*4.2. Organization-Based Power*

The reconstruction of the process as an informal institution in GISCO shows that the individual member organizations of different stakeholder groups usually only enter negotiations with each other in the three working groups (WGs) to develop decision papers. Decisions at the network level of the entire MSI are usually made by the representatives of the four stakeholder groups in the executive board. The individual board members' positions are prepared in meetings within the respective stakeholder groups. It follows that the use of individual organizations' forms of power takes place particularly within their own stakeholder group, whereas in the negotiations between the stakeholder groups, a powerful position of an individual organization plays a subordinate role, since the previously negotiated position of the entire stakeholder group is usually represented on the executive board.

The stakeholder group of the German Federal Government (Stakeholder Group A) consists of two federal ministries with different technical orientations. These cannot always be brought to a compromise, so the two ministries do not have a unified position in all processes. Examples of differing positions described by individual interviewees include divergence on a basic understanding of power structures in agricultural supply chains and the Act on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains (for further information see [46]). While one ministry wants to prevent a law in the perception of one interviewee, the second uses the dialogue in GISCO to gain a sense of the implementability of such a law. The impression that emerges from the interviews is that the activity of the stakeholder group in GISCO is additionally interpreted by all sides as a kind of patronage. One of the two ministries initiated GISCO and both ministries financially supported GISCO in its early days. More recently, one of the ministries has provided funding to outsource a complex drafting process to an external consultancy to advance a stalled process. Other deployments of financial resources by a ministry also occur outside of GISCO, e.g., for partnerships and in other initiatives in sustainable resources to initiate interactions between different supply chains. Another potential power designates a ministry's representatives the ability to withdraw from GISCO if dissatisfied.

Companies in the Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Industry (B) are characterized by their heterogeneity, both in terms of company sizes, ranging from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to transnational corporations (TNCs), and in terms of their business models. The interviews show that the level of activity in GISCO does not directly depend on company size, but much more on the willingness to engage. The willingness of individual companies to contribute to progress towards sustainability goals by engaging in GISCO beyond sourcing certified cocoa and paying the membership fee differs. Due to the high expectations, one interviewee sees blocking attitudes on the part of commercial enterprises in some cases. In the negotiations, some interviewees from other stakeholder groups see the interbranch organizations, which are also members of GISCO and coordinate "their" respective Stakeholder Groups B and C, as particularly obstructive. Within the stakeholder group, the interbranch organization is perceived as a coordinating and moderating actor that tries to bring together the heterogeneous positions of the group members. Contributing to the perception may be that the two board

members of the industry stakeholder group jointly represent the resolutions worked out in the industry group in the board meetings and do not give any approvals that deviate from them. If it is not possible to reach a consensus within the group, the board members also represent this within the board meetings. The decision-making process is sometimes controversial within the stakeholder groups. As an example, one interviewee describes: "But there I would say that in the individual groups it is the democratic system that the louder ones, the bigger ones and the majority have the heard opinion and the others tend to be unheard" (B2 2020: para. 57). While some interviewees explain that processes are sometimes dragged out by industry and retail actors, others refer to the time-consuming process steps in GISCO. In addition, the company representatives see it as their task in GISCO, with their practical experience in the cocoa and chocolate sector, to pay attention to the implementability of resolutions and not to give hasty approvals that they cannot keep. The quotation of an interviewee (B1 2018: para. 75) underlines the knowledge about the influence of the stakeholder group: "[ . . . ] insofar it was quite a process, [ . . . ] if we had not played along, there would have been no change at all. These are, of course, compromise situations". This also becomes clear in the dependence on the payment of membership and project fees for "PRO-PLANTEURS" (for further information about the project in Côte d'Ivoire implemented by GISCO, see [40]). The form of financing from membership fees paid by the stakeholder groups from industry (B) and trade (C) distinguishes GISCO from other initiatives in the perception of one of the staff members from the office. In addition, a high financial contribution means a corresponding commitment from the members. The "PRO-PLANTEURS" project is not financed by membership fees; instead, companies can participate financially on a voluntary basis.

There is a parallel between the Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Industry (B) and the Retail Grocery Trade (C) in that the two interbranch organizations play a central role and act as coordinators and spokespersons for their stakeholder groups. Apart from this, the Retail Grocery Trade (C) is described as comparatively homogeneous with a few, but very large and powerful companies. As in industry, the involvement of individual retail companies varies. There are different views on retail companies' potential to exert change on the supply chains. Therefore, it is disputed whether the actors of the trade group are sufficiently engaged in GISCO. Industry representatives in particular would like to see more engagement, while others acknowledge the existing engagement and/or do not want to equate the retail companies with industrial companies.

Civil Society (D) in GISCO consists of different subgroups, each with their own objectives. NGOs and standard-setting organizations were particularly frequently distinguished from one another. The standard-setting organizations are sometimes criticized for their position between companies and NGOs as part of a common stakeholder group D. Nevertheless, consensus building within the Civil Society group is described as constructive, although not always easy and, due to the process underlying GISCO, just as time-consuming as in the other stakeholder groups. Interviewees from other stakeholder groups also share the impression that Civil Society is a very active, articulate and well-organized group that puts content on the agenda and formulates demands to other stakeholder groups. At the same time, interviewees from the industry group sometimes see a certain lack of awareness in the demands and make it clear that, in some cases, there is a lack of expertise about internal company processes and concrete approaches to solutions. In order to advance their concerns, strategies were discussed in the interviews which the Civil Society actors can draw on:


• Also mentioned in the interviews is the increasingly international networking with the civil societies of the other European MSIs in the cocoa sector in Belgium, Switzerland and The Netherlands.
