*3.2. Legitimizing and Delegitimizing the Role of Policy*

The core message of the dominant storyline pertains to the existence of a dynamic and sufficiently mature clean energy niche with a thick network of actors engaged in learning processes and knowledge exchanges. Moreover, a common thread throughout this storyline is the need for public institutions and actors to proactively exert pressure upon the incumbent energy regime, prompting the deployment of clean energy technologies. We investigated this aspect further by identifying two additional storylines about the role of policy in niche development.

*STORYLINE 2:* Public intervention is everywhere.

The second storyline is based on three key narratives relating to policy intervention areas in support of the clean energy niche: the regulatory framework, funding for knowledge creation and sharing, and infrastructures for a collaborative environment. Such policy interventions, which aim at developing an environmentally friendly regulatory framework in the Boston area, account for a significant number of laws and regulations concerning air quality, toxic and hazardous substances, waste and recycling. One particular example is the Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA), which receives support from both industry and environmental groups. This Act requires companies to analyze and report their annual chemical use, quantifying the chemical content in the final product, the chemical content released into the environment at the end of the production process and any waste treatment performed. Furthermore, it requires companies to draw up long-term pollution reduction plans.

The TUR Institute, located on the Lowell Campus of the University of Massachusetts, is tasked with meeting TURA's goal of developing innovative techniques for cleaner production. As stated by the OTA interviewee: "the Institute is engaged in alternative assessments, in research developing alternative chemistries and in evaluation of alternative technologies in order to complete their program of technology transfer."

Moreover, following the Green Communities Act of 2008, the Massachusetts government now promotes the development of renewable energy, energy efficiency and conservation, "green communities" and the implementation of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives. This Act aims at reducing the costs of renewable energies for consumers and "increase[ing] generation from low or zero-carbon resources within Massachusetts" [43]. The Green Communities Program, instituted by this Act, provides incentives to municipalities that engage in energy efficient and renewable technology. Furthermore, the Pioneer Valley Planning Commission Sustainability Toolkit mentions that the Green Communities Division of the Department of Energy Resources shall provide "up to 10 million dollars per year state-wide in technical and financial help to the communities involved." A portion of this money is raised by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (enacted under the same Act), which draws on market-based cap-and-trade CO2 emissions. The emission allowances

issued under this initiative are auctioned, and the generated funds are used for zero-interest loans for municipal energy-efficiency projects.

With respect to knowledge creation and sharing, the Green Jobs Act, adopted in 2008, designated "125 million dollars to train about 30,000 people in green collar jobs" [47]. In order to achieve this goal, the Act instituted the MassCEC, which became "the most important quasi-public agency in job creation and for the economic development of the clean energy industry."(Interviewee from the MTTC.) Indeed, both the MassCEC and the Innovation Institute have programs in place to support students who are transitioning to the labor market, "because Boston has a high rate of international students who would chose to work in the Boston area only if there is a good work environment."(Interviewee from the Innovation Institute.) Similarly, the MassCEC Workforce Development Programs aim at increasing awareness of clean energy job opportunities and placing job seekers in clean energy jobs in Massachusetts [36]. Since 2011, this organization has placed "more than 1300 interns at over 250 companies which have received a reimbursement of \$14/h for the internships." (Interviewee from the MassCEC.)

Moreover, according to technology officers from MIT, Harvard University and Northeastern University, 80–90% of the research at these universities is publicly funded, with most of the funds granted by the NSF and NIH for basic research. However, the MassCEC and SBIR are key actors in placing their students in green collar jobs, commercializing their staff's clean patents and funding their inventors' spin-offs.

Considering that Massachusetts's basic research at universities, research institutes and hospitals is worth \$4.5 billion, in 2003, the state legislature created and funded the Massachusetts Technology Transfer Centre (MTTC). The MTTC aims at improving knowledge generation and the diffusion of innovative technologies. While it does not provide funding, it supports universities' technology transfer offices, assists institutions that do not have their own technology transfer office and develops programs in collaboration with the MassCEC and the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MassTech)—both quasi-public agencies that provide financial support for MTTC programs.

The MassTech provides capital funding grants with a co-participation of one-third (up to \$5 million) on projects relating to innovation development. It generally funds non-profit institutions—especially universities—that collaborate with private companies or for-profit institutions (Interviewee from the Innovation Institute). To confirm its role in the up-scaling of the emergent clean energy system, the MassCEC implements many grant programs, targeting university innovators and start-ups as well as growing companies, and provides pilot test areas for GTL companies. Table 3 summarizes the MassCEC grant programs that support the development of new clean energy technologies.


**Table 3.** MassCEC grant programs.

*Source:* Authors, based on data from MassCEC [54].

At the federal level, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) is a special program of the Small Business Association (SBA), which supports the creation of spin-offs. In particular, the SBA funds small companies that collaborate with universities, with funding also provided for the universities.

Public intervention also targets infrastructure in support of a collaborative environment. At the local level, the city of Somerville is building fabrication laboratories that are small makerspaces in high schools. Also, to stimulate innovation, Somerville is providing physical connections, in addition to economic ones. As highlighted by MIT and stated by Harvard representatives in Cambridge: "the State of Massachusetts and the municipalities of Boston and Cambridge have an economic development project for the creation of an innovation district and their engagement focusses particularly in infrastructural works of connecting Kendall Square with the rest of the area by the bridge and the red line."

Incubators and accelerators represent important infrastructure for start-ups and innovative companies in the Boston area. Some examples include the Cambridge Innovation Center (hosting 600 new companies), the Roxbury Innovation Center (situated in a marginalized neighborhood), Venture Café, MassChallenge and the Boston Innovation Center, which are all supported by the state of Massachusetts as well as local municipalities, as part of their innovation policy initiatives. All of these co-working spaces support start-ups in preparing business plans and networking with strategic partners, mainly for mentorship and resources. Furthermore, in 2015, the city of Boston launched an initiative involving a "startup czar." This czar, named by the municipality, has a background in planning and is tasked with analyzing the city's opportunities for welcoming start-ups and providing them with, in particular, physical connections (Interviewee from the Greentown Labs).

Table 4 summarizes the three key narratives of Storyline 2 related to policy intervention areas in support of the clean energy niche.


**Table 4.** Overview of Storyline 2 on legitimizing public engagement.

Most actors perceived the general framework of public engagement in the development of innovative technologies as rather positive and supportive of the emergence of the clean energy niche. However, the discourse analysis uncovered some hurdles in the maturation of the clean energy niche and the deployment of these technologies in the Boston area, as reflected in the third storyline.

*STORYLINE 3:* diffusion of clean energy technologies in the Boston area is limited by incumbent barriers.

This final storyline represents the interviewees' discourse in response to the questions: "In your opinion, which is the level of diffusion of clean energy technologies stemming from research in this field, as used by companies and households, respectively? For what reason(s)?" The concepts and ideas that emerged in the discourse mainly concerned the limited policy commitment to break through well-established practices and regulatory frameworks, the lack of public programs and policy support for attracting venture capital to up-scale innovations and the lack of infrastructural interventions for the commercialization of clean energy technologies (Table 5). Accordingly, this storyline significantly reframes the role of policy in the clean energy transition in the Boston area.


**Table 5.** Overview of Storyline 3 on delegitimizing public engagement.

The storyline rightly assumes that clean energy technologies are based on radical innovations that demand change in well-established practices and regulatory frameworks. The interviewed actors perceived limited policy commitment to increasing awareness and improving regulations to support a trustworthy and long-term transition in the Boston area. Indeed, the adoption of the Energy Policy Act in 2005 by the US government intended to extend federal production tax credit to renewable energies. The creation of this policy involved varying public and private stakeholders concerned with environmental regulation and incentives. However, although initially promising, the Act had no real effects (regulatory or otherwise) on the energy sector. In fact, according to the Union of Concerned Scientists [56], the \$14.5 billion provided for the implementation of the bill was spent mainly on nuclear and fossil fuel; only 9% was spent on renewable energy and 21% on energy efficiency. Moreover, community-driven innovations such as Greenovate (which promotes bike sharing and solar panels) are not necessarily attractive and struggle to establish shared practices. Consequently, these innovations are unlikely to become established in the market, unless policy intervenes with regulations aimed at raising awareness and forming new markets, for example through State purchasing and procurement. This is the main reason why only 30–50% of university patents are commercialized (Interviewee from the OTA).

Lack of resources also limits the up scaling of clean energy technologies, thereby hindering their ability to gain purchase in the market. Policy has failed to build long-lasting public–private partnerships and to financially plan innovative activities: "15 years ago, there was a program called the Strategic Technology Environmental Partnership (STEP). Its purpose was to take new clean technologies and make the proof-of-concept for commercialization. Once the technology was ready to be deployed, we proposed it to the companies. The program no longer exists, mainly because of lack of resources and change of administration." (Interviewee from the OTA.) Indeed, incentives that support the clean energy sector in the Boston area depend heavily on the governing party. However, there is a mismatch between the horizon of clean energy development and the horizon of political turnover; this increases the uncertainty of clean energy, making it less attractive for venture capitalists (Technology officer from MIT). Although venture capitalists are key for the flourishing of innovation activities in the US private sector, they are not particularly attracted to and active in the clean energy market due to its risky nature [2]. US states (with the exception of California) tend to be conservative with venture capital, due to the long-time horizons involved. In particular, the transition to clean energy technologies cannot occur in the short term (Interviewee from the EPA). This is one of the reasons why companies are afraid of investing in clean energy technologies, as they are unsure whether such technologies will prove sound investments over the long term.

With respect to infrastructural interventions for the commercialization of clean energy, the interviewed actors recognized a lack of policy. Massachusetts is highly dependent on external sources, considering that the state's energy consumption exceeds its production. The state does not produce any petroleum, coal or natural gas, yet its net electricity generation is 73.3% dependent on natural gas, 0.3% dependent on petroleum, 3.7% dependent on coal, 14.5% dependent on nuclear energy, and only 5.7% dependent on renewables (mainly hydroelectric and biomass) [7]. Moreover, Boston—the largest city in the state—has the oldest active port in the US; this port has petroleum product terminals

and the only liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals. In addition, Massachusetts is home to the largest coal-fired power plant in New England. This shows that state policy has mainly engaged in infrastructure for economic development (see storyline 2), rather than infrastructure that could boost the deployment of clean energy technologies (e.g., the MassCEC funding programs neither supply testing areas nor build infrastructural facilities for start-ups in the clean energy technologies niche).

All of these elements, which emerged from the discourse analysis, substantially undermine the belief that policy has embarked on a flourishing path to a clean energy transition in the Boston area.

Overall, storylines 2 and 3 seem to confirm what emerged in storyline 1—that the clean energy niche in the Boston area is dynamic and potentially able to achieve maturity. However, these two storylines provide two rather contrasting perspectives on this potential. On the one hand, storyline 2 stresses the role of public policy in supporting the emergence of the niche. On the other hand, storyline 3 suggests that policy has failed to support the deployment of clean energy technologies in the Boston area due to a lack of pressure on the incumbent energy regime; thus, breakthrough of the clean energy niche has been impeded.

#### **4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks**

Overall, our investigation showed that the clean energy niche in the Boston area is characterized by a fast growing and dynamic innovation environment. In particular, important actors in the quickly evolving clean energy niche are: (i) local research institutions and universities that provide innovation, a specialized workforce, laboratories, and equipment; and (ii) technology business incubators (e.g., Greentown Labs) and clean technology business accelerators (e.g., Cleantech Open Northeast, Venture Café, MassChallenge), which support start-ups in developing innovative business plans and networking with strategic partners, mainly for mentorship and resources. The activity of these actors lays the groundwork for the emergence of an innovative niche, by means of knowledge generation and networking. However, these actors are failing to up-scale clean energy technologies into innovative systems and to fully penetrate the market. In addition, they are lacking in long-term financial resources, as they are dependent on private funds and/or affected by instable political support.

Given the importance that the literature attributes to policy intervention for the development of clean technologies, we further tested the engagement of public agencies in the Boston area in relation to the three niche mechanisms determined through SNM. We identified a legitimizing public engagement storyline (storyline 2) grounded on three key narratives, each reflecting a policy intervention affecting niche mechanisms. The first policy intervention emerged from interviewees' discourse concerning the adoption of a significant number of environmentally friendly laws and regulations, paving the way to a common expectation of clean energy technologies development. The second policy regarded the availability of public funding for knowledge creation and sharing, in order to trigger actors' learning processes. Finally, the third policy targeted infrastructures for a collaborative environment to support networking among actors—both within and beyond the niche.

However, the narratives in the public delegitimizing storyline (storyline 3) identified gaps at the policy level that, according to the respondents, hindered the upscale of clean energy technologies, and thus the development of the clean energy niche in the Boston area. These gaps related generally to three major pitfalls in the public strategy for developing the clean energy niche: (i) state policy engaged more in adopting new laws rather than harmonizing regulation to destabilize well-established practices; (ii) policy intervention had not yet succeeded in attracting private investment to the clean energy sector, resulting in a dependent relation between (unstable) public funding and the market uptake of clean energy technologies; and (iii) by only occasionally providing key infrastructures (e.g., facilities for market-level technology deployment), policy had not yet succeeded in building an effective commercialization program, resulting in the limited deployment of clean energy technologies in the Boston area and hindering the clean energy niche breakthrough.

Overall, until policy designs and implements focused interventions, the emerging clean energy niche in the Boston area, though significantly dynamic, will struggle to overturn the incumbent regime. This explains why, although the government has invested significantly in clean technologies research and development, the Boston area remains at an early stage of deployment of clean energy technologies.

As a final remark, we shall suggest a possible action to overcome these pitfalls and speed up the transition process. As noted, the clean energy sector in the Boston area is largely composed of small companies—particularly start-ups—that are dispersed across the state. This industrial structure has struggled to develop and, for this reason, is not attractive for venture capital investment, which is "focused on some of the safer bets rather than on the radical innovation that is required to allow the sector to transform society so as to meet the double objective of promoting economic growth and mitigating climate change" [2] (p. 136). Therefore, larger amounts of public resources must be invested to stimulate the growth of small companies. This will attract private investments, facilitating a fruitful entrepreneurial environment and stimulating the development of dedicated infrastructures for the deployment of innovative clean energy technologies.

One limitation of the methodological approach we have applied in this work regards the inclusion of only local actors in the niche, while according to the socio technical transition literature, niches can be defined as networks of both local and global actors [57–60]. In that respect, it could be important to investigate learning processes that aggregate niches' actors in networks generating global structures. However, exploring global (knowledge) spillovers of the Boston area clean energy niche goes beyond the scope of this paper—whose purpose is to assess the role of policy in fostering/hindering the emergence of the clean energy niche and the deployment of clean energy technologies in the Boston area—and would represent a very fertile line for future research.

Furthermore, although the policy gaps and shortfalls identified in this paper are context-specific—grounded in the discourse of local actors—the analysis has highlighted divergent policy needs in the different phases of niche emergence and maturation. Considering the role of actors' perceptions and needs in transition studies, ADA could be a suitable methodology for pinpointing context-specific needs in the energy transition process. For this reason, as an interesting and important further line of research, we suggest that ADA be applied in developing countries that have only recently begun to engage in energy transition pathways.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization: A.T. and P.M.; methodology: A.T.; validation: A.T. and P.M.; formal analysis: A.T.; investigation: A.T.; resources: A.T.; data curation: A.T.; writing—original draft preparation: A.T.; writing—review and editing: A.T. and P.M. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.
