach from the Netherlands, emphasizing the rights of the landowner to its increased value because of the provisions of spatial plan [78]. Ultimately, however, it leads to budget problems of public authorities [54], of which the presented situation in Poland is the best example. Non-financial compensation is implemented to a negligible extent and is limited only to selected procedures related to urban regeneration. It is a bad sign for the development of governance in this respect [79]. The solutions from the concept of governance (management through networks, negotiations) not applied in this case allow, together with non-financial compensation (assuming problems related to their application, known for example, from the United States), to limit expenses in this respect. The above confirms that it is necessary to develop an optimal planning style in many European countries [61].

Problems with balancing income and expenditure (and problems with the vast predominance of expenditure) also result from an incorrectly constructed planning rent (fees on the increase in the value of the real estate, i.e., a solution that would implement the Value Capturing concept in Polish conditions). Its optionality, low amount, and the possibility of differentiating its rate are an expression of not only incorrect legislation. As indicated in the literature [48], outside the legal framework, the planning practice determines the implementation of goals which are specific from the spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> system's perspective. It may come down to informal solutions.

In the case at hand, social pressure led to disseminating informal solutions unfavorable from the spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> system's perspective: the depreciation of this fee's rates by the communal authorities themselves. It is an interesting example of the public authorities limiting the effects which are positive for them. It should also be added that the possibility of extreme differentiation of rates by public authorities may give rise to allegations of corruption. Such allegations and doubts are noticed (as indicated above) in Western countries. This problem concerns various spheres. Decisions concerning both the spatial development system and the real estate market (i.e., with an impact on real estate value) are discretionary. Discretion in this area as such cannot be eliminated: it would, for example, block the development of planning flexibility.

It is worth paying attention to one more manifestation of public governance failure in the spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> system identified in the research. It is a severe differentiation of projected and realized expenditure and revenues. From the spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> system perspective, this significantly hampers rational, planned activities (and this is the standard when implementing the value capturing idea in a significant part of countries). On the one hand, the discrepancies result partly from defective legal bases and, on the other hand, also from the practice of public authorities. From the perspective of communal authorities, sometimes the amounts of income and expenditure in forecasts are justified more by political and pragmatic reasons.

The described phenomenon exacerbates the uncertainty indicated in the literature which is related to European spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> systems in implementing investments related to the Value Capturing instruments [43]. If we add to this the poor flexibility in terms of changes in planning arrangements (and a much greater risk of opportunistic actions), the more understandable are the problems of the Polish spatial managemen<sup>t</sup> system and the failure of even sector-based urban agreements. It should be emphasized that the overall formal and procedural uncertainty in the Polish spatial development system deepens the speculative actions of investors and a kind of confusion among local authorities.

As indicated in the literature review, local plans in different countries have different formulas and functions. Individual instruments for the economic consequences of spatial planning are also adapted to these plans in different ways. The presented results lead to the reflection that the definition of extensive compensation consequences in the system, combined with the lack of developed individual instruments for the economic consequences of planning, contributes to a gross reduction of control by public authorities of the spatial development (identified in the literature as a key function of plans). Such control—with different legal solutions—is possible to a greater extent, even when local plans are not legal acts (as in the UK). The example of the French system (considering the compensatory consequences of spatial planning to a negligible extent) also leads to the conclusion that the liberal understanding of property owner's rights developed in post-socialist countries (also in Poland) can be repaired even when applying the regulations of the European Convention on Human Rights. This Convention, despite numerous discussions on it, does not only require such an understanding of property rights as in the Polish spatial planning system [31].
