*4.3. Dispute Resolution Pathways and Resolution Preference*

Despite the different categories of land-related disputes in the study areas, they did not translate into widespread tenure insecurity. The field data suggest that the mechanisms for dispute resolution were largely localised within the socio-political system, with very little variation between the study sites (Table 3). From Table 3, the overall results show that traditional courts (including clan/family heads (Abusuapanyins)) and stool land offices were the main adjudicatory institutions utilised by respondents. On face value, this seems to indicate that several fora were opened to landholders in terms of the enforcement and legitimation of their land rights. Critically, however, this does not reflect the actual situation on the ground, which is seemingly complex and negotiated exemplified by opportunism and the elite capture of the adjudicatory process. Indeed, the quantitative analysis demonstrates statistically significant differences regarding access to dispute resolution institutions across studied groups. For instance, when asked whether they had ever sought help from traditional authorities or statutory courts in the resolution of land-related disputes, a far less proportion of respondents in Kakum (11%) and Ankasa (10%) indicated they had made recourse to the traditional authorities or statutory courts regarding the resolution of land-related disputes (Table 3). This observation was corroborated during the interviews as participants explained that in the event of land disputes, they preferred private resolution through negotiation moderated by the Abusuapanyins and/or Odikro<sup>6</sup> at first instance. In the failure of such private resolution, recourse was made to any of the above-identified institutions.


**Table 3.** Mechanisms for land dispute adjudication.

Whereas Table 3 demonstrates a limited recourse to adjudicatory mechanisms, there is a sense of trust in the mediation afforded by traditional authorities as opposed to statutory institutions. During the community FGDs, participants cited the inaccessibility, delays in adjudication, cost, public image and fear of being labelled vexatious litigant as the reasons for their preference traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. These customary mechanisms played a pivotal role in maintaining social cohesion in their communities, particularly as most disputing parties are relatives or neighbours in the same village. Traditional authorities (who interpret and administer custom) were well-versed with the

<sup>6</sup> Odikro is the village chief or headman in the Akan traditional areas of southern Ghana.

local customs, norms and rules governing communal landholdings and thus more capable of dealing with contestations over land use and ownership. Two typical remarks by key informants are illustrative of the above observation:

*'Most people prefer an amicable settlement of their land-related disputes by making recourse to the Odikro and his elders as opposed to the court. This is due to several reasons, including the fact that the courts are expensive, delays in going to and fro and the fear of being labelled a litigant, which could affect or strain social relationships between families and friends in the community* ... *'. (Interview 1, Kakum)*

*'In this community we see ourselves as one, and as such, we try to resolve any disputes, especially in relation to land, amongst ourselves, sometimes even without seeking help from Odikro and his elders. Neglect of the customary structures could attract some scorn and/or sanctions from other members of the community* ... *'. (Interview 1, Kakum)*

The overwhelming stated preference for traditional adjudicatory mechanisms relative to the statutory courts in the study areas also finds expression in the observation that institutional constraints and allegations of corruption impede the effective functioning of the state courts as secure avenues for the protection of land rights irrespective of social status [39,57,58]. Indeed, interviews with some officials of the stool land office and CLS revealed that the local populace were quite sceptical that the statutory mechanisms would best serve their interests and/or protect their land rights as powerful entities could influence decisions in their favour. This is indicative of Platteau's [57] remark that 'in social contexts dominated by differential access to state administration [as in Ghana's case], there is always the fear that the adjudication/registration process will be manipulated by the elite to its advantage'. At the same time, the foregoing also brings to the fore an important question as to the effectiveness of these customary mechanisms in the protection of land rights of different social groups. This is discussed within the context of the respondents' satisfaction with the customary adjudicatory mechanisms.
