*Article* **Determinants of the Arab Spring Protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya: What Have We Learned?**

**Zahraa Barakat and Ali Fakih \***

Department of Economics, Lebanese American University, Beirut P.O. Box. 13-5053, Lebanon; zahraa.barakat@lau.edu

**\*** Correspondence: afakih@lau.edu.lb

**Abstract:** This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of protest participation in Arab Spring countries that witnessed major uprisings and in which social unrest was most pronounced. Namely, this paper investigates the latter in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya using a micro-level data survey, the Arab Transformation Survey (2015). The findings of our probit regression analysis reveal that gender, trust in government, corruption concern, and social media usage have influenced the individual's perception of protest activism. We find evidence that the role of economic factors was inconsistent, whereas political grievances were more clearly related to the motive to participate in the uprisings. We then control for country-specific effects whereby results show that citizens in each country showed different characteristics of participation. The findings of this research would set the ground for governments to better assess the health of their societies and be a model of governance in the Middle East.

**Keywords:** Arab Spring; participation; protesting; probit model

#### **1. Introduction**

The political landscape of the Arab states has been significantly shaped by the events of the so-called "Arab Spring". After decades of authoritarianism along with political and civil repression, a sentiment of discontent and disappointment developed throughout the years among Arab residents. The movements began in Tunisia when mass and vicious demonstrations took place against the long dictatorial standards of the tyrant rulers. This inspired other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to undergo similar movements, adopting this activism and making it a powerful tool that matured later in the form local uprisings. Consequently, these riots have reshaped the political in the region (McKay 2011).

Social mobilization is regarded as "conflictual", mainly due to its forms. The protest has been identified as the main foundation of social movements rising the threat of civil wars or conflicts (Porta 2008). The causes of these conflicts are viewed as double-edged. On the one hand, the authorities' inability to meet the continuous demands of citizens has contributed to their grievances (Gurr 1970; Hoadley 1981; Fisher 1990; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). On the other hand, it stems from the state's inability to curb uprisings in a peaceful approach. This results in the state responding with violence, which further entices conflict (Tilly 1978; Mello 2010). Most of the protests in the MENA region were oppressed by brutal measures taken by the state as in Libya and Egypt, while in other cases, appeasement and nonviolent measures were taken, such as in Tunisia.

This paper aims at providing empirical understanding of the determinants contributing to "Arab Spring" uprisings. The paper focuses particularly on the North African countries of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia where revolutions were more prevalent and the timing of such rebellions were almost simultaneous suggesting that these nations share common features in respect to their long-standing leaders, corrupt government and their educated citizen mainly youth who suffered from unemployment (Anderson 2011, p. 3).

**Citation:** Barakat, Zahraa, and Ali Fakih. 2021. Determinants of the Arab Spring Protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya: What Have We Learned? *Social Sciences* 10: 282. https://doi.org/10.3390/ socsci10080282

Academic Editors: Timo Kivimaki and Rana Jawad

Received: 2 June 2021 Accepted: 15 July 2021 Published: 23 July 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

Revolutions taken place in Tunisia and Egypt were special in respect to their ability to exploit their leaders, while the case of Libya witnessed much more violence adopted by the government to crackdown on protesters.

The findings of this research would set the ground for governments to better assess the health of their societies and set a model of governance in the Middle East. We use a unique dataset extracted from The Arab Transformation Project, which was carried out in 2015. The study employs participation in any "Arab Spring" protests as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are classified into eight different sets, and empirical analysis is carried out using a probit regression model, which investigates the determinants of taking part in "Arab Spring" protests.

The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a summary of related literature in the Arab World. Section 3 defines the data and variables included in our model. Section 4 introduces the empirical model and the methodology used. Section 5 elaborates on our findings. Section 6 provides a summary for our research along with recommendations for further studies, and Section 7 provides policy implications according to our findings.

#### **2. Literature Review**

Examining the literature on democratization and political movements provides a basic guide for understanding the reasons behind the power of the street. Various studies highlight the role of socioeconomic and ideological factors in shaping individuals' beliefs and social and political opinions. Moreover, gender is a vital determinant of political participation as previous research has shown that gender is a determining factor in political pariticpation, perception and engagement (Inglehart et al. 2003; Atkeson 2003; Andersen and Jennings 2010). The Arab Spring participants and particularly youth strongly demanded reforms with respect to economic, educational, and employment reforms and faced with little or no response from their respective governments.

The literature also confirms that unemployment is a determining factor in driving individuals to protest, as a natural outcome of economic frustration over dire economic needs and underutilized potential of human capital (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011, pp. 4–6; Sadiki 2000). Campante and Chor (2012) indicate that citizens in countries that exhibit high levels of unemployment and rapid educational development show higher tendencies to witness protest movements, including the Arab Spring. Such an approach has been confirmed by Paasonen (2020) who explored the role of unemployment in the "Arab Spring" uprisings. His empirical results show that unemployed individuals are more likely to take part in "Arab Spring" uprisings compared to those who are employed. Likewise, Al-Shammari and Willoughby (2019) suggest that unemployment among youth and regime durability are solid indicators of predicting any revolt or uprising that could result in regime change. In contrast, other arguments refute the hypothesis that illustrates a relationship between unemployment and political participation. For instance, Byun and Hollander (2015) show no evidence for the role of unemployment on the level of demonstrations taking place in "Arab Spring" countries. When studying the case of Tunisia, Doherty and Schraeder (2015) find no employment difference in terms of contributing to protests before the downfall of Ben Ali. Similarly, using the principal wave of the "Arab Barometer" survey, unemployment did not explain the participation in "Arab Spring" in either Tunisia or Egypt (Beissinger et al. 2012).

Several studies cite age and education as key drivers of being engaged in demonstrations. For instance, Paasonen (2020) shows that unsurprisingly being younger and more educated increases the probability of taking part in protest movements. History also shows that youth-rich nations are not afraid of revolting, as they have underutilized potential and growing frustration over the status quo. Nations with younger populations experienced three times more civil conflicts than other countries that had an older population in the 1990s (Terrill 2011). Demographically, the MENA region has a population of about 30% between 15 and 29 years, which is relatively high and could be one of the factors that the

region has experienced high levels of violence and conflicts (BBC Trust 2012). Nevertheless, many recent studies confirmed the effect of higher education on political engagement (Henderson and Chatfield 2011; Solis 2013). According to Glaeser et al. (2007), when the economy is struggling to provide the basic opportunities for its youth, the opportunity cost of political commitment tends to be lower including the educated labor, driving all youth have a higher tendency in joining political activism.

Moreover, Aissa (2012) presumes that the expansion in schooling gives rise to a democratic movement. Based on the World Value Survey, Campante and Chor (2014) claim that individuals who obtain a salary with a deficit in their education and biographical attributes reveal more inclination to participate in protests, predicting that educated people who express little trust in their institutions increase the likelihood of their participation in political activities. In other words, when expectations and improvement in education are not met, political violence is more likely to occur (Noland and Pack 2007).

Explanations of the government trust approach are worth noting. Many studies found a link between distrust and protest participation (Jackson 1973; Sears and McConahay 1973; Abravanel and Busch 1975; Citrin 1977) giving insights that protest occurs when people lack trust in their institutions (Muller and Jukam 1977; Muller et al. 1982; Pierce and Converse 1989). Likewise, a low level of trust sets the phase for a violent political protest which can be widely spread to show political instability (Parsons 1963; Coleman 1963, 1970).

Many articles have looked at the role of social media as a catalyst to accelerating social change. Literature on social media draws attention to its vital role in recruiting individuals and mobilizing them through the efficient online coordination of political movements beyond state control (Hussain and Howard 2012; Juris 2012; Diani 2000). Social media is often regarded as a modern resource that enhances communication channels among citizens to call for political demands and express grievances (Pérez 2013), thus resulting in a sense of empowerment, especially to those who are marginalized, to disrupt the monopoly of the authoritarian setting (Radsch and Khamis 2013). It was found that 93 million tweets made by Egyptian women focused on complaints about their states and contributed to the rebellion against the oppression of Mubarak's regime (Ali and Macharia 2013). In this sense, social media became their safe place to discuss their beliefs and speak publicly in times where their culture limited their political engagement (Cattle 2015). Another euphoric aspect of social media is being a useful instrument to spread knowledge, transparency, and raise awareness (Tatarchevskiy 2011; Müller and Hübner 2014), thus facilitating the flow of messages abruptly and impulsively to reach global exposure and support (Alqudsi-Ghabra 2012). Accordingly, the role of social media in politics was viewed as a threat to governments (Lynch 2011). Focusing on specific social media platforms, Lotan et al. (2011) shed light on the role of Facebook and Twitter in the Egyptian context to connect individuals with local and external communities. Interactive practices have been widely linked to the success of the Arab spring revolution, which was also labeled the "Facebook movement" (Tufekci and Wilson 2012; Lim 2012; Juris 2012). Müller and Hübner (2014) confirmed the latter in the Tunisian context.

However, most social scientists were circumspect if not disruptive. Comunello and Anzera (2012) criticize the Internet's role in the democratization process, arguing that individuals cannot solely depend on the Internet without prior knowledge of international relations theory. Other studies concluded that technology was not the reason behind protesting, but rather how technology was present in distinctive circumstances (Anderson 2011; Samin 2012). Byun and Hollander (2015) conducted an experimental design showing no correlation between a high level of internet connectivity and the level of unrest. Hussain and Howard (2012) focused on the Gulf countries; his results confirmed that increased frequency of social media coverage tended to be associated with a low level of protests. Along similar lines, findings of quantitative models lack the presence of a relationship between frequent use of social media and successful revolutions, concluding that social media is not an adequate instrument for protests. (Dewey et al. 2012). Burris (2011) shed light on the "trap" of the liberation technology paradigm through neo-orientalist tendencies

in the context of the Arab Spring uprisings. On another note, The Twitter devolution was claimed by Lynch (2013b) to be harmful to the political landscape in Arab countries.

Additionally, the lack of equality, continuous poverty, and deprivation due to the government's denial led to the eruption of mass protests throughout the Arab world. The relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970) argues that when individuals feel that their rights are left unrecognized, they may deviate towards social activism to have change. The literature on relative deprivation covered vertical inequalities, however, efforts were made to integrate horizontal inequalities, which bring stronger empirical evidence of validity behind conflicts (Cederman et al. 2011).

This deprivation hypothesis is viably clarified by Tunisian residents when the feeling of disparity and denial drove them to demand a democratic system (Kerson 2011). Basic rights such as freedom of speech, political freedom, and the right to vote have been restricted in Tunisia and other countries, motivating citizens to revolt against the political establishment (Müller and Hübner 2014). Thus, inspired by the nearby demonstrations, Libyan citizens refused to settle down and chose to defend their human rights, especially freedom. Such argument was emphasized by an empirical approach to this issue; results show that inequality is an important factor behind an individual's willingness to protest (Parent and Zouache 2017).

Along with lack of prospects, anger over widespread corruption in the MENA government were driving factors for people to take part in the Arab Spring. Research on firm performance in the MENA region has demonstrated a negative relationship between firms engaging in informal activities and firm performance (Abdo Ahmad and Fakih 2021), which in turn translates into lower unemployment rates, triggering protests (Fakih et al. 2020) and leading to a highly frustrated population. Frustration dominated people when they observed the luxurious lifestyle of the elites while most of the population had to grapple with basic necessities (Salamey 2015). For instance, the elites in Arab countries were spending a fortune of money to indulge in their lavish activities rather than helping their economy from drowning (Ogbonnaya 2013). In the case of Egypt, according to ABC News, President Mubarak and his family were charged with a high, unjustified wealth estimated at USD 70 billion (Kim 2011).

There were many calls for controlling the widespread corruption in the MENA region. Many surveys confirmed the urge for the need to root out corruption in Arab countries. For instance, according to a survey done by YouGovCambridge31 in almost eighteen Arab countries, 260,000 respondents mentioned that the major problem in their country is corruption. The "Arab Spring" was believed to be a natural outcome to people's suffering from poverty and unemployment. However, studies showed that the real reason behind these revolutions was the country being ruled by corrupt and unjust dictators. The intensity of the injustice was unbearable to people which led them to riot into the streets and protest against their suffering (Byun and Hollander 2015).

#### **3. Data and Variables**

We use a micro-level dataset extracted from the Arab Transformation Project, which is coordinated by the University of Aberdeen (UK) in collaboration with other partners (Abbott and Teti 2015). It was conducted by the European Commission's Seventh Framework Program. The latter covers six countries in the MENA region and consists of 12,145 Arab citizens. It establishes surveys that analyze the individual's perception about politics, education, social life, economic state, and governance. However, our study is restricted to Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, where we examine the factors that influence the individual's decision to protest.

Our dependent variable is participation in "Arab Spring protests", which is a binary variable that equals one if the respondent participates in any Arab Spring protests and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are divided into different sets. Basic socioeconomic factors, also known as control factors, are included in the first set. It covers gender, a dummy that equals one if the candidate is male and zero otherwise. It also covers age, which is defined in years. Additionally, this set covers education, which is captured through two binary variables: (i) No Education, which behaves as a reference variable in our study, and it is equal to one if an individual has an elementary education or below and zero otherwise; (ii) higher education, which equals one if the respondent has a secondary degree and above and zero otherwise. The Employment Status of the respondent also represents another binary variable where being employed takes the value of one, zero otherwise. Finally, the Health Status of the respondents equals one if a respondent claims good health and zero otherwise.

The second set holds Arab Spring factors ranging from Corruption, Authoritarianism, External Interference, Political Freedom, and Economic Problems. The Arab Transformation Survey (2015) asked respondents to identify the most important challenge facing their country and their perception about the reason behind citizens' participation. The set treats these factors as binary, which equals one if the respondent mentioned the above challenges.

The third set contains the Personal Beliefs factors of respondents. It includes the binary variable Social Security which equals one if the respondent feels satisfied with the system of social security and zero otherwise. Similarly, we measure satisfaction with the progress of the economy using a binary variable named Economic Satisfaction. The variable Equality Proponent reflects the tendency to place equality among all by the government, taking a value of one when the respondent believes that their current political system is practicing equality and zero otherwise.

The fourth set takes into account the Confidence in Institutions factors which consider binary variables of Corruption Concern, a variable asking candidates about their opinion of the government's effort in cracking down on corruption. Furthermore, a good extent in rooting out corruption is represented by the value of one, and zero otherwise. Similarly, for the Job Creation variable that equals one if the respondent believes that the government is doing well in creating job opportunities. Finally, the Trust in Government indicator equals one if individual shows trust for the government and zero otherwise.

The fifth set incorporates Poverty measures by comparing a household's income and expenses. The variable is equal to one if individuals' income was not sufficient to cover their expenses and zero otherwise.

The economic factor is covered in the sixth set where respondents evaluate the status of the economy at the current time. The National Economy variable, if equals to one, indicates good evaluation for the national economy and zero otherwise.

The seventh set employs Internet usage as a proxy variable for all forms of social media taking the value of one of the corresponding respondents uses the internet frequently, and zero otherwise.

The last set adds Country Dummies to control for the variation in countries applying Tunisia as a reference country in the empirical regression.

#### **4. Methodology**

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, either the logit or probit method can be utilized. Although they differ in the distribution function, both methods produce similar results. After checking for robustness, the probit model was chosen in this paper using the Arab Transformation (2015) data to investigate the determinants of individual's participation in "Arab Spring" protests.

The explanatory variables mentioned above are expected to exhibit correlation and therefore Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are used to detect multicollinearity. Given that the average score is below 10 and VIFs show a value less than 5, we conclude that our model shows no problematic correlation between the explanatory variables as can be shown in Table 1. To this end, the model is said to be reliable.


**Table 1.** Collinearity diagnostics among the explanatory variables.

The probit equation is estimated as follows:

$$PARI\_{i} = a\_{0} + a\_{1}SE\_{i} + a\_{2}AS\_{i} + a\_{3}PB\_{i} + a\_{4}CI\_{i} + a\_{5}POV + a\_{6}EC\_{i} + a\_{7}SM\_{i} + a\_{8}C\_{i} + e\_{i} \tag{1}$$

where *PART<sup>i</sup>* is a binary variable that equals one if the respondent (*i*) participates in any Arab Spring protests. The other variables (explanatory) represent individuals' characteristics present in the survey's dataset. *SE*, *AS*, *PB*, *CI*, *POV*, *EC*, *SM*, and *C*, stand for Socioeconomic, Arab Spring, Personal Beliefs, Confidence in institution, Poverty, Economic, and Social Media factors, respectively, in addition to the country dummies. The error term which follows a normal distribution is represented by *ε<sup>i</sup>* .

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest representing some of the characteristics of the respondents. It is shown that 34% of respondents participated in some sort of protests within the Arab Revolutions, 32% of respondents are Egyptian, 39% are Libyan, and 29% are Tunisian. We find that 50% of the candidates are males; the average age of those who were engaged in revolts is 39 years old. We also observe that 37% are employed, 76% obtained higher education, and 41% are highly active on social media platforms. The Arab Transformation Survey (2015) asked respondents to identify the challenges and reasons that they believed citizens participated in their societies, 57% claimed that corruption was the reason, only 6% identified external interference as a cause for protesting, 41% contributed demonstration for economic grievances, 23% believed that people were joining protests to oppose authoritarian leaders, and 22% mentioned that citizens were brought to streets to demand political freedom. When asking respondents about their current political system, 72% stated that there is a good extent in spreading equality, 32% were satisfied with the economic development, and 35% were satisfied with the social security system. Moreover, opinions at the institutional level show that only 30% trust their government, 26% believe that the government is showing a good effort in creating job opportunities, and 44% admit that the government is working on cracking down on corruption. At a personal belief level, 45% mentioned that they are poor since their income level is not enough in covering their expenses. Surprisingly, only 4% believed that the national economy obtains a good status.


**Table 2.** Summary statistics of variables.

#### **5. Empirical Results**

*5.1. Main Results*

Table 3 interprets the marginal effects resulted from the probit model of the determinants of the protest participation in the Arab Spring. Each column represents one of the specifications described earlier in the data and variables section.

**Table 3.** Determinants of the decision to participate in Arab spring protests (probit model, marginal effects).



**Table 3.** *Cont.*

Note: No education category is the reference group for higher education variable. Statistical significance: \* 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

> Column 1 presents the Socioeconomic variables, which behave as a control group to our study. Results indicate that gender, age, educational attainments, and health status are related to protest involvement, while employment does not matter. This result seems to be surprising taking into consideration earlier research that acknowledged the role of unemployment behind the so-called "Arab Spring" protest, except in light of the findings of Paasonen, 2020, who addressed the gaps of previous studies mainly in raising the problem of measuring unemployment. In her paper, unemployment was not regarded as a major force instigating individuals towards rebellion. Whilst various sources of conflict exist simultaneously, there is no denying that the dominant source of political problems in the MENA region stems from factionalism in politics. Such subnational challenges to the state have inevitably caused a growing doubt around the state's political legitimacy and could perhaps be the determining factor behind state fragility in the MENA region (Kivimäki 2021).

> The findings indicate that males are engaged in demonstration 16% more than females. In addition, age and health status are negatively correlated to protesting, implying that political uprisings are associated with a higher likelihood of protest participation among youth and those who have poor health. Result for education, however, contributed with a higher propensity of protest participation among educated people. These findings are consistent with (Paasonen 2020; Noland and Pack 2007).

> Column 2 incorporates Arab Spring factors. Corruption, authoritarianism, and political freedom show statistical evidence in support of the reason behind protest participation. These findings coincide with the narrative that protestors have been triggered by democratic and anticorruption reform ((Müller and Hübner 2014; Byun and Hollander 2015; Aissa 2012).

Column 3 adds personal beliefs variables. Health did not seem to impact an individual's participation anymore. We find significant evidence that individuals who are dissatisfied with the economic development show a greater tendency to engage in protest activism. The continuous poor efforts by the government to boost the economy push individuals to express discontent (Arampatzi et al. 2018). Surprisingly, our finding reveals that people who feel satisfied with the social security system are more likely to participate in protests compared to those who are dissatisfied. This unfamiliar result is consistent with other studies that speak for higher levels of participation among individuals who benefit from social welfare (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Klandermans 1997; Theiss and Kurowska 2019). Ideally, receiving satisfying social welfare empowers them to take part in political activities in the form of political transition; on the contrary, dissatisfied people are helpless in bringing about political change.

Column 4 presents Confidence in Institution factors. Authoritarianism and Satisfaction with the economic development lost their significance behind prioritizing protests whereas employment status showed positive and significant results implying that employed are more likely to have been engaged in rebellions. This suggests that the unemployed might have less interest in politics, which decreases the likelihood of revolt (Paasonen 2020).

We also find that individuals who show no trust in the government are more likely to participate, as concluded by Campante and Chor (2014). Additionally, there is evidence that cracking down on corruption by the government decreases the likelihood to bring people into the streets. This compulsion may be a reasonable result of massive calls to offset the level of corruption. Curiously, respondents who believe that the government is doing good efforts in creating jobs are 8.5% more likely to be involved in protests than those who gave bad evaluations for job opportunities. There is a gap in providing any empirical evidence to approve the link between job creation and increased stability. Developing a typical comprehension of the stability term enables more understanding of the linkage between job creation and stability (Bergh and Zanker 2013).

Column 5, which incorporates poverty measures, shows that 8.7% of those whose income does not cover their expenses are less likely to be inclined in protest than those whose income is sufficient for their needs. We would have expected the relationship to be positive instead of negative, as proved by other studies according to the deprivation theory (Kerson 2011; Parent and Zouache 2017). Our results imply that the political conditions of the MENA region explain the desire to rebel rather than economic distresses. This in turn distinguishes MENA countries from the rest of the world, especially South Asia. Moreover, Social Security and the employment variable became statistically insignificant.

Column 6 introduces the Economic factor: National Economy. We found no statistical relationship between national economy status and protesting. Unlike other studies which claim that the economy is declining due high level of inflation, individuals show more propensity towards protesting (Byun and Hollander 2015).

Column 7 accounts for adding the Social Media factor, obviously some variables such as higher education, corruption, job creation, and poverty flipped their significance. However, we obtain significant results indicating that frequency in using social media increases the probability of joining protests. This emphasizes the role of social media in antigovernment movements (McKay 2011; Chokoshvili 2011).

Lastly, column 8 introduces Country dummies. The results show that gender, trust in government, corruption concern, and social media usage influence protesting decisions for revolts, while other factors display no significance. Results are consistent with the other studies (Andersen and Jennings 2010; Muller et al. 1982; Chokoshvili 2011; McKay 2011).

Compared to Tunisia, Egyptian citizens are 9.4% less likely to participate in protests, whereas Libyan residents are 36% more likely to be engaged in revolutions. A likely explanation for dispersion in participation rate can be due to differences in population size, cultural and societal factors. Of note, our explanatory power increased when moving from column 1 to column 8 as the pseudo R2 increased from 8% to around 30% when proceeding with the model, indicating that our model is an excellent fit when adding all variables.

#### *5.2. Heterogeneous Effects across Countries*

Table 4 reports the marginal effects from the probit model of determinants of protest participation across the studied countries. Each column corresponds to specifications discussed earlier across each country separately.


**Table 4.** Determinants of the decision to participate in Arab Spring by country (marginal effects).

Note: No education category is the reference group for higher education variable. Statistical significance: \* 10% \*\* 5% \*\*\* 1%; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

The unconditional marginal effects in Egypt show that those who claim good health are 6.4% more likely to participate in protests than those with poor health. Corruption was shown to be a significant reason for bringing people to the streets. The result is in line with a recent study arguing that corruption brought a wave of dissatisfaction among Egyptians, leading them to protest (Saidin 2018).

Egyptians who mentioned that their current political system is much better at providing equality among individuals are 18.8% less likely to be engaged in protests. Such a conclusion was argued by Acemoglu et al. (2005) through the social equality approach. Thus, suggesting that Egyptians who support and call for the principle of equality tend to fear less political engagement compared to those that are less adherent to this principle (Fakih and Ghazalian 2019). Still, those who are satisfied with how the economy is developing are 6.3% more probable to demonstrate. Though improved economic conditions would lower unemployment, it is more likely to cause a higher degree of insurgencies (Berman et al. 2011).

Hence, the results give us an insight that those who are satisfied with the economic condition would be engaged in revolutions due to their belief that they are the advocates for the country, not the oppressive leaders.

Similar to Egypt, corruption also tends to matter for Libyan protestors in addition to the urge for political freedom; yet Libya shows a gender gap where male shows more tendency towards protesting. In February 2011, protestors raised their call for democratic changes, the rejection of corruption, and against the violation of human rights (Lynch 2013a). The lack of trust in government accounts for higher engagement in protests. It is worth mentioning that those who are better off in social security are more likely to join revolts than those who are dissatisfied. Those who are better off are more likely to protest, not necessarily those who are poor and helpless (Klandermans 2011). Notably, social media had a significant impact on Libyan people towards democracy as 21% of those who use social media show a higher likelihood to protest. Though the Libyan governments tried to limit internet access, which seemed to be a threat to the authoritarian regimes, protestors used Twitter to post and share information (Gire 2017).

For one thing, none of the reasons behind the protest were significant for Tunisia. In addition, revolutionary participants in other countries showed no significant difference in age except in Tunisia, which shows a negative and significant relationship between age and participation, but the magnitude remains very low (0.5%). Being a male and an active user on social media increases the likelihood of participation in demonstrations. Social media was an effective tool impacting the path of Arab spring in Tunisia, which displayed a peak after the self-immolating incident of "Mohammad Bouazizi" whose act had considerable impacts on the Arab world (Hussain and Howard 2012).

#### **6. Conclusions**

This paper examines the factors behind participation in the Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Findings for all three countries reveal that set of socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors have established a motivation behind an individual's decision to protest. The willingness to participate in uprisings was shown to be driven by political grievances rather than economic factors. The intention of such a result may reinforce the main determinant for conflict in weak MENA communities, suggesting that aspects of state fragility in MENA seem to be different than other societies in the world (Kivimäki 2021).

We find that the gender gap is significant in the examined sample, lack of trust in government showed to be a significant trigger towards protesting, social media played an essential role in influencing people to take part in protests, and governments' attempts to combat corruption tend to decrease the probability of bringing people into streets. Indeed, each country had its roots for the uprisings; hence, our results show a substantial difference among the studied countries in citizens' pattern toward rebellion. For instance, corruption and inequality seemed to increase the likelihood of protest participation in Egypt. We also find evidence that Egyptians with good health and who are satisfied with the economic development in their countries were engaged in political activism more often than those who are dissatisfied. As for Libyan citizens, males were more probable to join revolts. It was found that corruption, political freedom, lack of trust in government, and social media usage are the main drivers to prompt the protesting mechanism in Libya; however,

satisfaction with the social security played a positive role in influencing people to join revolts. Lastly, Tunisia showed a gender gap difference in protest involvement. Regardless of the low magnitude, youth engagements tend to be significant, and usage of social media was correlated with a higher likelihood for political participation.

To further validate our findings, we can include other countries, increasing our sample size to helps us draw more accurate generalizations. Adding more economic indicators that were unfeasible to us and essential in having a better understanding whether participants were motivated by political change or economic grievances.

To reach a more diversified understanding of the "Arab Spring" and its broader implications requires looking at their margins; hence, the narration of the "Arab Spring" employing a more in-depth approach. Although revolts used the same slogans calling for freedom and the fall of the "regime", considering them as a single revolution indicates a misguided viewpoint given the differences between distinct Arab countries (Ventura 2016, p. 285). Many groups anticipated their movements such as the "Arab Spring" for recognition purposes. On the other hand, terms such as Arab awakening is linked to a "Neo-Orientalist" world-view calling for people's awareness in the Arab world about the West's approach to portraying them as oppressed, under-civilized, and lacking agency, to the idea of "Arab despotism" and the belief that Western philosophical theology is the only path towards modernity, or the "Islamist Winter", which was employed to swing the focus of the social movement to political and security threats (Huber and Kamel 2015, p. 129; Al-Kassimi 2021). In this context, the representation of the events taking place in MENA seems to be generalized and associated with the myth of "Oriental despotism" (Ventura 2016, p. 286). The neo-orientalist approach can be recognized based on how rebellions were gendered by considering how Arab women were seen as victims of oppression and required saving (Al-Kassimi 2021). For instance, Western media deployed a gendered issue out of the uprisings and the continuous calls for women's rights confirm their "Orientalism" (Mahmood 2006; Abu-Lughod 2013; Abbas 2014; Ventura 2016, p. 291). Moreover, to state that all Arab are Muslims represents a neo-Orientalist myth (Mahmood 2006; Abu-Lughod 2013; Abbas 2014). The participation of women in the protest challenges the neo-orientalist approach whereby a broad range of females were involved in the protests. Whether on the ground or their heavily online presence on social media platforms, such as Leila-Zahra, Esraa Abdel-Fattah, and Lina Ben Mhenne, they played a major role as activists in women empowerment agenda. Such a deterministic frame necessitates a deeper recognition and deconstruction (Khalid 2015, p. 163). Of note, Western modernity has refuted the ideology of Arab women as being rational and competent authors of their political lives by limiting the intricacy of Arab cultural heterogeneity across the Mashreq and Maghreb (Al-Kassimi 2021, p. 26).

#### **7. Policy Implications**

Understanding the factors that gave rise to the uprising helps to better assess the health of our society and to provide guidance for strategies ensuring political stability. Governments shall rely on two main pillars to build citizenship and minimize the risk of political instability. The first pillar is forming an anticorruption ecosystem by taking solid and firm actions to fight the existing corruption. Some measures include restructuring the judicial system to avoid bribes and irregular payments, investigating and penalizing those involved in corrupt acts within the public administration, and seizing assets where wealth cannot be explained, subject to judicial oversight (Morgan 1998). The second pillar is building transparency and trust between citizens and the government. Though efforts to earn public trust are limited, transparency is assumed to be crucial (Kettl 2017). A vital prerequisite for that is creating portals where government spending is published regularly allowing citizens to track all the ongoing projects and initiatives. It is worth noting that governments can adopt social media to provide complementary information broadcasting, communication, and participation channels whereby citizens can access government services and also government officials be able to make more informed decisions. Countries

can also put citizens at the heart of policy making by offering them the opportunity to shape legislation in areas that they care most about by voting on policy proposals. Transparent, unbiased, and inclusive policy making helps in improving democratic performance (Shah 2007).

**Author Contributions:** Z.B. and A.F. contributed equally to this work. Both authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Data used in this paper are publically available from https://www. researchgate.net/project/The-Arab-Transformations-Project (accessed on 22 July 2021).

**Acknowledgments:** The authors would like to thank Timo Kivimaki and Rana Jawad, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **References**

Abbas, L. O. 2014. Islam and Modernity: The Case of Women Today. *Journal of Cultural and Religious Studies* 2: 297–305. [CrossRef]

Abbott, Pamela, and Andrea Teti. 2015. The Arab Transformations Project. Available online: https://www.researchgate.net/project/ The-Arab-Transformations-Project (accessed on 18 May 2021).


Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2013. *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2005. From education to democracy? *American Economic Review* 95: 44–49. [CrossRef]


Campante, Filipe R., and Davin Chor. 2012. Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26: 167–88. [CrossRef]

Campante, Filipe R., and Davin Chor. 2014. The People Want the Fall of the Regime: Schooling, Political Protest, and the Economy. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 42: 495–517. [CrossRef]

Cattle, Amy E. 2015. Digital Tahrir Square: An analysis of human rights and the Internet examined through the lens of the Egyptian Arab Spring. *Duke Journal Computer & International* 26: 417.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison. *American Political Science Review* 105: 478–95. [CrossRef]

Chokoshvili, Davit. 2011. *The Role of the Internet in Democratic Transition: Case Study of the Arab Spring. Public Policy*. Masters of Arts in Public Policy 51. Budapest: Central European University.

Citrin, Jack. 1977. Political Alienation as a Social Indicator: Attitudes and Action. *Social Indicators Research* 4: 381–419. [CrossRef]

Coleman, James S. 1963. Comment on the Concept of Influence. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1963: 63–82. [CrossRef]

Coleman, James S. 1970. Political Money. *The American Political Science Review* 64: 1074–87. [CrossRef]


Diani, Mario. 2000. Social movement networks virtual and real. *Information, Communication & Society* 3: 386–401.


Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.


Huber, Daniela, and Lorenzo Kamel. 2015. Arab Spring: The role of the peripheries. *Mediterranean Politics* 20: 127–41. [CrossRef]


Lynch, Marc. 2013a. *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East*. Paris: Hachette UK.


Morgan, Amanda. 1998. *Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications*. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.


### *Article* **The (Semi) State's Fragility: Hamas, Clannism, and Legitimacy**

**Abdalhadi Alijla**

V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden; a.ijla@daad-alumni.de

**Abstract:** This article shall ask how Hamas, as a non-state actor, negotiated legitimacy with the clans in a fragmented and factionalized tribal society in the Gaza Strip from 2007–2011. An important factor that shapes the extent of power of rebels and non-state actors in limited statehood areas (LSA) pertains to the negotiation of power these rebels develop with clans in certain areas or times. Rebel governance is a complex and multidimensional concept shaped by the pre-existing particularity of the rebel, its identity, level of factionalism, the former structure of administration, and the extant political institutions. This paper will discuss Hamas as a contemporary case of rebel governance in war and post-war times, which has resulted in a special case of fragile governance. Based on ethnographic research on Hamas and insights from political theories of identity and governance, this paper suggest that tribal factionalism led to violence and played a major role in shaping the governance structure and mechanisms through political affiliation, informal judicial mechanisms, and as a part of the social network which resists government authority. This paper shall propose that Hamas used two paths of negotiations with clans: a coercive power (violent), and by mobilizing individuals of these clans and families as part of the informal judicial system (*U'rf*). This research aims to contribute to the understanding of rebel governance in general, and Hamas in particular, showing how struggle over legitimacy is shaped and negotiated, and why Hamas could be considered a special case in the study of rebel governance.

**Keywords:** factionalism; rebel governance; Hamas; Gaza; Palestine; informal institutions

#### **1. Introduction**

We did not expect that. Public administration of the Gaza Strip is extremely difficult. We are walking on the edge of a knife. We are a resistance movement but also a government. We were caught from the beginning between the fire of clans, and the siege of Ramallah and the occupation.<sup>1</sup>

This article analyzes the negotiation process of power and legitimacy between Hamas and clans within the Palestinian community in Gaza in a time of fragility and uncertainty. Understanding this complex and dynamic relationship between clans and rebels, specifically in the case of Gaza, is vital to understand how and what brings order in society under the rebels' rule. It is similarly important as the internal dynamics further affect the external strategies when dealing with rebels and the communities under their control.

In the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the overlapping loyalties, factionalism, and the former authorities' reliance on informal institutions (managed by the clans), have created an invisible sense of competition between tribes and a governing structure which is fragile. This not to say that there is a strong competition in the form of a prolonged and continuous fight, but rather a silent struggle which provides tribesmen with privileges and resources, determining who legitimizes whom. Therefore, tribes were, and are still, competitors to Hamas's rule in the Gaza Strip, particularly within the judicial system and in their capacity to influence Hamas members from powerful tribes and the wider society.

While there are many who have examined rebel governance and how rebels and non-state actors interact with local communities, their research has primarily focused on

**Citation:** Alijla, Abdalhadi. 2021. The (Semi) State's Fragility: Hamas, Clannism, and Legitimacy. *Social Sciences* 10: 437. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/socsci10110437

Academic Editor: Lisa Hajjar

Received: 19 September 2021 Accepted: 13 November 2021 Published: 18 November 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

the ways in which states and international organizations negotiate power and authority with the rebels so as to ensure order (Hurd 2008; Clark 2008; Arjona et al. 2015; Arjona 2014). Contrary to the academic orthodoxies that associate rebels with warlordism in general, as well as with non-state actors in the MENA, rebels often rely upon local legitimacy within their societies; in fact, authors of many studies have shown that Hamas has established a professional and well-institutionalized security force (Brenner 2016; Sayigh 2011).

This paper shall provide empirical and theoretical findings on rebel governance and non-state actors' governance, contributing to the emerging field of study on rebel governance in general and the Middle East in particular. The driving question is how Hamas negotiated legitimacy in fragile semi-statehood/limited statehood area with clans in the Gaza Strip. The words clans and tribes will be used interchangeably; however, clans here refer to extended families carrying the same name, while tribes can be a coalition of clans based on blood, or intermarriage or historical ties. As this Special Issue focuses on state fragility, conflict and grievances, this article examines how one main pillar that led to state fragility concerns Hamas as a rebel group: a lack of having legitimacy (Kivimäki 2021). This paper shall draw upon the political sociology theory of identity, primary sources data from the author's extensive observations, and ethnographic research on Hamas and its administration in the Gaza Strip, as well as more than two dozen interviews from the Gaza Strip, among them with Hamas's activists, members of the Qassam, academics, Hamas police officers, civil society organizations, professionals, and clan leaders. I suggest that the relationship between Hamas clans is not based on social services provision alone, as many have suggested, but more importantly on a lengthy negotiation process using coercive and non-coercive strategies. I will also suggest that the factionalism and fragility of formal institutions has led to violence whenever rebels or non-state actors assume power. In other words, the legitimacy of Hamas and its government comes from diverse sources that range from service provision, Islamic identity, coercion, reform, anti-corruption, and struggle against the occupation.

To present these findings, in this article I will first explain clannism in Palestine, and the clans in the political life from the first Intifada and the establishment of the PA, until Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007; serving to illustrate clannism and how it has been used as a tool to create loyalists and manipulate society, thus maintaining order. Next, I shall explore the relevant literature on rebel governance, order, and legitimacy. In the latter sections, I focus on how Hamas used coercive power and an informal judicial system (*Lijan Islah*) to gain legitimacy within the clans. The two main cases I have studied are those of the Helles clan from Shejaia and the Dougmoush clan from Sabra area, both selected as they represented the most powerful families in the Gaza Strip with political affiliation to Fatah.

Clans are a crucial element of Palestinian society, where they are considered essential for social cohesion and solidarity, as well as a seat of power with which political parties seek to engage. In the Gaza Strip, clans form a network of power, particularly in the absence of formal institutions, and a fragile political system. When the Palestinian Authority was established by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat formed a separate department, the Clans Affairs Commission, affiliated with his office, to keep clans' loyalty. Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, rewarded many tribal leaders with various positions while dividing other clans to keep them under his control (Alijla 2013).

According to Mustafa Ibrahim, a Palestinian journalist and human rights activist, "The Palestinian Authority strengthened the role of the clans and their authority. It provided them with the legitimacy and a capacity to meet, organize, and even interfere in policy-making, which should only go through constitutional legal authorities such as the parliament". (Mustafa 2019)

In that sense, the fragmentation and fractionalization of the clans led on the long run to the fragility of the whole semi-statehood of the PA.

Although clans had stronger power and authority before 2000, they had more during the second Intifada because of the loss of wages for thousands of Palestinian workers in

Israel along with the Israeli strategy concerning the weakening of formal institutions of the Palestinian Authority, and the fragmentation of the Palestinian political system. This caused people to turn away from the police in order to seek conflict resolution from clans (Sayigh 2011, pp. 75–83), who further provided a social welfare network for laborers who lost their jobs. As the formal institutions and security apparatuses weakened, many clans overlapped with criminal groups. In Shejaia, a member of a famous clan killed a member of a smaller clan in front of the police station. The police could not act, and the judicial system could not find a witness, as hundreds feared for their lives if they provided testimony<sup>2</sup> .

Clannism and its manifestations continued as a competitor to the Palestinian Authority and its security forces, with many Palestinian security leaders employing bodyguards from strong clans, providing these families with weapons and (il)legal protection. After Hamas assumed power, the clans continued to present a challenge, echoing Fatah's inability to confront and extinguish clan violence, and that this "was not an option for Hamas at all".<sup>3</sup> In contrast to Fatah, Hamas was more successful in dealing with clans, ending their abilities to lawlessly use violence in the society. In special operations, Izzedin Al Qassam brigades continued to provide support to Hamas's security forces when needed, particularly against clans in Shejaia, Sabra, and Khan Younes. Indeed, one of the major successes of Hamas security forces and its governance structure since 2007 has been its strategy of response to clans and extended clan structures in Gaza (Sayigh 2011, pp. 62–67). However, that resulted in there being no single authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, leaving it with weakened legitimacy and a fragile capacity to create order.

This article contributes to the literature on factionalism and its problems for governance, especially in the cases of limited statehood areas or rebel governance. As far as the author is aware, there have not been such studies focusing on factionalism within the rebel governance literature. Besides that, this research provides empirical evidence that many existing political science studies (such as on the conflict in intrastate theory) can be applied to the cases of rebel governance or limited statehood areas.

This research uses the process-tracing method and historical narrative. It is the best method to capture the historical narrative in a very complex area and within the context of rebel governance and legitimacy theories. The aim is to capture a causal mechanism and explain the decision process within the negotiation process within the problem of legitimacy (Falleti 2006). The research used a snowball mechanism with interviewees, meaning they introduced the author to others within their network, confirming the historical narrative of the same story from several sources and from the news outlets, archives, and personal observations of the author during that time in the Gaza Strip.

This paper starts by examining the concepts of rebel governance, order, and legitimacy in the case of Hamas. The next section discusses the case of security chaos and clannism in Gaza society before 2007. The third section provides insight on the use of violence against clans and how Hamas tried to acquire legitimacy using coercive power, while the last section examines how Hamas used informal institutions in a fragile and fragmented society to acquire legitimacy.

#### **2. Rebel Governance, Order, and Legitimacy**

Rebel governance as a field of study has recently emerged with a focus on non-state actors in civil war and limited statehood areas. Many of these studies focus on the issues related to the violence of non-state actors, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Gaza, and Hizballah in Lebanon, while ignoring an important aspect of the life of these groups or externally identified rebels, particularly their acquisition of legitimacy and how they negotiate this with their surrounding environment. However, there are other studies that focus on legitimacy, but in general with no focus on the Middle East (Heydemann 2018; Al-Jabassini 2019; Florea 2020; Gilbert 2020; Furlan 2020).

Rebel governance can be defined as the mechanism by which order is created in an identified geographical area, under the control of a specific rebel group (or a number of rebel groups), enabling it to govern and meet its own goals, practice its authority, and create a form of order with direct or indirect negotiable legitimacy (Worrall 2017, p. 711).

The above definition has two important factors: the creation of order and meeting goals. Examining the order and goals of Hamas as a rebel group after 2007 will show how its rule depends upon order. The challenge for Hamas was to create order amid factionalized and fragmented parts of the society. Therefore, the creation and negotiation of this order, through both formal/informal mechanisms and violent/non-violent tools, will revolve around Hamas's acquired legitimacy. Legitimacy, in this case, is "the generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman 1995).

Rebels are part of the process of order, but they are not alone, as there is the society, norms, values, and beliefs. Therefore rebels (Hamas too) are not in complete control of order; there is a need for them to be in contact, negotiation, and interaction with many ordering forces. As part of the ordering process (imposing order) in Gaza, Hamas has been forced to interact with a range of forces at all levels. Locally it must deal with clans, political parties, extremist groups, armed militias, civil society organizations, and youth initiatives, and on a national level, with Fatah, the Palestinian Authority, and its different sets of departments and ministries, while regionally and internationally, it is faced with Israel, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, the UN, and other international organizations.

Since 2011, there have been three waves of protests erupt in the Gaza Strip. These protests were led by youths who were not satisfied by the status quo of political division, and the worsening living conditions in the Gaza Strip, particularly the lack of access to electricity, water, and employment. These protests were named "*Bidna Na'eesh*", which means "we want to live", and "*Bikaffi*" which means "enough is enough" (Manasra 2019; Yaghi 2019; Al-Ain 2019). The waves of protests were a manifestation of Hamas's failure as a rebel group to meet the needs of youth who constituted more than 40% of the whole population. Hamas's de facto police have used extensive force and violence against youths and participants in these protests.

These protests, and Hamas's subsequent reaction, raised questions about the legitimacy of Hamas as a rebel group and its governance structure. The well-known writer Majed Kayali argued, "It seems that Hamas has exploited the democratic elections to assume power; meaning, democracy for one time, one vote" (Kayali 2019). In this article, I argue that Hamas as a rebel group has negotiated legitimacy and order in society in a dynamic way, shifting and evolving through time and circumstances. I also argue that fragmentation and factionalization/politicization of the clans in Palestine could lead to more violence.

When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, its legitimacy was questioned both locally and internationally. In the eyes of its members, sympathizers, and even legal experts, Hamas's government was the legitimate ruler. Hamas's presence and ending of the security chaos was wanted and welcomed. The questioning of legitimacy is explained by two factors. First, the way in which Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, where a paramilitia, rather than a formal part of the Palestinian Authority, took power and ousted the Palestinian Authority forces, and second, whether the legitimacy of Hamas's government was considered legal under basic Palestinian law.

As Hamas won the elections and Ismael Haniya was the prime minister, his dismissal by Abbas in June 2007 should have afforded him the opportunity to lead a caretaker government until a new government could be formed and a confidence vote in the PLC ensued. However, Abbas announced a state of emergency, dismissed Haniya's government and appointed Salam Fayyad as the new prime minister. The Arab and international community recognized Fayyad's government as the legitimate one, while internally, Hamas's government and its legitimacy was disputed among all ranks of society. Based on the above argument, Hamas did not declare itself as a rebel group but as legitimate, dubbing itself "the resistance government".

A determinant that supports the argument of Hamas as a rebel group in the Gaza Strip is the absence of accountability mechanisms. There is a complete absence of institutions that can hold Hamas and its individuals accountable for the use of violence, extrajudicial executions, torture, financial assets, the budget, tax, and elections, among many other institutional state functions.

Hamas has inherited a structure of governance that is deeply penetrated by the informal institutions of cultural and societal norms; in many cases, such as the judicial system (*Muslaha*), these informal institutions have surpassed the more formal fragile establishments. In such cases, the capabilities of Hamas's governance to order and reorder is limited and coercive, shaped and affected by the extant factors and forces. Therefore, Hamas has been successfully negotiating its legitimacy and authority over the Gaza Strip, both regionally and internationally, securing itself as the de facto ruler; thus, succeeding in structuring order in society according to its vision and objectives. As the article reveals later, the fractionalization of the society and fragmentation of the judicial and security system leads to political violence.

One of the main challenges of Hamas after 2007 was to restore order. Indeed, as one of its senior leaders argued:

When we took over the Gaza Strip, social order was our main target. We wanted to do that job. We have been advocating for that in elections, mosques, streets, and *Diwans*, and we wanted to deliver social order and end *Al-Falatan Al-Alamni*. 4

Order is not just a political tool through which a rebel state may exercise its coercion or authority; it can further impact economic relations (Migdal 1988), shared norms (Worrall 2017), or even the institutions of any given society. In this paper, I see order as a set of overlapping economic, societal, and shared norms which form the structure of the whole society. In Gaza, the clans have their own moral code which influences the wider structure of order in the society, affecting economic relations, social life, and political order.

In the wake of the 2007 takeover, Hamas used excessive violence against two main components of the structure, namely the previous Fatah-dominated institutions and the familial/tribal structure of clans, to deconstruct their authority. Although violence is an exceptional tool, it can also be an integral part of the process of establishing cultural order (Worrall 2017). Hamas used indiscriminate violence at the beginning of its de facto rule, but after restructuring, developing a set of rules, and ensuring a higher level of professionalism (including the separation of the *Izzedin Al Qassam* from the civil police), it started to use discriminative and calculated violence, predominantly against clans and Islamist extremists (Sayigh 2011).

By violence, I mean the authoritarian practices of illegal and arbitrary imprisonment and torture, rather extreme violence that results in severe causalities and causes fractures within the social fabric. In this sense, the violence used by Hamas was targeting individuals and groups of individuals (clans, for instance) in order to shape their behavior in submitting to Hamas as the singular ruler, or to take control of a particular area (Kalyvas 2006) and thus eliminate no-go zones for the Hamas police (Sayigh 2011). However, the dilemma that many would argue faced Hamas would be that such violence has to be undertaken in accordance with the local practices in order to be effective.

Hamas has worked in two different ways to make the use of violence practicable; the first is avoiding using military officers and fighters to act in their own living areas, avoiding tribal clashes and future revenge (to maintain social order as far as possible); and the second is mobilizing members of large *Hamula*/clans to become members of Hamas and act as mediators between their clan and the de facto government. In Shejaia, Hamas brought Jabalia's police and Izzedin Al Qassam fighters of Northern Gaza to act against the Helles clan. Concurrently, they mobilized members of the Helles tribe to negotiate the surrender of their clan and end the conflict. This was partially successful but did not stop Hamas from using extreme violence, killing more than a dozen members of the clan (AbedRabo 2008).

According to a Hamas police officer who worked in Gaza in 2008, with the minister Saed Siyam,

We had to act; we were forced to use violence and restore order. But I can tell you that we were afraid of the social response. So we decided to bring police and Qassam from the north to avoid future killings and revenge in the same neighborhood, especially in Shejaia. At the same time, we asked Hamas members from the same clan to act, convince their clan to surrender and hand over the wanted individuals. At the end, we were forced to also attack and kill, as they [the Helles clan] were targeting us too. We had no choice but to use calculated violence.<sup>5</sup>

Order in Gaza under Hamas simultaneously developed in two ways. The first was the lack of mass protesting against Hamas's de facto rule, interpreted as the recognition of it (Hamas) as the legitimate ruler, thus exchanging civilian freedom and rights for the provision of security and services. In such a way, Hamas was able to use coercive power. The second was using mosques, meaning the internalization of norms and values which produce order. In the second mechanism, Hamas operates in Gaza through its members who are locals and have been connecting, mobilizing, and building social networks through mosques and social welfare organizations. Post-2007, it had an inbuilt socialization mechanism which allowed it (Hamas) to use coercive power to bring order and ensure legitimacy when needed.

When Hamas exercised its power, it recognized legitimacy as a crucial element to bring order. To gain legitimacy, Hamas linked local ordering (imposing order by Hamas through understanding the local fabric of the society) practices and the newly built structure of governance to ensure that it derived strength from these practices (such as the *Lijan Islah* of clans), and further challenged opponents who used these processes to undermine Hamas's legitimacy. Indeed, Hamas built its legitimacy in different forms and across different intervals (times) based on the circumstances—the provision of services, the struggle against the occupation (Zionist enemy in their terms), and its willingness to share power with Fatah—as well as moral legitimacy, such as the use of "goodness", anti-corruption, a reform agenda, and Islam as an identity. As a senior Hamas leader argued:

Our legitimacy is derived from the people themselves. From mosques, from families, from people who we serve in our schools and clinics. We have given a lot and we proved that we are not corrupt like Fatah. But the main legitimacy comes from our sacrifices and resistance against the enemy [Israel].<sup>6</sup>

After 2007, Hamas worked hard to maintain its legitimacy using a combination of these strategies, aware that any diminishing of its legitimacy would affect the ability to govern properly. After 2014, Hamas's legitimacy started to be questioned following severe corruption within its ranks and the diminishing capacity to provide services and secure order as clans clashed and unrest started to increase. Hamas subsequently imposed high taxes which led to an increase in basic goods prices, causing people to challenge its capacity to maintain order. Therefore, many youth-led groups took to the street protesting Hamas's inability to administer properly, calling for reconciliation with Fatah and using cries such as "*Biddna Ine'sh*", which means "we want to live". This was met with an iron fist and the arrest and torture of hundreds of youths (DW 2019; BBC 2019).

#### **3.** *Al-Falatan Al Amni* **and the Troubling Clannism**

Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election in January 2006. Hamas's manifesto in the election campaign was "Change and Reform", which used the widespread corruption and the damaged reputation of the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah as a strategy to gain traction among the Palestinians (Milton-Edwards 2007). Hamas's success in the elections paved the way for it to assume power for the first time. Ismael Haniya, Hamas's then leader, was nominated to form the government and in his first media statement, he asserted that his government would work with no delay to end "*Al-Falatan Al*

*Amni*", meaning the security chaos which Gaza had suffered for many years (Aljazeera 2007).

Hamas's government had not only an internal challenge but also enormous international and regional obstacles ahead. The economic and political sanctions imposed upon Hamas resulted in fractionalization within both Palestinian political institutions and society. The challenges were not only political but also financial, as public sector employees did not receive salaries due to the siege. Hamas was unable to secure enough budget funds to cover operational and bureaucratic expenses as well as the salaries of the employees who were mostly affiliated with Fatah. According to a senior Hamas activist,

We had many challenges, inside Gaza and outside. We felt everyone was trying to stop us from doing anything. We decided to work simultaneously on both sides [internal and external] with very limited resources and trying to make the government work.<sup>7</sup>

However, Hamas was mostly focusing on the internal issues because it was suspicious of Fatah's next move. As soon as Hamas won the elections, Fatah leaders warned Fatahaffiliated government employees against cooperating with Hamas (Watan 2016). These obstructive efforts, along with the denunciation of the electoral defeat, manifested in Fatahaffiliate rejection of following the instructions of Hamas ministers, particularly within the security apparatus, presenting Hamas with the urgent challenge of security chaos. Since the start of the second Intifada, many of Fatah's leaders, such as the head of the Military Police apparatus, had adopted a policy of mobilizing individual members of big clans as mechanisms of protection and influence. Fatah's provision of power, weapons, and societal connections to members of big clans constituted an overlap between clans, criminal groups, and the security apparatus. As a result, two parallel fragile institutions were created; one loyal to Hamas and another to Fatah, which eventually led to violence.

According to a Hamas security officer,

Before Hamas won the elections and formed the government, we knew that Fatah had its security apparatus of criminals and criminal networks from big families. Many of Fatah's leaders used them as a tool to act against their rivals in Fatah and Hamas too. For example, S. B. was a member of the Death Unit of the Preventive Security, which killed many Hamas members but also insulted the chief commander of the police.<sup>8</sup>

In 2004, the Death Unit established by one of Fatah's leaders, Mohamed Dahlan, stormed the headquarter of the Palestinian Police in West Gaza, attacking and insulting (by putting his head in the toilet) the chief commander of the Police, Gazi Al Jabali, as a response to his efforts to end the security chaos. Many have called the act a competition between security lords (heads of security) to prove who held power. Indeed, Al Jabali had no kind of clan protection as he was one of the Palestinian leaders who returned with Yasser Arafat in 1993, named by many Palestinians as "Al'Aedeen" (Osama 2004). This kind of behavior was widespread among the Palestinian leadership.

Hamas did appreciate the value of members of powerful families, particularly those with criminal records and who were willing to repent. These individuals were targeted by the "Da'wa" branch of Hamas, which invited them to "return to God" and work with them as an Islamic movement for redemption. The use of Islam and Islamic teaching was not an arbitrary move to mobilize former criminals, rather a well-calculated step to strengthen Hamas's military and violent actions against its rival Fatah when needed. The authority of extended families was so powerful that it affected the decision-making of the judicial system as well as the security apparatus. In many cases, the *Diwan* of a clan could hold more power than the headquarters of the police or a security agency. According to a senior Hamas activist,

The idea that we needed clan support began in early 2004. It was the beginning of us having strength and being able to breathe after a decade of oppression. So, there was an indirect decision to recruit and mobilize members from powerful

families, who also have active and senior members within the PA and its security apparatus.<sup>9</sup>

#### **4. The Iron Fist: Hamas's Coercive Power**

The creation of order is a complex process that interconnects and varies depending upon the situation, actors, and the different authorities that exist in society. When a rebel group tries to create order in society after taking over a territory, it finds other competitors. Those competitors leave the comfort zone of not being in power in a fragmented society and start to compete with others such as rebels and already existing political and socioeconomic structures, as well as the norms and traditions of society. In cases where tribalism and clans exist, the authority and legitimacy of Hamas was questioned by these actors, as many of them were affiliated with other political groups; thus, it was necessary for Hamas to use coercive power and authority to impose its sociopolitical order in the early days. The tribal factionalism created a competitor to the formal and fragile political system, which was unable to control it violently. However, the semi-state or quasi-state security apparatus of Hamas was new on the scene and wanted to prove itself. Although Hamas had built a network with clans, it was able, and indeed forced, to use its violent capacities in many areas across the Gaza Strip. In the early days of Hamas in power, it faced groups such as gangs and previous disreputable members of Fatah security with links to drugs and torture. Hamas's Izzedin Al Qassam used its extensive and extreme violence against clans. According to a senior Hamas security officer,

When we took over the Gaza Strip, we knew that there would be resistance from local groups, political parties, and most importantly from clans in areas such as Shejaia, which is famous for strong and extended families with powerful authority and weapons.<sup>10</sup>

To achieve their goals, rebels need to engage with the civilian population to exercise their control and gain legitimacy, as they will not be imposing their authority in a vacuum. We understand Hamas as a rebel/non-state actor in a broader spectrum along with other actors in society, particularly clans. In other words, the moves and actions of other groups provided constraints and opportunities for Hamas to react and interact to achieve its goals and exercise its coercive power. After June 2007, Hamas took no actions but rather waited in what Richards called a state of "no peace–no war", where no dichotomous conflict or peace exists (Richards 2004).

The use of violence was flexible and in a continuous process of negotiation with the different societal actors; therefore, there was a need to maintain the idea of using the violence against clans as a tool to meet the threats that endangered the order Hamas was trying to impose. As Hamas moved forward and started to be a service provider, the idea of negotiation and using both coercive power and soft tools was increasing (Heger and Jung 2017). However, as the governance of Hamas was not clear and not stable, these negotiations were also not stable. As traditional authorities who own the ethical codes in Gazan society, clans needed to negotiate and engage with Hamas as a rebel group and the governing body in the Gaza Strip, which had newly acquired the authority of violence. As one *Mukhtar* and clan leader told me,

When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, we were in the *Diwan*, and all were talking about it. There was a feeling that they wanted to take our weapons and revenge on our sons who worked in the security and were part of Fatah. However, some of us took the initiative and invited one Hamas leader to the *Diwan* and told them that we would try to keep the order and continue to work on *Islah* [reconciliation]. We did not want any confrontation with them as we knew they were waiting on any mistake to crush us.<sup>11</sup>

Crushing traditional internally embedded norms and informal institutions such as the clan was an option, especially after Hamas was able to take over the territory and begin to establish its form of order. The use of violence was not the only tool on Hamas's table; clans were still the linchpin that holds the network of informal institutions in place. The emergence of clans goes back to the traditional culture in Palestine, during the British mandate and later the Israeli settler colonialism, while in the second Intifada and the aftermath of weakened formal institutions, and during the political fragmentation, the role of clans took on a greater importance than before. As in most Arabic countries and communities, regimes and authoritarianism build on vertical chains of kinship ties, consciously exploited by the rulers (Sharabi 1988); Hamas, as with its rival Fatah, is no exception. It needed clans and needed to gain the clans' legitimacy, not least to avoid breaking the rules of the transitional norms with a violent confrontation from the start.

A senior Hamas and community leader confirmed that, arguing,

Hamas knows that clans are important in the society. They are part of the social fabric, and without them, the society will break down. But at the same time, we needed to limit their power and authority and put an end to the powerful families, and their weapons, who used violence against smaller families. At the same time we needed to be legitimate in their eyes.<sup>12</sup>

In an interview, Khalil Abu Shamala, director of the Al-Dameer Association for Human Rights in Gaza, stated, "any takeover or molding of this [tribal] system will most certainly affect the core of social relations in Gaza, especially when we take into consideration Hamas's increasing Islamization of the law" (Cunningham 2010). This was confirmed by a Fatah leader in Gaza who agreed that Hamas sought to negotiate power and legitimacy from the first day of taking over the Gaza Strip.

We received the deputy head of the Al Qassam at our house. He met with a Fatah leader and the elders. As both the biggest clan in the area and considered one of the most affiliated with Fatah, they asked the most senior Fatah leader to take the lead and participate in [power sharing]. He refused the offer, but a Hamas military leader asked if the clan could take a side and not make troubles in the coming months, and they will be imposing new order.<sup>13</sup>

Clearly, Hamas knew that violence had limits in a factionalized and fragmented society, so it needed to use other means, and to immediately begin renegotiating its power and legitimacy with the clans rather than wait until the formation of the new order. Initially, Hamas used violence to contain and control its rivals (Fatah), and then a critical issue emerged in the negotiation of power within Hamas as an authority: there was an internal discussion on whether to strip powerful families of their weapons or adopt the strategy of wait and see. Many hardliners, such as Mamhoud Al-Zahar, were in favor of the strategy of "*Kasr Anf* ", meaning to "break their nose" as a metaphor to make clans surrender and break their pride as powerful families. Other senior leaders, particularly from the Izzedin Al Qassam, were against this strategy in the first days. They feared that many members of the military wing would not be happy with this strategy, and Hamas would lose more than it gained.

The use of violence and coercion is high in such a case and lasts as long as the coercion is effectively applied, but seeking sustainable legitimacy is more appealing than the use of violence. This was evident when the Hamas police and its Executive Force, established to be under the full control of Hamas's Minister of the Interior during the first government, avoided extensive clashes with the Al-Masri clan in Beit Hanoun, Northern Gaza, after the death of one of its members who worked at the Palestinian Intelligence Agency. The Al-Masri clan, known to be affiliated with Fatah, killed a member of the Al-Kafarna clan who worked for the Executive Force of Hamas (Addustor 2007). Similarly, when Hamas tried to disarm and seize governmental cars owned by some families in Shejaia, Northern Gaza, Khan Younes, and Rafah, military clashes erupted, forcing Hamas to pull back and not confront clans at that stage (Alittihad 2007).

Interestingly, the process and negotiations were different in the Sabra area when the Dougmoush clan turned to global Jihadism. Many members of this clan are also part of *Jaish Al-Islam* (Army of Islam) and previously collaborated with Hamas in military operations against Israelis, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. In August 2006, *Jaish Al-Islam* kidnapped two Fox News journalists, Steve Centanni and Olaf Wiig, holding them in the Dougmoush clan area (ABC 2006). Embarrassingly for the Hamas government, the PA paid money for *Jaish Al-Islam* to release the two journalists after they (symbolically) converted to Islam. In December 2006, two members of the Dougmoush clan were shot dead by Hamas's affiliate clan, the Al-Deiry. In response, the Dougmoush clan killed three members of the Al-Deiry clan who were senior militants of Gaza and close to Hamas hardliner Mahmoud Al Zahar (PalInfo 2007). These clashes and criminal acts deepened the fragmentation among clans in Palestinian society and strengthened the attachment of tribes to political parties, leading to a higher level of factionalism.

On 12 March 2007, *Jaish Al-Islam* kidnapped the British journalist Alan Johnson. Although they demanded the release of international terrorists, their real demands were millions of US dollars and the release of ten members of the Dougmoush clan. This was a challenge to Hamas, Hamas's unity government, and the PA. In previous cases, Fatah and the PA paid the ransom, but this time, they warned Hamas to face this challenge alone (Lafi 2007; Al-akhbar 2007).

When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June, *Jaish Al-Islam* and the Dougmoush clan started to open channels for negotiations. Alan Johnson's release would be an event that could provide international legitimacy for Hamas as a governing body, which could, in turn, provide security. As a result, it formed a committee of religious scholars to rule and issue a joint Fatwa to end the conflict and release Johnson. According to a journalist who followed the issue closely,

Hamas wanted international legitimacy and at the same time wanted to nonviolently neutralize the Dougmoush clan and *Jaish Al-Islam*. The only solution was to use Islamic Sharia as a means to achieve that. Mumtaz Dougmoush [Leader of *Jaish Al-Islam*] was more into solving it peacefully as he knew that no one would support him if Hamas decided to eliminate him.<sup>14</sup>

This account was confirmed by a senior Hamas leader,

There was one option: negotiations. First to avoid clashes with *Jaish Al-Islam*, as then we would be faced by a wave of criticism from our own members, questioning how we could kill an Islamic group member. Second, because we [Hamas] wanted to gain legitimacy internationally and prove that we are able to handle such cases that previous security [Fatah] was not able to solve. And third, that there was no room for clashes with a clan like Dougmoush. We were just taking over the Gaza Strip and we were building our offices and security. It would not help.<sup>15</sup>

However, that was not the case with all families. Depending on the circumstances and sequences of events, Hamas was able to neutralize some families who were actively acting against Hamas in June 2007, amid the military clashes between Hamas militants and the PA security forces. On 12 June, Hamas surrounded the Bakers clan neighborhood, asking all men to gather in the mosque, subsequently arresting dozens and assassinating six (Miftah 2007). According to one member of the Bakers clan,

They attacked us from all sides and asked all men to leave and be inside the mosque. They searched our houses. We were 300 in the mosque, all men. Later they killed six men and one woman.<sup>16</sup>

Clearly, there was reasoning behind the decision to engage with the Bakers, and when a Hamas militant was asked about the clan, he stressed that,

The clan was part of the security [group] of the Fatah militia that killed many Hamas activists. They had attacked the [nearby] house and office of Hamas's leader, Ismael Haniya. They were clearly part of the fight, and we had the chance to act at that moment.<sup>17</sup>

These four different cases show that Gaza clans were trying to send a message to Hamas that, to govern Gaza, clans had to have an influence and clans are as important as other parts in the governing and ruling process. However, Hamas could not use violence in all these instances as it may have harmed its local and traditional legitimacy, as well as attracting disapproval from its own members. The opportunity to negotiate power, use violence, and neutralize was a carefully calculated strategy by Hamas leaders to avoid loss.

In the last week of July, events took a new direction when Hamas accused Fatah activists of detonating a bomb, killing several of its top military leaders from the Shejaia area, namely Hassan AlHelou, Ammar Musabeh, Iyad AL Hayya, Osamal Alhelou, and Nidal Almubayed (KUNA 2008). On 2 August, Hamas accused Fatah activist and military leader Zaki AlSakani of plotting the killings of the Hamas leaders before escaping to the Helles clan's area in Shejaia (Maan 2016). This incident was the perfect opportunity for Hamas to use violence against clans in the Shejaia area, since families who were affiliated with Fatah created a no-go zone in the eastern part of Gaza, undermining Hamas's legitimacy to some extent. According to a senior Hamas leader,

As of April 2008, we felt that there were some no-go zones for us under tribal and clan names. Shejaia, a tribal society, closed narrow streets, held meetings, and organized events under clan titles and we could not intervene as it was under the clan name. There were some warnings for us, and it undermined our legitimacy. It had become normal that someone would tell us [Hamas leaders], "*Tshataro A'ala Al Shejaia"* [be courageous enough to take Shejaia clans down and make them surrender].<sup>18</sup>

The Helles clan is numbered in thousands of men, well-trained in using both light and heavy weaponry. Living in the eastern part of Gaza, they have always been affiliated with Fatah, with hundreds of members working in the PA police and security apparatus. What is more, the Fatah leader in Gaza was from the same clan. As one of its leaders said,

We are a clan who live on the eastern borders of Gaza near the occupation. We are a big clan, and we need to protect ourselves from Israeli incursions. We have weapons and they are used only against the occupation. Israel has killed dozens from our clan since 2002 and we are part of the wider resistance of the Palestinians.<sup>19</sup>

During ethnographic research and observations, Hamas leaders, along with academics and other civil organizations, disagreed with the narrative of the clan leader. They argued that militarization and factionalization within clans was normal in Shejaia families since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. They stocked weapons, had conflicts, and many of their members committed crimes. As one researcher argued,

'Clans have weapons and they used them as a show of power and competition as to who is stronger. It was a norm so that they acquired more positions in the PA in a clientelist way.<sup>20</sup>

Clearly, clans were not just a part of traditional structure, but also of the political parties and their militarized branches, which led to the fractionalization and fragmentation of the clans and within the clan themselves. On 2 August 2008, Hamas decided to take a step forward and use violence. It surrounded the area of East Shejaia for three continuous days of military clashes, resulting in the deaths of eight of the Helles clan and three Hamas police officers, while more than 130 were injured (Rabbo 2008; Alquds 2008). The brutal and extremely violent eradication of the most powerful clan in eastern Gaza opened the door for Hamas to ask clans to surrender and hand over their weapons.

In the second week of September 2008, three of the Dougmoush clan killed police personnel while a patrol car was passing through their neighborhood, subsequently fleeing to their security quarter in the Sabra district. As a result, Hamas's forces encircled and besieged the district, checking IDs and names of people who entered and exited the area. The Dougmoush clan anticipated a similar conclusion to that of the Helles clan, and Hamas

intensified its forces around the area. The Dougmoush proposed to hand over three members to Hamas's security forces, but Hamas's de facto Minister of the Interior rejected the offer, refusing to negotiate with the clan. On 16 September, Hamas's security forces, along with its military wing, attacked using rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, and snipers, killing ten members of the clan, one child, and a police officer, and leaving 40 wounded (AlRiyad 2007). The clan was accused of being affiliated with Fatah, while many were also members of *Jaish Al-Islam* (Addustor 2008).

In a statement, Hamas's security forces said,

The [Hamas] police will not consider anyone to be above the law, [regardless of] clans, political affiliation, or social status. (Safadi 2008)

This statement and campaign against one of the most powerful families in east Gaza, coming less than a month after the first campaign against the Helles clan, was a clear message ending the negotiation with clans. It was understood that coercion would be used to impose the rule of law and end clannism in the region.

According to a senior Hamas leader,

The campaign on Dougmoush clan assured us that it was the time to take the power of the clans down and ensure they were not endangering our order anymore. When we ended the Dougmoush security quarter and the security chaos, we gained legitimacy of the people, and by that, the way was [open] ahead of us to act against clans in a violent way.<sup>21</sup>

After Hamas took control over the Gaza Strip, one of the most important factors in the negotiation process between the clans of Gaza was the anticipation of violence. In the first few months, Hamas avoided clashes with big, powerful clans affiliated with Fatah. From 14 June 2007 until September 2007, Hamas imposed the main element of social order—ending security chaos, "*Al Falatan Alamni*"—which provided it with partial legitimacy from the public. After Hamas built its security apparatus, opportunism as a strategy to neutralize clans was a rising possibility. Yet it waited for the clans to initiate the violence or break the new rules of the game. Coercive power was primarily used to end the domination and authority of the clans, and then further used to seek legitimacy as the ruler of the Gaza Strip in their eyes, particularly after the legal processes of arrests and trials that many clan members now faced. The end of clan militarism and factionalism provided such a sense of power that many other clans reached out to clan members within Hamas to secure visits to security and police headquarters or even liaise with them in social affairs. As one Hamas police officer argued,

After September 2008, we had many clan heads [*Mukhtars*] visit, to coordinate and collaborate with Islah committees and the police.<sup>22</sup>

#### **5. The Carrot and the Stick: Parallel Institutions**

Scholars who have studied rebels stress that they need to have a governance arrangement that maintains a reciprocal relationship between them and the local communities (Mampilly 2012). Hamas has had very sensitive relations with the powerful and most influential clans and, although it has benefited from these clans (particularly the mediumsized) to win the elections, considered them a threat to its de facto formal institutions and legitimacy.

As Weber noted, "social order by virtue of sacredness is the oldest . . . universal type of legitimacy" (Weber 1968), and there was a need for those clans living under the control of Hamas to obey it based on traditional sanctity. That is why Hamas later adopted, notably after the assassination of its Interior Minister, a new strategy of gaining legitimacy through providing services, creating new structures to include clans, and efforts to divide and conquer powerful families affiliated with Fatah and the previous authorities.

In 1987, the Palestinian leadership called upon the local population in the Gaza Strip and West Bank to boycott the local court and Israeli administration. In the midst of the first

Intifada, Palestinians refrained from complying with the Israeli military courts, instead resorting to other methods of conflict resolution, such as traditional mediation (Terris and Inoue-Terris 2002). Customary laws flourished during the first Intifada even though young political leaders tried to undermine their authority. These political leaders had more loyalty to their political affiliation than to tribal politics, unhappy with clan chiefs accused of corruption (Terris and Inoue-Terris 2002). Hamas was also dissatisfied with the degree of control that clan heads had, particularly when these clan leaders did not behave and judge according to Sharia law (Zilberman 1996). The prevalence of customary laws within informal institutions stood as a barrier to Hamas increasing its political and judicial influence. For Hamas, clans were more fragmenting than a uniting factor in the society, while for Fatah, clans were seen as an unaccepted alternative to the revolution or the liberation movements that could be exploited by the occupation.

Clans in Palestine undermine the democratic governance and the rule of law but also work as problem-solvers, customarily disputing resolutions as well as imposing informal forms of social order. Because accusations of corruption frequently tarnished the formal courts under the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (1994–2007), the *Mukhtars* (clan chiefs) became one of the only functioning judiciaries in Gaza during the "*AlFalatan Al Amni*." When Hamas took power, it tried to undermine the power of clans, gaining more legitimacy from the public and affiliated clans as the only authority in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas's Ministry of the Interior established a "Clans and Public Relations" department responsible for coordinating and collaborating with clans and providing official certificates to new *Mukhtars*. The start of the new policy was to create a parallel set of institutions to those that had existed before, appointing new *Mukhtars* from small families and providing them with stamps to issue formal certificates. In later stages, new *Mukhtars* from powerful and big clans were appointed besides the already active ones, but these posts were given to younger members, those affiliated with Hamas, or Islamists to compete with the other old Mukhtars. The strategy was to divide and conquer big clans, and in 2009 alone, Hamas replaced more than 630 *Mukhtars* and appointed more than 70 new (Sayigh 2011). According to a Hamas senior police officer,

We knew that getting complete legitimacy from the previous political regime and its affiliated clans will be difficult. Therefore, we moved to create our own legitimacy by appointing new *Mukhtars*, in most families including the most powerful families which were affiliated with the PA previously.<sup>23</sup>

Hamas increased the numbers of affiliated *Lijan Islah* (reconciliation committees). During the time of the PA, there were not more than a dozen *Lijan Islah,* supervised by the Ministry of *Awqaf* and Religious Affairs, along with the Ministry of the Interior. Although Hamas rejected customary law and informal conflict resolution during the first Intifada and the Fatah-led PA, it came to accept the practice of *Lijan Islah* in a strategy to gain legitimacy of the clans. In 2008, Hamas's de facto government established the General Administration for Tribal Affairs and Social Reconciliation, appointing Abu Nasser Al-Kujuk (Hamas affiliated) as the head of the newly established department (Brenner 2016). The customary tribal law (*U'rf*) is the main pillar of the clans' conflict resolution strategy, which was rejected by Hamas because it does not follow Sharia and Islam. The *U'rf* is also a principle of informal institution that keeps social cohesion and solidarity within the community on the basis of integrity and the honor of the clan. As a clan leader argued,

The *U'rf* is based on the principle that few elders and wise men have the authority and mandate over the whole clan.<sup>24</sup>

When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, as a strategy to gain legitimacy within clans and families and to avoid increasing pressure on the formal judicial system, it accepted the *U'rf*, but within its own framework. A new legal and Islamic framework (booklet) was prepared by a leading Hamas Islamic scholar, Marwan Abu Ras, with all leading members of these committees being Hamas clerics or members of Hamas. Hamas's *Lijan*

*Islah* were also competitors and parallel institutes to those formed and active under the PA's commission of Tribal Affairs. As the head of PA's *Lijan Islah* affirmed,

The *Lijan Islah* of Hamas were part of a strategy to create parallel institutes to the existing PA. They started with the formal institutes, such as ministries and police, and now they want to legitimize themselves through the clans and the *U'rf*. 25

By the end of 2014, there were more than fifty committees (*Lijan Islah*) and more than 600 certified mediators who were members thereof (Balousheh 2014). The members had to be approved by the head of Hamas's Ministry of the Interior, who is a member of Hamas and senior cleric within its Da'wa committee. However, Hamas police, as the formal authority and the one that can execute imprisonments and fines, worked closely with the *Lijan Islah* of Hamas, ignoring the *Lijan Islah* affiliated with the PA. This created a rift in the society when it came to conflict resolution. While clans could choose between the two different *Lijan Islah* based on their political affiliations, the more complex the case, the more people would lean toward engaging Hamas's *Lijan Islah* as they had the power to coordinate with the police as a formal institution<sup>26</sup> .

As pragmatic as it could be, Hamas's seeking of legitimacy and preservation of social order through clans remains an important means for its rule in the Gaza Strip. It was crucial for both Hamas and the clans to share power within limited and clear borders. Though Hamas was aware that factional loyalty is important to its members, it discovered that a clan's identity could help in securing partial legitimacy and maintaining social order with minimum resources. In this manner of negotiation, and without having to confront clan leaders affiliated with Fatah and the PA, Hamas provided clans with their power but under the parameters of its supervision, authority, and framework. Newly appointed clan *Mukhtars*, mediators, and members of *Lijan Islah* were mostly affiliated with Hamas, and respectful of members of society in general, which helped Hamas to avoid public confrontation or criticism. Factionalism of clans led to violence in Palestinian society, and Hamas tried by two strategies to maneuver and maintain informal control, by neutralizing clans, but also trying to unify them through formal mechanisms.

#### **6. Conclusions**

This paper examines how tribal fractionalization leads to violence in fragile and limited statehood areas. The findings support the introduction of this Special Issue, and that the level of fragmentation and factionalism could predict the development of violence (Kivimäki 2021). It argues that sub-national factionalism, exemplified by tribalism, interacts with conflict between political parties, leading to higher probabilities of violence. It contributes to the emerging scholarship on rebel governance and non-state actors in fragile and limited statehood areas.

When Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, it provided an opportunity for Hamas, as the Palestinian Authority miscalculated its capacities to govern the Gaza Strip after Israel pulled its troops from the center of the territory (keeping them on the borders). This paper provides new empirical evidence to support Fearon and Laitin's theory of intra-war (Fearon 2011). When the PA could not provide protection to small families and individuals (as well as financial support amid a heightened level of unemployment), Hamas and clans provided a safety net for them. Later, when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, clans became a new threat to Hamas.

Hamas serves as a contemporary case for rebel governance with an undoubted capacity to continue its power in a very tribal society where the authority of the state is often challenged by factionalized clans and political parties. It is, therefore, important to examine the complex negotiations of power and legitimacy between the different actors that provide Hamas as a rebel group with the broader and ordered space to govern the Gaza Strip. To achieve long-lasting order, legitimacy, and exercise of power as a rebel group, and with limited resources but with a degree of stable internal relations, the order that Hamas has tried to impose is dynamic and multi-layered, particularly with the clans. This study is important in helping to understand the dynamics of legitimacy in rebel-controlled areas, especially in the Middle East, where the clan is an entrenched part of society. In line with Kalyvas' argument, the case of Hamas shows that rebels are embedded within the daily life and practices of society through clans, extended families, and mosques, which generates a strong network that supports and serves the legitimacy of Hamas (Kalyvas 2006).

The article argues that there has been an ongoing negotiation and renegotiation of power between Hamas and various actors in the community. However, with the clan, there was a rollercoaster of a negotiation process that started peacefully, then became violent, and latterly renegotiated its legitimacy with the clans using their de facto authority and informal judicial system (*Lijan Islah*). Mobilizing the informal institutions of *Lijan Islah* is a depiction of a fragile state in a limited statehood area. The informal institutions are usually used when the formal institutions are weak or cannot do their job effectively.

Hamas's style of governance reveals that it was driven towards creating a new bureaucratic machine similar to that which had previously existed under the Palestinian Authority and parallel to the ones managed by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hamas created a meaningless structure of a state in the image of a sovereign "state", built around its ability to provide security using harsh measures and its capacity to create and expand upon its network of informal institutions as tools with which to impose its measure within and around clans. In the aftermath of June 2007, the transition regime kept the same pattern of control and negotiation with the public by building a framework that reflected Islamism, sacrifices, reform, security, and unity. Through this framework, Hamas worked consistently to create legitimacy among the local institutions, either those previously existing (pre-2007) or the new ones created to strengthen its capacity and provide an image of legitimacy among the society of Gaza. For Hamas, the critical factor has been to prevent political challenges to its de facto rule while at the same time maintaining social cohesion and legitimacy.

Hamas used two strategies to negotiate and manage fragmentation of the clans over public orders designed to establish its legitimacy: the first was using coercion, and the second was using the informal institutions of the tribal judicial system, although Hamas did not use coercion directly after it took over the Gaza Strip, rather waiting for the clans to make the first move. This finding is in line with Barakat and Fakih's findings in this volume that political stability needs a strong judicial system and anti-corruption mechanisms, which in our case led to more fragmentation in Palestinian society (Barakat and Ali 2021).

The two cases of clans and how Hamas acted towards them suggests that Hamas was able to acquire social legitimacy through clan members, *Mukhtars*, and attempts to change the structure of the informal judicial system by creating a parallel one, thus diminishing the role of the PA-affiliated system, while pushing towards fostering its own informal judicial system that was partially formalized and supervised by the MoI. As two different judicial systems competed and tried to enforce their norms amid weak formal and strong judicial systems, the society became prone to more violence as Hamas tried to use coercion, and clans tried to enforce their own norms.

Clearly, Hamas's strategy to legitimize itself in a fragmented and fragile society relied upon bringing together the mosque, security apparatus, reconciliation committees (*Lijan Islah*), local Hamas activists, and emirs of the neighborhoods. This reflects a deep understanding of the society and the importance of using coercive functions and the social control of securitization. The article argues that this benefited Hamas in gaining legitimacy through a complex set of passive and active negotiation and renegotiation processes, particularly when used at the right time.

**Funding:** This research was funded as part of Post-doctoral Research Fellowship by Orient-Institute Beirut, Lebanon, 2020.

**Informed Consent Statement:** All subjects involved in this research provided consent to participate without revealing their identity.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes**


#### **References**


Arjona, Ana. 2014. Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 85: 1360–89. [CrossRef]


Brenner, Bjorn. 2016. *Gaza Under HAMAS*, 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury UK.


Florea, Adrian. 2020. Rebel Governance in de Facto States. *European Journal of International Relations* 26: 1004–31. [CrossRef]

Furlan, Marta. 2020. Understanding Governance by Insurgent Non-State Actors: A Multi-Dimensional Typology. *Civil Wars* 22: 478–511. [CrossRef]

Gilbert, Victoria. 2020. Sister Citizens: Women in Syrian Rebel Governance. *Politics & Gender*, 1–28. [CrossRef]


Hurd, Ian. 2008. *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. In *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 488. [CrossRef]

Kayali, Majed. 2019. *Hamas's Authority and the Illusions of National Resistance*. Karachi: Al Arab.


Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian. 2012. *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. New York: Cornell University Press.


Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 2007. Hamas: Victory with Ballots and Bullets. *Global Change, Peace & Security* 19: 301–16. [CrossRef]


Safadi, Qais. 2008. *Hamas Neutralize Doughmosh Clan, 11 Deaths*. Beirut: Al-Akhbar. Available online: https://al-akhbar.com/Arab/15 7220 (accessed on 16 November 2021).

Sayigh, Yezid. 2011. *We Serve the People" Hamas Policing in Gaza*. Crown Paper 5. Waltham: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, p. 5. Sharabi, Hisham. 1988. *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Watan. 2016. *Dahlan Threaten Hamas*. Palestine: Watan, p. 24.


Zilberman, Ifrah. 1996. Palestinian Customary Law in the Jerusalem Area. *Catholic University Law Review* 45: 795–811.

### *Article* **Political Fragility and the Timing of Conflict Mediation**

**Carly Beckerman**

School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, UK; carly.beckerman@durham.ac.uk

**Abstract:** In recent years, much of the public discourse regarding conflict in the Middle East has pondered the possibility of military intervention, but far less attention has been paid to the optimal mechanisms for conflict mediation. There remains considerable confusion in the study of conflict resolution about how to locate the right time, or 'ripe moment' for this type of third-party involvement. This is a crucial area of policy relevant research. When attempting to model ripeness, most of the literature has relied on expected utility models of decision-making and found that crucial but nebulous factors that are important in the MENA region, such as conflicting parties' psychology, religious and political beliefs, as well as grievances compounded over time, cannot easily be incorporated into the framework. This paper offers a plausibility probe to highlight the potential of an augmented approach. Using Poliheuristic (PH) Theory that reflects the non-compensatory nature of political risk, it creates a litmus test for third-party mediation based not on what conflicting parties aim to achieve, but what outcomes and processes they must avoid. The result is a relatively simple identification of 'bad' timing, as well as theory-informed mechanisms designed to help practitioners generate better conditions for mediation. This probe contributes to our understanding of the relationship between political fragility and conflict in the MENA region by indicating how political fragility might be conceptualized as a process that can be mapped and perhaps interrupted.

**Keywords:** conflict; mediation; PH theory; Israel; Palestine; ripeness

**Citation:** Beckerman, Carly. 2022. Political Fragility and the Timing of Conflict Mediation. *Social Sciences* 11: 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/ socsci11020076

Academic Editors: Timo Kivimaki and Rana Jawad

Received: 4 October 2021 Accepted: 8 February 2022 Published: 15 February 2022

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

#### **1. Introduction**

Kivimäki notes how "(s)tate fragility is often described as consisting of two elements: lack of efficiency and lack of legitimacy of state institutions" (Kivimäki 2021, p. 2). As this special issue explores the relationship between fragility, conflict and grievances in the MENA region, this article focuses on the component of political fragility (Kivimäki 2021). It does this by drawing on Poliheuristic (PH) Theory to outline political fragility procedurally, as a process evident in how elites who represent conflicting parties make decisions about conflict. Rather than identifying a particular party's fragility, the approach in this paper provides a system for condensing and thereby simplifying our understanding of the interaction between societal grievances, political fragility and conflict. This permits parsimony on one hand, while facilitating the integration of existing insights, such as identified problems with legitimacy (Alijla 2021; Loewe and Zintl 2021), factionalism and oil-dependence (Kivimäki 2021), into a single, ordered framework. This article does not identify any new indicators of fragility, but instead helps researchers to rank known indicators and make that ranking relevant for practitioners.

This article's use of the Poliheuristic approach is intended to translate the mutually constituting relationship between grievances, fragility and conflict into the specific actions of elite decision-makers who represent conflicting parties. The geo-strategic importance of MENA actors, the level of global disruption expected to result from their conflicts and the position of the 'Orient' in western imaginations have all contributed to a disproportionate level of international pressure placed on conflicting parties in the post-Cold War Middle East and North Africa. Through the lens of PH Theory, this paper presents an inherent dichotomy associated with that pressure: Although it seems reasonable to call on the relevant leaders to seek mediation and resolution, the way political fragility functions automatically precludes much genuine peace-making behaviour. For example, the PH approach asserts that outside observers should expect intransigence among leaders who face societal grievance complications that are pertinent to the region. This inflexibility should not automatically be dismissed as personal or moral failure.

This paper presents a plausibility probe case study of PH Theory's usefulness in mapping how political fragility functions and argues that this approach provides insights which should be useful to practitioners who must work on conflict mediation in real time. The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1, a literature review identifies existing approaches to the study of optimal mediation conditions and explains why an explicitly bounded rationality model of decision-making is needed. Section 2 then covers the PH approach in more detail. Section 3 clarifies the methodology, and Section 4 provides the case study.

#### **2. Literature Review**

Bercovitch defines mediation inclusively as "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state, or organization to change, affect, or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law" (Bercovitch 1992, p. 7). Most conflict resolution literature has relied on expected utility theories of decision-making to structure investigations about the best timing for outside actors to push for mediated peace talks (Duursma 2014). The search for optimal conditions is analogous to the search for ripe timing, sometimes referred to as ripeness (Zartman and Berman 1982; Zartman 1985; Pruitt and Olczak 1995; Pruitt 2005). The idea of ripeness refers to the conceptualization of necessary but not sufficient conditions for the initiation of negotiations, including quantifiable criteria and psychological complications. These make up the two main components of ripeness: (1) the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), which is likely to be marked by the presence of a recent or impending catastrophe, and (2) the perception among conflicting parties themselves that there is a way out (WO) (Zartman 2000, 2008).

Within this literature, conflicting parties are assumed to form their preferences by weighing the anticipated costs of continued fighting against the likely benefits. The aim is to find the sweet spot "when the parties find the costs of continued confrontation too high and the prospects of an agreement enticing" (Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002, p. 116). However, as a set of guiding assumptions for conflict resolution scholarship, expected utility includes two components that constrain theory development in this area.

First, expected utility conceptualizes the decision-maker as conducting a holistic, exhaustive search for options (MacDonald 2003; Allison 1971). Therefore, the model itself provides little guidance for researchers about whether a particular dimension of conflicting parties' interests is likely to be more or most important. This means that researchers must inductively select their dependent variables. The resulting tests tend to indicate that one or more variables is not definitively causal in generating an MHS or WO. For example, the number of casualties is a reasonable variable to investigate, but Greig and Regan (2008) find no link between high numbers of deaths and leaders' willingness to engage in talks. Alternatively, studies do identify a relationship between costs and readiness to enter negotiations, but only by defining the variance in 'costs' very broadly (Beardsley 2010; Maundi et al. 2006). Although rigorously determined, such findings struggle to advance the agenda.

Second, the model conceptualizes preferences as purposeful action that seeks utility maximization (MacDonald 2003). This means that, while scholars recognize the realworld importance of more complex factors in parties' willingness to enter peace talks, the underlying model struggles to provide a systematic way to incorporate them into theory development.

Scholars, for example, widely accept that leaders' individual perceptions of a WO are crucial antecedents to mediation (Bargal and Sivan 2004; Pruitt and Olczak 1995; Saunders 1999; Greig and Regan 2008; Zartman 2008; Maundi et al. 2006; Duursma 2014). The parties themselves must perceive the possibility of a solution; they must share the desire to find an agreement and judge that the prospective deal is beneficial to their interests (Haass 1990, pp. 27–28). Bercovitch and Kadayifci note how parties' motivation, willingness and optimism are key to good timing (Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002). Likewise, Beardsley and Lo assert that "(t)he process of 'getting to yes' is inherently a process of getting the sides to recognize that concessions are needed to resolve the conflict" (Beardsley and Lo 2014, p. 364). This has also been referred to as readiness (Schiff 2017).

However, it is difficult to notice the presence of WO perceptions among conflicting parties when, in practice, their preferences are inconsistent—or their behaviour is inconsistent with their stated preferences—and so they do not appear to be engaging purely in maximizing reasoning. Humans act, for example, in many ways that unnecessarily escalate a conflict, such as refusing to withdraw despite imminent defeat, or rationalizing exponential costs through ideological belief (Zartman 2003; Dowty 2006). Leaders' interests may also be selfish and context-dependent, such as the need for recognition or stalling (Maundi et al. 2006; Beardsley 2011). These needs may also be fueled by feelings of distrust or reflect risk aversion behaviours (Kelman 2005; Ben-Artzi et al. 2015).

Scholars have generally addressed these add-on complications by highlighting one or more intervening variables at a time. For example, leaders' expectations of utility may be affected by the constraints of global power relationships, such as alliances during the Cold War, or tense regional relationships (Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002). Leaders' perceptions of a WO may also be complicated by commitment problems resulting from whether the respective parties are defenders or challengers (Beardsley and Lo 2014). They may be struggling with governmental legitimacy (Druckman and Green 1995) or exhibit greater or lesser readiness for talks according to their pre-existing preferences as doves or hawks (Pruitt 2005). This creates an analytical problem, as integrating each new insight into models of ripeness appears to be conceptually unmanageable (Bercovitch and Houston 2000).

Taken together, these two components of expected utility particularly frustrate investigations into the role of public opinion in creating and noticing perceptions of a WO. Some crucial insights exist. Public pressure, for example, may "decrease the costs of non-agreement and can potentially create a situation in which successful bargaining is impossible" (Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Goemans 2000; in Beardsley 2011, p. 403). It is also possible that combatants may desire third party mediation to direct blame for unpalatable concessions towards an outside party (Beardsley 2010). While it is accepted that public opinion must be crucial (Stover 2002; Hermann 2004; Desivilya 2004; Deutsch et al. 2006), the questions of when, how and how much elude the model. This is precisely because expected utility provides little guidance on the importance of one dimension over another and is focused on examining consistent, preference-seeking behaviours at the expense of seemingly inconsistent, risk-avoidance behaviours.

It is the contention of this paper that, although it is not feasible for theoretical assumptions to meet all the expectations of reality, the integration of a PH perspective provides a significant but simple insight that furthers the model by highlighting which of these seemingly additional variables are the most important empirically and so procedurally. This should also allow the analyst to pinpoint when and why the crucial psychological condition, the perception of a WO, is not present, and so when pushing for mediation could be harmful.

#### **3. Why PH Theory?**

This article offers Poliheuristic Theory as a necessary mechanism for advancing the study of timing in conflict mediation by integrating a procedural awareness of political fragility. Kivimäki (2021) notes how the interaction between a state's inefficiency, societal grievances and conflict can be portrayed relatively simply, as violence becomes the only mechanism available for addressing an intolerable situation, or it serves as an opportunistic tool (Alkhayer 2021). However, this causal pathway becomes much harder to describe linearly if the analysis occurs after conflict is already ongoing and there is (A) a feedback loop that is further complicated by collective trauma and historical narratives and (B) conflict resolution demands that elite decision-makers proceed with negotiations despite the expectation of backlash from among their own supporters. This problem of long-term, continuously reinterpreted conflict is particularly pertinent to the MENA context. Within these real-world dynamics, political fragility must be something that functions rather than labels.

PH Theory was developed to act as a conceptual bridge between parsimony and accuracy in analytical models of decision-making (Mintz 1993, 2004, 2005; Mintz and Geva 1997; DeRouen 2002a; Lui 2002; Christensen and Redd 2004; DeRouen and Sprecher 2004; James and Zhang 2005; Kinne 2005; Brulé 2008; Keller and Yang 2008, 2009; Oppermann 2014). Instead of conceptualizing people as only goal-oriented maximizers, PH theory builds on cognitive approaches that "feature mental shortcuts and other processes indicative of the mind's inability to carry out the complicated calculus of the rational model" (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, p. 8; Mintz and Geva 1997). There is a balance to be struck between descriptive accuracy and the appeal and utility of conflict resolution models, between "parsimony in theory building and the complexity in human action" (Zartman 2000, p. 237). This is the line along which PH Theory aims to walk, through the use of a two-stage model.

The decision-making process for Stage One is conceptualized according to principles of behavioural science established since the development of Prospect Theory and the 'Cybernetic perspective' (McDermott 2001, 2004; Simon 1959, 1985; Steinbruner 2002). Stage One is governed by five key characteristics: decision-making is non-holistic, dimensionbased, satisficing, order-sensitive, and non-compensatory (Mintz and Geva 1997). This means that politicians consider only a truncated range of options, which are clustered into organizing themes. They eliminate options according to their basic requirements rather than actively searching for an optimal alternative; their preferences are affected by the order in which they receive information, and they have some basic requirements that cannot be compensated for. These characteristics are not separable components of Stage One—they amalgamate to justify an analytical focus on first assessing the decision-maker's political dimension, before assessing their preferences across any other dimension.

In terms of its contribution to understandings of ripeness, the most important characteristic of Stage One in PH Theory is the recognition that decision-making is non-holistic, leading to its character of being non-compensatory (Mintz and Geva 1997). PH Theory assumes that the decision-maker "adopts heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria" (Mintz and Geva 1997, p. 85). Rather than maximizing by evaluating every option equally, decision-makers only evaluate options long enough (and in enough detail) to find an option that satisfies their basic core needs.

Assuming that political actors operate under self-interested motivations, politicians see gains and losses first in terms of political currency and only then in the context of policy success or failure (DeRouen 2002a). In the PH approach, therefore, loss-aversion overrules all other considerations, and so decision-making is driven by the desire to avoid political failure rather than to achieve success (Anderson 1983). Consequently, "a low score in the political dimension cannot be compensated for by a high score in some other dimensions" (Mintz and Geva 1997, p. 84). For example, if a leader perceives that there is an intolerable danger to their political survival from simply entering mediation, then neither incentives in the form of promised economic aid, nor threats of actions such as sanctions, would be likely to encourage more flexibility (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2002; DeRouen 2002b).

Therefore, in Stage One of PH Theory, it is assumed that politicians abandon all options that pose too great a threat to their political survival (Mintz and Geva 1997). The types of risk that leaders consider in this stage include a "( . . . ) significant drop in public support for a policy; ( . . . ) prospects of an electoral defeat; ( . . . ) potential collapse of the coalition government or regime; ( . . . ) threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy of a leader" or problems such as demonstrations and riots (Mintz 2004, p. 9).

After too-risky options have been eliminated, decision-makers can then be assumed to engage in a traditional cost-benefit analysis based on expected utility in Stage Two; this allows the selection of a final choice (Mintz and Geva 1997). Importantly, a PH perspective allows the analyst to anticipate that certain options will not be viable after Stage One, even if those discarded alternatives were objectively the most sensible (Beckerman 2020).

This type of reasoning has been hinted at within conflict resolution scholarship, but existing work has struggled to condense these disparate elements into a parsimonious framework. When attempting to reduce a large set to a more manageable subset, Maoz et al. (2007) noted that the analyst could begin by eliminating unfavorable options rather than simply selecting favorable alternatives. Scholars already recognize that this exclusion strategy might generate a different range of remaining alternatives than the expected utility assumption's inclusion strategy (Yaniv et al. 2002; Maoz et al. 2007). The importance of noncompensatory variables is also implicit in the notion of "peace spoilers", which highlight the role of constituency preferences in blocking peace processes (Newman and Richmond 2006). Nevertheless, systematic inclusion of these insights remains elusive.

In contrast, PH Theory indicates that, according to the non-compensatory loss-aversion principle, the political dimension always encompasses the primary (if not total) motivation for decision-makers. Thus, it should be reasonable to always begin the ripeness puzzle by locating these non-compensatory variables—these political survival pressure points just as one would begin a jigsaw by locating the corner pieces. The resulting model is deceptively simple. Instead of asking what leaders want to achieve through conflict, mediation and resolution processes, analysts would ask, as a first priority, what conflicting parties need to avoid. This realization provides a crucial mechanism for theory development because it gives researchers a systematic way to combine insights on otherwise disparate problems, such as legitimacy and factionalism, by first assessing how they affect the leader's political risk calculation.

As the rest of the proverbial conflict resolution puzzle remains somewhat mysterious, PH Theory mostly seems to provide a way to determine (from the most important, i.e., non-compensatory indicators) whether a conflict is definitely not ripe. This means that it provides a procedural description of political fragility that inherently indicates the practical importance of understanding that fragility.

#### **4. Methodology**

This paper now draws on the congruence method to offer an illustrative plausibility probe (George and Bennett 2005; Eckstein 1975). This qualitative approach is appropriate here because the real-world phenomenon of conflict ripeness is difficult to separate from its context (Yin 2008). Specifically, the congruence method offers a way for single cases to assist with theory development by investigating a specific theory's usefulness for understanding a particular case (George and Bennett 2005). This differs from process tracing in that it is not necessary to trace a casual pathway directly from independent to dependent variable. As such, the congruence method offers only tentative findings.

To assist in theory development, this article combines congruence with a plausibility probe. This type of case study is a preliminary investigation of "relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 212). This is an inductive exercise that is only appropriate when the theory is novel, or being applied in a new way, and previous research indicates its necessity (George and Bennett 2005). Rather than testing theory, the aim is to probe its usefulness to determine whether it is worth refining enough for more rigorous testing (Fenno 1973; Fiorina 1977; Lebow 1981; Evans et al. 1993; Vertzberger 1998).

Poliheuristic Theory has already been subject to case-based testing as a model for decision-making (see, for example, Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2002; Kinne 2005; Ye 2007; Tal-Shir and Mintz 2018). As such, the case presented here is less concerned with the validity of PH theory as a whole, but instead focuses on asking whether the Poliheuristic framework provides useful insights for understanding and mediating conflict. Poliheuristic Theory is an established approach in the fields of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and International Relations (Redd et al. 2010; Mintz and Chatagnier 2020), and so this article probes whether the PH approach contributes anything new or different to established, expected utility-derived advice specifically for conflict mediation in the MENA region.

Single plausibility probe cases must be selected according to the dependent variable, requiring a relevant example of attempted conflict mediation. Due to the nature of the probe, it is also necessary to select an example in which the conditions are likely to re-occur and for which research exists that offers practical advice. American involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict is an appropriate focus, as one of the longest running diplomatic interventions in the Middle East that also remains unresolved. The most contemporary, formal bilateral talks in this category took place under the Kerry Initiative, 2013–2014. These talks were also reflective of established diplomatic practices, and the nine-month negotiation took place under relatively unremarkable political conditions. Importantly, it is widely acknowledged that the Kerry Initiative took place when conflict conditions were not ripe (Schiff 2018). Therefore, if the PH approach was going to be a useful analytical framework in practice, it would have to demonstrate this unripeness according to the information available to mediators in real time.

Therefore, the following plausibility probe presents a mapping of the political dimension for conflicting parties that would have been apparent to American state department officials during the 2013 talks between Israel and Palestine. The most important element that distinguishes Poliheuristic Theory as a framework from expected utility is its emphasis on the assessment of non-compensatory political variables—whether there is 'too much' risk to the decision-maker's political survival. Rather than incorporating political survival into the standard rationality framework as an add-on factor, the behavioural science that underpins Poliheuristic Theory demands that these political survival variables always be assessed first (in Stage One). As noted above, decision-makers will automatically discard 'too risky' options, possibly leaving only a truncated range of sub-optimal alternatives to choose between (in Stage Two).

In accordance with the theoretical propositions discussed above, this probe asks whether, according to information available to decision-makers in real time, the importance Poliheuristic Theory places on non-compensatory political variables generates insights that diverge from existing scholarly and practitioner recommendations on mediation.

#### **5. Case Study: The Kerry Initiative**

#### *5.1. Overview*

The Kerry Initiative in 2013 attempted to rescue the failed peace negotiations that took place during President Barack Obama's first term in office. Obama professed a commitment to Middle East peace and a belief that Israeli and Palestinian leaders could come together "in a rational way" to agree a two-state solution (Schiff 2018, p. 11). During Obama's second term in office, the White House announced that Secretary of State John Kerry would undertake an ambitious plan to resume negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders beginning in July 2013. This would be shepherded by Martin Indyk, former Ambassador to Israel and Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. The aim was to reach a final agreement within nine months, by 29 April of the following year.

#### *5.2. A PH Approach*

To map PH Theory's non-compensatory loss-aversion principle and determine whether this provides a description of how political fragility functions in conflict mediation, this probe asks four related questions: (A) Would a PH assessment of the relevant political dimensions have indicated any red flags before talks commenced? (B) Did the breakdown of talks in 2013 reflect or defy Poliheuristic reasoning? (C) Does this analysis produce any new insights?

#### (A)

It appears that before the Kerry Initiative began, both Israeli and Palestinian political dimensions presented a number of risks to the relative decision makers' political survival. The Israeli political dimension during Kerry's initiative was dominated by three potential risks: coalition politics, perceived security threats and the need to maintain American support. These high-pressure points, as well as their potential to remove genuine peaceseeking options from the leadership's choice set, would have been evident to Kerry's staff.

First, the need to keep coalitions together acted as a constraint on Israeli decisionmaking. George Mitchell had struggled with Israeli domestic politics between 2009 and 2012 partly because the coalition government under Netanyahu was a constant distraction (Mitchell and Sachar 2017). The 2009 elections in Israel had left the centrist–liberal Kadima party (led by Tzipi Livni) with the most Knesset seats, but Netanyahu (as head of Likud) seemed more likely to achieve a coalition and was asked to form the government.

Notwithstanding a dramatic formation and dissolution of a unity government with Kadima in 2012, Netanyahu's coalition between 2009 and 2013 was comprised predominantly of right-wing parties: Likud, Yisrael Beintenu, Shas and Jewish Home, all with subtly different antipathies towards the peace process derived from varying preferences for security, nationalist and religious concerns. These nuanced but hardened differences made it very difficult for the Israeli government coalition to agree outwardly and amongst themselves. Indeed, three former Likud leaders had found it necessary to leave the party to make progress with the Palestinians in previous years (Danin 2013).

However, an Israeli General Election in January 2013 lost the Likud–Beitenu block a quarter of its seats, forcing it to seek a more diverse coalition (Reed 2013). The new 2013 Israeli coalition still included Likud and Yisrael Beitenu as a joint grouping, but also the new parties Yesh Atid and Hatnua. Led by a celebrity journalist, Yair Lapid, the centrist Yesh Atid party was in favour of peace through a two-state solution. Led by Tzipi Livni (after her ousting as head of Kadima in 2012), the liberal Hatnua party focused its platform on achieving a final settlement with the Palestinians. Livni joined Netanyahu's coalition in return for a position as Justice Minister, giving her the peace process portfolio. This may certainly have seemed like an opportunity for more effective mediation, especially considering public opinion polls at the time.

In December 2012, 62% of Israeli voters reportedly supported a two-state solution, with the same proportion even among right-wing voters and even when questioned about a divided Jerusalem (Tzvia Weiniger 2012). Similarly, 69% of Israelis polled in 2013 voiced their support for the Arab Peace Initiative (Eldar 2013). Israeli public support for peace talks in the proceeding years had also been reassuringly high. In theory, as noted by Sasley (2013), this general goodwill should have provided some protection from peace spoilers.

Second, Israeli political life has long been saturated with securitized discourses built upon a combination of traumas that persist despite the country's economic and military success (Siniver 2012). This means that, as new regional threats unfold or escalate, public and governmental tolerance for risk tends to decrease. The expected benefits of peace processes have frequently become overshadowed by the known costs of attacks that occurred in recent memory, such as abductions, rocket fire and suicide bombings. This was pertinent during the Kerry Initiative because Netanyahu's government had failed to deter rocket fire from Gaza as recently as November 2012. The Israeli Operation Pillar of Defense was intended to prevent rockets that threatened Israel for a distance of 40 km, but ended with a ceasefire, despite militants having escalated to firing rockets with a range of 80 km (Abu Amer 2013a). It was widely acknowledged that the cease-fire would not hold.

Seemingly existential risks, such as the fear that Iran or its allies in Syria might use weapons of mass destruction against Israel, have also made it difficult to discuss relinquishing control to Palestinian security forces in strategically sensitive areas such as the Jordan Valley. Concerns persist that an independent Palestine in the West Bank might ultimately adopt militancy or Iranian proxy support. In January 2013, Netanyahu drew public attention to these broader security concerns, moving one of five Iron Dome defence batteries north in case of a chemical weapons attack from across the border with Syria (Reed 2013). Israel also launched strikes against targets in Syria in May 2013 and February 2014 while the Kerry Initiative was ongoing.

Third, Israel has often found itself isolated and relying on material support and diplomatic cover offered by the United States. It was widely reported during Obama's tenure, however, that Netanyahu had alienated the US president and was undermining that historic relationship. Although the likelihood of severed relations was never high, the possibility that everyday antagonisms could lessen influence and create rifts over time was raised consistently to oppose Netanyahu's behaviour (The Times 2012).

This concern might have been amplified by Obama's nomination of Chuck Hagel for Secretary of Defence in January 2013, a slightly controversial selection given Hagel's history of criticism towards Israeli lobbying (McGreal 2013). Obama visited Israel in March 2013 to reaffirm American commitments to Israeli security against Iranian nuclear development and Syrian chemical weapons (and finalized a \$10 billion arms deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE the following month). Nevertheless, the US president's subsequent floundering over his 'red line' in Syria must have undermined those earlier reassurances (Sanger and Rudoren 2013).

Likewise, the relevant Palestinian political dimension during this period was also dominated by three potential risks to the leader or regime's survival: Mahmoud Abbas's rivalry with Mohammad Dahlan, the power struggle with Hamas, and the need to maintain a broad base of international goodwill and aid. Again, these potential 'spoilers' were evident in public discourse and diplomacy at the time.

First, Abbas has long maintained his position as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and key member of the Fatah party through elite consensus and tacit public acquiescence rather than through an applicable electoral mandate. By 2013, his main rival within Palestinian politics had emerged as the former head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Service (PSS) in Gaza, Mohammad Dahlan (Jaraba and Shitrit 2014).

After Hamas overran Gaza in 2007, Dahlan moved to the West Bank and became influential within Fatah and the security services. He was able to place close contacts in key positions and use foreign financial connections to maintain those alliances (Jaraba and Shitrit 2014). He exhibited skillful political manoeuvres and was able to bring adversaries, such as Tawfiq al-Tirawi, into his confidence through a shared conflict with other figures, such as Jibril Rajoub (Jaraba and Shitrit 2014). Together with supporters from across the West Bank, Gaza and multiple refugee camps, Dahlan accused Abbas and the PNA of weakness and mismanagement. The Fatah Central Committee expelled him from the organization in 2011 and attempted, unsuccessfully, to quash his remaining base of support.

Having to suppress such internal dissent to avoid provoking Israel has damaged Abbas's popular appeal, and the resumption of talks in 2013 was unpopular among his base in Fatah and the PLO. Many Palestinians feared that Israel would extend talks indefinitely to confuse, frustrate and marginalize the Palestinian cause. This was based on a relatively recent trauma. The Bush-era Roadmap had unreasonably championed an unachievable level of Israeli security as the precondition for Palestinian statehood, and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had agreed numerous concessions in his final days in office without the ability to follow through (Abrams 2013). To plunge further political capital into Kerry's 2013 efforts, the Palestinian delegation required quick results (Danin 2013). This urgency amid the challenge from Dahlan provided the internal context for Abbas's demands.

Second, the period before and during the Kerry Initiative witnessed new developments in rivalry between the PNA and Hamas. Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 had eliminated the Hamas military commander, Ahmed al-Jabari, and threatened the ruinous prospect of an Israeli ground invasion (Abu Amer 2013a). This coincided with a contraction of Hamas's engagement with formal political processes.

Since its election in 2006, Hamas had represented the continuation of armed resistance against Israel, appealing to Palestinian youth as "the natural heir of Fatah's original project" (Abu Amer 2013b). The group also derived legitimacy from a careful use of popular religious rhetoric, as well as its internationally funded social programmes providing medical care, childcare and Islamic education as well as field hospitals and funerals during the direct confrontations with Israel (Abu Amer 2013b). This freedom fighter image has frequently been used to criticize the PNA as collaborators while celebrating Palestinian unity in principle.

However, years functioning as a government in Gaza also left Hamas open to criticism over dissatisfaction with specific MPs and ministers, as well as internal disagreements between then Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, Khaled Meshaal, and other prominent figures in the movement such as Moussa Abu Marzouk, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud al-Zahar (Abu Amer 2013b, 2013c). To avoid exposing these divisions, the group ultimately declined to participate in local elections. Instead, Hamas favoured the outsider, opposition narrative that originally defined its raison-d'être.

During this time, both Israeli and Palestinian Authority security services feared that Hamas would orchestrate 'quick win' operations, such as abductions (after a successful exchange of multiple Hamas prisoners for the IDF soldier Gilad Shalit) and further armed activities, particularly in the West Bank. Hamas even called for a third Intifada in September 2013. Such popular but disruptive activities represented a constant threat to Abbas's credibility in early 2013, both internally and externally in terms of his ability to deliver peace after an agreement.

Third, the PLO chairman was also facing broader diplomatic considerations. Foreign aid, which somewhat protected the PNA against collapse, depended on successful conflict management within PNA administered areas as well as engagement with mediated peace processes. PNA funding and diplomatic support from the Gulf had severely declined since the rise of Hamas, leaving Abbas in a somewhat precarious financial situation between American and European diplomatic preferences on the one hand and Palestinian calls for justice and resistance on the other. Seeking goodwill from further afield, Abbas met with numerous foreign leaders during this period, including Iranian President Ahmadinejad in February 2013, Chinese officials in May 2013 and Jacob Zuma while in South Africa the following year (BBC News 2013).

These factors summarize the pressing aspects of political dimensions for both Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers in 2013–2014. For practitioners seeking to apply a Poliheuristic framework in real time, this initial task of the mapping of the political dimension and its potential danger zones should be relatively straightforward. The following section attempts to understand how these pressure points might have been operationalized during the case at hand.

#### (B)

According to PH reasoning, and depending on each decision-maker's sensitivity to risk, these fraught political dimensions could have severely limited the available options in Stage One before a cost-benefit analysis between the remaining options could be performed in Stage Two. As this paper is concerned with conflicting parties' ability to initiate genuine talks, this section is focused on the first stage only—it asks whether risks were non-compensatory rather than whether the behaviour was ultimately optimal. In 2013, both sets of decision-makers had to choose between making concessions and not making concessions on a small number of core issues: preconditions, borders with land swaps, the right of return, security in the Jordan valley, and the status of Jerusalem. If concessions had been offered, then the exact nature of subsequent choices would have become delicate. However, both sides reneged on the preconditions and showed little willingness to offer concessions in other areas.

#### *5.3. Preconditions*

The failure to engage fully with the preconditions suggests that risk to political survival was too great. However, this generates a somewhat tautological argument. If both sets of

leadership, represented by Prime Minister Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Abbas, intended to maintain their political positions as a first priority (but not necessarily as the only goal), and the option to offer concessions was seemingly removed from the choice set without a holistic search or utility-maximising perspective, then the PH approach represents a workable model in this case. To avoid the tautology, this analysis would need to be achievable pre-emptively or in real time. The following attempts to chart how and when options may have been removed from the choice set. In practice, both sides seemed to face a great deal of pressure to engage in peace talks in which they could genuinely negotiate very little.

First, could both sides have simply refused to engage with the Kerry Initiative? Although debatable, it is important to recognize that the Obama-era United States still occupied a great deal of financial, military and normative power in the international community, meaning American wishes were not easy to dismiss.

In addition, Israeli and Palestinian interactions often operated within a zero-sum mindset. If one side refused to cooperate, that decision would have gifted the other with the moral high ground and a diplomatic victory. Therefore, refusing any participation at all was almost certainly non-compensatory for both parties. There were also political incentives to be part of the process. Peace talks promised Mahmoud Abbas more American attention, understanding and possibly aid, and Netanyahu's second-largest coalition partner (Yesh Atid) needed some involvement in peace talks to build a platform for future electoral success. Both sides had to take part, and there were benefits associated with simply appearing to be willing.

However, with regard to the preconditions, the Israeli Prime Minister faced far less political risk than his Palestinian counterpart. Abbas needed Israel to produce some tangible result early to justify his team's involvement in a process that was already perceived to have dismissed and marginalized Palestinian needs. This translated into American pressure for Netanyahu to approve the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners in four batches. All were convicted of killing Israelis and had been held since before the Oslo Accords. Discharging these men would have seemed like an Israeli sacrifice, but the same prisoners were supposed to be freed in 1999 as part of the Sharm El Sheikh memorandum. They had remained imprisoned ostensibly due to fears of violence associated with the Second Intifada. Therefore, there was a clear precedent for Israel that prisoner releases might be reversed on security grounds with near impunity.

In return for prisoner releases, Netanyahu's government required Palestinian leaders to halt any attempts at unilateral recognition via international institutions, particularly in approaching the International Criminal Court (ICC) to accuse Israel of war crimes. However, such unilateral action was not genuinely dangerous to Israeli governmental integrity. Israel could have easily absorbed the reputational costs of losing this diplomatic battle; its politicians have a long history of denying external authorities the right to comment on military methods and have often blamed anti-Semitism for sparking international criticism. Therefore, whereas a successful completion of the preconditions was absolutely vital for Abbas (in the sense that quick results were almost certainly non-compensatory), Netanyahu risked almost nothing by entering talks in principle. This imbalance of non-compensatory risks was voiced before the Kerry Initiative was announced.

However, fulfilling the preconditions in practice carried far more risk for Netanyahu than agreeing to them in theory. Although the Israeli government formed in 2013 included Yesh Atid and Hatnua rather than a coalition of purely right-wing parties, the most problematic veto player remained Avigdor Lieberman as head of Yisrael Beitenu.

The Israeli Prime Minister did not have a direct rival from within his own party. Netanyahu accepted the principle of a negotiated two-state solution in 2009, defended his mandate to pursue this outcome, and cautioned his colleagues against permitting the creation of a binational state that would erode Jewish self-determination (Sasley 2013). Indeed, following Kerry's announcement of resumed talks, Netanyahu framed the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as a way to meet Israel's broader security needs (Sasley 2013).

However, maintaining cooperation from Yisrael Beitenu was more uncertain. A settlement resident himself, Lieberman reacted to Kerry's initiative by refusing to allow an agreement based on the 1967 borders, or any settlement freeze, and denying that Mahmoud Abbas represented the wishes of any Palestinian communities (Sasley 2013). Even the US State Department was unsure of how to handle this combination of contradictory Israeli governmental views. Former US Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, had been rather scathing on this topic before negotiations commenced. "There's been no government in Israel," he told *Politico* in March 2013, "so there's been no time to prepare that. If they were going to do that, the president should have gone nine months from now—not now" (Gerstein 2013).

By November 2013, the importance of Yisrael Beintenu and of security discourses became apparent. Netanyahu adopted Lieberman's stance on the 1967 borders, suggesting (with no expectation of agreement) that the unilaterally constructed separation wall would provide a new boundary. Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon (who had recently been elected to head the Likud central committee) was publicly promoting Lieberman's preferred annexation strategy, that "Palestinians living in the West Bank . . . be offered Israeli citizenship or residency or be made the responsibility of Jordan" (Booth and Eglash 2013). This general stance also drew support from right-wing nationalist opposition figures such as Naftali Bennet. Between them, they heavily promoted the idea that Palestinian leaders should recognize Israel specifically as a Jewish nation state as another precondition for continued talks (Lieberman 2014).

Likud ministers continued to agitate for annexation, particularly of the Jordan Valley, throughout December 2013. They remained in the minority within the Knesset (leftwing parties offered to join the coalition if peace talks caused its dissolution), but losing the support of Yisrael-Beitenu would have seriously eroded Netanyahu's ability to keep forming governments. It is reasonable to assume that his desire to resolve the Palestine issue was secondary to his desire to ensure political survival.<sup>1</sup> To maintain this relationship with the vocal minority, nearly 2000 new settler homes were approved in January 2014. Netanyahu and Bennett also showed solidarity the following month by storming out of a moderately critical speech made by the European President, calling it lies (Black 2014).

Against this contentious backdrop, fulfilling the agreed concessions became predictably contentious. Israel released 26 prisoners in August 2013, another batch at the end of October and the third tranche at the end of December. As these prisoners were convicted for murdering Israelis, their release prompted a series of backlashes in the press related to justice for the victims' families and the prospect that they may reoffend.

The Palestinian delegation withdrew from talks in November 2013, citing Israeli intransigence and further Israeli settlement building. Abbas also declared that he could not recognize Israel as a Jewish state because that would put non-Jewish citizens at risk of exile and deportation (Knell 2014). Yasser Arafat had recognized the state of Israel already in 1988 and 1993. By the end of December, chief negotiator Saeb Erekat declared that the talks were a failure, that Palestine should continue to seek recognition unilaterally, and that there could be no extension of the deadline. The PLO chairman and Palestinian negotiating team were precluded from continuing by the lack of quick results.

Indeed, Abbas faced a great deal of criticism for his accommodating patience. In what was presumably an attempt to appear reasonable to international audiences, Abbas commented while travelling in South Africa that he supported boycotts of settlements but not of Israel more broadly (Goldman 2013). This led to him being labelled a traitor. Commenting from Israeli prison, the widely popular figure Marwan Barghouti stated, "Any Palestinian official who lacks a democratic mandate and any real public support who today explicitly speaks against boycotting Israel only shows how aloof he is from his own people's aspirations for freedom, justice and equality, and how oblivious he is to our struggle for our inalienable rights" (Sherwood 2013). Samia Botmeh, a lecturer at Birzeit University in the West Bank, added that "Palestinians are angry and feel let down by Abbas's comments" (Sherwood 2013).

A sense that Dahlan was poised to take power intensified the risk associated with this waning public confidence in Abbas. When Dahlan reportedly met with Field Marshal el-Sisi in early 2014, Abbas struck out against his main rival by withholding the security service salaries of Dahlan supporters in Gaza. It is likely that the Egyptian meeting felt particularly undermining since Dahlan and Sisi had a long-standing working relationship from their days collaborating across the Gaza–Egypt border. An unnamed official told *Al Monitor* that, "All of that has pushed Abbas to curtail Dahlan's influence in Gaza. Sisi is finding his way to Egypt's presidency, and the PA fears that (Sisi) will be able to attract Saudi Arabia and the UAE to his side and then (pressure) Abbas (to act) in Dahlan's favor" (Abu Amer 2014). Far-reaching political interests were clearly at stake.

The snubbed employees responded by organizing a sit-in and accusing Fatah's leadership of marginalizing Palestinians in Gaza. This prompted other prominent Fatah leaders, such as Muhammad al-Madani and Zakaria al-Agha, to denounce the action in principle or deny that it was punitive (Abu Amer 2014). Rather than on Abbas directly, the controversy was blamed on Abbas-loyalist Nabil Shaath, who had also received death threats from Dahlan supporters in the past (Abu Amer 2014). Nevertheless, Abbas himself gave a speech in March 2014 and used a large proportion of this time to criticize Dahlan.

Netanyahu then refused to release the last batch of prisoners, asking for an extension to the deadline to justify their release. In retaliation, Abbas signed 15 conventions on human and social rights. In further retaliation, Israel demolished several EU-funded structures and approved another 708 settler homes in Gilo.

The problem for Abbas remained the need to have something to show for Palestinian involvement. He visited the White House in March 2014 but clearly could not commit to the Kerry plan. The PLO Chairman's domestic situation meant there was no way that the options to recognize Israel as a specifically Jewish state and to abandon the right of return were within his choice set (The Times of Israel 2014). Abbas did, however, apparently list three conditions for resuming talks after the deadline: borders to be dealt with in the first three months of talks, a total construction freeze in settlements, and the release (without deportation) of the final prisoners. Again, it is evident that quick results were paramount. As Shapland and Mekelberg note, "bad experiences with interim, partial, temporary or (solely) 'economic' solutions have caused the Palestinians to reject any further such arrangements, only a comprehensive settlement is now possible" (Shapland and Mekelberg 2018, p. 11).

Realistically, as the good faith preconditions were constantly violated and Palestinian internal politics intensified in criticism, the option to continue with Kerry's Initiative must have represented non-compensatory political risk for Abbas. He could not continue without the fulfilment of Israel's preconditions, but Netanyahu struggled to provide those preconditions while hoping to remain relevant to Israel's nationalist right.

#### *5.4. Remaining Core Issues*

In addition, even if talks had continued, each core issue would have presented similar political hazards. On borders and land swaps, there were longstanding American and PLO expectations that the 1967 borders would form the basis for negotiations, with wriggle room on discussing densely settled areas. There was some mention within Israeli circles about reprising the Sharon Plan, in which parts of the so-called Arab Triangle in the north of Israel would be transferred to a Palestinian state. This, however, was not agreed by the United States and did not fit prior, hard-won arrangements endorsed by the PLO (Winer 2014).

Security in the Jordan Valley also remained problematic. The Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 set a worrying precedent for both Israel and Jordan as militancy in the West Bank would be harder to contain. However, the Israeli insistence (and Jordanian preference) for maintaining a military presence in the Jordan Valley has always represented a violation of expected Palestinian sovereignty (Berman 2013). In July 2013, Abbas announced that there could not be a single Israeli in Palestine and clarified by October that this meant the exclusion of all Israeli troops.

To address the right of return, Abbas reportedly mentioned in passing that this may have to be waived to ensure a settlement. The possibility of a small number of token returns plus compensation had been part of previous discussions with Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert. However, abandoning the 'right' was wildly unpopular among young Palestinians and so a practical compromise largely depended on the belief that Israel would volunteer appropriate levels of compensation. The 2013–2014 discussions never progressed to this stage.

As possibly the most sensitive aspect of Israeli–Palestinian relations, Jerusalem was not addressed in initial bilateral meetings. Abbas and King Abdullah of Jordan signed a pact in March 2013 to protect the holy city of Jerusalem, signaling that the Palestinian negotiators would not be railroaded on this issue. Regardless, unlike Bill Clinton's complicated layered approach to the holy sites that was proffered, albeit unsuccessfully, at Camp David in 2000, Kerry's Initiative never advanced far enough to tackle the Jerusalem problem in any depth. Netanyahu announced in October 2013 that there could be no right of return and no divided Jerusalem.

It seems apparent, therefore, that the parties found themselves in an impossibly limited position at every juncture. Abbas could not engage fully without a tangible result, and Netanyahu could not produce a tangible result and expect to keep his position. It does not appear as though there was much scope for a rational cost–benefit analysis in Stage Two because no alternatives were left in the choice set after Stage One. Procedurally, this provides more insight into how political fragility functions, maintaining unripeness, despite external pressures for mediation.

#### (C)

Descriptively, this analysis would seem familiar to conflict analysts and specialists in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. However, it adds an important procedural component to the search for optimal mediation conditions and activities designed to 'ripen' otherwise unripe conflicts. The insight of a PH approach is the apparent necessity to prioritize the political dimension rather than operate primarily in terms of utility maximizing 'sticks' and 'carrots' and treating political risk as just one complication among many. This subtly changes the advice offered by prominent scholars and practitioners in this area.

Richard Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has noted the absence of ripeness in Israel–Palestine, and that "it's not right for any number of reasons" (CFR Events 2015). When pressed to explore what those reasons are, however, American former diplomats often mention the constraints of domestic politics as one of many factors (CFR Events 2015).

William Quandt, a former member of the Carter Administration actively involved in the Camp David Accords, provides seven key ingredients for American success in mediating the Israel–Palestine conflict (Quandt 2005, pp. 426–20). However, there is no sequence specified for his list of insights. Likewise, Kurtzer et al. (2013) offer 11 items that they deem crucially important for any future American mediation efforts in Israel–Palestine. The authors stress that their list of policy suggestions is indicative rather than exhaustive, but it is pertinent to note that the list is numbered without being ranked. No element of the peace process is able to be promoted as more or most important.

In addition, while there is a clear consensus that conflicting parties' political survival is crucial to diagnosing or encouraging the best timing for mediation, this recognition does not translate into a clearly articulated priority. Dennis Ross, for example, after serving as President Bill Clinton's Middle East Envoy, recognizes how political environments placed enormous pressure on both Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000.

Ross coherently describes the highly constraining political environments faced by both parties: Unelected leaders lack legitimacy, "(s)o they are easily put on the defensive and fear being accused of conceding principles or perceived rights. Their sense of vulnerability makes them risk-averse ( . . . )" (Ross 2004, p. 762). He notes how even democratically elected leaders "( . . . ) preside in a highly competitive political environment, with governments that are always based on coalitions of different parties", again making them risk-averse (Ross 2004, p. 762). However, Ross's policy advice does not centre on ameliorating this vulnerability that is felt on all sides.

Unfortunately, risk-aversion is often treated as a moral failing of one or more of the parties involved. They are called upon to show courage or make 'tough decisions' as though no constraint is insurmountable if the leader possesses a strong enough resolve (Wright 1997; Tait 2014; The Daily Mail 2016). Ross, for example, explains the outcome of Camp David talks in 2000 in relation to the leaders' egos. Ross asks, "Was timing the issue or was Arafat incapable of transforming himself from a revolutionary into a statesman? I came to believe the latter ( . . . )" (Ross 2004, p. 761). This is despite Ross's recognition that the rise of Hezbollah "raised the costs, in his (Arafat's) eyes, of making fundamental concessions" (Ross 2004, p. 761).

Martin Indyk has expressed similar frustrations with both parties regarding the overbearing nature of their political circumstances. Indyk has complained about a lack of urgency between negotiators and that "(i)t is easier for the Palestinians to sign conventions and appeal to international bodies in their supposed pursuit of 'justice'" and "easier for Israeli politicians to avoid tension in the governing coalition and for the Israeli people to maintain the current comfortable status quo" (Wilner 2014). The result is that they never feel the need to "make the gut-wrenching compromises necessary to achieve peace" (Wilner 2014).

Therefore, a Poliheuristic approach to ripeness endows some elements of existing advice on American mediation in the Israel–Palestine conflict with new relative importance that might have been useful in 2013. This perspective prioritizes key recommendations from existing advice and, in so doing, downplays the assignment of blame. Thus, there is the potential for a new model of ripeness to emerge.

In the first and most important (non-compensatory) stage, analysts and mediators hoping to understand or develop the MHS and WO must map conflicting parties' political dimensions by assessing the type and nature of risks to their political survival. This means that the mediator's priority is to ameliorate those risks, and all other recommendations for initiating or achieving successful mediation become subsidiary.

With regard to the Kerry Initiative, an awareness that quick results were a noncompensatory requirement for the Palestinians would have prompted American mediators to secure the prisoner releases and settlement freeze before all other considerations. If this was not possible, despite the diversified Israeli government formed in January 2013, then it would have been clear that fulfilling concessions was a non-compensatory task for the Israeli Prime Minister and signaled that negotiations were stillborn.

This may have prompted the Obama Administration to reprioritize their efforts in the short term. Instead of pushing for immediate talks, the White House could have heeded Indyk's warning and worked to ripen the conflict instead. This may have been pursued by helping to secure Abbas's political position through material and ideational aid while working to cement Netanyahu's relationship with Israel's centrist and liberal parties and easing the everyday indignities and violations that ordinary Palestinians endure under occupation.<sup>2</sup>

#### **6. Conclusions**

This paper has offered a plausibility probe that presents supplementary insights to existing work on conflict ripeness. By outlining the modelling problem created by a reliance on expected utility as an underlying framework for conceptualizing decision-making, the introduction of PH Theory offers a potentially useful alternative.

PH Theory would demand that mediation analysis and recommendations must reflect the non-compensatory loss-aversion principle. Through this prism, perceived risk to conflicting parties' political survival must be considered in the first instance when assessing the presence or absence of ripeness, and then perceived risk must be ameliorated as a first step towards developing ripeness—all other efforts seemingly risk futility. This case study

provides a note for prospective mediators on the crucial significance of appreciating conflicting parties' non-compensatory needs. It is a reminder that the appropriate conditions or timing for good faith mediation are not likely to be the result of bold leaders making the oft-demanded hard choices unless those non-compensatory needs are ameliorated first. This reinforces an understanding among diplomats that domestic political concerns not only matter, but also matter the most.

Procedurally, therefore, political fragility might be summed up as a process of multiple, severe and proliferating risks to leaders' political survival that removes key options from the choice set. This is a pathway rather than an outcome. These non-compensatory risks narrow the options that leaders are able to consider, sometimes excluding what would otherwise seem to be optimal courses of action. In this sense, political fragility might be mapped and anticipated in response to unfolding events. This probe, therefore, contributes to our understanding of the relationship between political fragility and conflict in the MENA region by indicating how fragility may be functioning in real time and so how it might be addressed in future.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes**


#### **References**


DeRouen, Karl. 2002a. Israeli Military Actions and Internalization-externalization processes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46: 244–59.


Fiorina, Morris. 1977. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gerstein, Josh. 2013. Obama in Israel: Symbolism Over Substance. *Politico.com*. Available online: https://www.politico.com/story/20 13/03/obama-in-israel-symbolism-over-substance-088969 (accessed on 31 August 2021).

Goemans, Hein E. 2000. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goldman, Yoel. 2013. Abbas: Don't Boycott Israel. *The Times of Israel*. Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-we-donot-support-the-boycott-of-israel/ (accessed on 31 August 2021).

Greig, J. Michael, and Patrick M. Regan. 2008. When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars. *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 759–81. [CrossRef]

Haass, Richard N. 1990. *Conflicts Unending: The U.S. and Regional Disputes*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

