*6.1. ICE's Oversight*

The GAO and DHS OIG reports illustrate another reason that ICE should have just one set of detention standards—one set comprised solely of evidence-based practices—and it is this. ICE is unable to ge<sup>t</sup> most of the facilities it uses to comply with one set of standards; it is at least five times as unlikely that it will ever achieve compliance when there are five different sets of expectations in the field. There are several reasons why this is the case.

First, ICE's standards for acceptable and unacceptable performance (ICE 2021a) do not adequately address conditions that detainees encounter. Both acceptable and unacceptable are highly subjective terms. Not all deficiencies are equal. Frequency and severity vary— and no objective benchmarks are provided.

Additionally, ICE monitors detention facilities by several means. It assigns on-site agency monitors to its largest facilities. Independent reviews and fairly thorough inspections are also conducted at some facilities every several years by the Office of Detention Oversight, an independent office within ICE but outside of ERO. ICE also contracts with the Nakamoto Group Inc. to inspect most facilities annually. Those inspections were suspended through much of 2020 due to the pandemic then resumed remotely. Both oversight agencies and Congressional committees have been critical of ICE's contract managemen<sup>t</sup> including its continued use of Nakamoto, and its inability to achieve better results over time. Chief among their concerns, no matter how poorly facilities perform, both the on-site agency monitors and the Nakamoto Group report that they Meet Standards. The GAO and OIG have also issued reports about ICE's failed oversight of detention operators, the most recent of which were published by the DHS OIG in June 2018 (OIG 2018), and the GAO in August 2020 (GAO 2020).
