*3.3. The Sociological Perspective*

In order for high-quality and meaningful agri-food products to be consumed by everyone, and not just seen as "Veblen goods", they need to be affordable and plentiful. For this to occur, systems capable of producing them must be possible and desirable and, therefore, have a favorable environment for them to flourish. Such environments are the institutions.

North, in 1991, stated that "Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)" [83]. The author understands that institutions are created to promote trust in trade, and work as an economy's incentive structure.

In other words, formal or informal institutions act in such a manner that allows or constrains economic and social development. The direction of the force exerted by institutions strengthens or weakens the performance of each sector. In any case, institutions play a decisive role in the economy's performance or, more specifically, the performance of markets. Additionally, the proper functioning of the involved institutions in societies is decisive with regard to the performance of the markets. Oriented institutions towards specific segments determine the success or failure of an economic sector. This concept is crucial for further conclusions.

In a complementary manner, Acemo ˘glu, Johnson, and Robinson also address the relevance of institutions in economic and social development, by studying the purposes of institutions based on the colonization process [84]. The authors argued that the development of European-colonized countries performs differently due to the home country's interests. Colonization of regions for purely exploratory purposes or to enrich certain states restrains local development, as seen in countries in Africa or South America. However, in regions where colonization took place for the purpose of permanence, the institutions allowed for development, such as in Australia and the USA. The argument is based on the types of colonial policies, the feasibility of settlements, and those institutions' persistence [84].

Additionally, Acemo ˘glu notes the influence of institutions on economic reforms. The author argues that in order to maintain privileges, interested and powerful groups act on their own behalf. However, the changes must reach not only formal but also informal institutions in order to achieve results [85–87].

The new economic sociology (NES) also brought essential elements that contribute to understanding of the influence of institutions on markets. Based on Weberian thinking, Swedberg [88] (p. 7) defines NES as "the application of sociological ideas, concepts and methods to economic phenomena—markets, companies, stores, unions, and so on". The author, supported by Weber, describes that its object studies "both economic phenomena, as well as how these phenomena influence the rest of society and how the rest of society influences them (economically relevant phenomena)".

In 1985, Granovetter used anthropological factors, such as those of Polanyi, to develop a critical theory of the relationships between individuals and institutions in a correlated manner [17]. With such relationships between them, embeddedness occurs, changing the market's characteristics. The main reason for this is that marketing behavior is based on trust and bad faith involved in the relationships between agents. Therefore, the connection of actors and institutions acts over the core fundaments of the market's functioning.

The theory of embeddedness in markets starts from the negation of classical and neoclassical utilitarian thinking, as well as from under and over-socialized views of consumer choices. The author was concerned about the atomization of human actions. This theory is based on the behavior of humans as a result of both the social web in which they are inserted, and their own initiative, avoiding theoretical extremes.

For the development of the NSE, Granovetter relies on three pillars: that economic action is a form of social action, that economic action is socially situated, and that economic institutions are social constructions [17,31,89]. Under any of them, the importance of complex analysis of a concrete economic issue from a non-isolationist perspective, but as part of a social context, is noteworthy. Alternatively, with regard to Granovetter's work, Raud-Mattedi [90] (p. 65) highlights this understanding, stating that "The market, therefore, does not consist of a free play of abstract forces, supply and demand, between actors atomized and anonymous, but in a set of actions closely intertwined in concrete networks of social relations". However, even within markets, authors differ as to the most appropriate approach for each market. This is typically divided into three theoretical groups [18,91]—(a) networks [17,30,31,92,93], (b) institutions [32,94–96], or (c) performativity [28,29,97,98]—as explanatory mechanisms for the emergence and dynamics of the markets.

Granovetter [17] (p. 488) describes a fundamental sense of validation and market gaps in his article on embeddedness. The author, without detailing explanations of overor under-socialization, argues that "what has eroded this confidence in recent years has been increased attention to the micro-level details of imperfectly competitive markets, characterized by small number of participants with sunk costs and 'specific human capital' investments". However, in response to this work, Raud-Mattedi [90] (pp. 63–64) refers to this understanding, stating that "The market, therefore, does not consist of a free play of abstract forces, supply and demand, between atomized and anonymous actors, but in a set of actions closely intertwined in concrete networks of social relations". Still, Stein [99]

proposes that institutions (property rights included) are crucial to examining markets, and that biases can hinder even neo-institutionalist perspectives in the neoclassical economy.

Still, with regard to the NES, Fligstein and McAdam [100] take a more in-depth approach regarding markets and institutions. The authors theorized about how institutions emerge, become stable, and are transformed to remain alive in what they call a theory of fields. This theory looks at disputes that occur at the intermediate or meso levels of dispute, implying that actions occur within organized local groups. It is in these disputes that institutions are built, stabilized, and transformed. Thus, Fligstein and McAdam argue that institutions result from social interaction between actors that confront one another in arenas or fields, and distance themselves from rational choice theorists by attributing importance to the social construction of identities, interests, actions, and action structures. Furthermore, they argue that the groups with the most significant influence in a strategic field of action promote shared identities and meanings by appropriating material and existential resources to legitimize their privileged position in the field, forging rules that favor them and defending the maintenance of their superior resources and power [100].

In another work, Fligstein went further and developed a theory of markets [94]. Here, the author theorizes that firms, faced with competition scenarios, tend to build what he calls "conception of control", where the incumbents' business model dominates the market's way of acting [94]. In the same work, he states that the creation of markets seeks stability in order to reduce the harmful effects of competition. For Fligstein, the state is a fundamental actor in reducing these harmful effects and promoting stability by acting not only through bureaucratic and legal means [94]. Sometimes, even its performance takes place through regulatory means and active participation [94].

In a third work by Fligstein, the author uses the metaphor of "markets as politics" to discuss how markets and states are intimately embedded. By dissociating the market into three phases (creation, stabilization, and transformation), he maintains that market arrangements develop around property rights, governance structures, conceptions of control, and rules of exchange [34]. Among the various propositions made, two stand out for this work: The first argues that "Laws and accepted practices often reflect the interests of the most organized forces in society" [34]. The second states that "the entry of countries into capitalism pushes states to develop rules about property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange in order to stabilize markets for the largest firms" [34]. Along with the other 14 propositions, he concludes that "Markets are social constructions that reflect the unique political-cultural construction of their firms and nations" [34]. His approach adds to the sociological approach to markets by deepening and consolidating some aspects of how states act to guarantee their interests. Thus, we affirm in this conceptual paper that for the specific context of agri-food markets, the state not only acts in the markets, but also acts in defense of the interests of the social segments that it hegemonically represents.

One last sociological aspect is crucial in this work. Gramsci's theorization of hegemony is the glue that unites and gives purpose to the forms of construction of markets, emphasizing the different constructions in the agri-food sector. This conceptual work does not intend to extract all of the concepts and critical approaches carried out by the author, but simply to enter into what is pertinent to developing an understanding of the functioning of modern agri-food markets—cultural hegemony.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Gramsci developed the concept of cultural hegemony in a European context of intense industrialization and, therefore, of large masses of the population migrating from the countryside to the cities. He argued that this domination is usually built up due to the prestige of more powerful groups, as a result of their positions and roles in the world of production [47]. Consequently, this process of domination over these groups takes place through the state (or political society) to maintain the status quo [47]. The author goes deeper by asserting that this consent is given through ideological formation. Thus, the culture and values of the bourgeoisie become "common sense" for everyone, making the masses identify with it and defend their causes as their own, containing popular revolts [47].

Gramsci still distinguishes intellectuals (in what would fit better today with a concept of authority) from the countryside and cities, arguing that there are significant differences between them [47]. The author's established concept of traditional and organic intellectuals (adapted by us to authorities) derives from his notion of forms of ideology. For Gramsci, the agents responsible for these forms of articulation receive these names. In their theoretical elaboration, traditional intellectuals are those most detached from the economic structure, without a necessary relationship with the social or political class. In contrast, organic intellectuals are the agents responsible for the ideological promotion of their function in the economic field, due to their similarities with the ruling classes in the political and social areas.

From the point of view of these authorities as traditional and organic categories, they present opposite influences in their relationships. While there is a vertical relationship with the exercise of power by these authorities in the field, the opposite occurs in industry [47]. This conclusion implies that the exertion of power and ideological dissemination in rural areas occurs via a top-down social structure. In other words, the domination through assimilation occurs through the manufacture of consent, where the ruling social classes exercise their worldview over the popular classes. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector, this takes place through peers, in a horizontal manner.

Both the construction of the concept through the theorization of cultural hegemony and the distinction of the relationship of influence between the authorities of the countryside and the cities inexorably compose the construction of markets. In this work, we argue that this construction of hegemony is even more present in the agri-food markets due to this relationship, and that there is still a change-resistant productive structure for the dominant groups to remain in a position of influence, privilege, and power.
