**7. Conclusions**

The results of the case study support the assumption that there is a linkage between urban growth mechanisms and urban outcomes in Chinese cities, as proposed in the analytical framework (Figure 1). The higher the dependency on land-leasing revenue in a city, the higher possibility it adopts a growth-at-all-costs approach, which increases the likelihood of overdevelopment. On the contrary, the lower the dependency on land-leasing revenue, the higher the possibility that the city pays more attention to promoting urban quality, where innovative and sustainable urban transition is more likely to be realised. Because the formation of urban growth approaches in China is deeply embedded in its institutional systems (e.g., tax-sharing system, land and housing reform, and cadre appointment system), institutional reforms are needed to achieve more sustainable forms of urban development. Currently, central government tends to use macroeconomic controls and administrative orders to stop the overgrowth of land-driven economy and local debts, but these tools cannot solve the fundamental problem of fiscal deficit of local governments under the current tax-sharing system. The central government can easily fall in the dilemma of "control then it dies, leave it then it becomes chaotic" (*yiguanjiusi, yifangjiuluan*) [63]. Furthermore, the strategies and behaviours of local governments in urban development are only supervised by the upper-tier governments. The lack of local supervision contributes to the formation of systematic risks in urban development of Chinese cities.

This study also calls urban entrepreneurialism into question in China. Chinese local governments act as both market regulators and players, holding two critical resources of capital and land, using market instruments for the recreation and reconfiguration of space. China is not a rule-of-law based society, and local leaders are not elected but officials appointed by high level governments. Local governments can go beyond budgetary constraints and apply a market logic to recklessly mobilise resources for urban development and political objectives. This often creates a trend of overspending and excessive investment in infrastructure and urban development. In this sense, their 'entrepreneurial nature' has uncertain and debateable long-tern consequences. Even though local leaders are often proud of the 'Chinese speed' in urban development and use it for political performance, the risks of overdevelopment, misallocation of social resources, and potential debt crisis may eventually do more harm than good from the perspective of long-term sustainable urban development.

**Author Contributions:** Y.S. is first author. He developed the concepts and methods, collected the data, and wrote the first draft of the paper. D.S. and M.d.J. advised on the structure of the article, the analytical framework, and the overall content of the manuscript. D.S. edited the final version of the article and M.d.J. was responsible for project management. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** The first author is funded by the China Scholarship Council (CSC).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.
