**3. Methodology of the Research**

The aim of the research was to examine how the pandemic itself, as well as the regulations introduced by the governmen<sup>t</sup> in the field of border management, influenced the lives of immigrants in Poland. Because it was impossible to reach a large and diverse group of immigrants who could assess these processes, in-depth interviews with experts working with migrants were conducted instead. The main goal was to reach people who have been providing advice and support to a large number of migrants for years. We assumed that these people would have a comprehensive picture of not only the practical functioning of the new regulations, but also the problems arising from the stay of migrants in Poland during the pandemic.

Between December 2020 and January 2021, fifteen in-depth expert interviews were carried out with 16 persons (9 women and 7 men). The group comprised six individuals offering legal advice and six assistants (who provide information and support but are not lawyers themselves). A total of nine respondents represented civil society organisations (CSOs) (of which three were grass-roo<sup>t</sup> immigrant organisations), three people worked for private law firms, two in public administration and a further two were experts—a researcher and a representative of an employers' organisation. The group of experts consisted of prominent representatives of organisations and institutions (especially on the national level) working in the area of migration for years. All interviewees shared the experience of working with diverse migrant groups—both forced and economic, as well as with people from different parts of the world. The main criterion used to invite experts to the study was a premise that the organisations or institutions they worked for should provide direct legal assistance to immigrants (in the form of legal advice or information). The group was also geographically diverse and included cities of various sizes located in different regions of Poland. Due to the composition of the researched group, the study has its limitations, as it focuses mostly on a general overview of the situation of immigrants during the pandemic (on the national level and in just several regions in Poland) and thus it could have overlooked some more nuanced and personal problems, especially in vulnerable groups, that people did not decide to share with the legal consultants in the first place and then the experts could not refer to during interviews.

The interviews were semi-structured, conducted on the basis of a common protocol (which was modified depending on the individual expertise of the interviewee), and the average duration was between 40 min and 1.5 h. The interviews were transcribed and then coded using the inductive approach and the MaxQDA software, although the basic categories were taken from the main categories of the interview protocol (Petintseva et al. 2020).

### **4. Better and Worse Asylum Seekers—I.e., Who May Enter the Country**

Since 2015, Polish authorities have been gradually closing borders to asylum seekers. Refugees have been approaching the Polish border applying for international protection, but the border guards 'fail' to hear these requests and do not accept their applications, sending most of the asylum seekers back to Belarus. Over the years, the number of people who have managed to enter has gradually decreased—from over 12.6 thousand in 2015 to just over 4 thousand in 2019. Entry was refused mainly to Chechens and Tajiks; in other words, Muslims (Klaus 2020a; Szczepanik 2018). These practices have been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights as a violation of the non-refoulement principle and as an example of prohibited collective expulsions (ECtHR 2020; 2021). Those illegal expulsions and refusals to accept asylum claims took place mainly at one border guard post on the Polish–Belarusian border, in the city of Terespol. For many years, this railway border crossing has received the greatest number of asylum applications in Poland, as it is located on the Moscow–Berlin railway route. Hence, it was the most convenient place to cross the Polish border for refugees from the former USSR countries, i.e., the vast majority of people who applied for asylum in Poland.

The outbreak of the pandemic, which reached Poland in March 2020, resulted in the governmen<sup>t</sup> closing the borders on 15 March 2020, which remained relatively impenetrable to migrants without Polish citizenship until 13 June 2020 (Nowicka et al. 2021, p. 5). The list of individuals who were allowed entry into Poland, although short at first, expanded over time. From the very beginning it included people who had the right to work in Poland (Princ 2020) and never included migrants seeking international protection. When asked about the absence (it could hardly be interpreted as an oversight) of this group, the Border Guard explained that such migrants could enter the country based on a provision, which allows people to be admitted 'in particularly justified cases' and after obtaining permission from the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard in this specific case1. In reality, however, the provision did not work in the case of refugees (except for Belarusians, as discussed below).

The railway crossing in Terespol was closed on 15 March and the train service to Belarus was suspended. This resulted in the discontinuation of asylum applications in Terespol; from 15 March until the end of 2020, only 32 applications in total were accepted in this facility (compared to 540 in 2019). Throughout 2020, only 1535 applications (which covered 2656 asylum seekers) were accepted in the whole country (KGSG 2021).

In 2021, the closure of the border continued, so the desperate refugees from other countries waiting in Belarus began to cross the Polish border illegally. According to the information published on the website of the Border Guard, 45 Chechens, 4 Tajiks and 93 Afghans who crossed the Polish–Belarusian border illegally have been apprehended since the beginning of 2021. All these people were placed in detention and most of them then submitted applications for international protection. Some of them had earlier tried to submit asylum applications on the Polish border, to no avail. The conduct of the Polish authorities not only forced them to pay the smugglers to arrange an illegal border crossing for them, but they were additionally punished for entering Poland—both by deprivation of liberty in detention centres, as well as by having proceedings initiated against them for illegal border crossing, along with a criminal conviction in a simplified procedure and without their presence in court—a standard practice in such cases (Kaciupska 2021). This practice is highly questionable, not least because it contravenes the provision of Article 31, paragraph 2 of the Geneva Convention that prohibits the punishment of refugees for illegal border crossing. What is also particularly relevant in this case is that those asylum seekers were not coming from a safe country. Belarus is no longer one, as declared by the ECtHR (ECtHR 2020, para. 177–78).

The situation at the border changed in August 2020 when, following Alexander Lukashenko's regime's brutal suppression of protests against the rigging of the presidential election, many protesters had to flee Belarus. It was at that time that Polish authorities began to introduce numerous measures to facilitate their entry, such as humanitarian visas (which had practically never been issued before), as well as other types of visas:

consulates were issuing [ ... ] repatriate visas to hide those people [from Belarusian authorities]. It mostly concerned the families of members of the Coordination Council against whom criminal proceedings were initiated in Belarus. There was a big problem whether such people would be allowed to leave or banned from leaving Belarus. Polish consulates here were trying to save such people. *Activist for a Belarusian organisation in Poland* (W6)

Belarusians were admitted to Poland on the basis of any visa (even one not explicitly mentioned in the COVID-19 regulations as granting entitlement to entry), or even without any visa at all—in which case, border guards themselves tried to obtain permission to enter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard. On 22 September, after Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's visit to Poland, the Polish governmen<sup>t</sup> put Belarusians on the list of foreigners who, as the only nationality, could cross the Polish border regardless of the purpose of entry and the entry document. This is how this phenomenon was recounted by the participants of the research:

It really is a cosmic exception of some sort. I won't criticise Polish authorities for allowing Belarusians to enter but it is a textbook example of unfair treatment and you'd be hard pressed to find a better illustration of it. We've go<sup>t</sup> better and worse refugees. It isn't bad to assume in advance that some groups [ ... ] deserve protection so we're letting them in. However, you mustn't assume [...] the opposite with regard to any other group, which is exactly what is happening to Chechens, Tajiks [they are thought not to deserve protection]. *Activist from an organisation helping refugees* (W3)

Indeed, Belarusians ge<sup>t</sup> preferential treatment when it comes to entering the country at the moment. We've seen how the situation in Terespol looked before— other foreigners were never let in like that [ ... ]. If anything, I reckon it's a political gesture of goodwill on the part of the Polish state, to allow Belarusians to enter Poland. *Activist for a Belarusian organisation* (W6)

The same respondent witnessed the extent of border guards' helpfulness:

a family of Belarusians wanted to cross the Polish border with their dog, which had no documents, and they went 'why won't you let us in with the dog—we're refugees and so is the dog'. Never before in my career had I seen border guards apologise and promise to do all they can to let the people in, including calling a vet and getting them to examine the dog and authorise its entry. I, for one, was very surprised.

Without doubt, the sense of cultural familiarity must have been playing a part in border guards' perception of Belarusians as people who are basically the same as us—a neighbour in need. The fundamental difference in the treatment of Belarusians can also be attributed to political will and a keen interest of Polish authorities in what is happening in a country considered to be a Polish political sphere of influence (Zarycki 2008). Furthermore, not without significance is the fact that officials are able to single out Belarusians amongs<sup>t</sup> other refugees seeking protection in Poland, most of whom are Muslims. This element seems to have been of special importance when comparing the treatment of immigrants from the Middle East, Afghanistan and African countries who started to appear at the Polish border in the late spring of 2021. A ploy orchestrated by Lukashenko's regime in order to destabilise the situation on the eastern border saw the immigrants being brought by planes from the Middle East with Belarusian tourist visas with a view to crossing the border. Those illegal border crossings by thousands of people who were dispatched by the regime to Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish borders resulted in a fence being built along the stretch of the EU eastern borders, which provoked violent responses by both border guards of the targeted EU countries (with a significant number of push-backs to Belarus) as well as Belarusian authorities, and caused the deaths of several people in the Polish forests, mostly as a result of hypothermia (ECRE 2021; Parliamentary Assembly 2021).
