*Article* **The Remaking of Institutions for Local Climate Governance? Towards Understanding Climate Governance in a Multi-Level UK Local Government Area: A Micro-Local Case Study**

**Erica Russell \* and Ian Christie**

Centre for Environment and Sustainability (CES), Arthur C Clarke Building, Stag Hill Campus, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK; i.christie@surrey.ac.uk **\*** Correspondence: erica.russell@surrey.ac.uk

**Abstract:** The crisis of climate disruption and shortcomings in top-down approaches has focused attention on the effectiveness of governance to achieve climate goals. New sub-national governance models such as business alliances, city networks and NGO coalitions have emerged; such institutional 're-making' is often motivated by frustration at national inaction, and by a belief thatlocal actors offer an effective 'bottom-up' approach. Literature on the emergence of climate-led multi-level and polycentric governance focuses primarily on cities; the role of urban-rural counties and of the microlevel of local government, and the challenges and opportunities before them, is less well studied. This paper draws on work in progress in a study exploring progress, challenges and failings in UK climate governance across multiple levels of county-based government: Surrey, an area of towns, peri-urban districts and countryside, is offered as a case study, with a focus on micro-level action in small towns and parishes. We find that despite a lack of national government orchestration or sub-regional frameworks, climate action is occurring voluntarily at all levels of governance. However, the nature of action is variable and irregular and there is little evidence as yet to demonstrate effectiveness. A fragmented form of multi-level governance is observed, with limited upward flows of ideas and no indication of national interest in micro-local climate lessons and experience. We identify the importance of 'wilful actors' and the need for greater coordination, information- and knowledge-sharing networks to achieve effective institutional 'remaking' for climate action.

**Keywords:** climate change; multi-level governance; institutional remaking

## **1. Introduction**

As the science of climate change has advanced, and concerns over climate disruption have mounted, in recent decades, interest has grown in the implications of climate crisis for governance, the complex interplay of governmental and non-governmental institutions, processes and cross-sectoral and multi-level relationships of policy actors in problem definition and problem solving, agenda setting, orchestration of strategies and policies, and the management of public goods (see, for example, [1–7]). The focus of research and policy development has been mainly at the global and national scales, with the evolution of trans-national institutions such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the International Panel on Climate Change, and policy making on climate within international networks such as the EU. There has been considerable attention in the academic and policy literatures on global and national governance of climate action in the context of ecological disruption, the negotiation of targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and the failures of national governments to implement effective measures to achieve goals set in international agreements (see, for example, [4,5,8–14]).

There has also been significant work in academic research and policy development on the local governance of climate action—focusing predominantly on the role of urban municipalities and leading cities (see, for example, [15–23]). This reflects the political and

**Citation:** Russell, E.; Christie, I. The Remaking of Institutions for Local Climate Governance? Towards Understanding Climate Governance in a Multi-Level UK Local Government Area: A Micro-Local Case Study. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 13817. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su132413817

Academic Editors: David Tyfield, Rebecca Willis and Andy Yuille

Received: 15 October 2021 Accepted: 8 December 2021 Published: 14 December 2021

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**Copyright:** © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

economic weight of major cities, and also the role taken by many of them in promoting more radical policies on the climate crisis than have been advanced by their national governments. We have seen the emergence of numerous city-led initiatives for climate action, such as the C40 Cities network at the global scale, and of initiatives led by urban mayors in the USA to accelerate climate action in the absence of leadership at the federal level following the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 [19,21,22].

The significance of local governance of climate policy as a source of exemplary and pioneering action across sectors [24] has been underlined by the well-documented and serious failure so far of national governments to implement international climate agreements, incentivise decarbonisation and set their economies on course for achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions, consistent with the goals of the Paris Accord [5,25,26]. Together, the literatures on emergent climate governance approaches at global and city scales provide a significant body of knowledge and theory on the benefits and failings of top-down and bottom-up policy development, contributing to understanding of multi-level governance for climate action and more generally for sustainable development [2,4,6,7,15,27,28].

However, so far, the literature on governance and climate challenges has not focused to the same degree on local climate governance in non-metropolitan areas, where local administrations and their network relationships with other policy actors cover towns, peri-urban and suburban localities and rural districts, and include relationships with 'micro-local' institutions such as parish and small town councils. Such places generate a physical, political, social and economic 'mixed ecology' very different from that governed by major city authorities. Given the political and social significance of such territories, and the distinctive policy challenges they pose (for example, the greater degree of car dependence in affluent non-metropolitan areas than in cities and greater opportunities for re-forestation), it is important to explore the opportunities, problems and emerging patterns in governance of climate action at this scale.

We suggest that more work is needed on this level of governance to enhance our understanding of the development of institutions and processes for coping with climate change, and to enrich the well-established literatures on multi-level and polycentric forms of governance in general. More important, better understanding of local governance of climate crisis could help to improve its processes and outcomes, and thereby contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation.

In this paper, we introduce some findings from an on-going research project in the UK, that aims to improve understanding of emergent climate governance institutions and processes at the sub-regional local scale in a non-metropolitan area, the county of Surrey in South-East England. We outline some initial results from a multi-level case study involving three layers of local government and related governance processes and networks.

While the research focus is specifically on this part of the UK, we hope that the approach taken and findings so far will resonate with researchers and policy makers in other contexts, given the wide range of states with similar challenges concerning the relationship between centralized national power and local/regional actors in the context of designing and implementing effective climate mitigation and adaptation strategies. The structure of this paper is as follows. We first set out the broad policy and research context for this study; then, in Section 2, we present our case study method at the micro-level of local governance in our selected area; in Section 3, we outline the results at the time of writing (early autumn 2021); finally, we discuss the findings to date.

## *1.1. The Policy Context*

The policy context for this study is the existing framework of local government and governance in England, and the political debates about its future and the pressures on the system as it stands. The local government system has been subject to substantial reforms over the past half-century and a stable settlement remains elusive. There is a complex multi-level array of institutions in the formal local government system, complemented by a complex set of networks of cross-sectoral partnerships and other governance bodies. There are unitary authorities, single-tier local government institutions overseeing services for an area: some are metropolitan areas, but some are rural-suburban territories. There are also multi-tier areas where a county council must work with borough (largely urban) and district (largely rural) smaller authorities, which in turn have below them parish and town councils, the smallest units of local government. Such an area is the county of Surrey, the focus of our project as explained below.

Alongside, and entangled with, these local government bodies are networks of local governance, in which public, private and voluntary sector bodies work in advisory, research, policy development, delivery and advocacy coalitions. Such bodies include the Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) established by national government as forums and sub-regional agencies for local skills, infrastructure and investment; the new and rapidly evolving network of local Climate Commissions, established by local government bodies and partners independently of central government; and many long-standing multisector partnerships on aspects of policy such as nature conservation, waste, and local energy systems.

What these diverse local government and governance institutions have in common is the impact of the recent history of central government policy making in relation to local governance. The trend has been towards centralisation of power in English government, despite the numerous phases of local government reform over recent decades [29,30]; and local government has been subject to a major reduction in power and resources in the years since the global financial crash of 2008 [31]. The imposition of 'austerity', in particular since 2010 under the then Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government of the UK, has greatly constrained local government and governance bodies, reduced their funding and weakened their capacity [32]. The past decade has also seen the abolition of regional assemblies and development agencies in England, thus removing the regional tier of government and governance, and leaving regional and sub-regional coordination in the hands of complex overlapping networks of local councils, new combined authorities (run by elected mayors, mainly in major metropolitan areas), and partnership organisations such as the LEPs [33,34].

A major development at the local level has been the reduction in core grant financial settlement from central government and the subsequent loss of staff, skills and discretionary activities from local government services [31]. At the same time, the demands on the core statutory services provided by local councils—such as adult and social care—have grown, with the ageing of populations and the impact on physical and mental health of economic insecurities and, since 2020, of COVID-19 [35,36]. Additional finance for local government has typically been provided by central government via once-off targeted grants and via funds available on a time-limited competitive bidding process. Local government in England remains very restricted in its capacities to raise revenues locally and to engage in strategic planning and investment in major infrastructures [35,37].

These developments have greatly constrained the development of climate policy and its implementation at the local level: climate action has been pursued, but has been hampered by lack of political priority, funds, staff and skills [38]. However, in many local authorities and among their local governance partners, there have been numerous initiatives for climate action in spite of the unfavourable financial and operational context [24,37,38]. In 2019, the worldwide upsurge in climate campaigning (Extinction Rebellion, School Strikes for Climate, and Climate Emergency Declarations) sparked a wave of interest and activity in UK local government and among local governance actors. Climate Emergency declarations were made at a large scale [38].

The rise in salience and urgency of climate policy since 2018 has focused attention at the local level on the gap between aspirations and local potential for effective climate action on the one hand, and the institutional weakness of local government on the other. Calls for much greater attention to local potential and capabilities, for a clear framework for climate action, and for climate-focused institutional reform have come from local government representative bodies such as the County Councils Network [39] and UK100 [40]; from national policy advisory bodies [41–44]; and from think-tanks (see, for example, [37,38,45]. These demands have in common a call for a coherent debate and framework concerning the role of local government and governance partners in the design and implementation of the UK Government's ambitious strategic goals for decarbonisation [46]; and a call for recognition of the essential role to be played by local actors in achieving net zero climate mitigation goals and implementing adequate adaptation measures in the face of climate disruption. This extract from the National Audit Office's [35] report on Local Government and net zero in England is representative of this body of critique, analysis and recommendations concerning policy gaps and lack of orchestration across levels of government in pursuit of effective climate governance and implementation:

"*While the exact scale and nature of local authorities' roles and responsibilities in reaching the UK's national net zero target are to be decided, it is already clear that they have an important part to play, as a result of the sector's powers and responsibilities for waste, local transport and social housing, and through their influence in local communities. Government departments have supported local authority work related to net zero through targeted support and funding. However, there are serious weaknesses in central government's approach to working with local authorities on decarbonisation, stemming from a lack of clarity over local authorities' overall roles, piecemeal funding, and diffuse accountabilities. This hampers local authorities' ability to plan effectively for the long-term, build skills and capacity, and prioritise effort.*" [35] (p. 12)

In recent years, in tandem with this wave of critical analysis of UK climate policy, we have seen the emergence and spread of a bottom-up movement for debate and institutional development concerning local governance of climate policy, in the absence of the called-for framework for national–local orchestration of net zero strategy and adaptation plans. The Place-Based Climate Action Network (PCAN, https://pcancities.org.uk, accessed 12 October 2021) has developed in recent years in the UK as a new force in climate governance, entirely initiated by local government and governance actors (notably universities) and based on the establishment of cross-sectoral local Climate Commissions as orchestrators and coordinators of climate strategies and projects at the local level [24,39]. The PCAN network began with a core of major cities (Leeds, Edinburgh, and Belfast) and has since expanded to include smaller metropolitan areas (Kirklees and Croydon); a major region (Yorkshire and Humberside in the north of England); and several counties spanning towns, suburbs and large rural areas (Surrey, Essex, and Cambridgeshire).

As we note below in Section 1.2, the emergence of the PCAN network and the widespread demands for a coherent framework to enable local climate action within a national strategy have highlighted a persistent theme in local climate governance over the past three decades: the way in which local actors have frequently developed policy in the absence of a clear framework from national government, or in the face of national leaders' opposition to climate action (as in the case of the USA under President Trump [47]). Where a framework for national–local shared planning, implementation and orchestration is missing, then piecemeal or coordinated bottom-up governance arrangements have emerged. Drawing on Patterson [48], we term this approach *'compensatory'* and *improvisational re-making* of institutions for climate action. The development of the still-patchy network of Climate Commissions at the local level in the UK is a case in point.

The changing policy context in the UK raises important questions about the design and implementation of effective institutions and processes for local climate governance. What should these be like? What seems to work well in new emergent systems for local governance of climate action? We suggest that the changes exemplified by the PCAN network and related initiatives [24] are signs that the UK is experiencing the beginning of what Patterson [48] terms institutional remaking for climate action:

'*the activities by which agents intentionally develop political institutions in anticipation of, or in response to, institutional weaknesses and failures*' [48] (p. 25).

We reflect further on this point in Section 1.2 below, and then consider in detail emerging results from our current research into recent and prospective developments in local climate governance in the English county of Surrey, a local government area covering towns, extensive suburban zones, and rural districts. In particular, we describe work in progress in mapping and understanding such institutional remaking at the smallest scale of local government and governance in England, the town and parish level.

## *1.2. Understanding Local Climate Governance*

As noted above, there is by now a large, rich and complex literature on climate governance from global to local scales. Valuable overviews of the field can be found in [2,5,6,9,13,21]. It is beyond our scope to reflect on more than a few elements of the literature that shed light on our research goal, that of exploring the emergence of microlocal institutions for climate action in a case study area in southern England. Below, we highlight briefly the following themes from the literature and use them to set the scene for our discussion of case study findings:


There is a substantial literature on the concepts and realisation in practice of multilevel governance (MLG) and polycentric governance (PG) in relation to climate action in particular and sustainability more generally (see, for example, [6,12,13,27]). Both concepts seek to represent the role and interaction of multiple levels and centres of policy making, implementation, coordination and agenda setting, recognising that systemic problems of the kind posed by climate change cannot be handled at one master level of government or via one mode of governance (i.e., the cooperation of governmental bodies with stakeholder organisations across sectors in problem definition, management and implementation of policies). They also have affinities with the ideal type concept of subsidiarity, in which functions are devolved to the most local level consistent with effective policy and decision making for the issue at stake. MLG and PG approaches recognise that climate change is a systemic challenge that has impacts at every scale from global to micro-local, and that must be governed accordingly in a flexible and multi-scalar way. They point to the need for new or adapted forms of 'orchestration' between institutions at the international, national and lower scales, to coordinate climate policy and achieve the goals established in global agreements on climate [1,49]. Research and policy questions then arise concerning what arrangements are being tried; what works and what does not; and what normative analysis can be made of what we ought to do for climate governance at multiple scales across sectors and levels of government.

Heinen et al. [6] offer a comprehensive review of the debates and distinctions offered concerning MLG and PG. We concur with their analysis, which suggests that the concepts have emerged from distinctive intellectual traditions (American and European approaches to governance) and that they have been used more or less interchangeably by many researchers: "As climate governance researchers draw on the intellectual foundations of both perspectives, it has been increasingly difficult to clearly distinguish between both concepts despite their different origins." [6] (p. 10). Heinen et al.'s [6] analysis of the literature generates a framework in which commonalities between MLG and PG become apparent and more significant than the distinctions offered by analysts. In effect, they propose a merger of MLG and PG perspectives. The common features in these perspectives are identified as follows by Heinen et al. [6] (p. 2 and p. 10):


Drawing on Heinen et al. [6], and given the entanglement of MLG and PG perspectives, we propose to use 'multi-level governance' as a term that spans both these concepts as they have developed in the literature. MLG refers not only to the formal statutory constitutional levels of government (central and local in the case of England, for example) but also to the 'horizontal' governance relations of collaboration with other bodies (such as multi-sector strategic partnerships) and to the 'vertical' relationships between tiers of government. Accordingly, we will present our case study of Surrey as one MLG in the face of climate challenges.

We turn now to the second major theme we wish to highlight from the literature: the constraints and problems affecting emergent institutions for climate governance. One important aspect of the debates over MLG, PG and climate governance is that, so far, climate policy in toto has been a failure, given the rise in global emissions despite multiple pledges and policy measures, and that the emergence of local governance innovations for climate action has been to a large degree based on frustration at the absence of effective policy and multi-level cooperation. Harris [5] identifies multiple sources of what he terms 'pathologies' in climate governance at the international and national scales. Stoddard et al. [26] review and attempt to explain the collective international and national failures to 'bend the curve' of greenhouse gas emissions and put the world on course for meeting the Paris Accord goals and keeping global average temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C. Parry et al. [25] analyse the extraordinary scale of subsidies from governments for fossil fuel interests worldwide. The power of established fossil fuel industries and their supporters and clients in governments and other bodies, and country-specific barriers to action rooted in national politics and economic path dependency, generate multiple interacting 'pathologies' [5] that have meant that, so far, international and national climate governance and political programmes for decarbonisation have been seriously compromised and have failed to stop the rise in emissions, let alone to reduce them at the global scale.

It is in this context that many high-profile local climate governance initiatives have emerged, whether at thr horizontal international level (as with for example the C40 network of cities, the R20 network of regional governments, and the ICLEI network of local authorities for sustainability) or at the local level within countries. The development of such collaborations and orchestrating institutions has taken place not only out of a positive impetus for making a contribution at the local and regional levels to climate action, but out of frustration at the failures of national governments and international actors to live up to their agreed goals for serious decarbonisation policies. See, for example, this statement from ICLEI [50] in the wake of the Rio + 20 conference on sustainable development in 2012:

"*We now see that all the good will, energy, brain capacity and money that went into the Rio + 20 process have resulted in dozens of pages of paper, which contain hardly any commitment by governments. Instead, national governments reaffirm what they had already resolved long ago, list non-binding intentions, and acknowledge the activities by other actors such as local governments. It remains unclear who should be in charge and accountable for taking decisions on the transformative actions needed, and for rapid implementation. Do cities have to step in where governments are failing to take effective action? Cities are cooperating internationally without borders, without customs, without military forces. They can address the issues of the future without the global power play that we see going on at inter- governmental level. We have once more seen governments defending national interests rather than working together on a common global agenda. We suspect that the mechanisms, rules and routines of international diplomacy are outdated and incapable of designing and bringing about a sustainable future.*" [50].

Similar comments can be found from leading figures in the C40 Cities movement and other networks over the past decade, expressing dismay and frustration at inaction from national governments. Many leaders at this scale also present local governance bodies (above all, cities—see, for example, [51]) as the main agents of meaningful and responsible strategies and policy implementation for climate change mitigation and adaptation. However, despite the framing of local action as dynamic and innovative, as in the ICLEI statement above, it is clear that the development of many new local climate governance networks and institutions has been a unilateral response to MLG failures at 'higher' levels of policy making, and thus a *compensatory,* and far from optimal, partial governance innovation.

In this context, it is important to explore the emergent forms of local climate governance not only as potentially valuable innovations but also as developments that have been shaped faute de mieux by frustrated and determined local agents—not that local enthusiasm is any guarantee of coherent and capable follow-through in climate policy and effective governance innovations [38]. Patterson's [48] concept of institutional remaking is helpful in approaching the analysis of local emerging governance forms. This framework emphasises and offers a set of evaluative categories for description and assessment of local institutional forms that are evolving to cope with climate change and with the constraints and opportunities available in a given political and policy making context (see Table 1 below).


#### **Table 1.** Evaluation categories for institutional remaking [48].

Source: [48].

Patterson's definition of institutional remaking reflects the importance of considering the evolution of climate governance as a process of improvisation and (re)invention of institutions in the face of constraining or failing wider institutional frameworks:

"*Institutional remaking is defined here as: the activities by which agents intentionally develop political institutions in anticipation of, or in response to, institutional weaknesses and failures* ... *The term 'remaking' encompasses both the 'making' of new elements and the 'remaking' of existing elements, while emphasising that this (almost always) occurs within an existing (possibly already crowded) institutional setting [48] (p. 25), emphasis in original)*".

This approach seems to fit well with our and others' analysis of the conditions of UK local governance in the face of climate change and of the development of national climate policy without a clear account of how it relates to the rest of the multi-level government system in the UK and to stakeholders in local governance. We return to this point in our concluding discussion below.

The third theme we highlight from the literature is the lack of research to date on the micro-level of local climate governance. As noted above, the literature is dominated by studies of national, city and urban municipal governance, and there is much less attention to the smallest scales of local government and their partners in governance; a surprising situation considering the work of Ostrom [27,52,53] and the development of polycentric governance theory. In the multi-level system of the UK the parish and town council, and associated networks, constitute the lowest level of governance. We suggest that this is a potentially important level to investigate, as at the smallest scale of governance there is in principle a higher level of trust, contact and scope for civic engagement between citizens and representatives, and potentially a significant channel for transmission of information, practices and lessons learned between levels and actors in a multi-level governance system. We also suggest that in a multi-level or polycentric system, the kinds of problems affecting relations between national and sub-regional actors may be reproduced in new forms between the latter and the micro-level—as in the UK context, between county and district authorities on the one hand and their parish and town authorities on the other. We would expect to find evidence of Patterson's [48] institutional remaking in response, with new forms emerging at the micro-local level as well as among sub-regional levels (county and district/borough).

In light of this background analysis, this paper draws on an on-going research project that seeks to understand how sub-regional multi-level governance of urban and rural areas is adapting to climate change pressures and takes a case study approach to evaluate this within an English county (Surrey). The work maps the climate actions of Surrey's urban and rural councils following the UK's declaration of a national climate emergency in May 2019. Further, the analysis uses deductive coding, developed from the literature, to evaluate action by the various tiers of government and the change drivers underlying this activity. This allows us to consider the following questions: at the micro-local level is there evidence of collaboration and orchestration of governance; are we witnessing the remaking of institutions as suggested by Patterson [48]; and if micro-level climate governance is present does it conform to the features of MLG and PG outlined by Heinen et al. [6]. The implications of micro-level climate change governance are considered further in the discussion.

## **2. Materials and Methods**

To address the questions raised in the introduction above, a case study research approach was considered appropriate due to the exploratory and explanatory nature of the work and as the knowledge base is still in development [54], with only limited research as yet into multi-level governance of climate crisis in the UK at the regional and local scales. The research aimed to map action by each tier of government within the selected area from May 2019 to the most recent point at which data were available. This would provide information that helped identify which governance bodies had declared climate emergencies, the type of action undertaken, and equally importantly highlight those who had taken little or no action.

This study has taken as its unit of analysis the climate action undertaken at different levels of sub-national government within one UK county, Surrey. The county provides a mixed peri-urban and rural area of some 1.2 million residents in the South-East of England, on the southern border of Greater London. Surrey is governed through multiple tiers of councils, a structure that is representative of many UK counties. The county council oversees the entire area, and within the county there are 11 borough or district councils and below this tier a range of town and parish councils. Surrey has no large cities but there are several significant towns, and a large part of the county is rural. Whilst mapping all Surrey Borough and District Council and sub-district government activity would provide an immensely rich and interconnected view of climate change action in Surrey, this was not feasible within the timeframe of the research. Instead it was decided to focus on one Borough, that of Waverley (see Appendix A for details of all councils within the study area).

Waverley was selected as an example of a mixed urban-rural area, with high emissions. The borough covers 345.2 km<sup>2</sup> and is, along with several other Surrey boroughs, highly prosperous overall, and ranked second in the UK in a recent think-tank ranking of affluence [55]. It has 121,572 residents [56]. Recent carbon footprint baseline work [57] by the University of Surrey for the independent Surrey Climate Commission identified Waverley emitting 522 ktCO2 in 2018, approximately 9% of the country's overall emissions. Emissions attributable to commuting and use of 'other' fuels are higher in this borough than any other, but its rural nature also supports one of the highest levels of carbon sequestration [58] The borough is divided into 21 civil parishes, of which three are town councils and the remainder are represented by parish councils (See Annex A for list). The three towns have a combined urban population of 78,118, with the smallest town having a population of 16,000. By contrast, the parish councils in Waverley represent much smaller numbers: the smallest has 185 residents, whereas there are over 11,000 people in the parish of Cranleigh [56]. Most parishes are rural. Waverley ranks highly on measures of social capital, both in terms of family and social networks as well as exhibiting trust in institutions and suggesting high levels of civic engagement [55].

Data for analysis were derived from council minutes, population statistics [59,60] and the nature of the council area in terms of its urban, urban/rural or rural nature. Council minutes were selected as suitable for this exploratory phase as they offered a standardized form of reporting on council activity, at all tiers. Indeed, all council types are required by UK law [61,62] to publish minutes of formal meetings not later than one month after the date of the meeting. Minutes and supporting documents are available for at least six years after publication [61], and whilst still available in paper format most are digitised. Such minutes offer detailed and factual notes which were easily accessible online. However, it should also be noted that the depth of information recorded can vary that such minutes are likely to exhibit a level of reporting bias and omissions [55]. Full council meetings and, where available, relevant sub-committees' minutes at each tier of government were utilised. All councils within this review had websites and provided online open access to all council minutes, with the exception of Peper Harow, the smallest parish in the sample. Due to the difficulties of accessing paper copies during the COVID period Peper Harow is not included in the analysis. Frequency of council meetings varies from monthly, often excluding August, to bi-monthly. More specific committees such as transport, health finance or planning were not reviewed, although these topics were frequently covered at sub-county council meetings. The mapping exercise defined the timescale over which the area is being studied. Whilst a national climate emergency had been declared in May 2019 the starting point for more detailed review was based on the slightly later climate emergency declaration by Surrey County Council in July 2019 [58]. The end date of the longitudinal study was April 2021, the last date for which minutes were available during our research period.

All minutes were read in full to ensure that all relevant text was identified, an important issue where climate change material is characterised by multiple key words, across many issues. Local parish websites and online news articles were additionally reviewed and where climate change was highlighted the text was also recorded. All text was logged, firstly in Microsoft Excel and then transposed into Nvivo (Version 12) for further textual analysis. During the mapping phase all text was categorised by nature of the activity, and these categories are presented in Table 2. The output from this work was a Microsoft Excel table (Table 2) providing a longitudinal analysis of the nature of climate action by county council, Waverley Borough and all town and parish councils within this borough. It should also be noted that to improve the presentation of the material rather than reference the minutes of each council within the text, the online source of the material is acknowledged in Appendix C.

To provide a richer understanding of the underlying drivers or nature of climate action, further textual analysis was undertaken using Nvivo 12 to support a deductive coding process. Deductive codes were drawn from the literature and a coding structure is provided in Appendix B. All resulting material was then assessed by both researchers and the findings discussed and evaluated.

#### **3. Results**

Council minutes were successfully accessed for all councils within the unit of analysis. Of the 23 councils comprising this case study, 73% of the councils included climate change issues within their meeting records, with five parish councils making no reference to climate change (see Table 2). Only 45% of councils are observed taking any climate action. Both the County Council and Borough Council record a wide range of activity, creating climate strategies, taking action, collaborating and developing action plans. Waverley also appear provide a key dissemination function in providing parishes with Borough Council climate action, with more than 60% of the parishes noting this in their minutes. It is clear that links to County Council work on climate are much more limited at this sub-borough level, with only three parishes detailing this in their notes. Only one, Cranleigh, mentions national government, and this shortly after the declaration of the national climate emergency. Similar to the Borough, the minutes of all three town councils suggest they are strongly engaged with the issue, although the records from Farnham suggest lower activity levels than their peers. We observe five parishes who have primarily incorporated climate into sub-committee work, are taking action, communicating climate change and collaborating with others. Two parishes have taken limited action, or worked more collaboratively with more climate active parish councils. Finally, five parishes have recorded a discussion of climate change in the context of updates from the Borough or County Council representative but appear to have taken no action. There is no indication in council minutes that the work being undertaken is attempting to achieve specific local goals, co-ordinated horizontally across peer groups or vertically at different governance levels. This includes direct contributions towards the achievement of the Waverley Boroughs Climate Action plan.

## *3.1. General Observations*

The longitudinal nature of the data provides insight into the flow of information and timescale of engagement. The results of the analysis confirm that the county council, borough and town councils all declared climate emergencies within four months of the UK Government's national declaration, with only two parish councils since taking a similar stance (see Table 2). As highlighted in Section 1.1, such declarations are not mandated by government but represent a response to local stimuli, either internal or external to the council. Whilst it is clear in Table 2 that the first COVID lockdown forced a pause in activity, those councils most engaged with the subject have continued to embed climate activity, at a range of scales, within their policy processes.

For parish councils, Waverley Borough Council members appear to be a main source of climate governance information, with climate emergency declarations being included in their briefings to the local parish councils in the period September–December 2019. Updates were then undertaken in 2020 at the launch of their carbon neutrality action plan, even though recognising that 'targets are still thin and costs lacking' (Dunsfold PC). National climate action receives little mention, with only Cranleigh parish council highlighting the government climate emergency declaration in July 2019. Similarly, few councils mention the work of Surrey County Council in relation to climate policy. The three town councils have no direct climate change references to other governmental sources.

*Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 13817

Appendix C for links to source materials).


## *3.2. Size of Governance Unit*

Much of the work on polycentric governance highlights the importance of ground-up, local initiatives generating collective action [63]; yet this exploratory study suggests that a small population may not generate public body-led action. Based on Table 2 councils were ranked as high, low, information-only or none in terms of the governance activity they have undertaken since the UK National climate emergency declaration. As is clear from the categorisation of activity these categories do not indicate effective climate outcomes. Due to the difference in population size and governance structure, town and parish councils were represented separately. The results, illustrated in Table 3, suggest there may be an alignment between population size and the level of climate governance activity (see Annex A for council by size ranking). Here, the divide appears to be less about urban and urban/rural council areas. We also see at least two councils with small populations ostensibly outperforming other larger population areas.

**Table 3.** Towns and councils by level of climate governance activity.


When level of climate governance activity is plotted across Waverley Borough parishes (see Figure 1), we see two geographical clusters emerging. Godalming, which declared a climate emergency in July 2019 and is highly active, forms an intersection between the two areas of high/low activity.

**Figure 1.** Levels of climate governance activity by parish.

This may suggest that smaller parishes such as Churt (PC10) and Thursley (PC15) in Cluster 1 may be influenced or supported by neighbouring parishes into greater activity than population size trends would indicate. Here, we may be witnessing an example of co-ordination or collaboration at a horizontal level. In contrast, in Cluster 2, Bramley (PC3) and Ewhurst and Ewell (PC7) are not performing as strongly as would be expected in

terms of their population size. Further assessment of the minutes was then undertaken to further draw out any indication of collaborative working. From this, a more nuanced picture emerges.

#### *3.3. Knowledge Acquisition and Local Collaboration*

Whilst minutes of council meetings are not sufficient to draw out complex interactions and relationships between individuals, this on-going research has been able to identify several routes by which inter-council collaboration and knowledge exchange have occurred.

Waverley Borough Council was seen by parish and town council members as a local leader, with their proposal of a 2030 net zero target (Haslemere TC) and their key role in dissemination of information. Leading councillors acknowledged a divide between small rural parish and town engagement and identified that 'it was important for the villages to be involved in the discussions rather than just the larger towns' (Waverley BC). Godalming and Cranleigh appear to be acting as local leaders at the sub-borough level. Godalming took an early lead in declaring a climate emergency, have set up working groups, and have taken action to offer financial support to local climate groups. Cranleigh has also been highly active in seeking external information and knowledge, looking to work with the University of Surrey, undertaking testing work on the University of Exeter carbon footprint tool, undertaking site visits and organising a Climate Change Event. Both of these councils have supported others in the borough, with Haslemere seeking guidance on criteria setting for environmental grants, a councillor providing information at a Churt PC meeting in February 2020 and Ewhurst linking to Cranleigh's repair café campaign (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2.** Collaborative engagement.

We also see the beginnings of engaged parishes beginning to develop collaborative working. As noted above, Cranleigh hosted an event delivered by the Centre for Sustainable Energy which involved local stakeholders from all tiers of Government. The discussion placed 'an emphasis upon the role of parish and town councils in enabling purchasing and behaviour change, drawing upon sustainable development goals' (Wonersh PC). The Churt PC representative noted a low attendance by neighbouring parishes but felt the event had led to 'a good dialogue with a councillor from Thursley PC who is actively engaging the public in Thursley' (Churt PC). More recently, a multi-parish environmental group has formed, something that was in discussion in March 2021, when minutes noted that councillors 'had spoken to Witley Parish Council who are in the early stages of their discussions on the matter but that a multi-parish collaboration arrangement had been discussed.' (Thursley PC).

Whilst it is clear that many of the parishes primarily rely on Waverley Borough Council for governance updates, councils across the borough appear to draw on their councillor's knowledge of external organisations for climate guidance and information. Rural parish councils exhibit strong links with biodiversity and land-based organisations, such as Plantlife, Butterfly Conservation and the Surrey Hills Management plan. Town and borough councils appear to reflect a more urban focus, with recommendations to seek information from the Energy Saving Trust and the Carbon Savings Trust on electric vehicles. Three organisations—the Friends of the Earth [63], the Centre for Sustainable Energy (CSE) and the Local Government Association—offer specific climate change guidance for subregional councils, with CSE holding a conference for the borough councillors, and then for clerks, in 2020. This localised approach-although events seem to have been poorly attended-was felt to offer valuable learning and opportunities for collaboration (Thursley PC) and new initiatives (Haslemere TC). The research also reveals council interaction with business as a source of knowledge, with councillors attending a presentation on zero carbon homes and others visiting the site of a biodigester and community composting.

Understanding the measurement of carbon and learning how to set baselines are much less explored in debates and exchanges at the parish and town levels. With the exception of the county council, only two councils in the Waverley area, Godalming TC and Cranleigh PC, have considered or implemented carbon footprinting. Cranleigh seems to have been particularly proactive, working with the University of Exeter as one of 170 parishes testing a new community carbon footprint tool; IMPACT [64]. They have additionally looked to the local University of Surrey for student support in developing their strategy.

Such engagement with academic and research institutions appears unusual at a subregional level, although the county council does include University experts in advisory boards and commissions research projects. More generally, Surrey County Council officers are working through the Surrey Association of Local Councils (SALC) and the professional body for council clerks (SLCC) 'to establish best practices protocols for reporting environmental implications of recommendations and setting baselines. (Surrey CC). It should also be noted that there was no indication of any online platform for sharing learnings or experience across the borough or county.

## *3.4. 'Wilful' Actors*

In trying to understand why parishes and boroughs have developed new forms of governance to support action on the climate emergency, our research, so far, suggests that 'wilful' actors have played a role. We define these as local policy actors who have initiated 'do-it-yourself' action in the absence of support, guidance or leadership from higher levels of governance: they can be seen as local agents in the institutional remaking process analysed by Patterson (2021) and noted above.

Three types of 'wilful' actors have been identified in the analysis to date:


Such actors attending meetings and putting pressure on councils to act appear to be most dynamic at a town and borough level.

The most frequently recorded actors of this kind are those representing environmental groups, most of which are specific to the area or act as local elements of global organisations. At the most local level, a newly formed residents environmental working group in Churt to Plastic Free Farnham and Plastic Free Godalming. Haslemere residents appear to be particularly active with representation from the Sustainable Business Initiative, a residents' group; and from the Haslemere Climate Alliance, Transition Haslemere and a representative from the Eco-Church movement of the Diocese of Guildford, all in favour of a climate emergency declaration. Extinction Rebellion members are linked with three council climate

debates, including Surrey County Council, which experienced extensive group pressure. In Godalming, council members were challenged by a member of Friends of the Earth on deployment of solar panels.

Independent resident voices appear less frequently, but certainly at a parish level are important, raising practical changes such the introduction of electric vehicle charging points and street lighting switch-off policies (Bramley PC). Residents attending council meetings in Farnham, Godalming and Haslemere supported climate emergency declarations, and in Haslemere were backed by a 600-signature petition. Less visible through council minutes are individual councillors who are not just interested and support climate change, but who push for action and drive change. This is seen particularly strongly in Churt, with the Parish Clerk inviting the Centre for Sustainable Energy to present to the Surrey parish clerks and in the development of a Climate net zero website for the parish by the Environment Portfolio holder. At a county level, the councillor representing the Green Party offers both support and challenge to Surrey County Council.

## *3.5. Finance*

The research identifies the importance placed by sub-regional councils on the role of the UK government in supporting climate change action; it is 'essential for central government to provide powers, funding and other resources' (Farnham TC). This is echoed at borough and county levels, aligned to concerns of local service trade-offs: 'to be able to secure funding from the government for this strategy rather than use funding that his currently supporting vulnerable Waverley residents' (Elstead PC). Our work, so far, on Surrey also indicates that, at the borough level, councils are lobbying local MPs to support 'the provision of necessary powers and resources to enable all UK local authorities to achieve carbon neutrality by 2030- (Waverley BC). At the county level, 'the Council's credibility on addressing climate change was dependent on significant investment, strengthened dialogue with Local Enterprise Partnerships and the Government' (Surrey CC). Surrey County Council officers have identified, through work by the University of Leeds and the University of Surrey, a requirement of approximately £1 billion in investments to enable the net zero transition and related environmental policies in the county (Surrey CC).

Even though local parishes have very limited budgets, there was at least one example of grant funding being allocated to tree planting, and other two parishes collaborated to raise over £20,000 for fire damage to a local heath. Both Godalming and Haslemere TC's have set up small green grant schemes, supporting carbon reduction projects and basing value for money on the amount of carbon saved per pound awarded. One small Godalming grant of £3000 for a cycle way feasibility study resulted in £200,000 of Strategic Community Infrastructure Levy funding to undertake the work. Waverley BC have incorporated carbon reduction requirements into their procurement process. Funding is being allocated at a county council level, such as £49 million for Surrey Ultra-low and Zero Emissions schemes, £32 million to remove polluting buses and £6.3 million for community transport. Concerning the County Council's £100 m Community Investment Fund launch, councillor feedback noted that the fund was to be used to support 'meaningful projects in local communities—not solely restricted to climate change' (Surrey CC). There was no indication whether or how funding would be allocated at a more localised level for parishes and towns, or for local networks.

## *3.6. Orchestration and Subsidiarity*

The research, so far, has found no examples that climate change governance was being orchestrated across the multiple tiers of councils reviewed. While Waverley Borough councillors did provide updates to parishes on the climate emergency, this did not appear to be linked to any management of response or action. Reference to the UK government's climate strategy was extremely limited, and this suggests that, at the sub-regional borough and parish levels, there is no element of subsidiarity in climate action. Even with some examples of collaborative activity, there is no indication that actions are being focused and coordinated to maximise impact.

#### **4. Discussion**

This research forms part of a wider on-going project on the remaking of local governance in the face of climate change, and offers an initial insight into the role and activities of multiple tiers of sub-national government, from county to micro-level government action on climate change in the UK. It sits within the policy context set by a national government which has had (so far) a highly centralised approach to climate change, with no binding targets or mandates on carbon reduction or climate action beyond the devolved nations of the UK (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) [65]. Additionally, its Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution [43] focuses primarily on top-down, techno-centric solutions. Indeed, recent submissions to the Environment Audit Committee of the House of Commons in the UK Parliament, for its inquiry into local government and net zero climate policy (July and August, 2021), emphasise the lack of a sub-national framework for net zero transition and of a long-term plan for local climate mitigation and adaptation funding. This is despite clear guidance from the Committee on Climate Change [42] and their acknowledgement that:

'*More than half of the emissions cuts needed rely on people and businesses taking up low-carbon solutions-decisions that are made at a local and individual level*'. [42] (p. 3).

From our findings to date based on parish, town, district and county council minutes in Surrey, we would concur that there is little evidence of sub-national climate action inspired and facilitated by national government. To put it another way, there remains little clarity about what the division of labour should be between different actors in the multi-level system in relation to climate action: the UK lacks a 'climate constitution' debate and process, although there is no lack of calls for such systematic thinking and action about national–local relations for climate policy [37–45].

We suggest that climate issues need to be understood within the broader concerns and problems, as noted in Section 1 above, concerning the overall relationship between central and sub-national governments in the UK [32]: the UK has an uneasy quasi-federal system based on devolution of powers to constituent sub-nations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), whose population and economic weight are dwarfed by England. The latter sub-nation has a multi-level local government system that lacks a regional tier of government and that is a patchwork of diverse sub-regional authorities and governance networks. The system is 'polycentric' in form but in practice highly centralised in resource generation and allocation [66]; it lacks a subsidiarity approach similar to that adopted as an ideal by the European Union, in which powers are devolved to the lowest level appropriate for effective policy making depending on policy domain.

We also failed to find, so far, any examples of systematic orchestration of climate action across the levels of local governance in the county. The gaps and weaknesses in the overall framework are criticised by local government and governance actors, pointing to centralism and lack of policy coherence. Such criticisms have been reiterated in relation to the centralisation of climate policy to date, and to its lack of attention to implementation of mitigation and adaptation at sub-national scales [24,37,38,42,44]. This critique is certain to be elaborated in a forthcoming report on local government's role in net zero policy making and delivery, from the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of Commons.

Pending changes in the wake of that report and similar calls for reform, and pending the UK Government's promised action plan for net zero, which might give some clarity about multi-level climate governance, local actors in areas such as Surrey have been 'remaking' institutional arrangements in the absence of substantial central guidance and support, and in the face of limited provision of information and time-limited grants. Government has provided modelled national statistics emissions data for counties and boroughs/districts so they can understand their carbon footprint but offered no target other than the national, legally binding, 2050 net zero goal [67]. As with Howarth [38], we found the primary focus of sub-county activity to be focused on mitigation actions only.

The UK Parliament's declaration of a climate emergency, whilst world leading and dramatic, did not create a legally binding commitment to comply or act, at any level of government. However, this action, and the accompanying publicity and activism, did seem to help prompt autonomous action at the local scale: in our research, we observe declarations of climate emergencies at multiple levels of sub-national government in Surrey, as a result of local decision making (see also [38]). Indeed, many of these were supported by the actions of local 'wilful actors'. Our case study reveals considerable action being undertaken at local and micro-local levels, with many town and parish councils independently taking steps to support climate goals. The analysis suggests, however, that many of these are working in isolation with little guidance on how they should act.

We also find only limited flows of information downwards across levels of government and even less flowing upwards from a parish level. Overall, sub-national actors such as the county council and districts and boroughs are critical of the lack of 'visibility' of climate guidance, resources and coherence above them in the governance hierarchy; and for microlevel actors the actions, division of labour and resources for climate policy are largely 'invisible' at the upper local scale as well as the national one. Problems of incoherence and lack of orchestration are thus repeated from one scale of relationships (national/county) to the others (county/district/micro-local), and independent action at the local scales is constrained by resources and capabilities.

All this is consistent with our analysis above of the nature of multi-level climate governance in the UK as a case of local institutional 'remaking' [48], in the face of both a policy imperative and a policy vacuum as to how climate policy is to be developed and implemented at sub-national scales. The remaking of existing processes and institutions and the creation of new ones are reflections both of urgency and local commitment on the one hand, and frustration on the other. As noted earlier, local climate governance in the current UK framework is largely *improvisatory and compensatory*, and with that comes risks of incoherence, ineffectual action and confusion. In particular, micro-local action, in the absence of clarity about tasks and resources, risks being ineffective and fragmented, for all the enthusiasm and energy we have detected in fieldwork in parish and town council networks.

Whilst there are nascent elements of promising multi-level climate governance, such as borough councils co-ordinating with parishes, town councils setting up funds (Godalming and Haslemere) and NGOs and business collaborating at a county level, current governance appears to be closer to the fragmented typology created by Pahl-Wostl and Knieper [68] which lacks the ordering and co-ordination [69] and distribution of power [68] needed for effective multi-level or polycentric governance.

In the absence of a clear and coherent division of policy labour within a multi-level framework, potential for action at county, district/borough and micro-local level is not likely to be harnessed and realised effectively and consistently. In particular, our research, so far, suggests that the county level and the borough are more active than the parish and town councils. At the micro-local level, our analysis suggests that this may be an issue of scale, but this needs to be investigated further as funding, capacity, regulatory alignment and other factors are also likely to play a role. We may also be observing differences between urban and rural interests and needs. Further work may give insights into what would constitute the most effective set of roles for micro-local actors and also the *limits* to their climate activities.

#### **5. Conclusions**

Climate governance—the development and implementation of coherent and effective policy for decarbonisation and adaptation by government actors and their governance partners at all levels from national to micro-local—is an emerging and, so far, ill-specified set of institutional forms in the UK. We have set out the context in which local climate governance arrangements are evolving in the UK, and related them to major themes in the literature on climate, multi-level governance and polycentrism.

It may be that the issues we have identified in local climate governance in our case study area have much wider resonance internationally, notably in similarly centralized states where local and regional actors lack adequate resources, recognition and clarity of division of labour concerning climate action. These issues raise questions of major concern for our theoretical and practical understandings of urgent and ambitious climate action within a multi-level governance framework. What would constitute an effective division of labour for climate action between national and sub-national levels? How can this be related to wider frameworks of governance for sustainability? What is the role in climate action of the sub-regional levels of governance, from (in the UK context) county to micro-local actors? What processes would generate a more effective orchestration of action? Additionally, what are the features of sub-national climate action in the absence of a systematic attempt at answering these questions by policy makers?

Whilst this study has been able to identify micro-level action, begin to understand some of the underlying causes and consider these within current theoretical approaches, it does have limitations. The use of council minutes offers only an imperfect insight into the motivations behind action, are likely to offer a level of bias within the reporting, and fail to capture all the work being undertaken at this sub-national level. It is also inherent within a case study approach that it remains difficult to generalize the findings beyond the area of study. Further research is needed to address the questions raised above. Our on-going research in the English county of Surrey indicates that a process of improvisatory and compensatory innovation is under way in climate governance at the level of the county, districts and boroughs, and among the micro-level bodies at the parish and town scales. This is consistent with Patterson's [48] analysis of the need for a 'remaking' of institutions for climate action in a context of wider institutional failure and inadequacy. We suggest that a wider programme of sub-regional research will shed further light on this uneven process across the UK, as local government bodies and their partners respond to the climate crisis in the absence of a clear multi-level 'settlement' that enables truly effective divisions of mitigation and adaption labour, and an approach to multi-level governance that plays to the strengths of each level of governance actors.

**Author Contributions:** All authors have been involved in the conceptualisation, research, development, writing and reviewing of this paper. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council through the Place-Based Climate Action Network (P-CAN) (Ref. ES/S008381/1).

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** The study was conducted according to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Ethical Review self-assessment process of the University of Surrey was followed.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

**Acknowledgments:** We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through the Place- based Climate Action Network (PCAN).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

## **Appendix A**

**Table A1.** Multi-level government in Surrey: the case of Waverley district.



**Table A1.** *Cont.*

## **Appendix B**

**Table A2.** NVIVO Coding utilised for the review of council minutes.



## **Table A2.** *Cont.*

## **Appendix C**

**Table A3.** Acknowledgement of the source of council minutes.


## **References**


## *Article* **Assessing City Governance for Low-Carbon Mobility in London**

**Paul Drummond**

UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources, Central House, London WC1H 0NN, UK; p.drummond@ucl.ac.uk

**Abstract:** City-level decisions are crucial for delivering a low carbon transition, particularly as urban population dynamics and environments change in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ensuring appropriate governance structures, mechanisms and resources to facilitate these decisions is therefore essential. Based on a systematic literature review by van der Heijden (2019), this paper develops a simple framework to assess the state of ten enabling factors for effective urban climate governance, and applies it to low-carbon passenger mobility in London. Drawing on documentary evidence and a series of semi-structured expert interviews, it finds that London's city authorities have a strong capacity for autonomy, stakeholder participation, local leadership and coordination on climate action and mobility, of which they make extensive use. The national legal and political framework remains broadly supportive following the UK's departure from the EU, but multi-level co-ordination is thin, and funding issues have intensified conflict over political jurisdiction since the pandemic began. Spatial variation in urban form and infrastructure, coupled with dual-layer city administration, complicate the socio-political landscape and drive for climate action in mobility.

**Keywords:** climate change; local government; climate governance; urban transport

## **1. Introduction**

Following existing nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, warming is projected to reach 2.6 ◦C by the end of the century, with a lack of practical implementation increasing this to 2.9 ◦C [1]. Although this represents progress, these values remain well above stated goals. In the absence of sufficient action by national decision makers, attention has been increasingly turning to sub-national actors to lead the low-carbon transition, and in particular, those in city governance. This sits alongside other areas of environmental concern and human development in which city-level governance is central, such as tackling air pollution and delivering Sustainable Development Goal 11.

In recent years, a wide literature examining urban climate governance has emerged, with insights across four key research themes systematically reviewed and synthesised by van der Heijden (2019) [2]. One theme concerns the factors that enable effective urban climate governance, from which the author derived a list of eight primary, interacting elements. This paper develops a framework to assess the state of an expanded list of enabling factors in cities and applies it to London, with a focus on the transition to lowcarbon passenger mobility in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Section 2 first presents a brief overview of the enabling factors presented by van der Heijden (2019) [2] and the wider literature, before describing the assessment framework derived from them, and the method used to apply it. Section 3 presents the result of the application of this framework to low-carbon passenger mobility in London. Section 4 concludes.

## **2. Materials and Methods**

## *2.1. Literature Review*

This paper draws (and expands) on eight "enabling factors" for effective urban climate governance derived and synthesised by van der Heijden (2019) [2] from his review of 260 articles published between 2009 and 2018. These factors are briefly summarised in

**Citation:** Drummond, P. Assessing City Governance for Low-Carbon Mobility in London. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 2480. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/su13052480

Academic Editor: David Tyfield

Received: 1 February 2021 Accepted: 23 February 2021 Published: 25 February 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

Figure 1 (dark green boxes). Van der Heijden (2019) [2] suggests no hierarchy between these factors, and a lack of distinct boundaries, with close interrelation between them. He also notes that they are not exhaustive. For this paper, I consider two additional factors, to provide a broader foundation for analysis (light green boxes in Figure 1).

**Figure 1.** Expanded list of enabling factors for effective climate governance.

The first additional factor is *conducive urban form and infrastructure*. The form of the urban environment strongly influences resource consumption and environmental impact; e.g., large, unicentric cities with low population densities, are likely to have a higher per capita footprint than smaller, polycentric and more densely populated cities—particularly with regard to urban mobility [3–5]. Inherited infrastructure such as metro lines and pavements, or their absence, may also raise or reduce hurdles to different behaviours. The form of a city may thus shape the challenge it faces to deliver decarbonisation, and mediate the transition to achieve it [6]. The second additional factor is *societal pressure*; if the city population is in favour of climate action, measures are more likely to be proposed and successfully introduced. This factor was used by van der Heijden, Luckmann and Cherkasheva—in addition to the original eight—to guide their assessment of the state of urban climate governance in Moscow and Saint Petersburg [7].

Frameworks for assessing the state of city-level governance for other environmental concerns (such as water and waste), for assessing particular strategies for urban climate action, or for climate change adaptation and resilience, have all been developed and applied in the literature (e.g., [8–10]). However, a framework to assess the broad state of urban governance for greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, building on a thorough assessment of critical factors, has yet to be developed.

## *2.2. Assessment Framework*

The assessment framework developed and employed by this paper qualitatively scores each of the ten enabling factors presented above, through two inter-related lenses. The first lens assesses the Capacity of a city to take advantage of the enabling factors, and reflects circumstances both within and outside its control. The second lens assesses the extent to which Action has been taken by city authorities to exploit this capacity to drive the transition. Each enabling factor is awarded a Capacity score using a straight-forward four point scale of "weak", "moderately weak", "moderately strong" and "strong", following Sovacool and Van de Graaf [11]. Seven of the ten factors are also provided an Action score with the same scale, with the remaining three—*Supportive political and legal context, Conducive urban form and infrastructure* and *Societal pressure*—considered contextual factors, within which the city authorities must operate but cannot easily influence or adjust (at least in the short term). Assigning an Action score to these factors would thus not be appropriate. Table 1 presents the broad criteria applicable to the scores for each lens, for each factor.


**Table 1.** Score descriptors for enabling factors and assessment lenses.


**Table 1.** *Cont.*

## *2.3. Method*

The evidence for ascribing scores is drawn from a range of documentary evidence (e.g., legislation, publications by city, national and other authorities, independent reports), and from a series of expert interviews. The interviews took place in September 2020, and were semi-structured around eleven guiding questions to allow free-ranging discussion. The guiding questions focused on each of the enabling factors, and on the role and impact

of the COVID-19 pandemic and measures to mitigate it. The questions are presented in Appendix A. Interviewee responses are anonymised, to allow participants free expression regardless of affiliation.

Table 2 describes the type of interviewees, and assigns each a code. In Section 3, specific quotes or insights from the interviewees are labelled using these codes. For clarity, "City authority" refers to bodies within the Greater London Authority or London boroughs, or their representatives.


**Table 2.** Coded list of expert interviewees.

Note: NGO = Non-governmental organisation.

I apply the assessment framework to the governance of low-carbon passenger mobility in London with respect to tackling CO2 emissions. This includes any mode of land-based passenger transport in the city, and excludes journeys that begin or end substantially outside its boundaries (e.g., intercity road, rail and aviation). Water/marine transport are excluded. Governance factors that target other environmental issues associated with passenger mobility, such as local air pollution, are included only where there is a substantial and clearly positive overlap with CO2 emissions. Scores for each enabling factor and lens are given in parentheses in section headings.

#### **3. Results**

Greater London (London, hereafter) covers 1569 km2, has a population of 9 million, and produces a quarter of the UK's GDP [12]. A further 1 million people regularly commuted to London to work between 2015 and 2017 [13]. Transport accounted for around a quarter of London's CO2 emissions in 2017, with private cars responsible for nearly half of this. Private cars, public transport and active transport each accounted for around a third of daily trips in 2018 (Figure 2).

At the height of COVID-19 restrictions in April 2020, road traffic reduced to below 50% of usual levels, whilst bus and London Underground travel decreased over 80% and 95%, respectively. Although by October 2020 road traffic had recovered, bus and Underground travel remained at over 40% and 60% below usual levels. Weekday cycling remained largely stable throughout the pandemic, with increased activity at weekends [16].

**Figure 2.** (**a**) CO2 emissions from all transport in London; (**b**) Annual average share of passenger transport mode by trip in London (Data sources: [14,15]).

#### *3.1. Supportive Political and Legal Context (Moderately Strong)*

As its capital city, London is within the jurisdiction of the UK government. The UK's 2008 Climate Change Act required the government to reduce territorial GHG emissions by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. In 2019, this was increased to net-zero emissions. The Act also introduces "carbon budgets"; successive five-yearly "caps" on emissions that reduce over time. The government must publish strategies for achieving these budgets. The most recent of these is the Clean Growth Strategy (CGS), published in October 2017 (prior to the net-zero target), which stated that "almost every car and van will need to be zero emission by 2050" [17] (p. 85) In November 2020, the government announced that that a ban on new petrol and diesel cars will take effect from 2030, and hybrids from 2035 [18].

Until 31st December 2020, the UK was subject to the political and legal framework of the European Union (EU), after which all EU legislation remains, or was translated into, UK domestic law. At the time of writing in early 2021, no deviations from such legislation have been introduced. Key EU requirements include fleet-average CO2 intensity regulations on passenger cars and point-of-sale labels presenting information on fuel consumption, CO2 emissions and running costs. In the UK, new cars are also subject to purchase taxes according to CO2 intensity (under vehicle excise duty—VED), ranging from zero (for zeroemission vehicles), to GBP 2175. Thereafter, annual ownership taxes are zero for electric vehicles (EVs), and GBP 150 for gasoline and diesel cars [19]. Purchase subsidies of 35% (up to GBP 3000) for cars with CO2 emissions < 50 g CO2/km, and GBP 7500 for zero-emission capable (ZEC) taxis, are available [20]. Excise (fuel) duty comprises around half total retail prices for gasoline and diesel, although the rate has been frozen in nominal terms since 2010. The reported average CO2 intensity of all new cars in the UK decreased by 17% in 2009–2019 [21], although this is subject to widely reported discrepancies between emissions in test and real-world conditions [22].

The government seeks to "develop one of the best electric vehicle infrastructures in the world" [23], with a policy framework that includes capital grants for domestic, on-street and workplace charging installations [24]. The principal instrument for low-carbon public transport is the Ultra-Low Emission Bus (ULEB) Scheme, a GBP 48 million fund for local authorities to purchase ULEBs and infrastructure. A Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy published in 2017 committed GBP 1.2 billion to associated infrastructure and initiatives to 2021 [25], although a report to Parliament in February 2020 concluded that although committed funding had since doubled to GBP 2.4bn, progress was insufficient [26]. In July 2020, the Government committed an additional GBP 2bn over 2020–2025, setting a target for walking and cycling to be "the natural first choice for many journeys with half of all journeys in towns and cities being cycled or walked by 2030" [27] (p. 12).

The UK's political and legal framework is broadly supportive of low-carbon mobility, however, it "doesn't seem as if all the policies are following through" (LI-5) to achieve stated goals, with "decarbonisation not coherently structured through all policies" (LI-8). Policy on passenger vehicles is generally positive (LI-1 and 6), particularly with the 2030 ban on new gasoline and diesel cars, but the UK is "really lacking in policy to promote active travel, and to encourage public transport use" (LI-3). LI-3, 4 and 7 highlighted that investment in public transport and active travel is dwarfed by the planned GBP 27bn investment in road infrastructure to 2025. Reflecting on the historic role of the EU, LI-8 believed that it remains "relevant through the legacy that has been created", although LI-3 felt that it provided "little more [than] strategic level commitments". LI-7 believes that "since the crisis hit, the government has talked more loudly and more assertively about walking and cycling than we have ever seen any government do", with LI-3 stating that "there does seem to be a real appetite for change, driven by Covid". However, LI-5 cautioned that although this momentum may "put us back on the path" to appropriate support for active travel, "it remains to be seen if this opportunity will be fully grabbed". LI-8 believes that although the national framework is broadly supportive, as it must cater to different regions, it is set at "not quite the lowest common denominator, but more of an average, which offers a number of constraints to more ambitious areas", although they qualify that London has governance arrangements to bypass this that other regions do not. They also believe a fundamental issue to be that the government and civil service "thinks very much in modal terms, and about modes only in competition", rather than their complementarities, in contrast with the approach taken in many other European countries.

## *3.2. Autonomy*

## 3.2.1. Capacity (Strong)

London is administered by the Greater London Authority (GLA), which consists of the executive Mayor of London and the 25-member London Assembly, both directly elected by the London public every four years. The Assembly scrutinises the mayor's plans, budgets and decisions, and may amend them by a two-thirds majority. The GLA shares administration with 33 local government districts (32 London boroughs, and the City of London—hereafter the boroughs). According to the GLA Act 1999, the principal purposes of the GLA are to promote economic development and wealth creation, social development, and the environment in Greater London. The mayor also has a duty to promote and encourage safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services to, from and within London, and must publish the Mayor's Transport Strategy (MTS) to fulfil this duty. The mayor is required to publish six other strategies, including a London Environment Strategy (LES), which must include policies to mitigate climate change, and a spatial development strategy (the "London Plan"). The Act states that the government may only intervene where strategies are inconsistent with national policy, but the government may issue guidance to the mayor for energy and climate policy specifically. The current guidance "encourages the Mayor to innovate, and, where this is possible and reasonable, go further than national policy" [28].

Transport for London (TfL) is a statutory corporation that exists primarily to implement the MTS, and related duties of the mayor. It is responsible for London's public transport infrastructure and services, including buses, the London Underground, Docklands Light Railway (DLR), London Overground, TfL Rail, London Trams, river services, the Santander Cycles hire scheme, the regulation and licensing of taxis and private hire services, and the Transport for London Road Network (TLRN)—major roads that make up around 5% of London's road network by length, but carry around 30% of its traffic. TfL is governed by a board appointed by the mayor, who may also issue guidance and directions as to how TfL exercises its functions [29,30].

The boroughs are usually led directly by elected councillors, who in turn elect a council leader from among their number. However, four boroughs elect an executive mayor for a four-year term, and who may choose a cabinet of councillors. The borough councils provide the majority of local services, including managing 95% of London's roads, parking enforcement, and acting as the statutory Local Planning Authority [31]. The GLA Act requires boroughs to publish a "Local Implementation Plan" (LIP) to implement the MTS. The mayor must approve each LIP, and may issue guidance for their production. All English Local Planning Authorities must produce a "Local Plan" for spatial development following national planning priorities. For London boroughs, local plans must also conform to the London Plan.

Local government in England is primarily funded from Council Tax and the Business Rate Retention Scheme (BRRS). Council Tax is levied on residential properties based on their value. Local authorities may increase rates, but if this exceeds 2% annually, a local referendum must be held. In London, the GLA also sets a "precept"; a "top-up" rate on council taxes that boroughs collect for the GLA. The BRRS allows local authorities to retain up to 50% of the increase in local revenue generated from national business rates, levied on the occupation of non-domestic property, in exchange for a reduction in direct government funding (which provides much of the remaining local authority funds). In 2018, London joined a national trial for 100% retention in exchange for the removal of the remaining "GLA Transport Grant" provided by the Department for Transport (DfT) to part-fund TfL. This grant had already decreased substantially, from more than GBP 2.8 billion in 2012 to less than GBP 230 million in 2017 [32]. Its removal meant that TfL became one of the only transport authorities in the world to receive no government support for its day-to-day operations (a position altered in practice since the onset of the pandemic, discussed below).

The GLA Act allows TfL to charge for services (with rates set by the mayor), and allows TfL or boroughs (with mayoral approval) to establish road pricing. Revenue must cover the costs of operation, with profits used to support the MTS. Such powers are additional to usual local authority powers, including the ability to designate parking zones and charge for their use. TfL may acquire, develop, sell or lease land, and to provide funds to third parties for activities that contribute to TfL's objectives. Local authorities in England (both the GLA and boroughs in London) may impose a Community Infrastructure Levy on new developments to fund local infrastructure [33], with certain authorities (including the GLA) able to introduce a Business Rate Supplement (BRS) to fund projects to promote economic development. All English local authorities (including the GLA, but also its functional bodies, such as TfL) may borrow funds within national guidelines [34].

The interviewees agreed that transport is "one area in which [the GLA] does have sufficient autonomy" (LI-5), but there are concerns that since the onset of the pandemic this autonomy is being eroded, as discussed below. LI-8 qualified this view by distinguishing different channels of autonomy. They believe that the GLA "has lots of autonomy to formulate its own vision [and] has a fair amount of decisional autonomy, but at the level of implementation, things get a bit trickier". With ownership and control over the public transport network and the TLRN, and as one of the largest landowners in London [35], TfL can take significant unilateral action and use "trial and error to work out the very best" (LI-1) in low-carbon mobility. However, several interviewees felt the key issue to be a lack of funding, and although the removal of the GLA Transport Grant made TfL "incredibly autonomous, because it had to be" (LI-4), fulfilling all its obligations and ambitions became "a great challenge" (LI-2), as discussed further below, and in Section 3.3. The GLA has relatively limited influence over private transport (LI-4 and 6). Although they must work within the GLA policy framework, boroughs have relatively high autonomy to operate within it. This is further discussed below and in Section 3.5, but the "difference in action between different boroughs is dramatic, and indicates that they do have quite a lot of autonomy from the mayor" (LI-7).

#### 3.2.2. Action (Strong)

The current London Plan, published in March 2016, stated an objective that "over the years to 2036—and beyond, London should [lead] the world in its approach to tackling the urban challenges of the 21st century, particularly that of climate change" [36] (p. 31). The majority of

low-carbon ambitions in this Plan relate to energy efficiency; it requires boroughs to promote walking, cycling and low-emission private transport, but with few specific requirements (such as minimum provision of cycle parking for new developments) [36]. A new London Plan will soon come into force, and which has been developed using the principle of "Good Growth"; growth that is "socially and economically inclusive and environmentally sustainable" [37] (p. 11). The focus and requirements of the new Plan are similar to the current iteration, but with greater stringency [37].

An overarching objective of the current MTS and LES is to "turn London into a zero carbon city by 2050" [38,39]. These strategies lay out plans for decarbonising TfL's infrastructure and operations, including a zero-emission bus fleet by 2037; increasing renewable energy generation on TfL's land; reducing operational emissions from TfL's assets and infrastructure; and for TfL-controlled rail services to be zero-carbon by 2030 by using renewable energy [38,39]. Using its ability to set license conditions, TfL will require all taxis and private hire vehicles (PHVs) to be ZEC by 2033 [38]. Other key targets, plans and policy instruments are discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.8.

In 2019/20, TfL had a projected budget of GBP 10.3bn—over half the total GLA budget [32]. Around 25% of this was to be met by income from the BRRS and council tax precept, and nearly 50% by fare income. Successive mayors, via TfL, have used their road pricing powers to introduce the London Congestion Charge (LCC) and the Ultra-Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), which alongside commercial activities, were to account for 12% of TfL's budget. The LCC is a GBP 15 daily charge for vehicles entering central London (about 1% of Greater London [40]), between 07:00 and 22:00, except low-emission vehicles. Recent changes to the LCC are discussed below. The ULEZ was introduced in April 2019, covers the same area as the LCC (with an expansion planned in October 2021), operates at all times, and charges GBP 12.50 for private vehicles that do not comply with current EU air pollution (EURO) standards. In 2010, the mayor introduced a BRS on the largest 15% of businesses in London, and a Mayoral Community Infrastructure Levy (MCIL). This income, alongside targeted grants from the GLA, government and boroughs, were projected to cover 15% of TfL's budget in 2019/20. The remainder was due to be sourced from cash reserves and borrowing [41].

The onset of the pandemic and measures to address it, including a nationwide "lockdown" with extensive travel restrictions introduced in March 2020, led to a 90% fall in TfL fare income in the months following. In April 2020, bus and Underground service provision decreased by 13% and 59% respectively, due to operational difficulties and service restrictions. Despite substantially reduced demand, efforts were made to resume usual service provision in order to allow for social distancing on public transport for essential travel. Although bus service provision returned to usual levels by July 2020, Underground service provision remained 7% below 2019 levels until at least October 2020 [16]. The mayor also suspended the LCC and ULEZ. These factors led TfL to project a budget shortfall of GBP 1.9bn between April and October 2020 [42]. In May 2020, the mayor agreed an emergency funding and financing package with the government, worth GBP 1.6bn. However, key conditions included: the immediate reintroduction of the LCC and ULEZ; an increase in fares from January 2021; two government-appointed Special Representatives to attend all TfL Board meetings; and a government-led review of TfL's finances [43]. Despite this, TfL projected an additional shortfall of GBP 2bn by the end of 2020, and GBP 2.9 billion for 2021/22 [42]. In November 2020, a second funding deal worth GBP 1.7 billion was agreed, with further conditions including a requirement for TfL to achieve GBP 160 million in savings, and for travel concessions to be funded separately by the mayor. Initial government proposals to extend the LCC to match the upcoming ULEZ extension, and to further increase fares, were not part of the final terms.

Successive mayors, TfL and the wider GLA appear to have made extensive use of the autonomy afforded; a conclusion supported by all interviewees. The mayor's strategies are wide-ranging and ambitious, as discussed in Section 3.8, and supported by specific actions. TfL is "world renowned" (LI-4) and "a resounding success of devolution" (LI-2). The LCC

and ULEZ are "really good examples of where TfL has put its autonomy to great use, and has shown its potential" (LI-5), although both LI-4 and 6 suggested that road pricing is an area where "autonomy could have been leveraged further than it has been" (LI-4) through a more sophisticated (e.g., time or distance-based) approach. LI-1 stated that although TfL has used its substantial land holdings in some areas, such as installing EV charge points, such action is "a bit piecemeal".

Successive mayors and Assemblies have advanced the case for further devolution. In 2012, the mayor (Boris Johnson) established the London Finance Commission (LFC) to investigate greater fiscal devolution. Their report concluded that "devolving revenue streams, including from the full suite of property taxes, will afford London government the autonomy to invest in the capital and increase its accountability to London's residents and businesses" [44] (p. 10). They argue that just 7% of all taxes paid by London residents and businesses is retained by London authorities, whereas in New York, for example, this value is 50%. [44]. The Commission was reconvened in 2016 by Sadiq Khan, and published a new report that proposed allocating to the GLA a proportion of income tax and VAT revenue that would normally accrue to the government [45]. LI-1 also believed further devolution would be of benefit, and stated that if given "the right capability, there is loads more [TfL] could do".

The COVID-19 pandemic has "highlighted how fragile the funding for [TfL] is, because it's so reliant on passenger fares which have been demolished" (LI-5). However, LI-4 believes that the conditions of the emergency financing packages have "created space for the government to leverage slightly more influence over what is ordinarily quite an autonomous transport authority", with LI-1 "very worried that a lot of that independence is going to be lost", with government attempting to "'claw back some autonomy" (LI-6). LI-1 and 8 feel that this in part a political fight between the mayor and government, with the government now having "parked its tanks on the lawn of the mayor" (LI-7). At the borough level, LI-1 felt that although some use their autonomy well, "the majority don't, not remotely", and most "don't do a terribly good job of making use of adopted roads and adopted highways, particularly in restricting use to active travel" (LI-4). LI-5 believed that most boroughs could make more use of their spatial planning powers, and be more assertive with developers to include low-carbon mobility infrastructure. The interviewees broadly agreed that those more likely to put their autonomy to use are the more central boroughs (for reasons discussed in Section 3.9). Elements of borough autonomy are further discussed under Sections 3.3 and 3.5, in particular.

#### *3.3. Access to Funding for Climate Action*

#### 3.3.1. Capacity (Moderately Strong)

The ability and discretion GLA (and TfL) have to raise and spend funds are described in Section 3.2. A recent report by the London Sustainable Development Commission (LSDC, discussed in Section 3.5), however, concluded that "the direct spending power of the Mayor is several orders of magnitude less than that necessary to achieve a zerocarbon economy for the capital" [46] (p. 11). In addition, around 87% of TfL's income is required simply to maintain and operate the existing network [47]. Much of the transportrelated funding for boroughs is provided by TfL, to implement LIPs. For 2020/21, TfL allocated GBP 200 million for this purpose, of which boroughs have full discretion over less than 2% [48]. LIP funding was paused in 2020 as TfL worked "to meet the conditions in our funding and financing recovery package" [49], but resumed in November 2020. One such condition was the establishment of a GBP 55 million Active Travel Plan for London, including GBP 45 million for boroughs to invest in related infrastructure (with the remaining GBP 10 million for TfL). In May 2020, the government announced a national Active Travel Fund of GBP 250 million, of which London (TfL and the boroughs) was allocated a further GBP 25 million. Other government funds, those described previously, have been available, although London authorities are often ineligible due to their specific devolution and funding arrangements (see Section 3.2). In the LES, the mayor calls on

government to ensure "that London can access national funding on the same basis as other local authorities" [38] (p. 101). However, the government does provide funding for specific, usually large infrastructure projects. A key example is Crossrail (The Elizabeth Line), the largest railway infrastructure project in Europe, for which the government is providing around half the projected GBP 17.6bn cost [50].

LI-7 felt that it was "very clear that the removal of the [GLA Transport] Grant was pretty brutal for TfL" (LI-7), and limited its ability to fund climate action. Although there is a lot of ambition to drive low-carbon mobility (see Section 3.8), "it is difficult to see where the money is going to come from" (LI-2), and TfL are "hampered by inability to invest and plan for the long-term [without] a stable footing to deliver its policy priorities" (LI-2). Interviewees agreed that this situation has worsened with the pandemic, as income for the GLA, TfL and boroughs has "fallen off a cliff" (LI-4). LI-4 believes that "the funding climate is incredibly challenging; a number of boroughs have been running on a very shoestring budget for a number of years".

## 3.3.2. Action (Strong)

The GLA and TfL make broad use of their ability to raise funds, as discussed in Section 3.2. In addition, in 2015, TfL issued a ten-year green bond, raising GBP 400 million to be invested in public and active travel [46,51]. In January 2020, another issuance was announced, with proceeds allocated to clean transport, pollution control and renewable energy [52]. TfL have also committed to leverage other sources of finance where possible, such as selling surplus land to develop affordable housing, with proceeds allocated to TfL's transport investment programme [39]. In 2018, TfL Consulting was launched to commercialise TfL expertise by partnering with cities and regions around the world. By 2023, it aims to have generated GBP 45 million in revenue [53]. A "fare freeze" introduced by the current mayor in 2016 is estimated to have reduced TfL income by around GBP 640 million by 2020, with concessions costing a further GBP 300 million [47,54]. Alongside ending the fare freeze and reducing concessions, a report by the London Assembly recommended that additional revenue be generated through TfL's advertising capabilities, sponsorship, TfL consulting, constructing and renting properties on its estate, and making efficiency savings. A recent LSBC report recommended the establishment of a London Future Finance Facility, offering a channel for clean investment. Both the London Assembly and LSDC also recommended further devolution of fiscal powers [46,47].

The vast majority of TfL's expenditure may be considered as spending on climate action, as without it, CO2 emissions from passenger mobility would be higher. The lack of data makes assessing spending with this explicit purpose difficult. However, the mayor has committed around GBP 1.8bn for "Healthy Streets" (see Section 3.3) between 2019 and 2024 [55], most of which is for public and active travel infrastructure. TfL also operate a car and motorcycle scrappage scheme for London residents that receive welfare benefits, to replace vehicles that don't comply with ULEZ requirements [56]. Of the GBP 200 million provided to boroughs for LIP implementation, around GBP 170 million is to be spent on Healthy Streets, including over GBP 60 million for cycling infrastructure [48]. Over time, "TfL has become more and more stringent about how it applies its funding [for boroughs], and has added more and more strings" (LI-7). A range of other grants for boroughs are occasionally available from TfL, such as the Mayor's Air Quality Fund—GBP 22 million to support projects by boroughs to improve air quality, but which is currently closed to new applications [57].

The GLA and TfL have been reasonably successful at receiving government funds to which they can apply. For example, TfL received around 15% of the budget from the ULEB Scheme [58]. In 2016, a collaborative bid between TfL, GLA and London Councils (described in Section 3.5) was awarded GBP 13 million as part of the national GBP 40 million Go Ultra Low Cities Scheme between 2016 and 2020 [59]. The boroughs also receive ad hoc DfT grants, such as GBP 2 million each to provide cycle training in August 2020 [57]. In addition, through the London European Partnership for Transport (LEPT) operated by London Councils, LI-5 believed that "boroughs had been quite good at getting EU funding, particularly for transport projects", but are now largely ineligible. The interviewees believed that action taken by boroughs to raise funds for climate action varies substantially, largely due to differences in "public views on [low-carbon] modes of transport, and the access they have to TfL's network" (LI-4). Interviewees agreed that inner boroughs, with strong transport connections and which tend to be led by councils of the same political persuasion as the current mayor, are more active, while many of the outer boroughs are "dragging their feet to avoid doing what the mayor wants for as long as possible" (LI-7). However, LI-4 felt that some of the difference "comes down to the different capacities that boroughs have to apply for these pots of money", and that some boroughs have invested in developing strong, highly engaged transport teams over a number of years, allowing them to identify and apply for available funds effectively.

## *3.4. Vertical Coordination*

## 3.4.1. Capacity (Weak)

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is responsible for developing government strategy to achieve the goals of the UK's Climate Change Act. However, Sasse, Rutter, Shepheard and Norris (2020) find that climate action is not a top priority in BEIS; only one of BEIS' five main objectives relates to this issue ("ensure the UK has a reliable, low cost and clean energy system") [60]. The DfT sets policy and regulation for all modes of transport, including active travel. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) is responsible for spatial planning, while the Treasury (the UK's Ministry of Finance) is responsible for tax policy and broad allocations of government budgets. Although the term 'sustainability' is used, none of the key objectives of these departments explicitly reference decarbonisation or its synonyms [61–63]. Despite its coordination role, BEIS holds few levers to compel action by other departments, and there are few cross-departmental processes or bodies dedicated to decarbonisation; a key exception is the Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV), operated jointly by BEIS and DfT, to support the market for ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs) [64]. The Climate Change Committee (previously Committee on Climate Change) was created to advise the UK and devolved governments climate action, but as an independent advisory body, it has no decision-making authority. Beyond the parameters of GLA autonomy laid down by the GLA Act described in Section 3.2, there are no formal processes for vertical coordination. Both the GLA and TfL maintain Government Relations teams that, inter alia, produce briefings, engage with parliamentarians and government officials to promote the mayor's priorities, and manage GLA responses to government consultations [65]. The GLA can also publicly state its position and call on government to act in areas of concern, such as through the mayor's strategies.

## 3.4.2. Action (Moderately Weak)

As described in Section 3.2, government has issued guidance for the preparation of energy and climate element of the LES. There is no evidence to suggest that the government has required alterations the MTS or LES, but the government directed the mayor to alter the upcoming London Plan (including to relax measures to reduce car ownership and use) [66]. Beyond this, coordination is largely conducted on a case-by-case basis, focusing on large capital investments (e.g., Crossrail). In May 2020, the government announced it would begin trials of rental e-scooters in England. In November 2020, TfL and London Councils jointly announced that they will host a twelve-month trial. The interviewees held a common view that prior to the pandemic, coordination between government and TfL was "not good enough ... really challenging" (LI-1), as although DfT seeks to encourage low-carbon mobility, "it also has a number of other [objectives]" that can make coordination difficult (LI-4). In addition, government thinking was often "well, just give it to TfL and the GLA and that's dealt with" (LI-5). However, LI-3 and LI-6 believed that coordination improved during the pandemic, with four interviewees citing e-scooter trial discussions as a positive example, although there have been "heated discussions between DfT and TfL on the nature" of these trials (LI-4).

## *3.5. Horizontal Coordination*

## 3.5.1. Capacity (Strong)

The GLA Act allows the mayor to make up to 11 appointments, to whom powers and responsibilities may be delegated (with some exceptions, such as the power to direct TfL), At present, there is a Deputy Mayor for Environment and Energy and a Deputy Mayor for Transport. The mayor has also appointed a Walking and Cycling Commissioner, reporting to the Deputy Mayor for Transport. The GLA is also able to constitute advisory bodies, such as the LSDC, established in 2002 to provide independent advice on delivering the GLA's duties on sustainable development [67]. As discussed in Section 3.2, TfL's primary responsibility is to implement the MTS, and it has direct control over London's public transport network, the TLRN, and other non-borough transport functions. The current mayor has appointed himself Chair of TfL, and the Deputy Mayor for Transport as Vice-Chair.

In preparing their strategies, the mayor must consult with the Assembly, GLA's functional bodies (including TfL), and each borough. Although there is no obligation for the views of these bodies to lead to amendments, the mayor must outline which have and have not been accepted, and why. In turn, each borough must conform to the final strategies. For spatial planning, the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) states that "local planning authorities are under a duty to cooperate on strategic matters that cross administrative boundaries" [68] (p. 10). The MTS, LES and the London Plan all pledge the mayor to work with the boroughs to deliver their aims [37–39]. In 2018, TfL established a Local Communities and Partnerships Team to provide a single point of contact for boroughs, and to understand how TfL can "better support [boroughs] to ensure [TfL's] strategies are clear and relevant, and take into consideration [borough] needs" [69] (p. 6). TfL has also published a range of guidance and toolkits to help boroughs engage with TfL's campaigns and schemes. The GLA Government Relations Team (discussed in Section 3.4) also works with the boroughs, including "through the Congress of Leaders, where the Mayor discusses key London issues with borough leaders" [65].

The main platform for inter-borough coordination and cooperation is London Councils, a cross-party organisation that "makes the case to government, the mayor and others to get the best deal for Londoners and to ensure that our member authorities have the resources, freedoms and powers to do the best possible job for their residents and local businesse" and seeks to act "as a catalyst for effective sharing among boroughs" [70]. It has a dedicated Transport and Environment Committee with members representing each borough and TfL, and operates the London Environment Directors' Network (LEDNet).

## 3.5.2. Action (Moderately Strong)

Although "London is in a very unique [sic] position, as the mayor is also the leader of the transport authority" (LI-4), LI-3 thought that the political nature of the GLA sometimes produces "political winds that can bash TfL about", creating tension, which has exacerbated during the pandemic. LI-3 also believed that TfL can often see itself as a sister rather than daughter organisation to the GLA, producing further conflict. Together, they believed that this could sometimes lead to a lack of communication and transparency, but overall the "dynamic between GLA and TfL can be both good and bad". A study commissioned by TfL found that although 83% of borough representatives surveyed believed TfL could be trusted, and 78% believed that they communicate openly and honestly, just 51% knew how to effective engage with TfL. Respondents also believed that TfL was too bureaucratic, and that it does not take sufficient notice of borough priorities [69].

LI-5 believes coordination between TfL and the boroughs to be "generally fairly good", although LI-2, 6 and 8 thought it to be a very mixed picture, with LI-3 believing it "haphazard at best". Broadly, although LI-1 feels that coordination is "mostly effective –

the city works, it functions very well", they also feel that the "GLA has no powers over the [boroughs], really at the end of the day, the boroughs will do what they want". LI-6 believes that in order to achieve his goals, the mayor may eventually be forced to compel some boroughs to act, or to take direct control of their LIPs. However, "these tactics are tough and questionable—and not nice options" to have to use (LI-7). So far, interviewees believed that the mayor and TfL have been "unwilling to wield the stick", instead taking "a carrot led approach" (LI-1), in part to avoid raising tensions, as "boroughs don't like that TfL can say yes or no to who gets money for what" (LI-1), yet "TfL cannot deliver without some form of cooperation" (LI-7), as "mobility governance is still quite fragmented, [with the] distribution of responsibilities quite complex" (LI-8). LI-3 believed that where coordination is effective, it is often because "two officers [in TfL and a borough] who know each other have joined the dots". LI-5 stated that some boroughs "are easier in their dealings with TfL than others", in part due to differences in politics and priorities, but also "how well equipped the borough is to deal with transport schemes; if they have good plans, are good at spending the money and meet all the deadlines, then they will have a good relationship with TfL. Those that don't, won't". Similarly, on inter-borough co-operation, LI-4 believed "quite different political objectives make a joined-up approach quite hard to achieve", which is "something than could be improved on a lot" (LI-5). Often, "the relationships aren't the best" (LI-5), leading to issues such as "cycle lines [that] just stop at borough boundaries" (LI-5). LI-2 believed boroughs are not necessarily "making bad decisions, but different decisions", which "gums up the roll-out" (LI-2) of car clubs, dockless bikes and cycle infrastructure, for example.

## *3.6. Membership of Capacity-Building and Learning Networks*

## 3.6.1. Capacity (Moderately Strong)

London is a member of C40 Cities, a network of 97 megacities that "supports cities to collaborate effectively, share knowledge and drive meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on climate change" [71]; the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, "the largest global alliance for city climate leadership, built upon the commitment of over 10,000 cities and local governments" [72]; and the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, a "collaboration of leading global cities achieving carbon neutrality before 2050" [73]. In Europe, aside from the European iteration of the Global Covenant of Mayors, London is largely represented by individual boroughs. This includes, for example, CIVITAS, a "network of cities dedicated to cleaner, better transport in Europe and beyond" [74], to which the boroughs of Bromley, Hammersmith and Fulham, Sutton, and the City of London belong, and POLIS, "the leading network of European cities and regions working together to develop innovative technologies and policies for local transport" [75], to which all boroughs are members via the LEPT. In the UK, 15 boroughs belong to UK100, "a network of highly ambitious local government leaders, who have pledged to secure the future for their communities by shifting to 100% clean energy by 2050" [76], and the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport (ADEPT), to which the City of London is a direct member, as well as all other boroughs through the LEDNet, with TfL being an associate member.

## 3.6.2. Action (Strong)

One of the five key principles of the LES is to collaborate "with leading climate change and environmental institutions and other world cities, sharing ideas and learning from best practice" [38] (p. 22), particularly through the C40, which was founded in 2006 in London following a meeting convened by Mayor of London Ken Livingston [77]. London sits on the steering committee, and the Deputy Mayor for Environment and Energy is a board member. London is also a lead signatory to the C40 Fossil-Fuel-Free Streets declaration (which pledges each city to procure only zero-emission buses from 2025, and ensure that a major area of each city is zero emission by 2030) [78], and participates in the C40 Climate Action Planning Framework, which was used to support the development of London's "1.5 ◦C Compatible Plan" (discussed in Section 3.8) [79]. London is active in other networks, with GLA officials sitting on two of the three managing committees of the Covenant of Mayors [80]. The mayor and the GLA have "been really active" (LI-5) in the C40 in particular, but largely to showcase action in London, as the city is "very proud of its achievements ... the creation of TfL and the congestion charge were genuinely admired and admirable" (LI-8). LI-5 believed that London Councils supports many networks, but active participation by boroughs has declined due to funding cuts. However, LI-1 stated that although "sharing leads to doing, often I feel it is just sharing", with LI-2 feeling that there is a "worthwhile entity overload", and often a "lack of joined up thinking among such organisations partly just because of the scale of the problem [of climate change]" (LI-3). LI-4 believed that the sheer size and complex governance structure in London makes learning lessons from other cities difficult.

## *3.7. Collaboration with and Participation of Stakeholders*

## 3.7.1. Capacity (Strong)

In exercising their statutory authority, in addition to public bodies described in Section 3.5, the mayor must consider consulting bodies representing different racial, ethnic, national and religious groups, and businesses. For the MTS specifically, they must also consult the national Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee. Government guidance on preparation of the energy and climate element of the LES encourages the mayor to consult with a range of specific organisations, although none have a focus on transport [28]. Shortly after entering office, the current mayor published "A City for All Londoners", which set out priorities to be fully developed through his strategies, and on which stakeholder views were gathered through workshops, focus groups and discussions via "Talk London" [81], an online platform "where you can have your say on London's big issues" [82]. Drafts of the current LES, MTS and upcoming London Plan were subject to a 14-week public consultation, advertised through the GLA website. For the LES, views were sought through online discussion threads and surveys on Talk London, email campaigns, online forms, focus groups, interviews, representative polling and events. For the MTS consultation, operated by TfL and advertised through the TfL "Consultations Hub", "an extensive marketing and engagement programme to seek the views of Londoners, businesses and stakeholders" [83] took place. TfL also seek views on new guidance, policy, and major projects [84]. The mayor's guidance for LIP preparation states that boroughs "may wish to consult with" (inter alia) elected members and the borough's Director of Public Health, local community, business and transport groups [85] (p. 12).

The MTS, LES, London Plan and 1.5 ◦C Compatible Plan (discussed in Section 3.8) all repeatedly state that the mayor, the GLA and TfL will work with stakeholders to achieve their objectives. TfL maintain an "innovator database" to which organisations may register to receive information on TfL innovation programmes. TfL have also "committed to making our open data freely available to third parties and to engaging developers to deliver new products, apps and services for our customers", believing that this "facilitates the development of technology enterprises [through] effectively crowdsourcing innovation" [86].

## 3.7.2. Action (Strong)

When consulting on the LES, the GLA received, inter alia, 5400 survey responses on Talk London, and 370 responses via an online webform [87]. TfL received 43,550 individual comments [83] for the MTS consultation. In both cases, responses were reported and amendments recommended in a publicly available report to the mayor. All recommendations for the MTS were implemented. For all other consultations, TfL publish responses to feedback on their website [84]. Consultation responses to the London Plan were made available online, with an updated plan published following a review of responses [88]. When preparing their LIPs, the mayor requires boroughs to demonstrate that stakeholder views have been considered [85].

Although TfL "went through a time when it had a very patrician approach" to stakeholder engagement (LI-7), it has "generally got a lot better in recent years" (LI-5). LI-3 felt that "TfL does a really phenomenal job [on consultation], at least when it comes to new projects [and] in terms of sincerity, I think it really stands out—pretty much second to none" and responses are often reviewed item-by-item. The "GLA and TfL tries its best to include everyone" (LI-1), and there is "a lot of will to involve different parties" (LI-8), but it is "quite difficult to engage everyone" (LI-8). Although TfL are getting better at seeking "silent" views, this is not seen as a priority (LI-6). Although policy officers at TfL usually weight stakeholder responses based on representativeness (LI-6), the level of attention granted to different groups tends to "wax and wane" over time (LI-2). Taxi drivers were identified as a group that "shout very loud" (LI-6), and used to have a substantial level of influence, but less so now (LI-2 and 7). In general, "boroughs are quite good at listening to different views" (LI-5), but "the management of stakeholder relationships is completely variable" (LI-7). LI-5 felt that the voices listened to largely depend on local politics, as councillors "have to take a political decision on what they're going to risk". Various interviewees raised the emergency measures introduced following pandemic restrictions, many of which were introduced without consultation, and which some boroughs have found difficult as they "are used to talking to their residents before they implement schemes" (LI-5). However, LI-5 believed that both boroughs and TfL have been responsive to concerns, with engagement "happening as part of a live scheme" (LI-7).

TfL has established "Innovation Partnerships" with companies to develop new products and services. This includes the "London Connectory"; a partnership with Bosch to allow small businesses to work with experts and TfL data to develop new transport-related products [89]. TfL have published "problem statements" to source new mobility solutions, and a call to participate in a new "Innovation Collaboration Framework", to allow TfL rapid access to corporate R&D facilities [89]. Around 42% of Londoners use an app with TfL data, across more than 600 apps developed by around 13,000 developers, generating GBP 130 million in economic benefits and savings a year [90]. LI-6 stated that the GLA and TfL are frequently approached by technology companies looking for collaboration, although TfL believe in "being able to fix problems with incumbents and transnational corporations" (LI-8).

## *3.8. Presence of Local Climate Champion*

#### 3.8.1. Capacity (Strong)

As described in previous sections, the mayor holds broad executive power over (particularly public) transport in London, through direct and indirect channels. The London Assembly provides some check and balance through its powers described in Section 3.2, and its ability to investigate any mayoral action, and to submit proposals to the mayor to which a response must be provided. The Assembly must also confirm certain mayoral appointments, including the Chair and Deputy Chair of TfL. The mayor must submit an activity report to the Assembly ten times a year, on which they are questioned. Members of the public directly question the mayor and the Assembly twice a year, and the mayor must also participate in an annual "State of London" debate and publish an annual report on developments and achievements. Although there are few formal curbs on mayoral action on transport within the GLA and TfL's remit (either from the Assembly or government), there is extensive scrutiny. The Mayor of London is one of the most high-profile political positions in the country, with 93% of the British population having heard of the incumbent (the third mayor), Sadiq Khan [91]; with his immediate predecessor, Boris Johnson, now Prime Minister.

#### 3.8.2. Action (Strong)

The mayor aims to achieve zero CO2 emissions in London by 2050, and has adopted London-wide carbon budgets, following the approach taken by national government [38]. The mayor has set targets of, by 2041, having 80% of all trips in London made by public or

active transport, increasing rail service capacity by at least 80%, and reducing road traffic by 10–15% [39]. The MTS, LES and upcoming London Plan include a core principle of "Healthy Streets", which "provides the framework for putting human health and experience at the very heart of planning the city", to ensure that "individual streets are appealing places to walk, cycle and spend time" [39] (p. 5). Key actions regarding TfL's infrastructure and operations in particular are discussed in previous sections. The strategies contain various other actions to encourage active travel, including delivering a London-wide strategic cycle network with improved infrastructure; encouraging restrictions on vehicle movements; protecting and improving walking routes; imposing expectations on developers to promote active modes; and using data to allow journey planning tools to favour walking and cycling [37–39]. For private transport the mayor aims to have all newly registered vehicles in London zero-emission by 2030, through inter alia, investigating proposals for more sophisticated road user charging systems to replace the LCC and ULEZ; introducing a zero emission zones in central London from 2025, increasing to London-wide by 2050 at the latest; supporting car clubs and reducing private parking; ensuring sufficient charging and refuelling infrastructure for ULEVs, and introducing other regulations and incentives to support their use [37–39].

To support his ambitions, the mayor has suggested further competences to be devolved in addition to those discussed previously, including powers to implement time-limited road closures, greater control of PHV licensing (including the ability to cap numbers), allowing the London Plan to take precedence over national planning policy, and responsibility for suburban rail services [39]. The mayor supports further action at the national level (without which he acknowledges his overarching decarbonisation goal cannot be met), for which his strategies may act as "the template for ambitious action" [38] (p. 6).

An Implementation Plan was published alongside the LES, against which annual progress is reported. The London Energy and Greenhouse Gas Inventory (LEGGI) reports GHG emissions and energy consumption from homes, workplaces and transport in London, and is used to measure progress against emission targets [14]. In December 2018, the London Assembly passed a motion calling on the mayor to "declare a Climate Emergency, supported by specific emergency plans to make London carbon neutral by 2030, [and] call on government to give him the powers and funding to make this possible" [92]. A few days later, the mayor published "Zero Carbon London: A 1.5 ◦C Compatible Plan", in which he states that "the world is now clearly in the midst of a climate emergency" [93] (p. 6), and outlines the expected impacts of his strategies on CO2 emissions to 2050, and associated costs. The mayor has announced that if re-elected in 2021, he will aim to make London carbon-neutral by 2030 [94].

The interviewees believed that "Sadiq Khan has made very loud and bold statements on climate" (LI-7), that he "has some pretty ambitious policy targets" (LI-4), and is "definitely providing leadership" (LI-5). While LI-6 believed that the introduction of the ULEZ was a good example, others would "like to have seen a lot more" (LI-1) and felt that if is "not a political winner, the mayor tends not to really push TfL" (LI-3). To date, 26 of 32 boroughs have declared a "climate emergency", with many aiming for net-zero emissions from their own operations by 2030 [95]. Although "some boroughs are showing quite a lot of leadership" (LI-5), others "don't seem willing to engage on the climate crisis" (LI-7), with climate emergency declarations "very quickly falling to the sidelines" (LI-4), often due to lack of funding, although some simply "aren't [keen to push] the mayor's agenda" (LI-3).

#### *3.9. Conducive Urban Form and Infrastructure (Moderately Strong)*

With a population density of 5700/km2, London is by far the most densely-populated English region [96], and more dense than comparable regions for Paris, New York and Berlin, but less dense than Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo [97]. London is considered polycentric; in assessing journeys on the underground network, Roth, Kang, Batty and Barthélemy found three "core" centres of activity, and a further seven secondary centres

in central London [98]. However, other centres may emerge if this analysis is extended to include other modes. LI-7 felt that "London is, amazingly for its size, incredibly well configured" for the transition; by contrast, LI-3 believed that "of major [world] cities, [London is] one of the most ill-suited to this transition that I've come across". LI-4 and 7 both believed that London's size "presents some challenges" (LI-7), and as London "is one of the oldest cities in the world with pipes and tunnels everywhere", reconfiguration is "very hard and very expensive" (LI-1). LI-2 believed that the underground network forms the "spine of low-carbon mobility in London". Although LI-4 agreed that the Underground and wider public transport system is "incredibly comprehensive, incredibly vast", it is also "incredibly centralised", in that it is designed to move as many people into the centre as efficiently as possible. Despite the conclusions of Roth et al. [98], there is a common view that "London is a very unicentric city [with] everybody commuting into the centre" (LI-3), and that "parts of outer London are very underserved by public transport" (LI-4), which alongside issues such as fewer pavements (LI-6), means that such areas are "much more car dominated and car dependent, even more so than many people believe" (LI-8). Although expanding the Underground would be difficult in a "very complicated subterranean world", improving bus connectivity has substantial funding implications (LI-2). LI-3 felt the pandemic may facilitate "real shifts in behaviour", particularly with home working, leading to London re-emerging as a "collection of villages", (LI-7), with more investment in areas that people both live and work (LI-1), potentially entrenching new mobility habits (LI-4).

## *3.10. Societal Pressure (Moderately Strong)*

In June 2020, 81% of UK adults were concerned about climate change, with just 3% unconcerned [99]. Prior to the pandemic, the environment was perceived as the third most important issue facing the country, after Brexit and healthcare (and above the economy) [100], with around half the population (higher in urban conurbations such as London) concerned about air pollution from road transport [101]. Following nationwide 'lockdown' restrictions introduced in March 2020, concern over COVID-19 was greater than for climate change, but a majority believed that government should prioritise reviving the economy and tackling climate change equally once the pandemic recedes [102]. In July 2020, a third of the English population felt the pandemic had made them more concerned about climate change and air pollution (with 8% less concerned) [103]. However, over 80% of the English adult population are wary of using public transport since the pandemic began, with less than a quarter having concerns over the use of private cars, or walking and cycling. Around 40% of people are walking and cycling more compared to pre-pandemic, with almost all planning to maintain this into the long term [101,103]. In London specifically, 39% of people believe that they would use public transport less once restrictions are lifted [104], with around 90% of people concerned about using the Underground [103]. Londoners strongly approve of the mayor's transport policies, with a majority supporting measures introduced during the pandemic [105]. Polls also suggest that the mayor is substantially more popular than his nearest rival for the next mayoral term [106].

Societal pressure for climate action in London "has certainly gone up" over time (LI-8), although there is "never as much as you'd hope" (LI-1), and "the difference is stark between inner and outer boroughs" (LI-3), with the former typically much more in favour of action. However, LI-8 felt that low-carbon mobility, and particularly cycling, had become embroiled in a broader "culture war", linked to gentrification and issues of mobility justice. LI-1 and 4 believe that commercial interests tend to be against measures to change transport behaviour, although LI-5 noted that once such measures have been introduced, opposition tends to diminish. LI-6 believed that due to the pandemic "fear [of public transport] may now stick in people's minds", and if this does not change, it "will have huge implications" (LI-8).

## **4. Conclusions**

Table 3 summarises the scores awarded to each enabling factor and lens. London's city authorities have a strong capacity for autonomy and stakeholder participation, and for an effective local climate champion to emerge. In each of these cases, it takes clear advantage of these capacities to encourage low-carbon passenger mobility. City authorities can and do raise substantial funds for low-carbon mobility, although discretionary spending is limited by obligations to maintain London's extensive public transport network, and the lack of external financial support. This has been exacerbated since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, as public transport fare income fell drastically. Emergency finance deals with the government may have long-term implications for London's autonomy over passenger mobility, which run counter to local demands for greater devolution. The UK's legal and political environment is largely supportive of urban climate action, particularly through its net-zero emissions target, but the policy framework focuses on reducing CO2 emissions from passenger vehicles, with lacunae in public and active transport. There are also few processes for vertical co-ordination between national and local decision-makers.



Note: ('W' = Weak; 'MW' = Moderately weak; 'MS' = Moderately strong; 'S' = Strong; grey shading = not applicable).

Despite two administrative levels with complex and interdependent roles and responsibilities, there are robust and varied processes for coordinated climate action on passenger mobility in London, owing primarily to the presence of a single public transport operator under direct influence of the mayor. These processes generally work well, although the mayoralty has been politically reluctant to use its most forceful levers to drive action by recalcitrant boroughs. Public and political attitudes differ between inner- and outer-London boroughs, with the former typically more disposed towards climate action and low-carbon mobility. This may be substantially linked to urban form; although London's public transport network is vast and multi-modal, its infrastructure is concentrated in the centre, with peripheral boroughs more car-dominated.

Although CO2 emissions from passenger mobility in London are declining, much more rapid progress is required to achieve net-zero emissions; particularly if this aim is brought forward from 2050 to 2030. The analysis presented by this paper does not seek to assess whether the measures taken by London's city administration are sufficient or appropriate to achieve these aims, but whether the governance arrangements are sufficient to facilitate them. On this basis, although a broadly positive assessment is made across most enabling factors, two key areas of deficiency remain. First, the UK government must provide a more supportive policy framework at the national level for rapid decarbonisation in this sector, with much improved co-ordination and funding for local authorities—including the GLA and London boroughs—that must take much of the granular action to achieve it. Secondly, action must be taken to improve horizontal co-ordination within London, to accelerate efforts by boroughs to implement and achieve the mayor's policies and targets. This is particularly the case with outer boroughs, which remain car-dominated. However, such

action exceeds issues of process and policy, and more firmly enters the realm of politics, strongly influenced by the preferences of the local populace and the form of the urban environment they inherited.

The COVID-19 pandemic may transpire to be a transformative event, addressing both of these deficiencies to some degree. The pandemic has drastically reduced public transport use in London, in favour of both private cars and active travel, with large numbers of people now working from home. The extent to which these trends can be altered or embraced to drive low-carbon mobility in London in the long-term is an open question, and one which requires governance structures and processes to be at their most facilitative to address effectively.

The framework applied by this paper provides a flexible approach to generating a snapshot of the strengths and weaknesses of governance arrangements for climate action. However, it relies to a substantial degree on subjective judgement, and does not assess whether these arrangements have produced effective action. Future work to expand this framework to incorporate analytical frameworks on the characteristics of policy mixes (e.g., [107,108] would allow a more rounded view of the policy environment for climate action at the city level). Adapting the framework to apply to other areas of environmental concern, particularly local air pollution, would also likely prove useful.

**Funding:** Research for this paper received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 730403.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** The study was conducted according to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the Ethics Committee of the UCL Bartlett School of Environment, Energy and Resources (approved 16 July 2020). Data protection reference number. Z6364106/2020/07/108.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

**Data Availability Statement:** The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to the protection of data provided by annonymised interviewees.

**Acknowledgments:** The author wishes to thank Benjamin Sovacool (SPRU) for his input and advice.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **Appendix A**

## **Semi-Structured Interview Questions**


## **References**


Transportation Research Procedia, Shanghai, China, 10–15 July 2017; Elsevier B.V.: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2017; Volume 25, pp. 3933–3943.

