*6.1. Numerical Example*

According to the research on the agricultural market, the transaction price of several vegetables between cooperatives and supermarkets, the retail price of supermarkets, and other costs incurred in the agricultural–supermarket interface were considered comprehensively, and reasonable parameters *q* = 30, *p*0 = 5, *w*0 = 3, *c*n = 2, *c*s = 0.7, *k* = 1.2, *b* = 0.8, and *z* = 0.2 were set. Based on the results of the theoretical analysis, the optimal values of quality safety degree *g*<sup>∗</sup>, price subsidy level *<sup>α</sup>*<sup>∗</sup>, market demand *d*<sup>∗</sup>, and total profit *<sup>π</sup>*n∗, *<sup>π</sup>*s∗, and *<sup>π</sup>*ns<sup>∗</sup> of producers, sellers, and supply chain under different models are shown in Table 3.


**Table 3.** Comparison of the three game models.

Variables with \* are the optimal variable values.

As can be seen from Table 3, under this set of parameters, compared with the producerdominated decentralized decision model, the quality of agri-foods is higher in the sellerdominated decision model, and the price compensation factor is also higher. The market sales volume does not change much. Although the profit of agricultural producers decreases slightly, the seller can obtain a higher profit, and the total profit of the supply chain increases.

The results of the algorithm can verify the conclusion of the above proposition. Obviously, the quality of agri-foods in the centralized model is the highest, followed by the Stackelberg model dominated by sellers, and finally the model dominated by agricultural producers. Although the actual market sales of centrally controlled cooperative game are not necessarily higher than those of non-cooperative game, the agricultural supply chain under the centralized game can still achieve more profits, i.e., the centralized decision model with the goal of maximizing the overall profit of the supply chain is more conducive to realizing the "quality and price" mechanism of agricultural supply.
