**Appendix A**

**Table A1.** Regional fishery bodies fact sheet.






Source: FAO Fisheries Division, available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/search/en.

**Table A1.** *Cont.*

### **References**


### *Article* **May China Fish in the Arctic Ocean?**

**Yen-Chiang Chang <sup>1</sup> and Mehran Idris Khan 1,2,\***


**Abstract:** In addition to the traditional so-called Arctic states, non-Artic states and some other international organisations are now showing a growing interest in this area. China, for example, has achieved some progress, since becoming an Arctic Council permanent observer, through participation in resource development in the region and strengthening its bilateral relations with the Arctic states. The present study examines China's Arctic policy and its implications for the governance of the Arctic Ocean. It also provides an insight into the existing relevant international legal instruments and examines China's interest in the participation, governance, and resource protection activities in the Arctic Ocean region, to successfully implement Chinese Arctic policy. To this end, the study examines the connection between the "white paper" and "China's Arctic Policy", in the context of executing the "Belt and Road Initiative", in particular the "Arctic Silk Road". The study concludes that China intends to perform a dynamic role in governing the Arctic Ocean, as a less challenging but cooperative partner in this region.

**Keywords:** China's white paper for Arctic policy; fisheries resources; Arctic Ocean; Chinese legal rights

**Citation:** Chang, Y.-C.; Khan, M.I. May China Fish in the Arctic Ocean? *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 11875. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132111875

Academic Editor: Tim Gray

Received: 7 October 2021 Accepted: 26 October 2021 Published: 27 October 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

### **1. Introduction**

Over the past 15 years, the ice of the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) has been increasingly melting and thus, offering new opportunities for international navigation [1]. For example, in the summer of 2012, around 40% of the CAO was covered with ice and thus appeared as unexplored open water on maps [2]. In recent times, new ocean access can be observed for the first time in many years of known history. In addition, as global warming increases, the probability of an ice-free Arctic Ocean increases in the coming years [3].

It is a fact that the fish stock of the Arctic is moving towards the sub-Arctic waters [4], with the summer retreat of the sea ice and the warming of the oceanic waters [5]. This combination of species in open waters and fishery stocks moving north increases the prospect of fishing in the Arctic, although it is as yet unclear which species, in what numbers and when, might arrive in the CAO waters [6]. Fish governance in the CAO has, however, become a more demanding problem as regards the governance of the Arctic Ocean, beyond national jurisdiction. The five Arctic states signed the Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean [7], in July 2015, including noting their intention to develop further comprehensive international agreement(s) based on these principles [8].

Usually, such issues are addressed as social or economic issues, which subsequently create political interests and lead to final planning and policymaking; fishing in the open waters of the Bering Sea, known as the Donut Hole, shows evidence of this pattern [9]. Scientific efforts have helped to establish governance goals for fish stocks and support effective management [10]. The signing of the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean by Arctic states, together with other non-Arctic states (China, Korea, Japan, and Iceland and the European Union), has developed a legal euphoria [11]. These five Arctic coastal states joined a group of non-Arctic states for the first time, to reach a legally binding agreement concerning specific issues in the Arctic

region; this legal development recognises that there is currently no ongoing commercial fishing within the high seas of the Arctic region [12]. As a result of the aforementioned, a distinguishing feature of this agreement can be identified as acceptance of the precautionary principle of international law.

On the other side of the coin, China has perceived itself as a "Near Arctic State"; what occurs in the Arctic Ocean region is having a progressively substantial impact on China, and it is also true that climate change and the ecosystems in the Arctic Ocean can have an impact on the Chinese climate, which in turn could have a significant impact on overall living conditions, especially concerning agricultural production in China [8]. In addition to potential navigation through the Arctic, the commercial exploitation of the Arctic Sea lanes also has potential implications for trade and economic development in China. Such developments as those concerning the oil and mineral resources in the Arctic Ocean region are of significant Chinese interest, as an important manufacturer of industrial goods, as well as a consumer of raw materials [13].

Concerning the participation in the Arctic Ocean region, China claims to have a long history, as evidenced by the signing of the Svalbard Treaty 1925 [14], and the opening of the Huang He research station in Ny-Ålesund in 1925 and 2004, respectively [15]. In addition, since 1999, China has led six scientific tours to the Arctic region and committed to running similar trips every two years, from 2012 onwards. Later, Chinese scientists made the state's first transaction voyage to Iceland from Shanghai, aboard the Xuelong (Snow Dragon) icebreaker, in August 2012 [16]. There are several goals of Chinese scientific expeditions to the Arctic Ocean region, including marine biological research, aurora observations, and environmental concerns.

China understood in earlier years that working with Arctic coastal states was the ideal way for it to participate in various Arctic-related issues [17]. For this purpose, China has also been periodically and significantly investing in various fields of Arctic states, e.g., in March 2015, in cooperation with Russian gas company, Novatek, China made available USD 15 billion to finance a USD 27 billion plant for liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the Russian Yamal peninsula [18]. Furthermore, in collaboration with London Mining in the UK, a Chinese company attempted to create an Isua iron ore mine in Greenland. That venture failed, however, with the bankruptcy of London Mining resulting from plunging iron ore prices, but the Chinese corporation retained the exploration rights of Isua and acquired the subsidiary of London Mining, which was based in Greenland. Later, in 2015, a Chinese private trading company (the General Nice Group) took over a large iron ore mine in Greenland, which was valued at around USD 2 billion [19]. In addition to this, some Chinese corporations have also been concerned about making significant investments in local infrastructure in the Arctic states [20].

Moreover, the potential of the fishery stocks in the CAO is also a great source of attraction for the growing Chinese economy and its global diplomatic mission of expanding and growing peacefully. Chinese demand for fish has grown significantly with the rapid rise in income of many of the Chinese population, as well as the collapse of fish stock resources in its near-shore areas [8]. These demands have led to the recent improvements in and the expansion of the deep-sea fishing fleet in China. It is also notable that experts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have suggested that overseas fishing could best suit the long-term priority of agricultural development in China [21]. China may, thus, wish to increase its presence in fishing around the globe, including participating in governance, conservation, and resource development activities in the Arctic Ocean region.

The methodology employed in this article is based on the qualitative data analysis of working papers, national policy documents, international and regional agreements, academic journals, books, key newspaper articles, reports, and other important relevant electronic materials including international organisations. It draws on the literature and content analysis method to qualitatively analyse the Arctic governance policies of the Arctic states and other major stakeholders. By doing so, however, the main focus of this article is China's role in Arctic governance as represented by its Arctic policy and future prospects,

i.e., China's White Paper—Arctic Policy, which is highly representative of how China deals with Arctic governance and supports its claim of being a near-Arctic state promoting its stances of co-existence and the sustainable future use of the Arctic fisheries. To this end, Section 2 provides insight into China's views on the Arctic Ocean. Section 3 examines Chinese Arctic policy as laid down in its white paper, including its participation in the governance, conservation, resource development and protection, and utilisation of fish stocks and other living resources, as well as the routes of the Arctic Ocean as part of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Section 4 provides an analysis of the available existing international treaties and legal agreements concerning fishing issues in the Arctic Ocean region. Similarly, Section 5 presents the logic and reasoning of China's future role in the Arctic, followed by concrete concluding remarks in Section 6.

### **2. China's Views on International Cooperation in the Arctic Ocean**

The fact of the continuing melting of the Arctic sea ice poses grave security and sovereignty challenges, which are gradually manifested in developing relationships between both the Arctic states and non-Arctic states such as Japan, China, India, and South Korea [22]. International cooperation concerning the Arctic Ocean region needs to be strengthened. Most Arctic issues are critically national; however, some are also regional and international, i.e., problems related to resource development, navigation, and environmental effects of climate change. These problems need deeper consideration of the causes and effects of natural variability and man-made ecological variations in the Arctic Ocean. Global cooperation in the Arctic region is increasingly expanding over time, creating significant challenges as well as enormous potential in the area. The history of such international collaboration in the Arctic goes back to the early 1990s, emphasising scientific research and environmental protection, but this swiftly extended to include sustainable development [23]. International cooperation among the states around the Arctic and other non-Arctic states has developed on some levels bilaterally or within the framework of the existing regional forums and international organisations, in the sphere of sustainable development, ecological protection, and scientific research.

In 2015, at the third meeting of the Arctic Circle held in Iceland, the then Deputy Foreign Minister of China delivered a keynote address entitled "China in the Arctic: Policies and Practices" [24]. The next year, China's chief climate change negotiator delivered another speech at the Fourth Assembly of the Arctic Circle on China's vision of working together in the Arctic [25]. These speeches and the way forward used the key word "cooperation" in the Arctic, which highlighted an emerging Chinese Arctic policy. Recognition and respect for mutual rights is the basis for international legal cooperation between the Arctic and non-Arctic states. The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [26] provides the Arctic states with the rights over jurisdiction as well as sovereignty, as regards their particular coastal areas of the Arctic Ocean. Similarly, non-Artic states also enjoy the rights of navigation and scientific research [27]. In order to develop a partnership in the Arctic region, all these states should act primarily based on mutual recognition and respect for the relevant provisions of international law.

Secondly, trust and mutual understanding offer political assurance for cooperation between these states. Arctic states, which have a greater interest in Arctic-related affairs, claim to be entitled to play a more dominant role in these affairs than that of non-Arctic states. Given the supra-regional impact of some Arctic-related problems, such as environmental impact, non-Arctic states also claim to have legitimate interests in matters relating to the Arctic Ocean [28]. There is no doubt that all these states will perform a progressively important part in Arctic affairs, with all interests being linked. In order to strengthen cooperation, all the concerned states should strive to improve their trust and mutual understanding, strengthen communication, mutual assistance and support, and seek convergent areas of interest, based on mutual respect for their rights.

Thirdly, the treatment of supra-regional problems through joint research efforts is an important field of cooperation among various states which claim their interest in the Arctic

Ocean. Increased trust and mutual assistance in scientific research will enable these states to consider supra-regional problems from a broader perspective, sending a broader message to the global scientific community while also appropriately simplifying the processes of resolution of pertinent problems. This collaboration model has already produced promising results in addressing issues, for example, Artic shipping and climate change [22]. The problem for the Arctic Council members is now to include the non-Arctic states in related scientific research and other comprehensive discussions at an early stage [29].

There are different specific interests, rights, and concerns between the Arctic and non-Arctic states concerning Arctic affairs: sustainable development, stability, and peace in the Arctic Ocean, however, serve the common interests of all states concerned. International cooperation and partnerships concerning mutual benefits that strengthen and promote these interests will certainly be the most suitable path in this region of increasingly internationally significance. Given the situation, "respect" is the fundamental basis for Chinese participation in Arctic-related affairs; therefore, "cooperation" could be an effective vehicle for Chinese Arctic policy. This can be a win-win situation for Chinese participation in various affairs or activities in the Arctic Ocean, by encouraging the message that all parties involved in all areas of activity should seek mutual benefit and mutual progress. China's interests typically range from promoting bilateral Arctic diplomacy to participating in the governance of Arctic affairs, as well as access to resource exploitation opportunities and exploration [30]. So far, Chinese involvement in the Arctic region has been relatively modest. In 2013, China gained observer status with the Arctic Council and slightly strengthened its bilateral relationships with some of the surrounding states, especially Iceland and Finland, while participating in various Arctic-related activities, i.e., resource development in the region [31].

The newly issued Chinese white paper concerning its Arctic policy indicates that the Arctic's political goals concern four basic principles—understanding, protection, development, and participation in Arctic governance. This stresses the need for "cooperation, sustainability, respect, and win-win results" to achieve these political goals. Chinese strategy concerning the Arctic is just beginning to evolve and is still facing several challenges, including the natural environment in the Arctic Ocean, coupled with technological constraints, disputes among the Arctic states on the issues concerning territorial sovereignty, and security activities between certain states. In sum, with the recently published Chinese Arctic policy, the white paper, China strategically highlighted a crucial issue in the future of Arctic affairs, that of cooperation.

### **3. China's Arctic Policy—'White Paper'**

China published its first white paper concerning its Arctic policy in January 2018. China has stated that its political goals as a major stakeholder as well as a "Near Arctic State" are to participate, protect, understand, and develop Arctic governance, in order to protect the common interests of the international community concerning the communities in the Arctic and, eventually, to promote sustainable development [32]. Thus, as a rising power, China primarily wants to understand the Arctic to use and protect this resource-rich region [11]. However, the question arises as to how China will attempt to reconcile the use and protection of natural resources in the Arctic region, bearing in mind progress to date.

As indicated in the white paper, Chinese Arctic policies should not, however, be seen as a revelation but as a confirmation of its existing policy. Chinese officials formulated the content of the white paper in previous years; these basic principles and political goals of its participation in the Arctic have already been raised several times by Chinese officials [33]. It is pertinent to mention here that all Arctic and some observer states have published their corresponding strategy documents concerning their Arctic policies. The conclusion of Chinese Arctic politics is relatively new, as compared to those of the other Arctic states, and is still in progress [34]. In contrast to its Western counterparts, China only outlines its policy in writing where it is obliged to do so or when it is in its best interests. The publication of the white paper, therefore, shows how important the Arctic is to policymakers.

In the above discussion and guidelines, it appears that the white paper stresses Chinese adherence to international law and the framework of international treaties. For example, with regard to scientific research, China expressed respect for the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states while, simultaneously, the freedom of scientific research and exploitation, as well as exploration of all high seas in the Arctic Ocean region, are essentially respected [33]. Similarly, it argues that further developments of shipping routes in the Arctic must also comply with international law, UNCLOS, and the freedom of navigation [27].

### *3.1. Chinese Participation in the Governance, Conservation, Resource Protection, and Utilisation of Fisheries and Other Living Resources in the Arctic*

It is an acknowledged fact that the Arctic Ocean region has the potential to become a new fishing area, with fish stocks tending to move north due to various factors, including climate change [35]. With regard to deep-sea fishing in the Arctic region, China has continuously taken a strong stance in favour of scientific research, resource protection, and sustainable utilisation. While China enjoys the legitimate right to conduct marine scientific research and development in the Arctic region, all relevant states should continue to meet their legal obligations to conserve the ecosystem and fish stocks in the region [36].

As part of China's most recent Arctic policy, the country is supporting efforts to draft a legally binding universal treaty on the conservation and governance of fish stocks concerning the Arctic Ocean. China also supports the creation of an organisation concerning the protection and governance of Arctic fisheries or other similar institutional measures, on the basis of relevant provisions of UNCLOS. In this way, China will increase the study and exploration of deep-sea fishing resources in the Arctic, conduct appropriate fishing activities, and form a productive part in the organisation of deep-sea fishing in the Arctic. It is a fact that China hopes to support mutual cooperation with the Arctic States in the areas of governance, resource development, conservation, exploration, and the use of potential fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean. China is also committed to the appropriate protection of Arctic biodiversity, clear and sensible exploration and exploitation, sustainable use of the genetic resources of the Arctic region, and reasonable sharing and exploitation of the benefits arising from the use of these Arctic resources.

Globally, China claims to actively participate in formulating the rules relating to deepsea fishing governance, the global environment, international marine affairs, and climate change, and fulfils its international obligations under international law. China is expanding its support and collaboration with several states and global organisations in promoting energy-saving and environmental protection, low carbon development, and emission reduction [37]. China also encourages cooperation in combating the issues of climate change and maintains the principles of fairness and shared but differentiated responsibility under the Paris Agreement [38], the Kyoto Protocol [39], and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [40], and supports developing countries in combating the issues of climate change [41]. Similarly, China also claims to play a productive part in various activities under the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and is making significant efforts to meet its global obligations to ensure the safety of shipping by preventing its ships from creating marine environmental pollution, while supporting greater global cooperation in the area of marine technology and research as regards the shipping industry, within the framework of the IMO [42]. China is actively participating in negotiations on the regulation of deep-sea fish stocks in the Arctic region and is calling for a legally binding international treaty for the development, protection, and governance of fish resources on the high seas in this region [43]. It urges that such a globally binding treaty should enable exploratory fishing activities and appropriate scientific research on the high seas in the Arctic region, as well as protecting the freedom of all states' rights on the high seas under the pertinent provisions of UNCLOS and international law.

The white paper underscores Chinese interests in the lawful and rational use of Arctic resources. China reaffirms that it respects the Arctic states' sovereign rights over minerals, gas, and oil and fishery resources in the areas for which they are responsible under international law and respects the concerns and interests of the residents of the residents Arctic region [22]. Of the five Arctic coastal states, Canada is most concerned about the impact of the Chinese Arctic policy, as laid down in the white paper. Canadian experts caution that the Chinese Arctic policy may try to draw a fine line between respecting the sovereignty of the Arctic states and the possibility of benefiting from international disputes [44]. An expert, Robert Huebert, sees the use of language such as "respect for international law" in the Chinese Arctic policy in the white paper as an attempt to articulate the limits of the sovereignty of the Arctic states [45]. Among the issues about which Canada is most concerned is whether China will have the same legal position as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US): to treat the Northwest Passage as a "road for international use", contrary to what Canada claims as "internal waters" [46]. By means of its Arctic policy, however, China claims that it largely avoids this complicated problem and instead focuses on the significant opportunities as well as possible challenges that may arise from environmental and economic considerations. As shown in Table 1, China holds a long history of engagement in the various aspects concerning the Arctic Ocean, including science and technology, management, cooperation, ocean governance, and sustainable fisheries across the region.


**Table 1.** Chinese chronological history of engagement in the Arctic Ocean.

Source: Created by this research.

### *3.2. The Routes of the Arctic Ocean as Part of the BRI*

Scientific researchers such as Camilla Sørensen and Ya˘gci (2018) have argued that the Arctic Ocean routes have been the central element of Arctic diplomacy in China for some time and its Arctic policy in the recent legal development is inadequate in the current situation [47]. In a related area, however, the Arctic states are opening up the novel and unique opportunities for trade and development. This concerns China's political goal of contributing to the development of the routes of the Arctic Ocean, which China believes may become a reality possible for commercial purposes earlier than is generally expected. China claims that the routes of the Arctic Ocean can be an attractive alternative to the strategically endangered routes passing through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca, on which the country currently depends for its international trade with European countries [48]. In June 2017, China officially declared the routes of the Arctic Ocean as part of its BRI and, since then, has started to cooperate with Arctic states, i.e., through high-level Chinese officials' visits to the Arctic Ocean [49].

### *3.3. The Ground of Polar Silk Road (PSR) Gains*

The Chinese have engaged in cooperation and dialogue with Russia in developing the infrastructure related to the routes of the North Sea for the major Chinese–Russian natural gas projects on the Yamal peninsula [50]. In addition, China has intensified cooperation and dialogue in the region with regard to Iceland and Finland. Iceland is also considering identifying itself as a logistical "hub" on the PSR, which, according to China's white paper, has become the term for the Chinese vision of Arctic Ocean routes [51]. Preliminary negotiations are currently underway in Finland to create a 10,500 km cable through the Arctic to ensure the fastest data connection between Europe and China [52]. In addition, Norway and Finland have started collaboration on an "Arctic Corridor", comprising railway lines from Kirkenes in Norway to Rovaniemi in Finland, which has been indicated as a possible terminus of the PSR [53]. In addition, China also has growing interests in Sweden (in Lysekil), where Chinese corporations want to invest in the expansion project of ports and the construction of roads, bridges, and railways, concerning the necessary surrounding infrastructure of the port of Lysekil, which links to the PSR [54].

All these are potential major Chinese investments; these projects are linked to the recognition of the BRI, which is likely to lead China's commercial banks and companies, as well as other involved parties, having a greater chance of obtaining funding, i.e., from the Silk Road Fund, the Chinese state investment fund, and will probably mean they can count on political support. The Arctic policy of China through the white paper clearly encourages Chinese corporations to prioritise involvement in the construction of infrastructure related to routes of the Arctic Ocean and stresses that China is willing to work with any Arctic state interested in developing the PSR [47].

The aforementioned shows that China intends to cooperate with all stakeholders to construct the PSR by developing various shipping routes in the Arctic Ocean [55]. The recent Chinese white paper emphasised the special status of the Arctic Ocean, as it is an oceanic region that includes areas within states' jurisdictions as well as areas within universal scope, making it a region that has the interest of both Arctic and non-Arctic states. Intrinsically, Arctic problems are not only national or internal problems for the Arctic states but also international concerns. As stated in China's Arctic policy, the current situation concerning various activities in the Arctic Ocean not only affects the Arctic states internally or the relations between Arctic states. Beyond the Arctic states, it has "global impact" and "critical impact" on the development, sustainability, and survival of all states, including China [56].

### **4. Existing International Treaties Regarding Fishery Issues in the Arctic Ocean**

UNCLOS provides that any coastal state has a right over fishing and other coastal activities extending up to 200 nautical miles from its coastal baseline. According to Article 87 of UNCLOS, vessels of all states have the right to fish in the areas on the high seas, unless they have entered into an international agreement in which otherwise is stipulated. Several international legal instruments, in some way, address issues concerning fishing in the Arctic Ocean region. Among these, the most recent development is that, on 3 October 2018, the governments of China, Korea, Japan, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, the Russian Federation, the EU, and the US, signed an agreement to prevent unregulated

commercial fishing on the high seas in the Arctic region [57]. This is the first agreement of its kind to apply a legally binding precautionary approach for the protection of the Arctic Ocean from commercial fishing before fishing begins in that area.

According to this agreement, the contracting parties undertake not to participate in commercial fishing in the CAO until a better understanding exists concerning the current fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean region. The parties under the agreement will set up joint monitoring and scientific research programmes to enhance understanding of the ecosystems of the Arctic region and determine whether the fish stocks can be harvested sustainably [58]. This programme should provide the contracting parties appropriate time to develop a better understanding of the marine species and ecosystems in the region in order to inform them about protection and governance measures. After this agreement is enforced, it will actively last for 16 years and be renewed every five years thereafter, subject to the mutual consent of the parties and must address any party objecting [59,60]. It is perceived that the CAO fisheries administration covers much beyond the fisheries, including cooperative Arctic governance and relations between the Arctic and non-Arctic states, as well as among the Arctic states [8]. Any fishing activity in CAO will couple with some negative impacts on the fish stock and the agreement creates an unusual avenue of participation that is based on caution rather than response. Eventually, such an arrangement could be more of a matter of diplomatic relations and states' politics. In addition, some scientists and states have shown their concerns and indicated that a CAO fisheries agreement is not necessary or urgent as there is no fishing activity or evidence that such activity could start in the foreseeable future [6]. Similarly, Young and Kim (2013) argued that the level of activity in the Arctic Ocean, particularly in relation to the high seas, was overestimated—the level of fear concerning gaps in the governance system of the Arctic Ocean region is largely predictive of diverting the world's energies to a grey area [17]. Such a scenario comprising the lack of scientific knowledge of the CAO species coupled with the unpredictable marine ecosystem could be catastrophic. Since China has a diplomatic history to carefully consider, it must address all reservations before ratifying any global agreement it has signed in light of best national interests. Nine out of ten signatories of this agreement had already ratified it, and in May 2021, after due consideration, China has also ratified this agreement, thus it came into force in June 2021 for the next 16 years [61]. Many regional authorities have already considered and developed measures concerning the governance and conservation of exploration fishing [62]. A collection evaluation of the present measures will represent a first step in the additional development of the governance and conservation measures for the control of exploratory fishing in the Arctic region.

### *4.1. The US–Canada Bilateral Fisheries Management Agreements*

The US shares coastal borders with Canada at the Great Lakes and in three oceans the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic Ocean. In these economically and ecologically significant regions, they share several important fishing resources and, at the same time, also face complex challenges in terms of conservation and governance. Given this situation, the US has been negotiating with Canada to sign several formal treaties and agreements that will facilitate collaboration on these shared fishing resources in the Arctic Ocean region. These governance measures also include three bilateral commissions, namely the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC), the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), and the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission (GLFC) [63]. They have also made arrangements to ensure sustainable governance and fair access to other important marine resources, including Pacific hake/whiting and Pacific albacore [64]. Similarly, various activities and recent legal developments concerning the Arctic Ocean region and the newly discovered fish resources due to the rapid ice melting over recent years are also of great importance and concern not only to the US and Canada but to all the Arctic states.

### *4.2. International Instruments Concerning Fishing Regulations*

International fishing law has emerged as a body of law on the basis of some binding and nonbinding global legal instruments on appropriate regulations [65]. There are some legally binding instruments: treaties and agreements that are concluded in writing by states and international organisations to affix obligations and create legal rights. Such instruments are known as "hard laws" since the provisions of such instruments are legally binding on the contracting parties once they come into force. In contrast, nonbinding legal instruments offer guidelines for states and are generally known as "soft laws" because the provisions of these instruments do not bind the contracting parties [65]. The UN has played a key role in facilitating the adoption of some global instruments concerning the conservation and governance of fisheries resources through its specialised agencies, including the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and even directly [66].

In addition to the above, the FAO has also put in place four International Action Plans (IPOAs) to address the various issues raised in its negotiations. These are generally non-legally binding measures, such as the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, that contain measures to primarily address several persistent issues, including combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, the bycatching of seabirds in longline fisheries, the governance and conservation of marine species such as sharks, fishing, and capacity management [67,68]. These different IPOAs address various pertinent issues, which include IPOA-IUU fishing, IPOA-fishing capacity, IPOA-sharks, and IPOA-sea birds. By accepting any IPO, states can ensure that other states increase the measures they are taking. The implementation of any IPO is voluntary and it is left to states to take explicit appropriate measures, including addressing problems that arise both in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the high seas [65]. Several international treaties deal with specific Arctic issues and are particularly relevant to the treatment of various Arctic issues. These agreements are presented here in chronological order, in Table 2.


**Table 2.** International agreements that directly or indirectly concern fisheries in the Arctic Region.

#### **Table 2.** *Cont.*


Source: Created by this research.

### **5. The Logic and Reasoning of China's Future Role in the Arctic**

China identifies itself as a near-Arctic state and emphasises that "China is an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs." Based on these two important narratives, China is primarily concerned with Arctic environmental conditions and the possible impact the region has on the Chinese climate system, the environment, and related economic interests [56]. With a forward-looking vision, China claims to lead the way towards a shared future for humanity by increasing involvement in Arctic affairs and contributing to Arctic knowledge and development in its economic and research activities [43]. It can be seen in China's recent fiveyear plan for 2016–2020, which closed the gap between itself and many Arctic states. For example, China now has two polar icebreakers and more scientific infrastructure capacities in the Arctic than any other non-Arctic state, including the Yellow River Station in Svalbard, the China-Island Arctic Observatory, and the Xuelong and Xuelong 2 icebreakers [69].

### *5.1. Current Arctic Legal Regime and the Future Role of China*

Changes to fishery stock compositions and distributions can result in conflicts between stakeholders of the Arctic due to various reasons, including unregulated fishing, overlapping jurisdictional claims, and a lack of multiregional agreements. The current Arctic fisheries management model is not flexible enough to meritoriously address the challenges of future fisheries caused by climate change. It merits a comprehensive law and order regime in the high seas in connection with environmental protection, especially to vulnerable indigenous peoples and the whole world at large.

Climate change has been challenging the effectiveness of the existing structure of international resource management in the Arctic Ocean. For example, in fisheries management, the matters relating to quota allocation and access to the EEZs tend to be a highly controversial issue anytime; therefore, this problem should be resolved by a broader and more robust set of compliance mechanisms. Presently, the basis for a legal framework in the region is the UNCLOS of 1982 and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) of 1995 (broadly followed by the recent CAO Agreement in 2018); however, these provide principles of international cooperation in conservation and fisheries management but do not formalise the way states use them [70]. Therefore, considering the fact that the Arctic is warming faster than any other area on Earth [71], this complex region requires a special and shared legal regime to achieve sustainable development goals.

China's future Arctic policy as demonstrated by Chinese officials includes six specific points, namely (1) exploring and further understanding the Arctic, (2) protecting and using the Arctic rationally, (3) respecting the internal rights of the Arctic states and indigenous peoples, (4) respecting the rights of non-Arctic states and the general interests of the global community, (5) building a multilevel framework for cooperation in the Arctic for winwin outcomes, and (6) supporting the Arctic governance system on the basis of existing international law [33]. The Arctic has the potential to provide solutions to domestic problems, including food production and energy security. This is because the Arctic, which is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world, provides a unique environment for food security research and options for importing food sources such as uncovered fish and Arctic seafood, as well as active oil and gas mining projects in China [72].

In addition to natural resources, China has a great practical interest in developing a long-term transport infrastructure through its vision of the PSR—an extension of the Chinese BRI [73]. The principle of the BRI is to create a network of roadways, railways, oil pipelines, and ports that may connect Beijing to Europe via the Middle East [73]. To this end, China has identified around 900 projects with an estimated cost of USD 900 billion within the framework of the BRI [74]. However, China's Arctic strategy on fishery resources is only beginning to evolve and still faces many challenges. Therefore, it underlines a key issue—cooperation—to mutually recognise the right of states to discover and release the potential of Arctic fish [22].

The white paper combines two provocative components of Chinese politics: adherence to the principles formulated by the Arctic Council and existing laws, while also aiming to defend the legitimate rights of non-Arctic states and improving legislation favouring better openness. The logical and practical approach that enabled China to develop diverse diplomacy towards the Arctic states implies clear arguments for interpreting the laws and key instruments—participation in Arctic governance, access to Arctic fishery resources, and global transport via the Arctic route [56]. Incidentally, despite its commitments to the existing legal system, China will be an activist for the rights of non-Arctic states in a situation conducive to legal change. Ultimately, if successful in this area, it will dramatically impact awareness of China's new role both in the Arctic and globally.

### *5.2. The Exploitation of Fishery Resources in the CAO*

It is a fact that the Arctic periphery is exceptionally rich in fishing resources: the Bering region, Baffin Bay, the Chukchi, and the Barents Sea are fishing areas with an abundance of commercial species—they provide around 20% of the world catch—such as cod, which are targeted by Spanish fishermen [75]. Therefore, it seems clear that as the ice recedes, the newly opened waters will be just as rich. However, the worst part is that the waters are very stratified, with cold, soft water from the melting ice remaining on top of the warmer and saltier water, inhibiting the increase of nutrients from the soil. This is combined with the lack of ports to unload, ship, and process the catches, along with the Arctic Ocean's acidification because, paradoxically, cold water absorbs more CO2 than warm water, and the misunderstood phenomenon of anomalous abundance and pollutants, meaning the apparent promise of bountiful catches has little support [76].

China is committed to improving and complementing the Arctic governance regime [36]. It should be noted that Arctic governance must be an integrative, holistic, and adaptive ecosystem with transboundary dimensions due to its complexity in the Arctic [77]. The governance of maritime transport is, in fact, one of the dimensions of Arctic governance. In a broader sense, China believes that the UN Charter and UNCLOS are essential elements of the basic legal framework for navigation in the Arctic [43]. Specifically, China considers the IMO as the global standard-setting authority for international maritime transport security, safety, and environmental performance and recognises that IMO plays an active role in formulating navigation rules for maritime transport in the Arctic. At present, actively participating in the governance of Arctic maritime transport is China's strategy for action at a global and a regional level [78].

### *5.3. China's Future Attitudes Reflected by Its Arctic Policy*

The impacts of developments and climate change in the region have pushed China to step up its efforts in the far north for a longer perspective [79]. In 2013, China became an observer to the Arctic Council with clear interests in the Arctic: use of the northern route, access to the natural resources of the Arctic, and working together to strengthen its image as one of the major powers. To this end, China has been investing heavily in projects in almost all Arctic countries [80]. In addition, China is expanding its research capabilities in this region; the Arctic strategy includes highlighting the two icebreaker research vessels and research stations in Norway and Iceland [81].

It has been reported that China is building or has built several hard-hull cargo ships. Additionally, at a recent trade fair in Shanghai, China showed models of its newly built ice-resistant LNG carriers [82]. The design and construction of polar ships have been China's political objective since 2016, starting with the thirteenth five-year plan [80]. It is due to the fact that regular use of the northern route would be an economic boom for China because the distance between German and Shanghai ports via the northern route is over 4600 km shorter than via the Suez Canal [83].

It can be said that China's interests concerning the various activities in the Arctic are principally economic, particularly energy cooperation with Russia. To this end, in order to strengthen energy security and reduce its dependence on coal for power generation, in December 2019, China inaugurated the 3000 km "Power of Siberia" gas pipeline connecting northeast China with Russia's Siberian fields [84]. In addition, Chinese enterprises are also playing a significant role in building the Arctic LNG 2 project, which is the second largest natural gas project presently undergoing development phase within the Russian Arctic [85].

### *5.4. Why China Needed an Arctic Policy*

First, climate change is a major concern in the Arctic and an important rationale for China's involvement in Arctic affairs. Indeed, the Arctic suffers from human-induced climate change and is witnessing the rapid melting of permafrost and the collapse of sea ice [86]. Meanwhile, China is the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases [87], while also faces major climate change challenges, such as extreme weather conditions [88]. China's Arctic policy in 2018 promised to tackle climate change in the Arctic and protect its fragile environment, but details are lacking. In 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced to the UN General Assembly that China is committed to being carbon neutral by 2060 [89]. This is a very ambitious step in the fight against climate change. However, some questions remain unclear and will be answered in the subsequent research concerning how this will affect the Arctic. What kinds of projects on the Polar Silk Road in China can help achieve this ambitious goal? Would Chinese investment in Arctic resource development conflict with China's zero greenhouse gas emissions roadmap? These are key issues that require clarification in China's Arctic policy [90].

Second, sustainability is another important theme for the future of the Arctic. China stresses the need to strike a balance between economic development and environmental protection in the Arctic. This is reflected in the negotiations of collective labour agreements, where China speaks of "wise use". However, terms like "sustainable development" and "balance" are subject to potentially conflicting interpretations. What exactly does China mean by equilibrium? It is not just about deep-sea fishing, but almost all Chinese activities in the Arctic. Given the fragile Arctic ecosystem, one would expect a balance between use and protection to shift towards the environment.

In sum, it is time for China to expedite and clarify its constructive ambitions as outlined in the Arctic Policy to shed light on the order that it would like to address the issues in the Arctic with its emerging power. Suppose China, the world's second-largest economy, can develop a vision based on a reinvention of the relationship between humans and nature, supported by a concrete plan. In this case, it will not only help propel the Arctic towards a peaceful and sustainable future, but will also benefit the rise of China in the region and across the globe.

### *5.5. Criticism of China's Arctic Policy and Global Concerns*

Over the last decade, China's Arctic engagement has increased considerably, aiming to offer plentiful economic opportunities. On the other hand, some critics believe that by doing so, China is likely to create new risks and concerns among the eight Arctic states [91]. Similarly, the US has been seriously concerned as China expands its engagements in the Arctic Ocean region; the implications of its activities and even its presence are an increasingly debated topic among the Arctic states, in the US, and across the globe [92]. The US Secretary of State and the Department of Defence publicly raised concerns on China's self-proclaimed status as a "near-Arctic state" [83]. China has claimed compassionate intentions in sustainable development, peace, and improving Arctic governance [93]. However, given the opacity of China's decision making and capability development, many observers and policymakers in the US remain sceptical or even hostile toward China's potential interests in the Arctic; strategic thinkers in the US worry that China's economic engagement in the region could be a precursor to much more invasive political and strategic ambitions [94]. The fact that China's Arctic infrastructure development has the potential for dual-use facilities increases the insecurities that China may intend to have a permanent security presence in the region.

In addition, the fact that Some Arctic states have welcomed chinese economic activities in the Arctic is worrying to the European Parliament and thinktanks too, and they believe that China is interested in a narrow interpretation of its claims and the largest possible interpretation of maritime space in the Arctic Ocean considered as the high seas and international seabed, where non-Arctic states have the same rights as Arctic states [95]. They also believe that China is interested in expanding its BRI into the Arctic to facilitate the strengthening of its claims of co-existence with economic and sustainable development coupled with its participation in Arctic governance affairs, including respect, cooperation, and win-win outcomes. Despite all the critics, if China keeps its word and focuses only on promoting research, peace, and sustainable development, it would obviously be a win-win situation for China, Arctic states, and other stakeholders in the long run.

### **6. Conclusions**

The world, including the Arctic and non-Arctic states, is looking for fisheries resources to meet the requirement for more food and are now considering the potential of the Arctic Ocean as a result of increasing access, due to the melting of the ice cap. Similarly, China is also strategically considering this area from the perspective of the economy as well as ecological and resource governance measures. To this end, China's emerging interest in the circumpolar north was established with the Chinese Arctic policy, as laid down in its white paper. The clear and articulated objectives, priorities, and principles have become a guide for the further development of Arctic politics and international cooperation, concerning all political actors' efforts. More notably, the white paper confirmed China's aim to construct the PSR and identified Arctic participation, conversation, protection, and governance as the crucial areas of Arctic policy, being on par with other regional development since the creation of the PSR will combine economic effort, while also confirming China's national interest in the implementation of such policies in the Arctic. As a result, Arctic governance will tie together the development of intangible mechanisms: legislative and institutional involvement and contribution, which include China's "discursive power".

In addition, the analysis of China's Arctic policy white paper enables the establishment of principles that will form the core of Chinese Arctic policy in the future. The first component that reflects the image is that China is an "important and legitimate stakeholder", a "responsible power" and a "near-Arctic state". The second is an affirmation of the Chinese right to participate in the governance of the Arctic Ocean and to develop Arctic shipping and marine resources, and, consequently, China's obligation to defend the legal rights of a "near-Arctic state", creating a right to access the Arctic resources including fishing, as with the other Arctic states. Thirdly, the intention to make a contribution toward an "Arctic

community with a shared future" [96] through the implementation of the PSR. Such a combination will be at the centre of China's Arctic policy both now and in the future.

Additionally, it is also pertinent to note that China has become one of the major stakeholders in Arctic Ocean governance as adhered by the Agreement to prevent unregulated commercial fishing on the high seas in the Arctic region. However, there is still enough room for improving the effectiveness of the legal framework governing the Arctic—the absence of a shared legal regime. This status will not only enable China to influence environmental governance but also provide access—as one of the key players—to the Arctic fisheries resources in the future. To this end, China has long been focusing on this area through investing in various sectors, including infrastructure development and economic and food security research and development, contributing towards novel shipbuilding technologies, i.e., ice-resistant LNG carriers and polar ships, which is a positive and peaceful strategy towards participation in resources development, protection, and ocean governance across the regions and the globe. If China handles these transactions successfully and peacefully, sustaining them with mutual cooperation in the future, it may enable China—a resourceful continental state closest to the Arctic circle—to obtain a legal right to fish in the Arctic considering its significant stake and contribution to building a sustainable future Arctic, including huge investments in the development of relevant sectors, research and governance endeavours, and efforts towards ensuring environmental security, as well as sustainable use of the Arctic fisheries resources, and so on. Concluding, China has shaped its Arctic policy very tactfully, claiming legal rights over fisheries resources and gaining global acknowledgement of its co-existence in Arctic governance; it will also be backed by and considerably strengthen China's strategic Polar Silk Road vision as well as the Belt and Road Initiative in the long run.

**Author Contributions:** M.I.K. deals with substantial writing up and revisions; Y.-C.C. provides general guidance and arranged the funds. Conceptualization, M.I.K. and Y.-C.C.; methodology, M.I.K.; formal analysis, M.I.K.; investigation, M.I.K.; resources, M.I.K. and Y.-C.C.; writing—original draft preparation, M.I.K.; writing—review and editing, M.I.K.; supervision, Y.-C.C.; funding acquisition, Y.-C.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** The field work is supported by the following project: The National Social Science Fundamental Project, China, 'Research on China's Maritime Rights Protection under the Perspective of Maritime Community with the Shared Future' (Grant No. 19VHQ009).

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare that there is no known conflict of interest.

### **References**


### *Article* **Introducing the Seasonal Closure into the CCAMLR Fishery Management Framework: Problems, Methods, and Prospects**

**Keyuan Zou <sup>1</sup> and Sen Wang 2,\***

<sup>2</sup> Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310008, China

**\*** Correspondence: charlie.senwang@gmail.com

**Abstract:** In June 2020, China unilaterally announced two seasonal closures on squid fishing in certain areas of the high seas that apply to the Chinese distant water fishing fleets. Such closure refers to the withdrawal of the Chinese distant water fishing fleet from part of the high seas where they regularly operate. It is an innovative conservation measure initiated by a nation-state with the significance for global ocean governance and meeting the requirements from the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This paper is designed to seek the possibility, through a qualitative study and interpretive analysis, of whether such an innovative conservation measure can be introduced into the fishery management in the Southern Ocean, currently mainly under the framework of CCAMLR. This paper attempts to answer some questions with this new introduction. First, whether this kind of seasonal closure is applicable or feasible within the framework of CCAMLR. Second, whether this kind of seasonal closure would infringe upon or disrupt existing regimes, such as marine protected areas (MPAs) created by CCAMLR. Third, how and to what extent such a measure is supported by best scientific evidence so as to reach optimal effectiveness. In this regard, firm support from contracting parties is necessary to enforce the seasonal closure within the coverage of CCAMLR. The paper concludes that the seasonal closure feasible under the CCAMLR legal framework, which, like the measures of MPAs, will facilitate the fulfillment of best scientific evidence and eventually contribute to the SDG-14 progressively in the Southern Ocean.

**Keywords:** seasonal closure; CCAMLR; MPAs; RFMOs; conservation measures; China

### **1. Introduction**

On 2 June 2020, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China (MARA) issued the "Notice to enhance the conservation of squid stocks on the high seas in order to promote the sustainable development of China's distant water fishing" (hereinafter referred to as the Notice) [1]. According to the Notice, Chinese fishing vessels were not allowed to enter into certain areas or engage in any fishing activities in the east-western Atlantic and east Pacific during two separate periods of time, respectively, from 1 July to 30 September (32◦ S–44◦ S, 48◦ W–60◦ W) and from 1 September to 30 November (5◦ N–5◦ S, 110◦ W–95◦ W) [1]. The Notice essentially imposes the seasonal closure of squid fishing in certain parts of the high seas on a Chinese voluntary basis without regulation from any Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) and only binds the Chinese fishing vessels [2]. After the successful completion of the first phase, the MARA was going to facilitate and promulgate this policy into different RFMOs [3]. This policy initiated by China, one of the largest distant water fishing (DWF) nations in the world, is probably helpful for the purpose to better conserve squid stocks on the high seas and contribute to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG-14 [4]. Besides, this policy reflects China's intention to actively participate in global ocean governance and take more responsibility for global fisheries conservation and management.

**Citation:** Zou, K.; Wang, S. Introducing the Seasonal Closure into the CCAMLR Fishery Management Framework: Problems, Methods, and Prospects. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 9770. https://doi.org/10.3390/su 13179770

Academic Editor: Just Tomàs Bayle-Sempere

Received: 7 July 2021 Accepted: 26 August 2021 Published: 31 August 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

Despite China's intention to introduce this innovative conservation measure into international fishery management organizations [5], many specific questions in scientific, legal, and political perspectives need to be asked, and they are, *inter alia*, the rationale between science and law, legal applicability, transnational cooperation, and the effectiveness of such a proposal. Preliminary studies shall be conducted while adopting seasonal closure in terms of RFMO/As, such as the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR Commission). The CCALMR Commission, established by Article VII of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) [6], has adopted a series of conservation measures to maintain fisheries management in CCAMLR Area [7], mainly targeting krill (*Euphausia superba*), toothfish (*Dissostichus* spp.), and icefish (*Channichthyidae*), which are under commercial harvesting currently [8]. States Parties of CCAMLR can participate in the decision-making process and submit proposals to the fisheries management in the CCAMLR Area [9]. China is a member of the CCAMLR Commission [10] and one of the fishing states in the Southern Ocean [11]. Furthermore, China has its long-term interests in commercial exploitation of marine living resources in the Southern Ocean, especially krill [12].

This paper primarily aims to find any possibility to introduce China's recent seasonal closure practice into the CCAMLR regime based upon a qualitative process of a legal analysis of the rationale, legal basis, and foundations of such a proposal. Specifically, this paper attempts to answer relevant questions with this introduction. First, whether and how seasonal closure is applicable or feasible with CCAMLR. Second, why and how seasonal closure could strengthen existing conservation measures adopted by the CCAMLR Commission. Third, how and to what extent this seasonal closure proposal could be consistent with other regimes inside and outside of CCAMLR. Besides, this paper will finally explore a possibility of a proposal by China to push forward this conservation measure within the CCAMLR framework. To conclude, this paper tries to offer some preliminary observations on China's seasonal closure proposal in global ocean governance, especially for global fisheries management and sustainable fishing development.

### **2. Applicability of Seasonal Closure in the Southern Ocean**

Abundant fishery resources exist in the Southern Ocean in which krill is the cornerstone of the food chain in Antarctica and also the key component of the whole Antarctic ecosystem [13]. Ecological and economic risks potentially caused by large-scale harvest of krill accelerated the law-making process of conservation of Antarctic marine living resources in the 1970s [14–17]. Efforts have been made by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) since 1975 [18]. After several sessions of negotiation, the final act was adopted unanimously by fourteen countries in 1980. Unlike other RFMOs, the goal of CCAMLR focuses more on conservation of marine living resources than sustainable exploitation through the ecosystem approach [19], which can be proven by the absence of catch allocation in conservation measures of CCAMLR [15] (pp. 139–140).

Article IX is the key clause with regard to conservation measures under the CCAMLR regime, which, in a uncompromising tone [14] (p. 356), provides that the CCAMLR Commission shall formulate, adopt, and revise conservation measures on the basis of the best scientific evidence available in order to give effect to objectives and principles of Article II [20] and subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article IX, which requires consistency externally between CCAMLR measures and relevant measures established by other RFMOs that CCAMLR Contracting Parties acceded to [21]. In the meantime, recommendations and advice of the Scientific Committee (SC-CCAMLR) shall be taken under full consideration of the CCAMLR Commission exercising its functions [22]. Of course, designating open and closed seasons for harvesting, for instance, a seasonal closure, is one of the conservation measures confirmed by paragraph 2 of Article IX [23]. From the contextual perspective, paragraph 2 of Article IX also implicitly requires to ensure the internal consistency between conservation measures [24].

In practice, fishery regulations, as categorized by the CCAMLR Commission, comprise a series of measures for managing marine living resources in the CCAMLR area, including general measures, fishing season, closed areas and prohibition of fishing—by-catch limits for toothfish, icefish, and krill [25]. Directed fishing over various kinds of species in different areas, subareas, and divisions [26] covering several marine areas of CCAMLR Area [27], and in the 2020/21 season for toothfish fishing in Subarea 48.5, is prohibited [28]. Besides, directed fishing on shark species in the CCAMLR Area is banned as well, with the exception of activities for scientific research purpose [29]. Such seasonal closures could be revised by the CCAMLR Commission on the basis of reports prepared by the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment (WG-FSA) of SC-CCAMLR (see Figure 1).

As available options of conservation measures are provided by paragraph 2 of Article IX, it is hard to totally differentiate the seasonal closure that is also referred to as "open and closed season for harvesting" and the closed area that means "open and closing of area" [30]. Normally, three elements at least must be acquired if an appropriate management rationale is to be presented by the legitimate seasonal closure: respectively targeted species, certain marine areas, and specified period of time from the perspective of common practices. The Commission offers the definition of closed area as certain subarea and division where directed fishing on various taxa is prohibited, primarily in CM 32-02 [26]. The only term relating to the seasonal closure given by the Commission is the CCAMLR fishing season (CM 32-01) [31]. Another relevant term is the marine protected areas (MPAs), which can be found in several conservation measures (CMs 91-02, 03, 04, and 05) that will be well discussed below.

Accordingly, three basic requisites should be fulfilled if a seasonal closure would be adopted by the CCAMLR Commission. First, a conservation measure shall be subject to the objectives and principles set out in Article II of CCAMLR. Second, such a conservation measure ought to be made on the basis of the best scientific evidence available, which means the advice of the SC-CCAMLR plays an important role in this process. Third, the consistency, whether internal or external, must be tested prudently. The test of consistency is designed to determine, from the perspective of international law, whether a new conservation measure is compatible with other relevant existing measures, arrangements, and regimes. To fulfill the legitimacy of a proposal, it is necessary to do this test before submitting. There are two categories of consistency tests in this regard: the internal consistency and the external one. The internal consistency refers to the situation that a new measure proposed must not be in conflict with current provisions within a specific legal regime, while the external consistency means that such measure cannot hamper relating arrangements of similar regimes other than the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), including CCAMLR.

### **3. Objectives and Principles of CCAMLR**

The Preamble of CCAMLR emphasizes the importance of ensuring the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources [32]. Article II defines one objective of CCAMLR as conservation which includes "rational use" [33]. Fishing countries wanted the CCAMLR to concentrate on utilization with limited conservation measures, while non-fishing states called on the comprehensive preservation and protection of the Antarctic marine environment as a whole [34]. The introduction of the term "rational use" apparently represents the intention that the CCAMLR Commission desired to reconcile different interests between fishing and non-fishing countries [35]. The provisions of principles correspondingly attempted to make a compromise in terms of conservation standards between the two groups in exploitation and use [36]. Fishing states wished to introduce the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) that other RFMOs apply, whereas non-fishing states suggested that explicit conservation standards should be expressly defined in the provisions of Article II other than those revised by the Commission time by time [34]. However, paragraph 3 of Article II indicates a neutral position held by CCAMLR concerning conservation rules, which provides three principles, neither MSY or explicit conservation standards,

applying to all harvesting and associated activities in the CCAMLR Area [37]. In other words, CCAMLR does not prohibit harvesting of available marine resources but rather formulates a compromise between rational use and conservation [38]. It is well recognized that the neutral position of CCAMLR definitely contributed to its long-term success. but rather formulates a compromise between rational use and conservation [38]. It is well recognized that the neutral position of CCAMLR definitely contributed to its long-term success. On the other hand, however, this neutral position, unfortunately, does not eliminate

provisions of Article II other than those revised by the Commission time by time [34]. However, paragraph 3 of Article II indicates a neutral position held by CCAMLR concerning conservation rules, which provides three principles, neither MSY or explicit conservation standards, applying to all harvesting and associated activities in the CCAMLR Area [37]. In other words, CCAMLR does not prohibit harvesting of available marine resources

*Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 16

On the other hand, however, this neutral position, unfortunately, does not eliminate all disputes over the objectives and principles of CCAMLR. Relevant debates among ATCPs remain till now. Arguments over the objective concentrate on the characteristics of CCAMLR itself. It leads to the key question in theory of whether CCAMLR is a conservation-oriented regime or an RFMO. Justifiably speaking, the CCAMLR contains some provisions beyond those of traditional RFMOs, for instance, the International Whaling Commission (IWC). However, the position expressed by paragraph 2 of Article II shall be upheld as well. all disputes over the objectives and principles of CCAMLR. Relevant debates among ATCPs remain till now. Arguments over the objective concentrate on the characteristics of CCAMLR itself. It leads to the key question in theory of whether CCAMLR is a conservation-oriented regime or an RFMO. Justifiably speaking, the CCAMLR contains some provisions beyond those of traditional RFMOs, for instance, the International Whaling Commission (IWC). However, the position expressed by paragraph 2 of Article II shall be upheld as well.

Three principles set out in paragraph 3 are to be summarized as the ecosystem approach. As early as 1977, Recommendation IX-2 firstly underlined the importance to achieve an effective conservation of marine living resources in the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole [39]. This approach was recognized by most Contracting Parties during the negotiation of CCAMLR [40]. Rather than merely designating single species or certain marine areas under conservation, CCAMLR defines its Convention Area according to its indigenous resources, having taken into account species interaction and comprehensive preservation of the entire ecological system [41]. The CCAMLR Convention Area is described as following: Three principles set out in paragraph 3 are to be summarized as the ecosystem approach. As early as 1977, Recommendation IX-2 firstly underlined the importance to achieve an effective conservation of marine living resources in the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole [39]. This approach was recognized by most Contracting Parties during the negotiation of CCAMLR [40]. Rather than merely designating single species or certain marine areas under conservation, CCAMLR defines its Convention Area according to its indigenous resources, having taken into account species interaction and comprehensive preservation of the entire ecological system [41]. The CCAMLR Convention Area is described as following:

**Figure 1.** CCAMLR Area [42]. **Figure 1.** CCAMLR Area [42].

Therefore, CCAMLR was designed to including all living resources within the Convention Area but more so by the extent of their ecological wanderings [43]. It is fair to conclude that the ecosystem approach expressed in Article II sets CCAMLR apart from a typical fishery convention [36] (p. 229). While the interactions between species have been well considered, the interpretation of Article II is extremely complicated and challengeable to policymakers, however. It should be clarified that, distinct from the MSY normally adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other Therefore, CCAMLR was designed to including all living resources within the Convention Area but more so by the extent of their ecological wanderings [43]. It is fair to conclude that the ecosystem approach expressed in Article II sets CCAMLR apart from a typical fishery convention [36] (p. 229). While the interactions between species have been well considered, the interpretation of Article II is extremely complicated and challengeable to policymakers, however. It should be clarified that, distinct from the MSY normally adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other RFMOs, the ecosystem approach is an extraordinary innovation created by CCAMLR to conserve all renewable resources [44]. Given the nutrient level in the Antarctic marine ecosystem and other facts of the scientific complexities of fully understanding the interactive ecosystem, scientific information remains fundamental in implementing this approach.

The core of the ecosystem approach links closely with the precautionary approach/ principle. Arguments over whether this term is an approach or principle have lasted for decades [45]. However, this concept has been incorporated by a number of international instruments, for instance, the Rio Declaration [46] and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) [47]. Moreover, one thing is for sure: the burden of proof concerning the possible impact of a given activity under the precautionary approach/principle is reversed [48]. The precautionary approach/principle is an overall requirement for all activities engaged in the Antarctic, including the Southern Ocean. Accordingly, the burden of proof shall rest with people who are going to fish in the Southern Ocean, which means fishing states must prepare some environmental impact evaluations before fishing. Meanwhile, in order to better implement the ecosystem approach, the burden of proof shall rest with fishing states so as that prudence of scientific uncertainty supplies a true ecosystem approach in CCAMLR.

The scientific certainty can hardly be gained in the Antarctic, as scientists are still struggling to discover more and more facts about this mysterious region. The same is true of the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. However, the scientific uncertainty shall not be the excuse of delaying the adoption of active conservation measures, as expressed by the precautionary approach/principle. By this logic, more adventurous measures could be carried out in data-poor areas. The measure of seasonal closure happens to be an appropriate choice in this regard and can perfectly fit into the precautionary approach/principle when scientific data are insufficient. Consequently, the seasonal closure is not only in accordance with but also to safeguard the objectives and principles of CCAMLR in a more proactive way.

In fact, the CCAMLR Commission is responsible to seek mutual understanding of objectives and principles through working out conservation measures over the past four decades, which also reflects the ATCPs' consensus of a step-by-step approach in developing the conservation regime of Antarctic marine living resources [40].

### **4. Strengthening the Existing Conservation Measures**

Current conservation measures in force, as mentioned above, divided into four categories by the Commission, are compliance, general fishery matters, fishery regulations, and protected areas [49]. The seasonal closure proposal tightly relates to the conservation measures of general fishery matters and fishery regulations, including CMs 31-01, 31-02, 32-01, 32-02, 32-09, and 32-18. CM 31-02 provides general rules for the closure of all fisheries in which vessels under the closure notice issued by the Secretariat of the Commission shall depart from closed areas and remove all fishing gear from water by the notified time [50]. The flag state bears main responsibilities in implementing this measure [48]. The fishing season for all CCAMLR Area species is from 1 December to 30 November of the following year (CM 32-01) [31]. Directed fishing on taxa in areas is prohibited (CM 32-02) [27]. According to CM 32-02, various kinds of finfishes [51] are not allowed to be harvested in Subareas 48.1 and 2 around the Antarctic Peninsula and South Orkney Islands [27]. In the Amundsen Sea (Subarea 88.3) and parts of the western Ross Sea [52], only toothfish shall be prohibited for directed fishing [27]. Toothfish and grey rockcod are non-harvested species near the Ob Bank and Lena Bank (Divisions 58.4.4 a and b) [27]. Patagonia toothfish is subject to prohibition around the Kerguelen Islands (Division 58.5.1), Heard and McDonald Islands (parts of Division 58.5.2 [53]), Crozet Islands (Subarea 58.6), and Prince Edward and Marion Islands (Subarea 58.7), adjacent to areas under national jurisdiction of coastal states [27]. Most of these prohibitions, however, are subject to the exception of scientific research permitted under CM 24-01 and the review by the WG-FSA on the basis of surveys of stock biomass so as to be amended by the Commission [27]. It should be noted that, in the South Georgia (Subarea 48.3), where the first conservation measure was adopted [54], the above two conditions cannot apply (*Electrona carlsbergi* not included), and the Commission can decide reopening based on the advice of the SC-CCAMLR [27]. The strict prohibition in South Georgia does not regulate any fishing of Patagonia toothfish, toothfish, and other

finfish [27]. Furthermore, directed fishing for toothfish in the Weddell Sea (Subarea 48.5) is prohibited [28]. In addition, in response to the FAO International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, directed fishing on shark species for purposes other than scientific research is prohibited by the Commission [29]. Despite these measures, exploratory fisheries of toothfish, icefish, and krill are subject to the catch limits set out by the Commission [55]. By adopting the above conservation measures, the Commission essentially creates numbers of closed areas within the CCAMLR Area, mainly referring to CM 32-02. Similarly, toothfish fishing has been banned around the Weddell Sea by CM 32-09 annually since 2003, which probably has already turned into a closed area. As for sharks, the whole CCAMLR Area becomes de facto a closed area, or sanctuary, for sharks by CM 32-18.

The critical point is the MPAs regime created by the Commission. In 2002, CCAMLR committed to creating a network of MPAs following recommendations from the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development [56]. So far, there are two MPAs in the Southern Ocean established by the Commission, respectively, the South Orkney Islands southern shelf MPA (SOIMPA) and the Ross Sea Region MPA (RSRMPA). Three other MPAs are still under discussion and negotiation within CCAMLR [57]. The SOIMPA was created by the CM 91-03 in 2009, covering a 94,000-km square in Subarea 48.2 [58]. All fishing, discharges, dumping, and transshipment activities are prohibited within that area, with the exception for scientific fishing research activities under CM 24-01 [59]. SOIMPA is unprecedently pioneering in conserving marine biodiversity, although it leaves many gaps to fill in. However, the MPAs regime cannot and shall not exclude any rationale use of marine living resources in relevant areas [60]. Accordingly, by 2011, three principles of establishment of MPAs at least had been recognized by CCAMLR, and they are protection of the environment, freedom of scientific research, and rational use [59].

The following general framework for establishment of CCAMLR MPA adopted by CM 91-04 in 2011 is definitely a milestone in the proceeding of CCAMLR MPA. CM 91-04 connects the seasonal closure with closed areas, as it reads: "[D]esiring to implement Article IX.2(f) and 2(g) of the CCAMLR . . . " [61]. This is the first time that the relationship between seasonal closures, closed areas, and MPAs has been clarified in CCAMLR's legally binding documents. In 2016, The RSRMPA was agreed upon by CCAMLR and had been the largest MPA in the world since its establishment [62]. Three zones, each of which allows certain activities and restricts others, are divided in the RSRMPA [61]. CM 91-05 confirmed the relationship between seasonal closures (Article IX.2(f)), closed areas (Article IX.2(g)), and the MPAs regime. Overall, the RSRMPA is much more sophisticated than the SOIMPA, including different functional zones to achieve distinct purposes, respectively.

After a full consideration of Article IX.2 and relevant existing measures, some observations can be made. First, seasonal closure, as one form of conservation measures expressly provided by Article IX of CCAMLR, is a legitimate way to conserve relevant marine living resources. Any member has the right to propose a seasonal closure in accordance with provisions of CCAMLR. Second, there are some connections between seasonal closure, closed areas, and MPAs. In general, the CCAMLR Commission would endeavor to set up a seasonal closure in a certain area during a period of time, mainly focusing on one species, then extend the closing time of such seasonal closure so as to turn such closed season into a closed area, and finally seek possibilities to develop a MPA based on proper scientific evidence. Third, such relationship between seasonal closure, closed areas, and MPAs does not represent that seasonal closure is necessarily standing against the MPAs regime, and in fact, they could probably coexist and even mutually support each other for the conservation purpose.

Arguments always arise from the different roles that seasonal closures and MPAs play in the conservation of marine living resources in the Southern Ocean. Indeed, seasonal closures only refer to single-specie fishery, while the MPAs regime is an overall conservation of the whole ecosystem of the CCAMLR Area. The question is which one is better. It is hard to answer that comprehensively. Advocators of the MPA regime would claim that

the MPA regime could provide a more holistic and integrated measure in accordance with the ecosystem approach, whereas others would support seasonal closures as a pragmatic way to initiatively develop further conservation measures, if possible. On the other hand, it remains unknown which one could gain more support amongst CCAMLR members, as little discussion has occurred around the relationship between these two measures so far. Thus, it is necessary to conduct more research on this subject-matter in advance before more discussions happen in the future.

It is generally concluded that seasonal closure is in essence able to play as a bedstand to test whether the applied area should be transferred or upgraded to a closed area or turned into an MPA that includes seasonal closure and/or closed area. Adoption of seasonal closure would constantly bring out scientific understanding of certain aspects of the Antarctic ecosystem, which could be helpful to develop a more comprehensive and sophisticated regime to conserve fishery resources in the Southern Ocean. Besides, seasonal closure is also in conformity with the ecosystem approach, and such closure urges countries concerned to take actions before it is too late while no scientific certainty exists, as required by the precautionary approach. Overall, seasonal closure is a good way to strengthen existing measures under the CCAMLR, and it is feasible and reasonable to propose the seasonal closure in order to achieve the objective and principles of the CCAMLR, especially with consideration of SDG-14.

### **5. Consistency Test**

According to the provisions of Article IX.5, conservation measures shall be consistent with any relevant measures, regulations, or recommendations made by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) or by existing fisheries commissions. Two international treaties, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) [63], are specifically provided in Article VI. The consistency between the seasonal closure and other regulations could be divided into two categories. The internal consistency test is to examine whether such seasonal closure is consistent with regulations within the Antarctic Treaty System, while the external is to ensure this seasonal closure is in conformity with regimes outside the ATS.

### *5.1. Internal Consistency Test*

### 5.1.1. CCAS

The CCAS was adopted to fill the gap with regard to sealing outside of the regulation of the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (AM-CAFF) [64]. The protected seal stocks expand to crabeater seals (*Lobodon carcinophagus*) and Weddell seals (*Leptonychotes weddelli*) [65]. The area that CCAS applies, which strictly adheres to the area south 60◦ S provided by Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty, is narrower than the CCAMLR Area [66]. Again, Article 3 of the CCAS provides that conservation measures under this Convention include opening and closing of sealing seasons [67]. The outstanding regime created by the CCAS is the "special permit" system which allows sealing countries to issue permits to kill or capture seals in limited quantities and in conformity with certain objectives and principles of CCAS [68]. The Annex of CCAS provides in detail permissible catch, protected species, closed season and sealing season, sealing zones, etc. Ross seals (*Ommatophoca*), Southern elephant seals (*Mirounga leonina*), and fur seals (*Arctocephalus*) are protected from sealing, and Weddell seals (*Leptonychotes weddelli*) are not allowed to be killed or captured during breeding time (1 September to 31 January inclusive) [69]. Sealing from 1 March to 31 August in the area south 60◦ S is forbidden [70]. The provisions of the Annex could be amended by Contracting Parties in accordance with Article 9 of the CCAS.

Given the arrangements stipulated by CCAS, it is well accepted that CCAS is a typical RFMO targeting one single species and is slightly distinct from CCAMLR. In fact, since the enforcement of the CCAS, large-scale sealing has never occurred in the Antarctic [71]. There is currently no market need for seals, either [72]. Suspension of commercial sealing, as Julia Jabour viewed, is more a sort of response to public emotions than a practical effort before [71] (p. 11). In 2002, the number of seals in the South Georgia only reached three million [73].

However, for the purpose of keeping internal consistency, the seasonal closure under the CCAMLR should not derogate any measures adopted by the CCAS. Such seasonal closure should not deal with any sealing activities, although sealing in the Antarctic is not in the ambit of international discussion anymore [74]. Frankly speaking, due to the clear nutrient level of the Antarctic ecosystem and that the seal is one of the top predators in the Southern Ocean, it is probable to indirectly manage and conserve seals through seasonal closures over krill, toothfish, and icefish. Accordingly, there is no problem to propose seasonal closures targeting zooplanktons and fishes in the Southern Ocean only if such measures would not mandate sealing.

### 5.1.2. The Madrid Protocol

The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) is a milestone in the international management of Antarctica and widely for the global environment by the creation of an integrated environmental protection regime [75]. Regimes relating to the seasonal closure are provided by Annexes II and V to the Madrid Protocol, both of which derive from the AMCAFF. Obviously, conservation of Antarctic marine living resources constitutes part of the comprehensive environmental protection regime [76].

Annex II was amended by Measure 16 (2009) during ATCM XXXII [77]. This amended version of Annex II is mainly to protect native fauna and flora [78]. However, zooplankton or fish is not within the ambit of Annex II [79], although native mammal is subject to Annex II, not jeopardizing provisions of ICRW [80]. Conservation of marine mammal might still be under the long-term regulation of the IWC, and thus, seasonal closures over krill and two kinds of fishes would not be in conflict with Annex II to the Madrid Protocol.

According to Annex V, two relevant arrangements developed by the ATCMs have to be taken into full account, namely Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) and Antarctic Specially Managed Areas (ASMAs). ASPAs refer to areas, whether marine or terrestrial, where outstanding environmental, scientific, historic, aesthetic, or wilderness values, any combination of those values, or ongoing or planned scientific research shall be well protected [81]. ASPAs include Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest designated by past ATCMs [82]. Any entry into ASPAs shall be prohibited, with exceptions provided by Article 7 of Annex V [83]. It is not difficult to find that fishing vessels are not allowed to sail into any ASPAs, which means seasonal measures shall not apply in marine areas that have been designated as ASPAs. The other one, ASMAs, include marine areas in which activities are being conducted or are to be conducted to assist in the planning and co-ordination of activities, avoid possible conflicts, improve co-operation between Parties, or minimize environmental impacts [84]. The purpose of ASMAs is to avoid risks of mutual interference or cumulative environmental impacts caused by relevant activities and protect sites or monuments of recognized historic value [85]. However, fishing vessels do not need a permit to entry into ASMAs [86]. Therefore, seasonal measures can be conducted in ASMAs. However, the size of each ASPA or ASMA is quite small, especially compared with closed areas or MPAs [87], and the influence from ASPAs and ASMAs towards determination of seasonal measures therefore seems minor.

### *5.2. External Consistency Test*

### 5.2.1. Whale Sanctuary

Whale Sanctuaries are developed by the IWC in accordance with the provisions of the ICRW in order to conserve the whale stocks. The first IWC whaling sanctuary, the Indian Ocean Sanctuary (IOS), was established in 1979 [88]. The Southern Ocean Sanctuary (SOS) was designated by the IWC in 1994, approximately covering the waters of the

*Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 16

*5.2. External Consistency Test*  5.2.1. Whale Sanctuary

Southern Ocean [88]. Commercial whaling is prohibited in the SOS as illustrated below (see Figure 2). Southern Ocean [88]. Commercial whaling is prohibited in the SOS as illustrated below (see Figure 2).

Whale Sanctuaries are developed by the IWC in accordance with the provisions of the ICRW in order to conserve the whale stocks. The first IWC whaling sanctuary, the Indian Ocean Sanctuary (IOS), was established in 1979 [88]. The Southern Ocean Sanctuary (SOS) was designated by the IWC in 1994, approximately covering the waters of the

small, especially compared with closed areas or MPAs [87], and the influence from ASPAs

and ASMAs towards determination of seasonal measures therefore seems minor.

**Figure 2.** Southern Ocean Sanctuary [89]. **Figure 2.** Southern Ocean Sanctuary [89].

Three principles have been highlighted by the IWC. First, scientific reasons to designate such sanctuary must be definite and clear. Second, temporary functional duplications caused by the sanctuary cannot undermine the validity of long-term scientific and conservative values. Third, the precautionary principle will be applied if there is no consensus with regard to certain affairs of the sanctuary [90]. Legal effects and outcomes of the SOS have been further demonstrated by the International Court of Justice in the *Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) Case* in which the Court found that Japan has not acted in conformity with its obligations under the SOS in pursuance of Phrase II of Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic Three principles have been highlighted by the IWC. First, scientific reasons to designate such sanctuary must be definite and clear. Second, temporary functional duplications caused by the sanctuary cannot undermine the validity of long-term scientific and conservative values. Third, the precautionary principle will be applied if there is no consensus with regard to certain affairs of the sanctuary [90]. Legal effects and outcomes of the SOS have been further demonstrated by the International Court of Justice in the *Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) Case* in which the Court found that Japan has not acted in conformity with its obligations under the SOS in pursuance of Phrase II of Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) [91].

(JARPA II) [91]. As discussed above, even though all marine living resources are under the regulation of CCAMLR, the Convention shall not derogate from the rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under the ICRW [92]. Whales, therefore, cannot be the targeted species directly managed by conservation measures of the Commission in the Convention Area. The nutrient level within the Antarctic ecosystem, however, determines that the conservation of whales, heavily relying upon krill, is not possibly unaffected by the conservation of krill, which is one of the main targeted species of CCAMLR. It is paradoxical that singlespecies conservation and comprehensive preservation of the marine ecosystem shall be maintained simultaneously in the Antarctic, and, as Erik Molenaar argued, understanding the functional relationship between target species and non-targeted species might be one As discussed above, even though all marine living resources are under the regulation of CCAMLR, the Convention shall not derogate from the rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under the ICRW [92]. Whales, therefore, cannot be the targeted species directly managed by conservation measures of the Commission in the Convention Area. The nutrient level within the Antarctic ecosystem, however, determines that the conservation of whales, heavily relying upon krill, is not possibly unaffected by the conservation of krill, which is one of the main targeted species of CCAMLR. It is paradoxical that singlespecies conservation and comprehensive preservation of the marine ecosystem shall be maintained simultaneously in the Antarctic, and, as Erik Molenaar argued, understanding the functional relationship between target species and non-targeted species might be one of the biggest challenges for conservation and management of CCAMLR [93].

of the biggest challenges for conservation and management of CCAMLR [93]. Thus, according to the provisions of Articles I, VI, and IX.5, the seasonal closure in the Southern Ocean shall not be inconsistent with the regulations adopted by the IWC, primarily the SOS. In other words, such seasonal closure cannot directly mandate conservation of whales in the Convention Area, whereas it is entitled for CCAMLR to regulate other species, such as krill, toothfish, or icefish, the conservation of which is closely related to the conservation of whales.

### 5.2.2. Voluntary Restricted Zones (VRZs)

Another notable regime relating to the seasonal closure is the Voluntary Restricted Zones (VRZs) proposed by the Association of Responsible Krill-Harvesting Companies (ARK) and other NGOs [94]. The VRZs represent the main conservation effort from ARK companies to protect critical habitat for krill-dependent predators, manly penguins, during the summer season [94]. The implementation of this voluntary restriction on fishing is as follows:


But the VRZs have two major problems. On one hand, the VRZs are located in areas where there is little krill fishing. On the other hand, the VRZs are outside of CCAMLR's monitoring and evaluation, and some members, such as Australia and the UK, prefer to consider such issues under the MPAs regime [95]. Besides, the VRZs partially overlap with the proposed D1MPA jointly submitted by Chile and Argentina [96]. The true deficiency of the VRZs is that this regime is developed by non-governmental organizations that governments seldom submit themselves to. Additionally, the VRZs are not legally binding. The foundation of such voluntary action is different with any conservation measures proposed by state parties based on state commitments. However, this effort might partly contribute to the formulation of the seasonal closure initiated by states in terms of seasonally closing krill fishing. Furthermore, two major problems of the VRZs might remind policymakers to develop a seasonal closure in areas where substantive krill fishing activities existing. To solve these two problems, seasonal closure, if proposed by states, should be subject to monitoring and evaluation of CCAMLR in form of conservation measures.

### 5.2.3. Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP)

There is an argument that seasonal closure was already established in the Southern Ocean by the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP) [97]. The ACAP [98] is to conserve listed albatrosses, petrels, and shearwaters by coordinating international activities to mitigate known threats to their populations [99]. Incidental mortality of birds resulting from interactions with fishing gear is one of the most significant threats facing albatrosses and petrels, which is also regulated by relevant conservation measures adopted by the Commission, including CMs 25-02 and 25-03 [100]. According to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the CCAMLR Commission and the ACAP Secretariat, which was signed on 1 November 2018, these two bodies are committed to facilitate cooperation in supporting efforts to minimize the incidental by-catch of listed albatrosses and petrels in the CCAMLR Area [101].

There is no doubt that the conservation of birds promoted by the ACAP is directly related to conservation measures adopted by the CCAMLR Commission in which the removal of certain fishing gear does inevitably result in the prohibition of fishing during some periods of time during each fishing season. That argument is fairly reasonable to some extent. However, efforts made by the ACAP do not diminish the necessity of proposing seasonal closures under CCAMLR in the Southern Ocean. On the contrary, the common interest to conserve albatrosses and petrels implicitly represents the urgency to conduct seasonal closures. In order to better minimize incidental mortality of birds, the fishing activities concerned should be forbidden in the form of seasonal closures in the Southern Ocean, which is obviously a stronger measure than mere removal of fishing gear.

Accordingly, proposed seasonal closure can probably target krill, toothfish, or icefish, which are allowed to be fished in the marine areas except the areas of special protection, such as ASPAs, ASMAs, and MPAs. IWC sanctuaries can also be the area where seasonal closure applies. To avoid unnecessary duplication in the management and conservation of fishery resources, it is not feasible to adopt seasonal closures in existing MPAs or VRZs. As for the chosen period of time, the breeding time seems a better choice. After all, details of all these conditions shall be finally determined by the standard of best scientific

evidence available, but such standard will not prevent the policy-making process from being formulated by CCAMLR, as demonstrated by past experiences of the adoption of most conservation measures.

### **6. Further Considerations**

After examining the legal applicability of the seasonal closure in the Southern Ocean, the next question concerns why it is a wise choice for China to jointly propose such seasonal closure. Any strategy is basically rooted in state interests as well as the status quo of state practice in that regard. On the surface, the true intention of China's proactive participation into Antarctic affairs is not so clear at least in comparison with many traditional Antarctic countries. Rapid growth of capacity to explore and exploit Antarctic resources undoubtedly results in enhancing its role in Antarctic governance. However, misunderstandings have risen from this shift in which traditional Antarctic countries (original signatory states in 1959) will definitely be concerned about wider participation of newly involved Antarctic countries (acceding states after 1959). Adherence to existing rules in Antarctic governance, primarily the ATS, may be the wisest choice for making contributions to good governance of Antarctica. In terms of CCAMLR, any constructive proposals, whether concerning seasonal closures, closed areas, or MPAs, can be beneficial with mutual understanding between old members and newcomers.

China is a member of the CCAMLR Commission and has been engaged in the conservation of fishery resources for decades. From the perspective of capacity, China has advanced marine scientific technologies and excellent scientists and conducted many marine research expeditions both individually or jointly. In addition, China is an important DWF state with large-scale fishing fleets. Additionally, in 2020/21 season, six Chinese fishing vessels for krill were notified to the Commission in the CCAMLR Area [102].

In terms of geopolitical considerations in Antarctic governance, several basic conflicts or tensions must be carefully kept in mind. Conflicts between claimant states and non-claimant states [103], between fishing states and non-fishing states, and between traditional Antarctic countries and newly involved Antarctic states. Notably, tensions between claimant states and non-claimant states have recently concentrated on the MPAs regime, particularly the East Antarctic MPA and D1MPA that were proposed by claimant states (Australia, Chile, and Argentina) [96]. It is unacceptable to connect the establishment of MPAs to claims of maritime zones claimant states. Since the MPAs issue is highly political and hardly to facilitate agreements between CCAMLR members in the near future, the seasonal closure might be a pathway to engage some essential cooperation between those members.

### **7. Conclusions**

China has its discretion and rights to submit a joint seasonal closure proposal within the framework of CCAMLR. Such seasonal closure shall be required to be subject to the objectives and principles of CCAMLR and adherent to conservation, including a rational use and an ecosystem approach based on the precautionary approach/principle. The seasonal closure could be adopted with no scientific certainty in the context of the precautionary approach/principle. More importantly, seasonal closure is not necessarily in conflict with the establishment of MPAs, and in some ways, these two will mutually supplement each other. In order to fulfill the consistency test, such seasonal closure shall not be inconsistent with other measures, regulations, or regimes, such as CCAS, ASMAs, ASPAs, IWC Sanctuary, VRZs, or ACAP.

The wider involvement of China into Antarctic affairs cannot be ignored. Though it seems too early to consider China as a big power in Antarctic governance given its late participation, China is rising rapidly, especially in science, fisheries, and tourism [104]. The rise of China is a fact and causes considerable concern of some Western countries. When the active attitude behind the seasonal closure was conducted by the Chinese government, it was a surprising signal of China's willingness to make progressive and constructive

contributions to the global ocean governance; many countries are not happy with China in this respect.

Nevertheless, nothing will stop China from repeatedly pursuing any means to protect the Antarctic environment and conserve Antarctic marine living resources. The conservation, including rational use, is always the main objective of the management of Antarctic marine living resources. It is completely legitimate for members to propose a seasonal closure with specific targeted species, certain marine areas, and durations of time. Therefore, the analytical finding in this paper indicates that seasonal closures are a viable and sound proposal to achieve the objectives and principles of the CCAMLR and the furtherance of good governance for Antarctic marine living resources.

However, it should be noted that the final purpose of seasonal closure is not only the concern of the CCAMLR, but also of any other suitable RFMOs. The seasonal closure in CCAMLR, once established, should inspire and facilitate the introduction of such seasonal closure into other RFMOs. In doing so, the seasonal closure could eventually contribute to the SDG-14 in the long run.

**Author Contributions:** Writing—original draft, K.Z. and S.W. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This paper is part of a research project funded by China's National Social Sciences Foundation (18VHQ002).

**Acknowledgments:** It is acknowledged that this paper is based on our presentation originally made to the China-Japan-ROK Cooperation on Polar Regions Workshop, organized by China Institute for Marine Affairs, 3 February 2021 (Virtually).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

### **References**


### *Article* **Dilemma of Multisubject Co-Governance of Global Marine Ecological Environment and Implementation Path**

**Weibin Zhang**

School of Law, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China; 120081160@aufe.edu.cn

**Abstract:** The governance of the global marine ecological environment is closely related to human life and needs to adopt a multisubject co-governance system. There is a lack of understanding of the need for co-governance by multiple subjects for global marine ecological environment protection. Global marine eco-environmental multisubject governance is characterised by fragmentation, lack of coordination, and other issues. It should be recognised that global marine ecological environment protection is a task for all to protect humankind's common heritage ergaomnes. At the same time, the idea of a global marine ecological environment protection led by an ocean community with a shared future should be established. A global marine ecological environment multisubject co-governance model is set up by establishing a global marine ecological environment governance model alongside a multisubject co-governance committee.

**Keywords:** marine ecological environment; multiple subjects; co-management; ocean community with a shared future

### **1. Current Status of Global Marine Ecosystem Governance**

*1.1. Current Situation of Marine Ecological Environment Pollution*

With the increasing exploitation and exhaustion of land resources, deep-sea exploitation has become inevitable for human beings. The ocean is the largest natural ecosystem on earth and key to human survival and development. There is no doubt that the 21st century is the century of the ocean. With the rapid development of the marine economy, each country's marine ecological environment faces more risk than they can bear. Advances in technology and ocean transportation have aided deep human exploration of marine life. It has resulted in an increased number of marine surveys, deep mining of the seabed and remote areas, a sharp drop in fishery resources, and the rapid expansion of global maritime trade, which has led to an increased use of the oceans outside the national jurisdictions [1]. Surveys show that human use of the oceans outside national jurisdictions has gone beyond traditional navigation and fishing activities. It has extended to marine genetic resources, bioexploration, deep-sea mineral exploration, scientific research and exploration, seismic experiments, etc. [2]. Although some progress has been made in international marine governance since the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force, it still faces enormous challenges. Human activities in international waters that pose actual or potential threats to the marine environment include illegal, unreported, unregulated, and disruptive fishing practices, invasive species, excessive mineral mining, oil pollution from ships, waste dumping, and microplastic pollution. They lead to warm waters, increase water acidity, and reduce marine biodiversity. The "tragedy of the commons" occurs in the ocean [3], and there is a worsening trend that is threatening marine life, coastal and island regions, and national economies

According to statistics, the oceans absorb 93 percent of the extra heat stored by warmer air, sea, land, and melting ice; moreover, increased carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere contribute to artificial climate change and ocean acidification [4]. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) data, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere rose 32.62 percent from 1959 to April 2021 [5]. Ocean

**Citation:** Zhang, W. Dilemma of Multisubject Co-Governance of Global Marine Ecological Environment and Implementation Path. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 11145. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011145

Academic Editors: Keyuan Zou and Yen-Chiang Chang

Received: 19 June 2021 Accepted: 30 September 2021 Published: 9 October 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

acidity has increased by an average of 30 percent and is expected to increase by 170 percent by 2100 to a pH of around 7.75 [6]. The warming and acidification of seawater directly affect marine biodiversity. The distribution of most marine species will shift to the polar and deeper waters, resulting in the redistribution of the fishing potential of fish and invertebrates [7]. Pollution from land has a significantly negative impact on the oceans. For example, there are nearly 10,000 land-based sources of pollution in the seas in China, with an average of one pollution source per 2 km of coastline, which is a serious issue. Marinebased industrial development, including the ever-changing marine science and technology, has also brought new ocean-related problems while promoting the development of marine natural resources. Many claim that "mankind is destroying the ocean" [8].

In a theoretical sense, the damage caused by human activities to the marine ecosystem mainly includes pollution damage and exploitation damage. Pollution damage, also known as input damage, is damage caused by inappropriate human discharge and the input of environmental pollutants into the ocean. These include ship oil pollution, which accounts for 12 percent of marine pollution. Exploitation damage, also known as removal damage, refers to damage caused by improper removal or development of a substance or energy from the ocean [9]. However, in reality, these two kinds of damage are often inseparable and have no strict boundary. The interaction between human activities and the marine ecological environment, especially the uncertainty and unpredictability of the impact itself, increases the damage degree of marine ecological environment pollution. Given this, the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea issued Resolution 70/235, "First Global Integrated Ocean Assessment", in January 2016. According to the assessment report, both pollution damage and development damage have caused irreversible damage to our marine ecosystem, and the carrying capacity of the marine ecosystem and its ability to clean itself arenearing theirlimit [10]. Therefore, no matter the perspective, be it human self-protection or marine ecological environment protection, there is an urgent need to control these two kinds of damage.

### *1.2. The Current Situation of Multisubject Governance of Marine Ecological Environment*

Oceans cover approximately 71% of the earth's surface, playing a significant role in climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable development of the earth. The marine ecological environment itself has unity and mobility, and its governance has raised great concern in the world. As early as the 1950s, to combat the pollution of the oceans by oil discharged from ships, the International Convention against Oil Pollution at Sea was adopted at the London Conference on 12 May 1954. The International Maritime Organization has been responsible for the implementation of the Convention. Since the Convention's adoption, relevant international organisations have formulated and adopted a series of treaties on marine environment protection. They include the 1969 Convention on International Intervention in Oil Pollution Accidents on the High Seas, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters and its 1996 Protocol, the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its 1978 Protocol, the 1982 UNCLOS, the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Cooperation, the 1995 Convention on Biological Diversity, and more. In 1972, the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP) first discussed and defined marine pollution [11]. Since then, many international conferences, such as the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, whichdiscuss marine environment issues, have laid the institutional foundation for marine ecological environment governance.

In recent years, to strengthen the governance of the global marine ecological environment and achieve sustainable development goals, the United Nations and its relevant institutions have adopted a series of resolutions. For example, the UN General Assembly

(UNGA) adopted the UN 30 year Agenda for Sustainable Development on 25 September 2015, in which Article 14 aims for the sustainable utilisation and development of the oceans and their resources. On 9 June 2017, the United Nations convened another important meeting to support implementing the 14th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on oceans and seas, adopting a declaration entitled Our Ocean, Our Future: Call for Action [12]. It was the first time the United Nations convened a meeting on advancing a single goal in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which has been hailed as a historic conference on ocean governance. The resolution of 10 May 2018, "Towards a Global Pact for the Environment", which was adopted by the UNGA, was sponsored by the Clubdes Juristes and supported by jurists, stakeholders, and representatives of environmental groups from more than 40 countries and regions around the world, to establish a framework for the development of a global environmental convention to consolidate the effectiveness of global environmental governance and open the negotiation process for a treaty [13].

At present, the main modes of multisubject governance of marine ecological environment include unilateral governance by the governing countries, bilateral or multilateral agreements between the governing country and other governments or international organisations, contractual cooperative governance between intergovernmental and nongovernmental international organisations, and the "Unilateral Authorization" governance model, which demonstrates an expansion of the competencies of EU institutions towards its member states. However, the EU approach, largely regarded as a success, has also been criticised as tending towards unilateralism [14]. In any case, it is clear that the international governance of the marine environment, which used to be characterised solely by state actors or a coalition of state actors, is beginning to shift to a global governance model as a result of the inclusion and increasingly deeper involvement of nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and multinational corporations.

It is worth pointing out that with the rapid development of the international shipping industry, cooperation on the marine ecological environment has been continuously promoted and deepened, and some achievements have been made in the control of marine oil pollution. For example, oil pollution caused by ships was reduced by about 60% in the 1980s, and oil spillage has also decreased significantly in the past 20 years [15]. However, despite this, marine ecological environment governance is still problematic. Even in recent years, the progress in marine pollution control cannot keep pace with the pollution rate, and some marine ecological environment governance problems have not been fundamentally and effectively curbed. For example, pollution from land-based sources, oil pollution from ships, acidification of seawater, and pollution from seabed activities will be spread to the whole ocean through ocean currents, which will do irreparable damage to the global marine ecosystem. Bilateral or multilateral agreements for the governance of marine ecological environments are often regional, one-sided, and postpreventive. For example, the Action Plan for Environmental Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal Areas of the Northwest Pacific Ocean, in which China participates, is an integral part of the United Nations Environment Programme regional seas project that includes Russia, Japan, Korea, and China. The program aims to manage the ocean and its resources in the Northwest Pacific region to achieve human health, ecological integrity, and sustainable development for future generations. Although the program has played a positive role in protecting marine ecosystems in the Northwest Pacific, the regional nature of the program makes it "powerless" in the face of global marine ecosystem issues [16]. The main reason for this is that the global marine ecological environment does not need unilateral or multilateral local or regional governance, but a high degree of joint and common governance at the international level; this is the only way to avoid the marine "tragedy of the commons ".

This paper analyses the existing problems in marine ecological environment governance and focuses on realizing the path of global marine ecological environment shared governance by multisubjects.

### **2. The Dilemma of Achieving Multisubject Co-Governance of Global Marine Ecological Environments**

### *2.1. Lack of Awareness of the Necessity of Global Multisubject Co-Governance*

There is no doubt of the strategic position of oceans in the 21st century. Though global, governance of the marine ecological environment is still dominated by countries or international intergovernmental organisations, with global NGOs playing a limited role. This stage is characterised by the diversification of the members of marine ecological environment governance. However, there is a lack of a mutual coordination mechanism among the various subjects, especially among countries and international intergovernmental organisations.

Multisubject co-governance is closely related to Hermann Haken's synergetics and Ostroms' polycentric governance theory. For the former, synergy occurs between subsystems when external energy or aggregation of matter reaches a critical value, while the core of Ostroms' polycentric governance theory is that it is possible for a group of interdependent individuals to "organize themselves for autonomous governance"; by contrast, "multisubject co-governance" combines the core connotations of synergy and polycentricity, linking multiple subjects at a node and producing better results than fragmented subjects [17].

The international marine ecological environment governance system is mainly based on the United Nations as the centre and the regional countries as the system's main body. For example, as of 2020, the number of parties to the UNCLOS was 168; the number of parties to the 1994 agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention of 10 December 1982 was 150; and the number of parties to the 1995 agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks reached 91 after the addition of Cambodia, on 6 March 2020 [18]. To effectively govern the marine ecological environment, the international framework and guidelines established by international organisations and agencies for this purpose mainly include the 21st century agenda adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. The agenda contains 21 sustainable development action plans on global governance, the seventeenth chapter of which specifically discusses the ocean, marine protection, and the exploitation and utilisation of seabed resources [19]. Since then, more documents on global governance have dealt with ocean governance. These include Guidelines for Integrated Coastal Zone Management issued by the World Bank in 1993, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries by the United Nations Agriculture and Food Organization (FAO) in 1995, Global Plan of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities by the United Nations Environment Programme in 1995, a review of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2000 on the existing instruments for implementing the Convention's integrated management of marine and coastal areas and their implementation, Implementation Plan of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the outcome document of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development entitled "Our Future", 2030 Sustainable Development Plan in 2014, and the Agenda for Action for Addis Ababa of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development by the United Nations. This is in addition to regional organisations' document such as the European Commission's Demonstration Programme on Integrated Coastal Zone Management, which was launched in 1996 to promote sustainable development of the EU coastal zone [20], and An Agenda for the Future of Our Oceans, which is the first joint statement document on global ocean governance at the EU level [21]. Of course, the main actors involved also include global NGOs who have contributed to the global marine ecosystem governance, such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the only international organisation in the field of natural environment protection and sustainable development that is a permanent observer to the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted the Intersectoral Integrated Plan for Coastal Areas in1993.

In summary, from a horizontal perspective, there is no lack of relevant action program documents for marine ecosystem governance worldwide; from a vertical perspective, relevant documents are issued almost every year, and their contents cover different dimensions of marine ecosystem governance. However, the discussion of global governance has so far been limited to various proposals for improving its governance. For example, Markus Jachtenfuchs and NicoKrisch, in their article "The Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity in Global Governance" [22], make a good argument about the role of the principle of subsidiarity in global governance but do not address the principle of application to marine ecological environment governance with the participation of multisubjects in the global governance framework. Some scholars still focus on their neighbours or local areas for marine ecosystem governance [23]. However, the unity of theocean determines the limitations of such regional multisubject governance. Indeed, as early as 1967, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Arvid Pardo argued that "all aspects of ocean space are interrelated and should be treated as a whole". [24]. It is undeniable that the space for marine ecological resources and the use of resources require "comprehensive governance" by countries or regions. With the ocean taken as a whole—the high seas, international seabeds, resources, etc.—and the common heritage of humankind, there is a need for multisubject participation in the global governance of the ecological environment. In other words, marine ecological environment governance needs to be carried out under a global governance framework. Countries or regions need to raise awareness of the need for multisubject global marine ecological environment protection to speed up itsrealisation.

### *2.2. Concept of Global Marine Ecosystem Governance Lags Behind*

Thought is the forerunner of action, and ideas determine the direction of practices. However, because some countries emphasise the supremacy of their own or group interests, adopting a policy system based on confrontation or exclusion, there is bound to be conflict with the reality that solving global marine ecological environment problems requires cooperation among all subjects. Moreover, in the distribution of the achievements of global governance, looking horizontally, there are problems of unreasonable, unbalanced, and unequal distribution among countries and a lack of consideration of sustainable development for future generations. Thus, it is difficult to share the achievements of global governance across generations. These are all issues that need to be addressed in the reform of the global governance system [25].

Global marine ecological environment governance is a key topic in global governance. The concept of co-governance of global marine ecological environments is the premise and foundation for multiple subjects to participate in the governance of marine ecological environments and the construction of a negotiation mode. The key to solving this dilemma lies in replacing the traditional idea with the modern concept of an ocean community with a shared future [26].

In recent years, a series of "black swan" incidents represented by Britain's exit from the European Union and the "antiglobalisation" measures taken by the United States have made the neoliberal and individualistic global governance values established in the West since the 1980s nearly bankrupt. Although neoliberalism originated in the field of economics, it has been practiced in social, political, cultural, and social labour movements [27]. Neoliberalism is based on individualism and over emphasises "self-interest". In this regard, some scholars have pointed out that neoliberalism has from the beginning viewed globalisation as a historical process of ensuring wealth creation and profit distribution across national borders through global resource allocation by weakening arbitrary interventions imposed by sovereign governments [28]. This concept is manifested in the zero-sum game, winner-takes-all national strategy and way of doing things and, in the marine ecological environment, the excessive plundering of marine resources for the sake of transient achievable benefits that cause irreversible damage to the global marine ecological environment. In this regard, Professor David Lane of Cambridge University believes that one of the inherent flaws of neoliberalism is that it "creates environmental unsustainability" [29].

For these reasons, the last century witnessed many marine pollution incidents. From the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010, then Japan's

Fukushima nuclear power plant incident in 2011, and the oil spill accident on the Penglai 19-3 oil field jointly developed by Conoco Phillips and CNOOC, each pollution event was large scale, wideranging, and caused serious damage to the marine ecological environment. On 13 April 2021, the Japanese government disposed of the nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant accident by discharging it into the sea, which has had far-reaching implications on the marine environment. The liberal values that underpin the marine ecological environment governance have a natural latent effect of latency. Therefore, the concrete manifestation is the damage prevention mode of marine ecological environment governance. Damage prevention mode in marine ecological environment governance aims to "prevent" the damage of marine ecological environment when the damage cannot be determined, has already occurred, or the damage is further expanded. However, this kind of prevention cannot completely change the current marine ecological environment governance situation nor can it reverse the damage that has already occurred. Therefore, the backward nature of marine ecological environment governance is also one of the causes of frequent marine ecological environment pollution incidents.

It is worth noting that it is difficult to effectively deal with the existing crisis of marine ecological environment governance because of the neoliberal underpinnings of marine environment governance. After all, human marine resources are limited, and the safety of the marine ecological environment is closely related to human development. Therefore, human activities greatly impact the marine ecological environment, and various marine ecological environment face an increasing risk of damage. For example, the "dead zones" in near-shore waters caused by seawater eutrophication have continued to expand over the past five decades. To date, there are more than 400 "dead zones" worldwide, covering an area of 240,000 square meters [30]. As far as local waters are concerned, the ability of the ocean to rid itself of pollution is approaching its limit. Suppose we want to realise the sustainable development of limited marine ecological environments and achieve intragenerational equity and regional equity. In that case, the original dominant value of international governance must be abandoned for transformative global governance values. Based on this, the participation of multiple marine ecological environment governance subjects must not remain the neoliberal-dominated damage prevention type of marine ecological environment governance concept. Instead, it should be based on an ocean community with a shared future, targeting the existing marine ecological environment situation to provide a conceptual basis for the construction of multisubject marine ecological environment governance mechanisms.

### *2.3. Unilateralisation or Regionalisation of Marine Ecological Environment Governance*

Global multisubject marine ecological environment governance is a holistic and integrated approach to marine environment governance. However, the current marine ecological environment governance is underpinned by "new regionalism" such as unilateralisation or regionalisation. Throughout the world, marine ecological environment governance mainly includes unilateral governance by sovereign states, bilateral cooperation among governments, regional governance by multilateral agreements between organisations and governments of coastal countries, and regional governance by intergovernmental organisations. James H. Mittelman conducted a typological analysis of contemporary "new regionalism" and proposed a typology of subnational microregional governmental cooperation, transnational subregional governmental cooperation, and supranational macroregional governmental cooperation [31].

It is worth emphasising that unilateral or regional governance by sovereign governments is still the basic form of marine ecological environment governance. For example, Costa Rica announced a new marine protected area on the country's Pacific coast, home to 37 high-value marine species, three turtle-hatching sites, and three areas of importance for dolphins, whales, and other aquatic mammals. The country also launched a National Wetlands Policy (2017–2030) and recently outlined a long-term National Sanitation Policy to prevent further water pollution [32]. The Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation, and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean was adopted on 4 March2018 and came into force on 22 April 2021, per Article 22(1). There are currently 12 contracting parties. According to Article 2 of the present agreement, one of the objectives is to guarantee the creation and strengthening of capacities and cooperation, contributing to the protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to live in a healthy environment and to sustainable development [33].

Furthermore, the Palagos Marine Reserve in the Mediterranean, the South Shelf Marine Reserve in the South Orkney Islands, and the network of marine reserves in the high seas of the Atlantic Ocean have been established [34]. It is clear that when facing global marine environmental governance issues, establishing marine protected areas is one of the best options for maintaining the health of the oceans and avoiding further marine degradation. The United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and relevant specialised agencies also play a significant role in promoting global marine ecological environment governance. The United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, the Office of Legal Affairs of the Administrative Department of the Law of the Sea, the World Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Seabed Authority play active roles. Under the coordination and management of the "Ocean and Coastal Area Network", they have made great contributions to maintaining marine biodiversity and sustainable development.

By dividing marine areas into different spaces, regional international organisations, such as the Arctic Council and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, govern specific problems in different sea areas. However, regional organisations have natural disadvantages, such as fragmenting the integrity of the world's oceans and forming a situation of selfinterest-based self-administration and exacerbating fragmentation of governance [35].

Of course, spontaneous nongovernmental marine environmental organisations, NGOs, and multinational corporations have also played key global marine ecological environment governance roles. These international NGOs include the Marine Stewards Committee for the Conservation of Marine Ecosystems, International Marine Conservation and Coastal Cleanup Organization, the Inuit Arctic Circle Council, which governs the polar seas, Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research, Greenpeace International, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. According to the 2018 Conservation of the Earth Report published by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), more than 7 percent of the world's marine areas iswell protected, a rise of 3.2 percent over 2016. In the case of China, according to the latest survey report by the China Marine Environmental NGO Capacity Development and Network Building Project, as of 2017, there were 191 organisations in the field of marine environmental protection in China, including 18 foreign-related marine environmental protection organisations [36]. Apart from Beijing, these organisations are mainly located in Hainan, Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, and other major coastal provinces in China that are committed to the conservation of marine resources, environmental protection, and the protection of biodiversity in China's coastal waters.

There is no denying that countries worldwide are committed to strengthening marineprotected areas to achieve the sustainable development goals, but the borderless state of the ocean is original, permanent, and unavoidable [37]. It is still the tip of the iceberg compared to the overall marine ecological protection. The main reason for this is the emergence of populist and nationalist tendencies in the international community, which has led to a certain shift in globalisation and the return of the diluted role of government in many countries, which has been given a new mission by populism and nationalism. For example, individual countries have insisted on unilateralism and continuously adopted "antiglobalisation" measures, no longer emphasising multilateralism, and even unwilling to participate in the World Environment Convention. Thus, worldwide, pessimistic arguments such as the "collapse", "end", and "death" of the existing international order gradually

established after the Second World War have become rampant, and the international community is struggling to fulfil its "obligation ergaomnes" in environmental protection.

Some countries have chosen to withdraw from relevant international treaties or form regional interest chains based on their interests, showing a negative turn of unilateralisation or regionalisation, which is not conducive to the promotion of global marine ecological environment governance. As mentioned above, the global marine ecological environment governance should realise the joint participation and co-governance by multisubjects, which is the optimal choice for the governance of marine ecological environment. The substantive multisubject coordination mechanism is the premise and foundation of multisubject participation in global marine ecological environment governance. Considering this, some countries are paying attention to strengthening regional environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia and jointly formulating and implementing the Northwest Pacific Action Plan and East Asian Maritime Plan. However, the distribution of member states of each action plan is still concentrated in the region, which has no essential significance for the protection of the global marine ecological environment. Based on this, the fragmentation of the marine ecological environment governance system also requires the international community to strengthen global multisubject co-governance mechanisms. This is the only way to create the possibility of and realise co-governance of the global marine environment by multiple subjects.

### *2.4. The Lack of Coordination in the Global Marine Ecological Environment of the Multisubject Co-Governance Committee*

As mentioned earlier, the states as the subject of global marine ecological environment governance, intergovernmental organisations, and NGOs are diverse, but the role of each governing subject is not balanced. Thus, the status and role of state actors and nonstate actors are different. The sovereign state is the dominant force, while the NGOs, as auxiliary forces, mostly play their role through intergovernmental organisations and are relatively weak. Moreover, developed countries have strong roles and influence in setting topics, formulating and implementing rules, while developing countries have a relatively weak position [38]. As sovereign states, regional governance and global governance have different values, interests, and rulemaking and governance modes. Therefore, the governance of the global marine ecological environment still exists in the out-of-the-corner pattern of pollution, while in governance, even in some areas, there is a lack of governance rules, the lack of effective integration, and a co-governance consultative governance model.

Despite this, the international community has made considerable efforts to improve the marine ecological environment through relevant legislature designed to protect against marine ecological environment system damage globally. Chapter XII, Article 194, Paragraph 2 of the UNCLOS is a general provision for protecting marine ecological environment systems from damage. However, in practical operation, protection against marine ecological environment system damage often goes beyond marine ecological environment governance, incorporating sea power and maritime rights and interests disputes. However, if the international system wants to create an optimal design, various subjects' interests, demands, and values must be considered. While a series of bilateral, multilateral, and regional treaties, with the 1982 UNCLOS at their core, have shaped the new international maritime order, the diversification of governing subject inevitably results in the decentralisation of power from one centre to multiple centres. However, there is no platform for consultation, collaboration, and interconnection for multiple centres. Because the marine ecological environment system's damage is characterised by crossregional coverage, a long incubation period, and irreversible damage results, global marine ecological environment governance needs a coordinated multisubject co-governance committee to serve as a practical platform for building an ocean community with a shared future. In other words, such an organisation can integrate the unilateral marine ecological environment governance plans centred on a few countries or regional marine ecological environment governance plans dominated by some countries into a comprehensive and interrelated plan.

Although the international community generally agrees that an ecosystem approach is needed to improve ocean governance, its application value in practice is still limited. To a large extent, this is due to considerable implementation difficulties, including the lack of appropriate data and scientific and analytical tools to support the process. Therefore, to realise multisubject co-governance of the global marine ecological environment, the key point is not limited to the construction of the marine environmental rule of law itself. The main difference between global governance and previous international governance is that the former is based on the global governance mechanism, rather than the government in a traditional sense. It breaks from the previous single-governance model, emphasises diversity, pluralism, and polymorphism of actors, and forms a complex structure that is flexible and coordinated [39]. Certainly, the key to dealing with the current global marine ecological environment governance is establishing an appropriate platform to realise the co-governance of global marine ecological environment with the participation ofmultisubjects.

### **3. Path to Realisation of Multisubject Co-Governance of Global Marine Ecological Environment**

*3.1. Protection of Global Marine Ecological Environment Is the Natural Requirement of Humankind's Common Heritage*

The ocean belongs to all humankind. Global marine ecological environment protection is underpinned by protecting the common heritage of humankind and the awareness of the need for multisubject co-governance of global marine ecological environment protection. The fulfilment of this mission requires the joint participation of all humankind: global cooperation. In 2012, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the theme of World Oceans Day is "Our Oceans, Our Responsibility", emphasising our individual and collective duty to protect the marine environment and carefully manage its resources. Safe, healthy, and productive seas and oceans are integral to human well-being, economic security, and sustainable development [40].

International law is essentially the international legal system that governs relations between states. It is based on reciprocity, protects interests, considers the legitimate rights and interests of other countries, shoulders international responsibilities, and seeks to achieve win–win results through international cooperation, consultation, and collaboration. Article 136 of the 1982 UNCLOS established the principle of a common heritage of humankind, which emphasised that all persons could benefit from such places in a peaceful manner and for peaceful purposes. It also excluded unilateral application by countries, groups, enterprises, and individuals [41]. This mode breaks from the conventional thinking and path dependence of traditional governance and provides a theoretical basis for multisubject co-governance of global marine ecological environment protection.

Over the years, China has attached an importance to and actively participated in global marine ecological environment governance. In essence, the concept of "sharing common resources" as emphasised in the principle of the common heritage of humankind in UNC-LOS coincides with China's global governance concept featuring "extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits". In recent years, there have been differences on the subject and scope of application of the principle of the common heritage of humankind in the world, but scholars generally agree that marine environment resources are part of the common heritage of mankind [42]. Though multisubject co-governance of global marine ecological environment governance is based on the UNCLOS, it should achieve "extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits", not only because the marine ecological environment resources are the common heritage of humankind but also because strengthening the protection of the marine environment is humankind's "obligation ergaomnes". It is worth emphasising that the principle of the common heritage of humankind means that the protection of the global marine ecological environment is humankind's "obligation ergaomnes". From 1973 to 1982, during negotiations on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, insufficient attention was paid to maritime issues outside national jurisdiction. The focus was on maritime rights and interests, while marine ecological environment

protection was relatively secondary.With the development of marine transportation and international trade, disputes about marine trade environment have increased, and the international community is paying more attention to the marine ecological environment. Based on this, the scope of the "obligation ergaomnes" concept in international law has gradually expanded from international crimes to protecting the human environment. Marine ecological environment protection has become an absolute international legal obligation recognised by every country to perform certain acts or omissions per the basic norms of international law, which is necessary to safeguard the basic moral values of humankind and the common interests of the world. Therefore, as an important "obligation ergaomnes" in the 21st century, global marine ecological environment protection reflects the basic value of human society and safeguards the international interests of the international community [43]. Moreover, this obligation is not premised on bilateral or multilateral reciprocity, which is consistent with the core idea of the common heritage of humankind. Thus, we should first realise that the global marine ecological environment is the common heritage of humankind, and humankind has aunshirkable "obligation ergaomnes" to the marine ecological environment. In this way, awareness can be raised on the need for multisubject co-governance of global marine ecological environment protection.

### *3.2. Establishing the Concept of Global Marine Ecological Environment Governance Led by the Concept of an Ocean Community with a Shared Future*

Pollution damage and exploitation damage caused by human activities are pushing the bearing capacity of the oceans to the limit. Marine ecological environment problems have transcended national and regional limitations and become global problems. It is thus necessary to establish an advanced concept of global marine ecological environment governance with multiple subjects. However, the current global marine ecological environment governance system is West-centric and embeds the values and intentions of major Western powers. Therefore, it is difficult to create shared values for a global community. The liberalism-based international governance has been unable to meet the existing needs of global marine ecological environment governance to deal with environmental issues, coordinate intergenerational equity, and promote the sustainable development of marine ecological environment. In the face of these problems, neoliberalism and individualism must be abandoned, the rigid boundaries of administrative divisions between countries broken, and the "obligation ergaomnes" fulfilled as citizens of the earth. This is why the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development on 25 September 2015, along with a set of 17 bold global goals to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all, including SDG14 on the conservation and sustainable use of the ocean's resources. It called on each country, private organisation, and individual to develop green and sustainable consumption and production patterns to protect the environment. Thus, protecting and restoring our environment is at the heart of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. To achieve these targets, the overall theme of the fifth session of the United Nations Environment Assembly was "Strengthening Actions for Nature to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals". The session was held online on 22–23 February 2021 and called for strengthened action to protect and restore nature and nature-based solutions to achieve the SDGs in its three complementary dimensions: social, economic, and environmental [44]. Human beings live in a global village, in the same space and time where life history and reality converge, increasingly becoming a community with a shared future. The concept is extensive and its essence includes five pillars, "lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, inclusiveness, cleanliness and beauty", which all have rich connotations of international law [45].

On 10 February 2017, the 55th UN Commission for Social Development approved a resolution that called for more support for economic and social development in Africa by embracing the spirit of building a human community with a shared future. It can be said that the UN has once again adopted ideas initiated by China, following the "Five Cardinal Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", the "Three World Theory", and the concept of a "Harmonious World", which reflect China's initiative. There is no doubt that the concept

breaks national, race, cultural, and ideological barriers. It provides a new perspective and feasible action plan to focus on the future and destiny of humankind and realise "the free union of man". Of course, the concept of a community with a shared future for humankind is also open and inclusive. It is not about building a community with a shared future for humankind with China at the centre but building a beautiful home for humankind that embodies the international view of power, common interests, sustainable development, and global governance, featuring "inclusive development and shared rights and responsibilities". China will always be a builder, an important contributor, and a major defender of this homeland.

The concept of a community with a shared future for humankind is multidimensional, covering political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological aspects of the international community. The development of science and technology has accelerated economic integration, increased globalisation, and increased interdependence. However, with the rise of nationalism and populism, there is also a strong undercurrent of antiglobalisation, such as the US government's recent withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement and later rejoining under the Biden regime. The issues of survival and environmental protection and how to live in harmony with nature have engendered extensive thinking in the international community. The realisation of the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind needs a practical platform, and the construction of a regional community with a shared future for humankind and new organisations and new mechanisms are indispensable platforms. On this basis, the blue planet we live on is not divided into isolated islands by the oceans. Rather, it is linked by a shared future where people of all countries share weal and woe. This shows that global marine ecological and environmental governance should be based on the common destiny of humankind, sustainable development of the marine environment, and the common interests of all countries. Only by sharing the same breath and issues and building a global model of marine ecological and environmental governance can we truly form an ocean community with a shared future for the sustainable development of the marine ecological environment. Based on this, under the guidance of an ocean community with a shared future, the existing global marine ecological environment governance should shift from damage prevention to risk prevention.

As mentioned above, protection against damage to the marine ecological environment has the colour of "mending the damage after it is too late", the concept of risk-prevention marine ecological environment protection requires multisubjects to carry out risk assessment for a series of planned marine activities, including the exploration of marine resources, the application of marine science and technology, and the possible effects of dumping on the marine ecological environment. In the past, marine ecological environment governance was that if there is an undetermined risk of marine ecological environment damage caused by human activities in the ocean [46], theresulting current situation of serious marine ecological environment pollution would also damage the intergenerational equity.

The declaration "Our Oceans, Our Future: A Call to Action" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in July 2017 calls on states to take a preventive approach and enhance the resilience of the oceans to better protect and sustainably use marine biodiversity. The declaration emphasises taking a risk-prevention approach to protecting the marine ecological environment while implementing SDG 14 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In short, for the sustainable development of humankind and common maritime interests and seeking a new trend in global governance that features "extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits", global marine environment governance should be guided by the concept of an ocean community with a shared future for global marine environment protection.

### *3.3. Establishing a Global Mechanism for Coordinating Marine Ecological Environment Governance*

According to the French scholar Godane, governance is not a concept put forward by a certain person, nor is it the concept of a specialised discipline, but a collective product, more or less with the characteristics of negotiation and hybridity [47]. As discussed above, the realisation of a community with a shared future for humankind requires new organisations and new mechanisms, which is an indispensable platform for practice. As a subordinate concept of a community with a shared future for humankind, an ocean community with a shared future has regional characteristics. It is particularly necessary to build a global coordination mechanism for marine ecological environment governance to implement the concept of a community with a shared future for the oceans. Due to the unifying nature of the ocean, global marine ecological environment pollution often affects many countries and subjects along the coast; therefore, it is not just a governance problem for one country or region. In the face of the current regionalised and fragmented of marine environmental governance system, coordinating the multisubject marine ecological environment governance and establishing a global multisubject co-governance coordination mechanism is important.

The governance model should be considered first to transform the global marine ecological environment governance from regional governance to global multisubject governance. Although the Montevideo project has made great progress, it is still fragmented. Territorial and maritime disputes may lead to ecological environment protection issues. Taking biodiversity and natural resource protection in the South China Sea as an example, some scholars believe establishing a multisubject co-governance coordination mechanism for the marine ecological environment requires shelving sovereignty disputes [48]. This view reflects the consultative governance model of shelving disputes, pursuing joint development, and safeguarding the marine ecological environment. Compared to the traditional dialogue and consultation model, it is worth pointing out that a network governance coordination model can also be considered to introduce a monitoring and evaluation mechanism with public participation to prohibit individual subjects from predatory exploitation of the ocean. This model breaks away from the traditional hierarchical governance model within a country and the discrete state of divided governance rather than shared governance among various governance actors in the international community.

The establishment of a consultation mechanism should be based on the parallel structure of the international community. The marine regional governance mechanism as a bureaucratic mechanism has played an important role at the domestic level. However, due to the existence of too many administrative levels, there is information asymmetry, resulting in a poor governance coordination and slow response. In addition, a strict division of labour leads to "strict barriers" between departments, making it difficult to realise communication and cooperation among various subjects truly. Therefore, this kind of hierarchical governance mechanism is unsuitable for the complex, dynamic, and pluralistic marine environment [49]. By contrast, because the international community belongs to a parallel structure dominated by states, hierarchical mechanisms cannot be applied. However, some developed countries regard the international community's interests as an exclusive zerosum relationship; therefore, they believe that there wouldbe disagreements and conflicts between countries competing for interests. Without the concept of "harmony without uniformity" and "obligation ergaomnes" and upholding the hegemonic logic of putting national interests first, it is difficult to achieve "harmony between human and sea" and "harmony between man and nature" to address global ecological environment governance issues. For that reason, the governance mechanism of the global marine ecological environment governance should be based on the parallel structure of the international community rather than the hierarchical or vertical structure, establishing a dialogue and consultation mechanism featuring extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.

Finally, it is also necessary to consider the balance of rights and the duality of identities of multisubjects in the marine ecological environment. For the former, some scholars point out that the construction of a global coordination mechanism for shared governance by multisubjects needs to take into account power preferences and that achieving an "ideal balance of rights" is an important prerequisite for providing an environment for international law to create a sense of legal obligation. Such a balance can create "added value" for international law and thus encourage compliance with the UNCLOS [50]. Thus, co-

governance of the marine environment from regional to global governance is necessary to overcome geopolitical barriers and achieve a balance of rights among multiple governance subjects. As for the latter, it should be said that in the global marine ecological environment governance, there is a duality of "profit-seeker" and "governor" identities for all governance subjects. If actors overemphasise their "profit-seeking" identities in an interdependent world, it wouldbring about noncooperation and create a bad image in the international community. Therefore, the successful realisation of global ocean governance also needs to deal with the contradiction of identity duality of governance actors [51]. For this reason, each governance subject should abandon the discrete governance concept of fragmented governance and actively learn marine life community, gather the points of convergence, and merge them into one, while pursuing their interests, taking corresponding international responsibilities, and fulfilling their "obligation ergaomnes" for environmental protection.

In summary, it is undeniable that the construction of a coordination mechanism for the participation of multisubjects in the governance of the global marine ecosystem is not easy. Therefore, the construction of a coordination mechanism for the co-governance of the global marine ecosystem should be based on the UNCLOS and the implementation of regional marine project plans as a model, on top of which the balance of interests and points of convergence for the shared governance of marine ecosystem by multisubjects should be analysed and a high degree of joint, integrated planning and management should be realised, based on unilateral governance by countries and regional subgovernance. However, governance does not mean possession and ownership, and the coordination mechanism of a global marine ecological environment with multisubjects should also be based on the concept of an ocean community with a shared future, through friendly consultation and reaching consensus on global cooperation to solve marine ecological environment problems jointly.

### *3.4. Establishing the Global Commission for the Co-Governance of Marine Ecological Environment with Multisubjects*

At present, the governance of marine ecological environment by multisubjects has become a reality, but various subjects involved are constrained by many factors that include different governance objectives, methods, and contents, a lack of effective synergy among various subjects or power centres, and competition and conflict among them. For example, according to the UNCLOS, the oceans are divided into nine regions, and several regions have their international organisations for the oceans. In addition, various ocean actors, including countries, international organisations, and NGOs, have different worldviews, values, and interests, while various regional ocean organisations have a certain degree of exclusivity. Therefore, the diverse and fragmented international ocean governance has not yet formed a truly meaningful global ocean governance system. Moreover, various power centres or subjects of governance also lack a platform for common discussion, interconnection, and win-win cooperation based on the concept of an ocean community with a shared future.

Based on analyses, the fate of the world should be jointly held by all countries; international rules should be jointly written by all countries; global affairs should be jointly governed by all countries; and the fruits of development should be jointly shared by all countries. Promoting the reform of the global governance system is a common cause of the international community. Only by working through extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits can we build consensus and take concerted actions to reform the global governance system. It should be said that the historical role of the law of the sea has always been to balance competing international interests. The approach to achieving this balance in the face of new challenges and potential threats remains the same: realistic achievability based on cooperation, consultation, and mutual compromise [52].

The realisation of an ocean community with a shared future requires a corresponding practice platform, and the construction of regional communities of human destiny and new organisations and mechanisms is essential. For this reason, no single country, organisation,

or institution can take on the responsibility of global marine ecosystem governance on its own to form a holistic and clear approach to solve the multiple problems facing the ocean. A study conducted by Di Jin (2019) mentioned that fragmented sea governance approaches are illsuited to handling the multifaceted interrelationships between the marine ecosystem components and anthropogenic activities [53]. Bycontrast, integrated management practices, such as marine spatial planning (MSP), integrated coastal zone management (ICZM), and ecosystem-based management (EBM), are relatively progressive and advanced approaches [54]. However, fragmentation continues even with the new initiatives, largely because of a lack of institutional and policy reforms [55]. In this regard, MarjoVierros believes that MSP can take on this responsibility [56]. The plan can integrate current human behaviour in marine ecosystem management without compromising controversial values to achieve sustainable development of the global marine ecosystem. However, although the scholar argues that the MSP can enable stakeholders to make full use of the sea area and prevent existing or potential conflicts at sea, it lacks sufficient theoretical analysis and practical operational recommendations and is therefore not feasible. ChristerJönsson and Anders Johnsson provide a comprehensive analysis of the role of the IPU in global governance, covering mainly cooperation with the WTO, counterterrorism actions, and refugee protection. They point out that marine ecosystem governance is an integral part of global governance [57], but their article does not provide an in-depth analysis on how to achieve a co-governance path for multisubjects in the global marine ecosystem.

By contrast, Chinese scholars Liang Jarei and Qu Sheng took ocean governance in the South Pacific region as an inspiration and posited that the key to global marine ecosystem governance lies in strengthening coordination and cooperation among organisations, building global ocean governance partnerships, and strengthening the effective docking of regional ocean governance concepts with global ocean governance concepts [58]. It should be said that they have attempted to construct a relatively complete theoretical system for global marine ecosystem governance, but only based on a large number of existing regimes and treaty provisions, and failed to note that since World War I, there has been an increasing number of international conventions with global scope but without any substance or representativeness. Some scholars believe that there are three main points of marine ecological environment governance: firstly, to build a crossregional trust and rules guidance mechanism for the marine environment; secondly, to deepen the "regional sea" system in international regions; and thirdly, to improve the "strong system" of regional governance of the domestic marine environment [59]. Although these scholars focused on the construction of the relationship between multisubjects and the deepening of the existing system of marine ecology, it is obvious that the goal of co-governance by multisubjects of marine ecology cannot be achieved because it is confined by the existing framework but lacks the overall construction of marine ecology governance rules. Thus, the plurality of global marine governance subjects inevitably causes the power to be dispersed from one centre to many centres, and there are potential governance conflicts. For example, for the restoration of marine ecosystems, countries far from the marine commons and countries near the sea have different environmental governance needs.

However, it is worth pointing out that global ocean governance also needs leaders to overcome difficulties to solve common human problems. Decentralisation and the lack of leaders are structural contradictions in global ocean governance. There are many difficulties in managing the whole-ocean governance process and coordinating the interests of governance subjects. Based on this, we can consider establishing a global international organisation for global marine ecological environment governance, the global commission for the co-governance of marine ecological environment with multisubjects, which is dedicated to coordinating and solving the many problems in marine ecological environment governance. The main mission of the commission is to coordinate and integrate the regionalised and fragmented marine ecological environment governance systems in the initial stage and build a healthy "blue ocean economy". The latter's mission is to carry out planned and purposeful governance of the marine ecosystem as the common heritage

of humankind globally to achieve sustainable development of the global ecosystem. In this regard, a multisubject committee on shared governance can be established under the authority of the UN General Assembly, and the members of this committee can include states, intergovernmental organisations, international nongovernmental organisations, and multinational corporations. At the same time, specific subsidiary bodies, including a council, a secretariat, a compulsory dispute settlement body, and an executive board, should be set up, drawing on the structure of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Seabed Authority. Given the possible intertwining of interests, conflicts and contradictions among various governance subjects, and even behaviours that are contrary to the value goal of co-governance under an ocean community with a shared future, it is possible to draw on the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization to establish a corresponding compulsory dispute settlement body and to resort to legal means to resolve disputes that occur in the process of co-governance. Meanwhile, an executive board wouldbe set up to enforce the judgment delivered by the dispute settlement body, and members who refuse to enforce the judgment wouldapply for sanctions or authorised retaliation by the Council. A logical roadmap of the specific concept is shown in the diagram below (Figure 1). planned and purposeful governance of the marine ecosystem as the common heritage of humankind globally to achieve sustainable development of the global ecosystem. In this regard, a multisubject committee on shared governance can be established under the authority of the UN General Assembly, and the members of this committee can include states, intergovernmental organisations, international nongovernmental organisations, and multinational corporations. At the same time, specific subsidiary bodies, including a council, a secretariat, a compulsory dispute settlement body, and an executive board, should be set up, drawing on the structure of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Seabed Authority. Given the possible intertwining of interests, conflicts and contradictions among various governance subjects, and even behaviours that are contrary to the value goal of co-governance under an ocean community with a shared future, it is possible to draw on the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization to establish a corresponding compulsory dispute settlement body and to resort to legal means to resolve disputes that occur in the process of cogovernance. Meanwhile, an executive board wouldbe set up to enforce the judgment delivered by the dispute settlement body, and members who refuse to enforce the judgment wouldapply for sanctions or authorised retaliation by the Council. A logical roadmap of the specific concept is shown in the diagram below (Figure 1).

*Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 11145 15 of 18

tries near the sea have different environmental governance needs.

the construction of the relationship between multisubjects and the deepening of the existing system of marine ecology, it is obvious that the goal of co-governance by multisubjects of marine ecology cannot be achieved because it is confined by the existing framework but lacks the overall construction of marine ecology governance rules. Thus, the plurality of global marine governance subjects inevitably causes the power to be dispersed from one centre to many centres, and there are potential governance conflicts. For example, for the restoration of marine ecosystems, countries far from the marine commons and coun-

However, it is worth pointing out that global ocean governance also needs leaders to overcome difficulties to solve common human problems. Decentralisation and the lack of leaders are structural contradictions in global ocean governance. There are many difficulties in managing the whole-ocean governance process and coordinating the interests of governance subjects. Based on this, we can consider establishing a global international organisation for global marine ecological environment governance, the global commission for the co-governance of marine ecological environment with multisubjects, which is dedicated to coordinating and solving the many problems in marine ecological environment

gionalised and fragmented marine ecological environment governance systems in the initial stage and build a healthy "blue ocean economy". The latter's mission is to carry out

**Figure 1.** The basic framework of the Global Commission for Co-governance of Marine Ecological Environment.

Considering the current fragmentation, ineffectiveness, and absence of a uniform global governance system for the marine environment, the author believes that if the proposed global commission for the co-governance of marine ecological governance is successfully set up under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly, it could benefit the world in a time when it is much needed. However, it could serve as an icebreaker and may be feasible for all the coastal states to accept, as a starter, reaching out at a uniform and mutual agreement to ensure that the global marine ecological environment is being governed by a well-planned and safer system under the proposed global commission of the United Nations. The main idea of this proposal is to let the global stakeholders realise that the world should join hands together to mutually protect the marine ecological environment before it may becometoo late. To this end, a reference can be made with the establishment of framework for a pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas (MPAs) by the Arctic Council in 2015 [60], which logically responded and provided a global solution to the urgency of safeguarding and restoring marine ecosystem function, biodiversity, and sustenance of the available natural resources to make them sustainable for the future generations [61]. Similarly, research conducted by Christina Kelly et al. (2010) also demonstrated that the negative impacts of fragmented sea governance still exist under the new governance measures mainly due to the fact that the different organisations are

still working separately [54]; thus meriting the need forone uniform commission under the United Nations.

### **4. Conclusions**

The global marine ecological environment multisubject co-governance is an inevitable requirement of human beings for the continuous deepening of marine development and utilisation, marine ecological environment protection, and the rightful meaning of building an ocean community with a shared future. The key to the realisation of the global marine ecological environment is not only the accurate recognition of the current situation of marine ecological environment damage but also how to combine the international political, economic, and social situation to make rational analysis, break through the ideological barriers of master and subordinate, different camps, and separate policies, and realise the optimal institutional model design for global marine ecological environment protection under the non-zero-sum game of multicorporate governance. Only when the international community is fully aware of the limitations of the traditional marine ecological environment governance concept and the inadequacy of unilateral or regional marine ecological environment governance can it truly realise the necessity of global marine ecological environment co-governance by multisubjects guided by the concept of an ocean community with a shared future. At the same time, only through the global marine ecological environment governed by multisubjects can we effectively achieve the sustainable development of the marine ecological environment, protect the common heritage of all humankind, achieve intergenerational equity, and build a community with a shared future and other major goals, and an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world with lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity.

**Funding:** This research was supported by the National Social Fund of China [Grant No. 20BFX196].

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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