**1. Introduction**

Complex problems on a global scale are often referred to as "wicked problems" [1–3]. Frequently studied "wicked problems" relate to the massive environmental and social imbalances in global food supply chains [4–6]. Other examples include climate change, biodiversity loss, child labor, or persistent poverty in parts of the world. Such multidimensional problems affect diverse and various stakeholders or are influenced by them [7,8] (p. 9). Therefore, dealing effectively with such problems requires joint and networked action by different groups of actors inside and outside (food) supply chains [9]. A significant advantage of such cooperation between different actors and groups of actors is the circumvention of possible competitive disadvantages of sole entrepreneurial engagement [8] (p. 9).

Multistakeholder initiatives (MSI) are an opportunity for heterogeneous actors inside and outside supply chains to cooperate in order to achieve sustainability goals [10]. MSIs are defined as "[ . . . ] formalized arrangements in which organizations from diverse sectors (private, public, and not-for-profit) commit to work together in mutually beneficial ways to accomplish goals that they otherwise could not achieve alone" [11] (p. 1837). Together, the member organizations of an MSI can define their own standards and develop certifications for products in the context of (food) supply chains. Due to voluntary participation, decisions usually have no legally binding effect and are therefore referred to as soft law [12]. In addition to such standard-setting MSIs, there are MSIs that can be described as a "continuous improvement model" [13]. In this case, MSIs usually focus on the entire value chain and develop principles and indicators that members can implement and use to track progress. It is therefore a different approach compared to standard-setting MSIs. Hence, MSIs focusing on continuous improvement rely primarily on dialogue and successive improvements through negotiations between actors and groups of actors.

**Citation:** Schuster, D.; Mossig, I. Power Relations in Multistakeholder Initiatives—A Case Study of the German Initiative on Sustainable Cocoa (GISCO). *Sustainability* **2022**, *14*, 11279. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su141811279

Academic Editors: David Eshun Yawson and Fred Amofa Yamoah

Received: 28 July 2022 Accepted: 7 September 2022 Published: 8 September 2022

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**Copyright:** © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

The influence of an MSI on global economic contexts depends to a large extent on the ability of the participating actors to act together in an efficient way. However, MSIs bring together a variety of actors whose interests may diverge or be entirely opposed [14]. Moreover, individual members may prioritize the achievement of common goals very differently given their individual goals [15]. In the case of an empirical study of an MSI in the Indonesian cocoa sector, divergent values and interests between actors from the so-called Global South and those from the so-called Global North represent one of the key challenges to collaboration [16]. Considering this, it seems important to develop a better understanding of the interactions between actors in MSIs. This knowledge is the basis to assess the implications of MSIs in terms of the "wicked problems" that MSIs were created to address [17].

De Bakker et al. identify three thematic research areas on MSIs. The first area deals with the development of MSIs into stable institutions. The second area focuses on the impact of MSIs, including studies that deal with outputs and outcomes. The third thematic research area examines the functioning of MSIs in more detail. This research area "is related to discussions about how MSIs are created and managed; it concerns the actors, decisions, processes, and practices that give rise to MSIs" [18] (p. 356). Within the area, research on the underlying processes of coordination and alignment between organizations has mainly taken place in the context of standard-setting organizations or certification partnerships [16,18]. In the development of standards, they refer to power as a factor that influences outcomes. "Although power is a key theoretical concept within this line of work, the literature acknowledges this only implicitly. Interestingly, power is mostly ascribed to actors possessing valuable resources or operating in a favorable position (e.g., lead firms in global value chains [19]). Other faces of power, such as manipulation (e.g., shaping anticipated results) or domination (e.g., manufacturing consent), are not discussed in the literature" [18] (p. 360). For MSIs of the "continuous improvement model" [13], it can also be assumed that power influences the negotiation process, as well as the concrete shaping of results. This is where this article comes in, by aiming to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of power in MSIs that, on the one hand, builds on different approaches from the interdisciplinary literature on power in networks and MSIs and, on the other hand, is adapted to the specifics of the governance of MSIs of the "continuous improvement model" [13]. For this purpose, a conceptual framework on power in MSIs is outlined in Section 2. The framework allows us to show at which levels power occurs in an MSI, as well as the impact of different forms of power that take place on these levels with their effects on achieving its own goals. To this end, a case study is conducted on a German MSI working for sustainable cocoa. In order to empirically capture the power relations between the actor groups and the actors in the negotiations, two methods were used: An analysis of minutes from meetings and guideline-based expert interviews, which are presented in Section 3 after the introduction to the case study. The results in terms of power in the studied MSI are presented in Section 4. These empirical results are discussed with regard to the relations between the dimensions of power and the conceptual framework (Section 5). This paper concludes with a brief summary and a proposal for a conceptualization of power in MSIs of the "continuous improvement model" [13] (Section 6).
