3.1.6. Lancang–Mekong Cooperation

The Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC), despite its relatively young age, is one of the most rapidly progressive and notable platforms in the Mekong Subregion. In 2012, Thailand proposed an initiative for sustainable development of the Mekong Subregion, which received a positive response from China. At the 17th China–ASEAN Summit held in November 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed the establishment of the LMC Framework, which was welcomed by the other five Mekong countries. In March 2016, China and the other five Mekong countries held their first LMC Leaders' Meeting, which released the Sanya Declaration and officially launched the LMC mechanism [57].

Although the LMC seeks to promote many aspects of cooperation on security, economic, cultural, agriculture, and poverty reduction issues [57–59], the major driving force is seen through its emphasis on infrastructure development for the region. Some of the major examples are Myanmar's Kyaukpyu Port and gas pipeline, the Laos and Thailand's high-speed railway projects, Cambodia's irrigation systems and transport infrastructure, and more plans to develop better capacity for navigation along the Mekong River [60].

As a subregional cooperation mechanism connecting the six countries along the Mekong River, the LMC has seen China emerge as a willing investor and guarantor as part of its wider BRI. While a comprehensive list of LMC projects is not publicly available, the LMC has provided financial support for at least 132 projects in the Mekong Region as of 2018 [61]. During the LMC Ministerial Meeting in 2019, the LMC proposed 101 additional projects, all of which were considered fast-track—to be carried out in one year or less—in the six Mekong countries [62] to respond to "socioeconomic demands and water related challenges" [63] (p. 2). The LMC, like the BRI, is often promoted as an effective platform that offers countries in the Mekong Subregion the resources they need for development (see, for example, [64–68]).

Critics, however, have voiced strongly that China is using the LMC to build its regional strategic influence and that the LMC per se does not promote good governance. China's strong interest in driving the development of the LMC stemmed from gaining substantial control over the Mekong Subregion, delimiting the influence of external actors such as the US and Japan, and pushing forward its neighborhood diplomacy [69,70]. While the LMC can be a building block for stronger regional multilateralism, it can also work against the advancement of broader ASEAN regional cooperation and marginalize other Mekong Subregion bodies [60]. Amongst all the seemingly unchecked development that has flourished as a result of the LMC, perhaps none has had such an impact on local communities and the environment as the dams that have sprouted up across the region, where China has taken the role of developer or funding agency [61]. While Chinese investment in infrastructure development through the LMC is a welcome source of capital for Mekong countries, Southeast Asia should approach it more critically to avoid development that later becomes a debt trap, does not last, and only benefits the few.
