**6. Discussion**

Our findings confirm Kern and Rogge's assumption that regime actors, like policymakers, can speed up the pace of transition by addressing sustainability challenges through directed policies [4], which, if left to market mechanisms, could take multiple decades to achieve [14]. It also supports the observation in policy studies that any enacted policies achieve some degree of success [103]. The findings also illustrate Berkhout's [104] assertion that in industrial economies where both production and consumption supply chains are linked, environmental problems are addressed through technological solutions.

STR assumes that incumbent socio-economic regimes and their related actors are path-dependent and locked-in to unsustainable practices, so they resist change [10]. A few studies, like Penna and Geels [12], Berggren et al. [105], and Shiroyama and Kajiki [106], identified that there are deviations to this assumption. Penna and Geels [12] associated the support from incumbent actors with external pressures such as those from the policymakers, which are not necessarily due to the actors' own strategy. This research contributes to the deviation. For the Indian case, the introduction of policy did play a role in aligning all the actors toward the directed sustainability transition at an accelerated pace through guiding the socio-technical system towards a pre-determined future. Yet, the incumbent actors did not just submissively follow the transition policy but eventually adjusted their positions to it after the transition was finalised and during its implementation, as was shown by some actions, such as initial contestation to the timeline, the production of BS6-compliant vehicles before the transition timeline, communication of the benefits of the transition, and the responses in the face of the lack of compatible fuel and economic crisis.

Support from incumbent regime actors is dynamic, and the degree of support can vary throughout the transition timeline. This dynamism was in response to externalities and key events in the transition trajectory. It identifies that through negotiation with the other actors and addressing some externalities, actors can reposition themselves either as those proactively moving the transitions or those opportunistically resisting.

The next sub-sections elaborate further on the reasons for support to APDST and the dynamic positioning that influenced the support.

### *6.1. Reasons for Support from Incumbent Actors*

The deviation in the positions of incumbent actors from the mainstream assumption in the STR is thought to be due to two factors: The socio-political landscape in India, and the anticipated co-benefits of policy transitions.

In India's post-colonial development trajectories, different national governments have collaborated with indigenous entrepreneurs in establishing a domestic automobile manufacturing industry and in realising national development strategies. Despite the change in the political regime, the national governmen<sup>t</sup> worked closely with incumbent automotive industry actors [87,92], and have mostly enacted policies to foster growth of the automobile manufacturing regime. A similar relationship between the political regime and incumbent actors was observed across other Asian countries like Korea, Thailand, and Japan [32]. This observation underlines the significance of considering the political landscape and development trajectories [52] before assuming the position of the incumbent actors.

The Bharatiya Janata Party led New Development Alliance (NDA) national government enacted the APDST by leapfrogging the BS5 vehicle emission norms. Before enactment of this policy, the NDA government's 2014 election manifesto indicated making India a 'Global Manufacturing Hub' and creating an 'innovation and technology driven society', among others. The Indian automobile manufacturing industry is one of the key sectors identified by the NDA governmen<sup>t</sup> to realise this manifesto. Moreover, the NDA governmen<sup>t</sup> projected the Indian automobile manufacturing industry to be world's third largest automobile manufacturing base by 2026 [107]. To realise these aspirations, adopting one of the world's most contemporary vehicle emission control norms, on par with the European manufacturers, had anticipated economic and symbolic benefits, while banning the BS4 vehicles and fuel had environmental benefits.

The support from incumbent automobile manufacturers was crucial for the success of the BS4 to BS6 transition as they are among the most powerful actors of the incumbent regime whose strategies directed the component manufacturers and dealers. As most of the analysed automobile manufacturers were active in exports, transitioning to BS6 emission norms would further strengthen their export potential. Hence, the sub-transition to manufacture BS6 vehicles was well received by the incumbent regime due to their anticipated benefits. However, the resistance came from giving upon the immediate economic gains through domestically selling BS4 vehicles, for which the pressure from the actor like the Supreme Court helped in gaining support from the incumbents.

Depending on the political landscape and the anticipated benefits of transitions, the incumbent regime's actors are likely to support directed transitions. Similarly, the actors positioned themselves in the expectation of future gains. Even though the transitions were enacted as part of a policy to address air pollution, there were multiple benefits associated with achieving this socio-technical transition. This observation is congruen<sup>t</sup> with the anticipated co-benefits associated with sustainable development, particularly in addressing the problem of air pollution [108]. This also supports the idea that sustainability transitions have multiple co-benefits, which, when they are quantified and communicated effectively [109], create an impetus to address sustainability challenges [108]. In line with Berkhout [104], this confirms that incumbent actors could align with transition visions as long as the benefits of the transitions are communicated amongs<sup>t</sup> all actors.

The following subsections delves further into the reasons for dynamic positions of incumbent actors and the key considerations for APSDT implementation.

### *6.2. Dynamic Position of Incumbent Actors*

In STR, actors are often grouped based on the analytical hierarchy they belong to, or the time they have been operational in those analytical hierarchies, for example, regime vs. niche actors or incumbent vs. emergen<sup>t</sup> actors. Such terms deflect our attention from dynamism in actors' positions during the implementation period. The dynamic positioning of incumbent actors in response to the key events during the transition timeline was revealed by assessing the actor strategies. Despite the support from different actors in the

automobile industry supply chain and various national ministries, the implementation of the BS4-to-BS6 leapfrog encountered different challenges, and accordingly, the actor's degree of support for the transition varied. Moreover, actors like members of the FADA could not transition within the pre-determined timeline. The key reasons are discussed below.

### 6.2.1. Systemic Interdependencies

In addition to the changes in vehicle technology, the BS4-to-BS6 transition depended on the availability of BS6-compliant fuels. This mandate came under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. India has both publicly owned and private oil refineries. Since the introduction of the BS4-to-BS6 draft policy, SIAM expressed concerns about the transition timeline. According to them, for the implementation of the transition, BS6-complaint fuels should be made available three to six months before the automobile manufacturers shift their production line to BS6 vehicles. However, the lack of information on the availability of BS6 fuel until October 2019 created challenges for the manufacturers to plan for BS6 vehicles, and they continued with surplus BS4 vehicles.

As opposed to the transition timeline planned by the national government, some subnational governments and financing agencies set their own transition timelines, prohibiting the registration and lending for BS4 vehicles before 31 March 2020. To address the lack of coordination between national and sub-national governments, SIAM sought the Supreme Court's intervention.

The burden of the BS4 vehicle surplus and the changes in transition timeline was first borne by the members of SIAM and more so by the members of FADA.

### 6.2.2. Unforeseen Externalities

Externalities can hamper the implementation of accelerated policy transitions. During the transition timeline for BS4 to BS6, the slowdown in auto industry sales further created a surplus of BS4 vehicles in the supply chains for both the manufacturers and the dealers. SIAM's support for transition weakened, and they demanded tax reductions for vehicles. FADA supported SIAM's demand. However, the support from SIAM was regained after the national Ministry of Finance introduced tax cuts.

Members of FADA, being downstream actors of the supply chain, suffered more and could not unload the BS4 inventories; they approached the Supreme Court to seek extension for the sales of BS4 vehicles. Toward the end of the transition timeline in March 2020, the surplus was exacerbated by the enactment of a countrywide lockdown by the national governmen<sup>t</sup> due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court granted a last-minute extension, three days before the end of transition timeline.

### 6.2.3. Non-Negotiable Timeline Revealed Power Asymmetries

The pre-determined and non-negotiable timeline underscored the power asymmetries within the automotive industry. Actors with limited capacities to negotiate suffered during the transition, as powerful actors succeeded to transition by imposing the cost of transition. In 2018, the Supreme Court of India mandated the BS4-to-BS6 transition to be completed by 1 April 2020. Though the timeline for sales and registration was common for all actors, meeting this timeline depended on mutual support among different actors along the supply chain. Upstream actors like auto components manufacturers, members of the ACMA, were well-prepared for the transition and delivered the BS6-compliant parts ahead of the transition timeline. However, despite repeated requests from the dealers to the automobile manufacturers, the dealers received stocks of BS4 vehicles until March 2020, which they were unable to sell. The two-wheel vehicle dealers, which are often small- and medium-size businesses, had limited capacity to negotiate with automobile manufacturers. They continued to receive BS4 vehicle stocks until the end of the transition timeline, making them unable to ge<sup>t</sup> rid of old stocks, and pleading support from policymakers.

The above examples indicate that though different incumbent regime actors supported the transition, their degree of support varied across the transition timeline. It was influenced by the challenges during the implementation process and the response of governmen<sup>t</sup> actors in addressing those challenges. These challenges revealed the lack of coordination and power asymmetries. It underscores that enacting policy-driven transition is a multi-level and multi-actor process; sustained support for the accelerated policies requires deliberate efforts throughout the implementation process [110]. The leapfrogging from BS4 to BS6 looked successful with the support from the incumbent industry. However, it was a sleek success putting costs to actors in weaker positions and forced them to find out loopholes such as the registration of BS4 vehicles in their employees' names and selling it later as a second-hand stock.
