*Concept Paper* **On Path Diagrams and the Neurophenomenal Field in Bilinguals**

**David William Green**

Department of Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Brain Sciences, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK; d.w.green@ucl.ac.uk

**Abstract:** Conversation is a major site for our use of language. Each conversation elicits a distinct subjective experience: a specific and dynamic phenomenal field, and it is this field that controls our communicative actions. We cannot hope to understand the neural bases of conversation without relating these to the phenomenal field. We need a neurophenomenology of the bilingual speaker. I propose and illustrate an approach involving path diagrams together with retrospective experience sampling to capture the richness of the phenomenal field as a speaker talks through an issue of concern, and relate this process to large-scale attentional networks. The proposal offers a general approach to developing a neurophenomenology of the bilingual speaker and listener.

**Keywords:** path diagrams; neurophenomenology; neurophenomenal field; language attrition; mental simulation; counterfactual thinking; attentional networks; retrospective experience sampling

#### **1. Introduction: Rationale and Setting the Scene**

An important goal of research in bilingualism is to understand the linguistic and cognitive processes involved in language use, and that entails understanding such processes in a key site of language use: conversation. We talk to others to share our thoughts and feelings about different topics and so express our lived, subjective experience about them. This subjective or phenomenal experience is important if we are to make sense of the neural bases of language use, as revealed by analyses of the neural networks involved. How can we tell just by observing the dynamics of neural activity as a person looks at a film or talks about an episode in their lives what the neural flows of activity actually signify, without knowing what they are actually thinking or feeling? Linking the phenomenal and the neural domains is an exercise in neurophenomenology, a termed coined by Varela (1996), and is an exercise vital to further our understanding of the nature of human consciousness. Its purpose is to connect the study of the structure of human experience, as in the work of the phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (1964), with research that examines the dynamics of brain activity. This exercise is vital too for the narrower project of understanding the neural basis of language use in bilingual speakers.

Consider a small thought experiment. Suppose, hypothetically, we record neural activity as a bilingual speaker narrates an experience in her first language, and then ask that she retell it in her second language. How might we explain a dramatic increase in the activation of networks mediating affect in the latter case when we know from selfreports that words or phrases in a non-native language may lack affective charge and lead to a misconstrual of the significance of the utterance for the addressee (Pavlenko 2017), and that current experimental research suggests that talking in a second language may increase emotional distance from an event (e.g., individuals may be more utilitarian in their decisions (Costa et al. 2014))? Well, for some bilingual speakers, the disconnect between their lived experience and the felt capacity of the language they are currently using to express it induces a real sense of frustration, and even anger (e.g., Wierzbicka 2004). If, after the recording, we actually ask the speaker what they were thinking or feeling at different

**Citation:** Green, David William. 2022. On Path Diagrams and the Neurophenomenal Field in Bilinguals. *Languages* 7: 260. https://doi.org/10.3390/ languages7040260

Academic Editor: John W. Schwieter

Received: 18 May 2022 Accepted: 6 October 2022 Published: 12 October 2022

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moments in time, we are in a position to develop an explanation. Particularly poignant examples of disconnection arise when children become attriters in the language of their parents. I make use of one reported example of such attrition to illustrate how we might bring subjective experience into our theorizing and experimental research, and so afford a deeper understanding of the neural bases of language use during conversation between bilingual speakers. In the next section I overview the approach before then detailing the case study.

Our experience of the world is integrated, multi-modal and situated from a first-person point of view: a centered spatial structure or phenomenal field. Its point of origin, at least for sighted individuals, is experienced behind the eyes. It is sustained as we act in the world and engage with others. It allows us to envisage other points of view. For example, it allows us to envisage the hidden parts of objects so that we can act appropriately (e.g., I see just one side of a pot, not its hidden side, but infer it and so grasp it appropriately). It also allows us to envisage the points of view of other agents in our world, and so is a grounding for intersubjectivity and our ability to attribute mental states to others (e.g., Wiliford et al. 2018). The perspectival properties of the phenomenal field are therefore essential to our ability to act in the world. My interest is with its corollary—its psychological characterization. It is distinct, as personal experience attests—we can look out on the world as we walk, for example, and be somewhere else in our thoughts.

Psychologically, for the purposes of this paper, the focus of the phenomenal field is a current issue of concern (a particular topic) with a periphery of factors that bear on it. The core idea is that its more detailed structure can be expressed as a path diagram connecting together factors that we deem relevant to the issue of concern. Such diagrams have been used to understand how individuals perceive a wide range of issues (e.g., the risk and prevention of coronary heart disease (Green and McManus 1995); the causes of unemployment and employment (Green et al. 1998); the causes of overfishing (Nikolic and Lagnado 2015)) and have been used in formal analyses identifying causal factors in numerous phenomena (Pearl 2000; Pearl and Mackenzie 2018). Here I propose such diagrams as a means to capture the psychological relations involved in the phenomenal field as a precursor to mapping these onto the neural substrates to capture the neurophenomenal field.

The paths in the diagram reflect our understanding of which factor can affect which other factors based on our interactions with our physical, cultural and interpersonal worlds. Such understanding is captured in the notion of a mental causal model (e.g., Craik 1943; Green 1997, 2001; Johnson-Laird 1983, chp. 15; Pearl 2000; Pearl and Mackenzie 2018) that may be intersubjectively shared within a community. Our models are generative and we use them to explain, predict and control experience. For instance, in the case of the interpersonal world, we can ask why did someone speak as they did? Further, we can answer it: Why did John argue with Mary? Because she voted for someone he disliked. One or other party can intervene and defuse the argument by agreeing to disagree. Such questions, answers and interventions are possible because our models express relations amongst relevant factors, including their causal relationships. We also hold models of ourselves expressed in the narratives we use as we interact with others to make sense of our past and give meaning to our future (Mead 1959; and see also Andersen et al. 2020, for the important narratives in the context of social action).

Whilst our models of our physical, cultural and interpersonal world underlie our perceptions and attributions, our phenomenal experience at some moment in time arises from our current concerns: the cognitive–affective nexus. This is the psychological focus of the phenomenal field. Talking about it (or reflecting on it) creates further structure in terms of the paths linking different factors to the cognitive–affective nexus. The paths themselves are an outcome of our own personal memories, and the possible futures we envisage are intimately related to whom we consider ourselves to be. As we will see in the illustration, "loving daughter" is a salient theme of the personal narrative, and is an important driver of transformation in the phenomenal field. The approach here makes evident that our

phenomenal worlds mediated by language are permeated by imaginary and not simply by actual worlds.

In the illustration, I envisage that after talking about the specific concern to a friend, the participant constructs the path diagrams and also describes her thoughts and feelings at different points in time during the conversation. It is then the job of the researcher to code utterances in terms of the network of paths they reflect, and their experiential qualities, and analyze the neural dynamics coincident with the coded speech acts. I will say a little more about how we might construe that complexity in Section 2.3, but first I explore the illustrative case.

#### **2. An Illustrative Case**

Consider a familiar story: the life worlds of families migrating to a country whose main language (or lingua franca) they do not speak—Cantonese speakers, for instance, who migrate to America. A local community, whose language the parents speak, may support them and they thrive with hard work. Unsurprisingly, parents want their children to enjoy a better life with more material advantages than themselves. They muster an education for them so they become proficient in the dominant language (English, in the illustration). Some children as they grow older perhaps continue to live within the local community and function as language brokers with respect to the wider society. Others, with progressive mastery of English and the opportunities arising from their education, move away, identify themselves as members of American culture (assume an American identity) rather than as members of their parents' diaspora, and become attriters in their first language. The salient issue here is the practical and affective communicative rupture experienced by a hypothetical young woman in the circumstances described by Liao (2021): in conversation with her parents, she is no longer fluent in Cantonese, and they speak no English.

#### *2.1. The Path Diagrams*

Imagine if you will the rich data recorded as our participant describes her thoughts and feelings in conversation with a friend. She first talks about how she has been feeling.

She expresses awkwardness at having to use a translation app as she tries to find a Cantonese word or expression, regret at the loss of Cantonese, a sense of loss of her childhood, despite the sudden recall of specific childhood memories or a felt remembrance of childhood (see Sheldon et al. 2019, for this distinction). Then in a second part of the conversation, she talks about what she has decided to do as a result of a felt recognition that parents do not live forever. Her interventions are to relearn Cantonese and to envisage a new sense of self: a Cantonese–American identity. She anticipates a transformation in her lived experience. Awkwardness in conversation now becomes part of a joint project with the parents to relearn Cantonese—an exercise, at least initially, in translanguaging perhaps (Wei 2018). She sees it is possible to laugh about the process with her parents as she reaches for her translation app once more (see Appendix A) indicates the kind of change required to accommodate such a joint endeavor in an existing hierarchical control model of speech production and comprehension. The decision to form a new Cantonese–American identity becomes the intimation of a new self-narrative grounded in shared memories elicited through conversation and parental recollections—a richer intersubjectivity.

After the first part we ask her to draw a path diagram of the factors as she sees them that contribute to her salient concern—the focus of the phenomenal field (the cognitive and affective nexus). She draws Figure 1a. In this figure we see that she attributes attrition in Cantonese to her proficiency in English. Reduced Cantonese proficiency makes her interaction with her parents more difficult, both cognitively and emotionally. In the diagram, increased English proficiency contributes to an assimilation into American culture and identity, but suppresses identity based on Cantonese heritage. This too is seen as having a negative impact. It is important to note that the diagram can express relations that are not expressed in talk, but are in the phenomenal field. After the second part, she draws Figure 1b. Here two distinct but interlinked interventions are envisaged: relearning

Cantonese and forging a new self-identity. The estimated effect of relearning Cantonese is to improve the quality of the interaction with the parents as Cantonese proficiency improves. Any such improvements yield a happier state. The second intervention, namely, the goal to create a new self-narrative based on a Cantonese–American identity, helps to integrate her life story to date. (e.g., the path from Cantonese proficiency to the interaction with parents) or are deleted (e.g., the path from American identity to Cantonese identity), or become contributory to a novel factor (e.g., Cantonese identity to Cantonese–American identity). The flow arises from the process of resolving the cognitive–affective nexus: reflecting on the issue of concern drives the transformation.

These two diagrams are snapshots of the principal relations of factors involved and so "arrest" the dynamical flow of experience. A comparison of the two snapshots provides an indication of the change in the phenomenal field arising out of the two interventions. Indeed, at the path level, the transition between the two snapshots depicts the (psychological) flow of the phenomenal field. Essentially formerly negative paths become positive

identity, but suppresses identity based on Cantonese heritage. This too is seen as having a negative impact. It is important to note that the diagram can express relations that are not expressed in talk, but are in the phenomenal field. After the second part, she draws Figure 1b. Here two distinct but interlinked interventions are envisaged: relearning Cantonese and forging a new self-identity. The estimated effect of relearning Cantonese is to improve the quality of the interaction with the parents as Cantonese proficiency improves. Any such improvements yield a happier state. The second intervention, namely, the goal to create a new self-narrative based on a Cantonese–American identity, helps to integrate her

*Languages* **2022**, *7*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 13

life story to date.

**Figure 1.** The Phenomenal Fields of an Illustrative Case: (**a**) before interventions, (**b**) after. **Figure 1.** The Phenomenal Fields of an Illustrative Case: (**a**) before interventions, (**b**) after.

*2.2. Conversation, Path Diagrams and Cognitive–Affective and Linguistic Processes*  In this part I consider the gist of the talk between our language attriter and her friend as she considers the communicative rupture with her parents and resolves to do something about it. The goal is to conjecture the cognitive–affective and linguistic processes involved as they relate to the paths in the diagrams before, in the following section, relating these to their neural bases. Her utterances, capturing paths in the diagram, sometimes take the form of an argument comprising a claim and a reason (e.g., I will feel better because I am able to talk to them) or may issue as conditional statements (e.g., If I acknowledge my heritage I will feel whole). Such arguments arise primarily out of thinking counterfactually (i.e., if only I These two diagrams are snapshots of the principal relations of factors involved and so "arrest" the dynamical flow of experience. A comparison of the two snapshots provides an indication of the change in the phenomenal field arising out of the two interventions. Indeed, at the path level, the transition between the two snapshots depicts the (psychological) flow of the phenomenal field. Essentially formerly negative paths become positive (e.g., the path from Cantonese proficiency to the interaction with parents) or are deleted (e.g., the path from American identity to Cantonese identity), or become contributory to a novel factor (e.g., Cantonese identity to Cantonese–American identity). The flow arises from the process of resolving the cognitive–affective nexus: reflecting on the issue of concern drives the transformation.

#### had… or, if I were to…). Cognitively, such thinking is a type of mental simulation and *2.2. Conversation, Path Diagrams and Cognitive–Affective and Linguistic Processes*

underlies emotions such as regret, wherein we envisage a better outcome if we had acted differently. In fact, we may choose actions that minimize anticipatory regret. We do so by In this part I consider the gist of the talk between our language attriter and her friend as she considers the communicative rupture with her parents and resolves to do something about it. The goal is to conjecture the cognitive–affective and linguistic processes involved as they relate to the paths in the diagrams before, in the following section, relating these to their neural bases.

Her utterances, capturing paths in the diagram, sometimes take the form of an argument comprising a claim and a reason (e.g., I will feel better because I am able to talk to them) or may issue as conditional statements (e.g., If I acknowledge my heritage I will feel whole). Such arguments arise primarily out of thinking counterfactually (i.e., if only I had . . . or, if I were to . . . ). Cognitively, such thinking is a type of mental simulation and underlies emotions such as regret, wherein we envisage a better outcome if we had acted differently. In fact, we may choose actions that minimize anticipatory regret. We do so by placing ourselves in a hypothetical circumstance and mentally simulate alternative courses of action that lead to a preferred outcome. This yields an argument for action and provides

the basis for responding to a question as to why we are intending to act in a particular way (cf.: Billig 1987; Green 2011; Vygotsky 1981).

My construal takes **mental simulation** as the core process, with a number of phases nested under it corresponding to separate stretches of talk as per the text. It is this mental simulation that captures the flow of the phenomenal field. I consider the talk (indicated in *italics* and not intended as vernacular) and offer a gloss of the main cognitive and affective processes involved (in **bold** and in brackets0). These glosses are high-level descriptions and are intended as indicative and simplifying. For example: **(imagine possible world)** covers both counterfactual "if only . . . "and semi-factual "even if . . . " thinking. The outcome of thinking counterfactually is the interventions to relearn Cantonese and to construct a new self-narrative. The gloss **(self-reflection)** includes the retrieval and use of autobiographical memories. The gloss **(affective attribution)** covers love, regret, blame and exoneration. Such attribution is a necessary part of thinking counterfactually, but the gloss allows a separate reference. These high-level glosses are combined on occasion to emphasize the relative weight of a process. A gloss at the beginning of a paragraph indicates the main process of the phase and, for simplicity's sake, ones at the end reference the various processes nested under it. The text in normal font that follows references the paths identified.

2.2.1. Part 1 of the Conversation Figure 1a Refers

*Well I think about my interactions with my parents* **(self-reflection)**: *I feel an emotional distance because I hardly speak Cantonese anymore and have to use a translation app. Look I know they love me and know that they know I love them. I have become distant from my Cantonese heritage as I've assumed an American identity* **(affective attribution, mental state attribution** *nested under* **self-reflection)**

These utterances reflect the paths in Figure 1a to do with Cantonese proficiency and its impact both on her conversations with her parents, and her sense of identity as a loving daughter.

*Am I to blame for this intersubjective rupture? I remember times when I was horrid to my parents and rebuked them: why had they never learned English?* **(self-reflection)** *and then think: if only I had maintained fluency in Cantonese but then (as a counterargument) they wished me to speak English fluently and are proud of me and I am proud of myself too* **(imagine possible world, affective attribution, mental state attribution** nested under **self-reflection)**

These utterances justify the inhibitory path between English proficiency and attrition in Cantonese and address the emotional complexity involved.

2.2.2. Part 2 of the Conversation Figure 1b Refers

*Well you know with the pandemic and all, I started to think. Is there a way forward out of this unhappy state?* **(imagine possible world**)

*I could let matters go* **(imagine possible world)** *but I don't want to be a stranger to them* **(self-reflection).** *If I were to do nothing I will regret it* **(affective attribution**). *Is there something I could do that will be better for myself and my parents?*

These utterances refer back initially to the state of affairs depicted in Figure 1a, and then look forward paths (interventions) in Figure 1b that could alter the cognitive–affective nexus for the better.

A: *I will relearn Cantonese* **(imagine possible world):** *I think that I can improve my Cantonese. I know I can persevere* **(metacognitive processing)** *and if I do so it'll make talking to my parents so much better.*

*And even if I do not succeed I will have tried and they will know it and that is a solace and no occasion for self-blame* **(metacognitive processing, affective attribution, mental state attribution** nested under **imagine possible world)**.

These utterances refer to a path emanating from the cognitive–affective nexus to a novel factor (relearning Cantonese) that enhances her interactions with her parents via a path coming from increased proficiency in Cantonese, and so helps resolve the issue of concern. They do not express the deletion of the negative path from English proficiency to Cantonese proficiency. Psychologically, though, this deletion signals a lack of opposition in her mind to the use of the two languages. In actual language use, given dual language activation, there will be an increased need for language control (see Kroll et al. 2015, for a review). The psychological value of the intervention is that it transforms her interactions with her parents and her future anticipated recollection of it.

B. *I will recognize my Cantonese heritage: I built an American identity at a cost of my personal history* **(self-reflection)**. *But if I work on my Cantonese heritage (e.g., my parents' life histories and culture) I do not want it to be in conflict with my American identity I will create a new Cantonese-American identity* **(imagine possible world** nested **under self-reflection).**

These utterances refer to a driving input from the cognitive–affective nexus to a novel factor—an imagined Cantonese–American identity in which her American identity no longer suppresses her heritage identity, but together with it contributes to a to-becreated identity. The path diagram also indicates something that is not directly expressed, that forging the new identity is envisaged to resolve the concern and also improve her interactions with her parents. Their life histories are a way for her to learn about her heritage, but also such conversations may well ground or embody her learning of Cantonese just as the initial learning of a language is learning a habit of conduct (Merleau-Ponty 1964).

#### *2.3. The Neurophenomenology of Resolving the Cognitive–Affective Nexus*

Neural dynamics can be captured at multiple scales, both spatial and temporal, reflecting self-organizing networks. Naming the coordination of regions as networks tuned to certain functions does not imply that the regions involved are specialized for such a function any more than the so-called word form area is specialized for word recognition. The functional profile of a region depends on the full set of its interconnections (Price and Friston 2005). The high-level descriptions likely cover a range of component processes, and so only detailed task comparisons may delimit the functional profile. However, it is convenient, and least tendentious here, to map the high-order process descriptions such as mental simulation to large-scale attentional networks. Table 1 references research that has associated the mental processes, such as mental simulation, that I have identified in the construction of the paths in the path diagrams with such large-scale networks or neural regions.

If the construal offered here is correct, there is analytic complexity to any analysis of neural data. The construal implicates a hierarchy of control in which one process is nested, at least transiently, within another (see also Green 2019). For example, in holding a conversation, we need to sustain attention on that goal whilst also calling on different networks as we change topics of conversation from talking about a shared external current scene to reporting a memory. Here nested under the goal to sustain attention to conversation, the attentional network mediating mental simulation, for example, must be sustained over some duration, as other networks and regions are coopted for other purposes. At a minimum, whilst perceptual and sensory processing continues, this entails that a network engaged in the fulfilment of some external task (e.g., the dorsal attentional network, **DAN**) is down-regulated or suppressed, at least temporarily, to allow internally focused attention to act. The default mode network (**DMN**) mediates such attention and its recruitment coincides with an increase alpha oscillation over parietal regions consistent with the suppression of **DAN** (e.g., Higgins et al. 2021). The **DMN** forms a core network for mental simulation and counter-factual thinking that is crucial to feelings of regret or self-blame (as expressed in her talk), and also in identifying suitable interventions. Such thinking requires distinguishing the present world from the imagined world, and is postulated to require a fronto-parietal and a cingulo-opercular network for its control (see van Hoeck

et al. 2015). It also involves recruiting regions or networks that offer grounds for believing in the effectiveness of an intervention. Part of the reason she gives for undertaking to relearn Cantonese is the confidence she feels in her ability to persevere. Such a feeling is metacognitive and is associated with computations in rostral and dorsal prefrontal regions (Fleming and Dolan 2012).


**Table 1.** Resolving the cognitive–affective nexus: mapping to large-scale attentional networks.

**Key: DMN** default mode network; **FPC** fronto-parietal control network; **C-O C** cingulo-opercular control network; **AI** anterior insula; **PFC** prefrontal cortex; **PCC** posterior cingulate cortex; **dlPFC** dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; **mPFC** medial prefrontal cortex; **vmPFC** ventromedial prefrontal cortex; **mOFC** medial orbito frontal cortex**; plOFC** posterior lateral orbito-frontal cortex.

At the heart of the present proposal is the driving role of affect. Affective processing is integral as it instigates the search for a preferred state (via mental simulation) and selects actions that plausibly lead to that state. van Hoeck et al. (2015) refer to an emotion and value processing network. It is the one mediating affective attribution and connects the amygdalae, striatum and frontal cortices, and in the proposal here is core to the cognitive– affective nexus and the drive to identify options expressed in the pathways of the path diagram to resolve a personal state of unhappiness. If this proposal has merit then it is reasonable to expect this network of regions to increase in activation as it provides a coordinating hub for identifying possible interventions. Such activation should then precede utterances that reference such interventions.

We can go further in our neurophenomenological approach. After the scan, we ask her what she was thinking and feeling at different moments in the scan. Retrospective experiential sampling of her experience at different time periods during the scan can deepen what can be inferred from her utterances (see Gonzalez-Castillo et al. 2021; Jääskeläinen et al. 2022; Jachs 2021, for discussion and use of such methods). We should expect retrospective sampling to reveal episodes of mental simulation subsuming periods of self-reflection and counterfactual thinking. Further, if she was asked to trace the felt psychological importance over successive time intervals (see Jachs 2021, for such a method) we might find high importance to be associated with the explicit recall of autobiographical memories under the dominance of the default mode network. Conceivably, as proposed above, the affective network is the primary driver of episodes in which she considers possible interventions, and so should precede episodes where she identifies the proposed interventions.

Analytically, the need is to explore the transient and flexible reorganization and coordination of the various neural networks implicated. Fortunately, researchers are actively exploring techniques such as Hidden Markov modeling to do so (e.g., Chen et al. 2017), which can be applied to both magnetoencepholography data (Tibon et al. 2021) as well as to functional magnetic resonance imaging data (Quinn et al. 2018).

#### *2.4. Further Tests and Predictions*

I considered above how to explore the neurophenomenal field of our hypothetical attriter as she talked with a friend about the communicative rupture with her parents. Testing the proposal in this way may seem a promissory note if it involves full multimodal recording including body movement, facial expression and hand gestures, though that prospect may not be too far distant for certain neural-based signals, as wearable optically pumped magnetometers provide fine multichannel sensitivity for magnetoencephalography systems (e.g., Tierney et al. 2019). In this section I consider other ways to make use of the perceived structure of the phenomenal field together with retrospective experience sampling, and relate it to its neural basis.

We talk not only to others but to ourselves. Self-talk engages parts of the languagesensitive networks too (e.g., Jones and Fernyhough 2007; Grandchamp et al. 2019; Barber et al. 2021), and can concern all manner of topics. On the basis of such research, we can perform a type of resting state scan with our attriter. We ask her to silently think about and think through the issue of concern. After the scan, as previously, she draws a path diagram of the factors she considered important with its focus (the cognitive–affective nexus), and indicates how that diagram changed in the light of the intervention to relearn Cantonese and to forge a new sense of identity. Then, we make use of retrospective sampling to enhance our mapping from the subjective to the neural.

I have explored the value of path diagrams in understanding the neurophenomenal field of a hypothetical bilingual speaker. The approach can be extended with a novel between-subject protocol. We can ask bilingual speakers with common experiences and those from different community backgrounds and experiences to construct path diagrams with respect to a key issue of concern for them as bilingual speakers (see Beatty-Martínez et al. 2020, for the value of comparing bilingual speakers from different backgrounds in understanding behavioral data). Now, we record their neural responses as they listen to the narrative of our language attriter. We know from prior research that neural responses between speaker and listener couple or align most closely when listeners comprehend what is being said (Stephens et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2017). Under the novel protocol, we use path diagrams to predict time periods in the narrative that may have the most direct relevance to each individual., i.e., we predict periods of heightened cognitive–affective response. We can test these predictions by asking listeners retrospectively to profile their reactions at different time periods (e.g., as per Jachs 2021), and coordinate these with respect to their individual neural response. Under this type of protocol, the idea would be to examine whether or not the variety of neural response across participants as they listen to a common narrative can be explained by the phenomenal characterization of their personal bilingual histories. Studies of this type explore the neurophenomenal fields of different bilingual speakers.

#### **3. Review: Characterizing the Neurophenomenal Field**

The neural bases of language use in conversation between bilinguals will remain opaque to understanding until we capture the subjective experiences of the participants as well—we need to understand the neurophenomenal field. This paper proposes that we can use path diagrams (see Figure 1a,b) to capture the psychological structure of the phenomenal field: its cognitive–affective nexus (the focus), and the important factors and their path interrelations that bear on it. Such diagrams, together with further path qualities yielded by retrospective experience sampling, can inform the mapping between subjective experience—the flow of the phenomenal field—and its neural bases.

This paper has illustrated the approach by considering the neurophenomenal field of a hypothetical bilingual speaker reflecting on a matter of cognitive and affective significance for her in two contexts: one as she talked to a friend and a second as she thought about it silently. The matter of concern (the topic) was that she was an attriter in Cantonese, the language of her parents, and they spoke no English—a language in which she was proficient. Her path diagram indicated that by relearning Cantonese and forging a new self-identity (a Cantonese–American identity), she could resolve the cognitive–affective nexus. I treated

mental simulation as a fundamental process in envisaging an alternative state of affairs from the present, and allowed the nesting of other processes (e.g., ones linked to the retrieval of personal memories) within it. By mapping such processes to high-level attentional network (such as the default mode network), it is possible to conjecture the neural bases of her talk. Retrospective experience sampling after the scanning allows such conjectures to be tested and refined. A third context envisaged bilinguals from either a common or a distinct background listening to her talk. Using the same basic procedures (path diagrams, retrospective experience sampling) allows assessment of the neurophenomenal fields of different bilingual speakers in response to an identical input.

Path diagrams aim to capture the psychological factors and their relations, as perceived by the bilingual, that bear on a key issue. The subjective flow of the phenomenal field is induced by resolving the cognitive–affective nexus through an intervention. It is a driving vector that can alter the polarity of the relations in the field—changing a negative relation, for example, to a positive one. Interventions issue in particular kinds of utterance (e.g., If I do X then Y will follow), and reflect the individual's understanding or model of their world.

Which kinds of interventions are considered are likely to depend not only on the polarity of the relations expressed in the path diagram, but also on their strength. The strength of a relation may commend it as a candidate intervention likely to have the greatest impact. Retrospective experience sampling, I have suggested, is a way to profile the likely multidimensional nature of the paths, and so amplify our ability to capture the neurophenomenal field. Other methods, involving more detailed enquiry with actual speakers (e.g., using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis—Smith et al. 2009) may reveal phenomenological fields of greater complexity. The empirical question is then the extent to which the increased richness derived from such methods further enhances the explanation of the neural dynamics. It would also be valuable to have a more formal characterization of subjective experience in order to explore this question. The pioneering work of Székely (1965) offers a possible formalism for capturing the affective and cognitive content of inner experience.

Perhaps it goes without saying that just because a speaker recognizes a matter of concern does not entail that they wish to do anything about it. That decision depends on their stance with respect to the issue. Self-talk may yield acceptance of the state of affairs (che sera, sera). For the hypothetical individual, I considered such a stance was not part of the narrative of herself.

I illustrated a neurophenomenal approach with respect to a particular topic related to language use in a speaker who was an attriter in the language of her parents. Such diagrams also offer a way to identify individual differences in the subjective demands of learning a language later in life. Consider the urgent demand to learn a new language experienced by refugees from war living in a new culture. Such a demand will strongly characterize the cognitive–affective nexus of their phenomenal field. Allowing individuals to depict the key psychological factors that they perceive as stressing and de-stressing offers a way to identify potential interventions to support their language learning. Such interventions (e.g., physical exercise; joint music-making) may not be directly related to language learning, but directed at reducing the effects of stress on the network of cortical and subcortical regions involved in the cognitive control required for language learning (Green 2018; and see Sousa 2016, for a synoptic review of the effects of stress on the cortical and subcortical networks involved in cognitive control.) If successful, such efforts will be reflected in changes in the neurophenomenal field of such bilinguals.

Language concerns also arise for proficient speakers. As noted in the Introduction, a felt disjointedness when discussing feelings in one language rather than another may also merit an intervention in the phenomenal field (e.g., Wierzbicka 2004). In such circumstances, only a recognition of the fact of disjointedness may offer a way to circumvent irritation. Figure 2a,b below proposes an intervention in which the person shifts their pragmatic frame. When they use English, rather than their native tongue (Polish), they "act in English", meaning that they feel but do not worry about the discrepancy in emotional

nuance, allowing for covering phrases such as "it's not quite how I'm feeling" to signal this discrepancy. It would be interesting to know whether such reframing alters the neurophenomenology of language use. tional nuance, allowing for covering phrases such as "it's not quite how I'm feeling" to signal this discrepancy. It would be interesting to know whether such reframing alters the neurophenomenology of language use.

(Green 2018; and see Sousa 2016, for a synoptic review of the effects of stress on the cortical and subcortical networks involved in cognitive control.) If successful, such efforts will be

Language concerns also arise for proficient speakers. As noted in the Introduction, a felt disjointedness when discussing feelings in one language rather than another may also merit an intervention in the phenomenal field (e.g., Wierzbicka 2004). In such circumstances, only a recognition of the fact of disjointedness may offer a way to circumvent irritation. Figure 2a,b below proposes an intervention in which the person shifts their pragmatic frame. When they use English, rather than their native tongue (Polish), they "act in English", meaning that they feel but do not worry about the discrepancy in emo-

*Languages* **2022**, *7*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 13

reflected in changes in the neurophenomenal field of such bilinguals.

**Figure 2.** A frame shift intervention designed to accept the perceived incomparability of language use suffused by distinct cultural identities. (**a**) before the intervention, (**b**) after the intervention (please see text for exposition). **Figure 2.** A frame shift intervention designed to accept the perceived incomparability of language use suffused by distinct cultural identities. (**a**) before the intervention, (**b**) after the intervention (please see text for exposition).

Depicting phenomenal fields in path diagrams is widely applicable beyond issues concerned with language use as such. Conversations cover a range of topics, and speakers may have a range of issues of concern that they wish to discuss. Understanding the neural basis of conversation between bilingual speakers requires not only tracking neural activity in language-eloquent networks and tracking the large-scale attention networks as different topics are covered (Green 2019), but also tracking the thoughts and feelings as such topics are discussed. Path diagrams together with experience sampling offer a way to do Depicting phenomenal fields in path diagrams is widely applicable beyond issues concerned with language use as such. Conversations cover a range of topics, and speakers may have a range of issues of concern that they wish to discuss. Understanding the neural basis of conversation between bilingual speakers requires not only tracking neural activity in language-eloquent networks and tracking the large-scale attention networks as different topics are covered (Green 2019), but also tracking the thoughts and feelings as such topics are discussed. Path diagrams together with experience sampling offer a way to do so.

so. In conclusion, and in line with Varela's (1996) exhortation for the necessity of neurophenomenology in the study of human consciousness, I hope I have provided grounds for believing that with the use of path diagrams, on-line scanning and experience sampling, we can explore the neural bases of subjective states during conversations between In conclusion, and in line with Varela's (1996) exhortation for the necessity of neurophenomenology in the study of human consciousness, I hope I have provided grounds for believing that with the use of path diagrams, on-line scanning and experience sampling, we can explore the neural bases of subjective states during conversations between bilingual speakers, ushering in a neurophenomenology of the bilingual speaker.

bilingual speakers, ushering in a neurophenomenology of the bilingual speaker.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not Applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not Applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Acknowledgments:** I thank Judith Kroll and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Appendix A Appendix A**

**Figure** A**1.** Mapping the speech act when a word or phrase is unknown in the target language (adapted from Green 2019). **Figure A1.** Mapping the speech act when a word or phrase is unknown in the target language (adapted from Green 2019).

Appendix A sketches the mapping of a speech act into overt speech in the context of conversation. It depicts the intimate relation between speech production processes and the comprehension of another's speech and own speech. The intention to speak about a particular topic recruits knowledge represented in a conceptual domain, and drives the activation of lexical concepts and constructions in functionally separable language networks. Outputs from the networks are gated for entry into the planning process as per language control processes (see Green 2019, for further details). Where no word or phrase is available in the target language, and switching between languages is precluded because there is no shared language, the speaker uses an external translation app. The path indicated in Figure 1 is that app use is initiated once the monitoring circuits detects the problem. Output from the app becomes speech input that is mapped into the language network before release via the gate into the utterance plan. Appendix A sketches the mapping of a speech act into overt speech in the context of conversation. It depicts the intimate relation between speech production processes and the comprehension of another's speech and own speech. The intention to speak about a particular topic recruits knowledge represented in a conceptual domain, and drives the activation of lexical concepts and constructions in functionally separable language networks. Outputs from the networks are gated for entry into the planning process as per language control processes (see Green 2019, for further details). Where no word or phrase is available in the target language, and switching between languages is precluded because there is no shared language, the speaker uses an external translation app. The path indicated in Figure 1 is that app use is initiated once the monitoring circuits detects the problem. Output from the app becomes speech input that is mapped into the language network before release via the gate into the utterance plan.

#### **References**

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**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not Applicable. Andersen, Ditte, Signe Ravn, and Rachel Thomson. 2020. Narrative sensemaking and prospective social action: Methodological challenges and new directions. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 23: 367–75. [CrossRef]

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.


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dimensions of inner speech within a hierarchical predictive control framework. *Frontiers in Psychology* 10: 2019. [CrossRef] Green, David W. 1997. Explaining and envisaging an ecological phenomenon. *British Journal of Psychology* 88: 199–217. [CrossRef]

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## *Article* **The Nature and Function of Languages**

**Franco Fabbro 1,\*, Alice Fabbro <sup>2</sup> and Cristiano Crescentini <sup>1</sup>**


**Abstract:** Several studies in philosophy, linguistics and neuroscience have tried to define the nature and functions of language. Cybernetics and the mathematical theory of communication have clarified the role and functions of signals, symbols and codes involved in the transmission of information. Linguistics has defined the main characteristics of verbal communication by analyzing the main tasks and levels of language. Paleoanthropology has explored the relationship between cognitive development and the origin of language in *Homo sapiens*. According to Daniel Dor, language represents the most important technological invention of human beings. Seemingly, the main function of language consists of its ability to allow the sharing of the mind's imaginative products. Following language's invention, human beings have developed multiple languages and cultures, which, on the one hand, have favored socialization within communities and, on the other hand, have led to an increase in aggression between different human groups.

**Keywords:** communication; symbols; neural recycling; cultural identities

**Citation:** Fabbro, Franco, Alice Fabbro, and Cristiano Crescentini. 2022. The Nature and Function of Languages. *Languages* 7: 303. https://doi.org/10.3390/ languages7040303

Academic Editors: John W. Schwieter, Raquel Fernández Fuertes and Juana M. Liceras

Received: 16 May 2022 Accepted: 22 November 2022 Published: 28 November 2022

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

#### **1. Introduction**

For over two thousand years philosophers, theologians and poets have reflected on the nature of language (Heidegger 1959; Panikkar 2007). More recently, scientific disciplines, from linguistics to computer science, have also sought to clarify its characteristics and functions (Sapir 1921; Jakobson and Waugh 1979; Borden et al. 2006). Nevertheless, in spite of thousands of books and articles, both theoretical and experimental, the nature of language still remains rather enigmatic (Lieberman 2013; Scott-Phillips 2015; Corballis 2017a, 2017b).

In the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, language is defined as a symbolic system (composed of sounds, hand gestures or letters) created by a social group to facilitate human expression. According to this perspective, the functions of language include communication, cultural identity, play and imaginative and emotional expression (Britannica n.d.). The Italian encyclopedia *Treccani* also specifies that language is an exclusive faculty of human beings allowing for the expression of consciousness' contents through a conventional symbolic system (Treccani n.d.). These definitions, albeit general, highlight characteristic aspects of language: its communicative function, its symbolic nature and its ability to express and share consciousness' contents.

#### **2. Language as a Communication System**

Communication is a particular form of transport in which what is moved is neither matter nor energy but "information" (Escarpit 1976). Yet, information cannot exist without a material substrate, though it is not reducible to it (Longo 1998). For example, sending a telegram to New York saying "*all right*" would require the same amount of energy and matter as sending "*gar lilth*" instead. Both telegrams are composed of two words and the same eight letters arranged in a different order. Transmitting either message would require an equal amount of energy and matter; although, only the first would convey understandable information. Thus, information is to be regarded as something altogether different from its material supports (Wiener 1948).

Every communication system, be it verbal expression, telephone lines, radio channels or the internet, consists of at least three elements: an *emitter* (source or transmitter), a *receiver* and the *channel* carrying information from the emitter to the receiver. The information source (emitter) selects the "message" and encodes it in a "code" that is a set of "signs" or "symbols" which are represented by "signals" compatible and specific to the channel in use (Pierce 1961; Singh 1966). For example, the channel of a telegraph can only transmit electric current impulses of two possible durations: a short impulse (dot) and a long impulse (line). Accordingly, all letters of the alphabet have to be codified as a series of symbols made up of sets of lines and dots before being transmitted (Singh 1999).

To date, information's nature remains rather elusive (Dodig-Crnkovic and Burgin 2019). Information plays an essential role in the functioning of living systems (cells, organisms and societies) and in the regulation of some man-made devices, in particular, in self-regulating systems such as thermostats and electronic processors. Norbert Weiner, in one of the earliest definitions of information, describes it as being neither matter nor energy (Wiener 1948, p. 132; Montagnini 2015). According to Gregory Bateson (1972), information has to do with the notion of "difference": for example, maps are representations of territorial differences (roads, hills, mountains, cities). If all land was alike and presented no discernible features, there would be no information. Giuseppe Longo has thus proposed to define information as a "difference that generates a difference to somebody" (Longo 1998; Longo and Vaccaro 2013). Such definition necessarily implies the existence of an observer (man or machine) able to detect and/or produce differences.

Transferring information through a channel while limiting the interference of "noise", which tends to distort and shatter messages, is considered a crucial aspect of communication by mathematicians and engineers alike. In the monograph entitled *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (1949), Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver maintain that the fundamental engineering problem of communication is to reproduce in one point (A), in an exact, or more or less approximate way, a message originating in another point (B) (Shannon and Weaver 1949). Such two points can be separated in "space" or "time". In this sense, communication then not only concerns the spatial transfer of information, but also its storage on physical supports.

Shannon was concerned with the technical aspects of communication, and in order to make mathematical observations, he isolated information from its semantic contents (Longo 1998, p. 28; Longo and Vaccaro 2013, pp. 22–23). In such a manner it was possible to relate it to the concepts of uncertainty and entropy. The level of information depends on the number of possible messages: if only one message is possible, there is no uncertainty and therefore no information. Moreover, information is related to probability, therefore, to a certain element of surprise. The smaller a message's likelihood, the more informative it is. By elaborating on these concepts, Shannon established an equation to quantify the amount of information contained in a message, regardless of its meaning. This quantity was related to the average logarithm of the improbability of the message. It was basically a measure of its unpredictability (Gleick 2011).

Establishing that information was not a concept of the physical discipline, and could not be related to either matter or energy, called for the invention of a new unit of measurement in order to define it. Shannon had the brilliant intuition to think of information as something allowing to answer a question with either a "yes" or a "no". The answer of such question can take one of two possible values: "1" (yes) or "0" (no). Thus, each question corresponds to a *Binary Digit* or a bit. For example, it is possible to precisely define a number between one and one hundred by asking a series of questions that can be answered with "yes" or "no". "Is the number greater than 50?" (Yes). "Is the number lesser than 75?" (No), and so on. According to this perspective, any question with a possible answer can be codified in sequences of "1" and "0" and can thus be measured in bits. Since language is a set of symbols (phonemes or letters of the alphabet), it too can be rendered in a series of bits. For example, as each letter of the English alphabet can be coded in five bits, an average book of about four hundred letters approximately contains two million bits of information.

Conceptualizing language as a communication system (*Code Model*) is a major model of linguistic analysis. However, as language is not only a system for the transmission of information but performs other functions, it can be examined through other analytical frameworks (Scott-Phillips 2015).

#### **3. Signs, Symbols and Codes**

Information sources emit message units. These units are exchanged by means of a code (such as the genetic code, the alphabetic code, the Morse code, etc.) between the emitter (encoder) and the receiver (decoder) (de Saussure 1922). The code is a list of units, called symbols, that constitute the message. Symbols are signs in which the relationship between what is being represented and its representation is arbitrary (Mazzone 2005; Deacon 1997). The word *sign* derives from the Latin "*signum*" and describes "something referring to something else" (Peirce 1931–1935), as claimed medieval philosophers: *alquid stat pro aliquo* (Bettetini 1963; Mazzone 2005). The word *symbol* derives from the Greek *symbolon* (σ*υ*´µβoλoν) which means: "to cast together", "to connect", "make coincide". The symbol for the Greeks originally designated an object, a tile, a fragment of ceramic or metal that was divided in the stipulation of an economic, emotional or spiritual contract. Each party kept a piece in token of their agreement. Upon meeting, the fragments of the *symbolon* were brought together to honor the bond and commemorate the economic, emotional or spiritual ties uniting them (Mazzone 2005). Aristotle emphasized above all the conventional and relational aspect of language's symbols (words) (*De Interpretatione*, (Aristotle 1962)). Symbols are entities in relation with one another, and for this reason the meaning of a word opposes and differs from the words surrounding it.

Each symbol of language has two faces: the signifier and the signified. The mathematical theory of communication has been interested above all in the signifier and its characteristics: encoding and decoding, resistance to noise, speed of transmission. To return to our earlier example, sending a message via telegraph requires that the letters of the alphabet be encoded in the symbols of the Morse code. The individual letters transformed into Morse symbols are then sent through a series of short (dot) and long (line) pulses, minimizing the effects of noise along the telegraph line. Other areas of general communication theory, such as semantics and pragmatics, are more interested in aspects related to meaning and the communicative context (Longo 2001). A fundamental aspect, which is often forgotten, is that at the origin and at the end of most of the experiences of coding or decoding a message, we always find "language". It is a very particular form of communication that presupposes thinking and speaking individuals, who have tacitly agreed upon an interpretative code among themselves through an action of social coordination (Singh 1966; Escarpit 1976; Mazzone 2005).

In a series of reflections developed in the biophysical context, Howard Pattee analyzed the most significant characteristics present in cultural (such as language) and biological (such as the genetic code) symbolic systems (Pattee 2008, 2015; Pattee and Kull 2009; Pattee and R ˛aczaszek-Leonardi 2012). According to Pattee, "symbols" are "formal entities that stand for something else" (representing something else).

The first defining characteristic of symbols is that they are constituted by physical structures. In fact, all codes, rules and even the most abstract descriptions related to the symbolic dimension have well-defined physical bases. For example, DNA is formed by nucleotides, phonemes are made up of sound signals and even the letters of the alphabet consist of signs drawn on paper. The second characteristic concerns the aspect of reproducibility. The symbolic structures can be transmitted through their replication, which is articulated first in a process of "reading" and then in a process of "copying". The third characteristic refers to arbitrariness. All the symbolic structures, aside from being informative (highly improbable), present a complete arbitrariness between the "signifier" (phonemes, letters, nucleotides) and the "signified". The arbitrary relationship between

symbols and their meaning depends on the history of that particular symbolic system (the history of languages or the history of the genetic code). Indeed, at the lowest level of organization, no symbol carries any meaning (i.e., no phoneme or no nucleotide refers to anything significant). The effects of the symbols are highlighted within a dynamic system capable of generating more or less complex structures. Symbolic systems are historically determined and represent "memories of possibility"; they are coordinated adaptations with biological, psychological or social reality.

#### **4. The Symbolic Nature of Language**

Compared to DNA and psyche, language is the symbolic domain that is most "external" (Fabbro 2021a, 2021b). It is a symbolic system constituted by several layers. At the most superficial level, sounds are symbols for phonemes. In turn, sequences of phonemes are symbols for words, while strings of words form symbols for sentences and, finally, ordered chains of sentences constitute symbols for narratives and stories.

All languages are made up of symbolic systems nested within one another and sharing some universal properties (Hockett 1960). The first is the *duality of structure*: all human languages use meaningless signs (phonemes), which combine into ordered sequences of sounds with meaning (words). The second characteristic refers to *arbitrariness*, which is one of the fundamental concepts of all symbolic systems. In language, this concept indicates that there is no physical similarity between a symbol (word) and the object that it represents. Within a linguistic community, phonemes, words and numerous grammatical aspects are passed on from one generation to the next (*transmission*) through usage and learning (de Saussure 1922; Thorpe 1972).

Like DNA, languages have a *linear code*. This implies that every verbal expression is made up at the most superficial level of a string of words that, at the deepest level, presents a hidden structure (syntax). Linearity manifests a fundamental aspect of spoken languages, namely the temporal arrangement of acoustic signals along a timeline (de Saussure 1922). An additional property of languages, which is also shared by DNA, is *discreteness*. The sound symbols of a language (phonemes) are represented by a discrete number of elements (in Italian = 30; in English = 44). The same can be said of words; there are no intermediate sentences between a sentence composed of "n" words and a sentence composed of "n + 1" words (Moro 2006).

Another important feature is *recursiveness*, which is the ability to infinitely repeat a process within the same structure. Since a sentence can consist of a nominal syntagm (SN) plus a verbal syntagm (VS) [S = NS + SV], and the verbal syntagm can consist of a verb plus a nominal syntagm or a verb plus another sentence [VS = V + NS or VS = V + S], it is possible to recursively expand a sentence by inserting another sentence at the level of the verbal syntagm. For example, "Marco is wearing a sweater" + "The sweater cost 100 euros" = "Marco is wearing a sweater that cost 100 euros". Recursiveness accounts for another property of languages: *openness*, that is, the possibility of producing sentences that are always new or have never been uttered before. As a result of recursiveness and openness, every speaker can generate an almost infinite number of sentences.

The rules that determine the organization of words within a sentence are called 'syntax'. Each language has specific syntactic rules. For some, such as Latin, word order has only rhetorical significance. In fact, in Latin there is little difference between the sentences: "*hominem videt femina*" or "*femina videt hominem*", while in English the order of the words is very important: the sentence "the child eats the chicken" means something very different from the sentence "the chicken eats the child" (Sapir 1921). Within human languages, there is an enormous variety of phonemes, words and grammatical rules. Nevertheless, there exist some restraints in their choice and implementation.

The repertoire of phonemes that humans can produce is limited. The phonoarticulatory organs and the nerve structures that coordinate them have structural and physiological constraints. Likewise, it is not possible to pronounce words that are too long (e.g., composed of 500 phonemes) because at a certain point the air emitted during exhalation runs out. Based on these premises, many linguists, starting from Noam Chomsky, have argued that there are limits also in the possible syntactic rules. Therefore, the set of syntactic rules of all languages would be delimited by a system of categories, mechanisms and constraints called "universal grammar". Universal grammar seems to be related to the ways in which the brain develops, organizes and functions, which in turn are related to specific genetic information that has probably evolved over hundreds of thousands of years within a context of a musical nature (glossolalic singing) (Mithen 2005; Patel 2008; Fabbro 2018).

#### **5. The Invention of Language**

Humans belong to the class of *Mammals* and the order of *Primates*, which emerged about 80 million years ago and comprises about 400 species, including prosimians (tarsiers and lemurs), monkeys and anthropomorphic apes. The Hominid family, which includes our species, separated from the latter about 5–7 million years ago. The most significant characteristic that distinguishes hominids from other primates is the bipedal gait (Manzi 2017). Adapting to bipedal locomotion brought about a series of anatomical modifications, concerning the conformation of the lower limbs and feet, and important physiological transformations at the level of the respiratory system and central nervous system. The bipedal gait modified the respiratory rhythm allowing for an extended expiratory phase, a fundamental requirement to develop the ability to laugh, sing and speak (Provine 2000).

*Homo sapiens*, the only extant species of hominids, appeared in Africa about 300,000 years ago. Fossil remains attributed to *H. sapiens* have been found in Ethiopia (dated 195,000 years ago) and Morocco (dated about 300,000 years ago). The modern human presents a more gracile and slender structure than the Neanderthal man, with a brain volume of about 1400 cubic centimeters in *H. sapiens* and about 1600 cc in H. neanderthalensis. Paleoanthropologists believe that modern humans seem to have come from an eastern or southeastern region of Africa and then spread across the continent. They subsequently migrated, in several waves, to Eurasia and the rest of the world (Tattersall 2012).

For a long period of time, more than 200,000 years, H. sapiens did not produce any technological innovations: its lifestyle and style in manufacturing lithic tools was similar to that of other extant hominid species (*H. erectus*, *H. heildebergensis*, *H. neanderthalensis*, Denisova man). The only significant distinction consisted in a different organizational structure of human villages. In fact, modern humans present, in all hunter-gatherer cultures studied, a more numerous social structure than that of the other hominids. About 80–90 thousand years ago, *H. sapiens* began to manifest great creativity by producing ornaments, decorations and complex tools that involved the development of symbolic thinking. This was unprecedented. Numerous anthropologists, psychologists and linguists have wondered about the causes behind this qualitative leap in culture and technology. Some have concluded that what brought about this *cognitive revolution* was most probably the appearance of articulated language (Tattersall 2012; Lieberman 2013; Corballis 2015; Chomsky 2016).

Not much seems to have changed at the genetic, anatomical and physiological levels in *H. sapiens* since its appearance 80,000 years ago. For this reason, some neuroscientists and paleoanthropologists, including Israel Rosenfield and Ian Tattersall, have argued that a group of *H. sapiens* located in a southeastern region of Africa probably "invented" articulate language (Rosenfield 1992; Tattersall 2012; Fabbro 2018). Evidently this was not a "conscious invention", but rather a kind of social game probably developed by a sufficiently large group of children who lived together for a few generations. The hypothesis that articulate language was invented and did not evolve, as many biologists, linguists and psychologists have long argued (Pinker 1994; Dunbar 2014; Corballis 2002, 2017a), is supported by the recent discovery that at least two languages emerged from nowhere in a group of children in Nicaragua and in a community of Bedouins in the Negev desert (Senghas et al. 2004; Senghas 2005).

Nicaraguan sign language is the first language invented by a group of children to have been thoroughly studied (Tattersall 2012; Bausani 1974; Fabbro 1996). Towards the end of the 1970s, after the victory of the Sandinista revolution, a special school dedicated to the education of deaf and mute children was established in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua. Initially, 50 children were brought together, joined by more than 200 in 1981, a number that gradually grew in the years that followed. The school aimed to teach deaf–mute children to lip-read the Spanish language, a goal that was not achieved. Instead, just within the span of two generations, the children spontaneously invented Nicaraguan Sign Language.

The first generation shared a set of signs that they had developed in the domestic context of their families (*homesigns*). These signs did not represent an actual sign language yet, but rather a form of gestural communication. In contrast, the second generation of deaf children, younger in age, was able to develop a grammatically complete language on the basis of the signs shared by children of the previous generation. The younger children were able to categorize the gestures of the older students, generating a true grammar, i.e., a set of abstract categories capable of regulating the relationships between different symbolic units. Only younger children were able to transform "gestures" into "symbols". This confirms the hypothesis that a language can only be "acquired" in a complete form or "invented" by children who have not yet reached puberty (Senghas et al. 2004; Fabbro 2004).

The invention of articulated verbal communication (language) by (deaf–mute) children indicates that language has not evolved but has been invented (Rosenfield 1992). This means that some biological bases of language (concerning phonology and syntax) have evolved within vocal behaviors that are much more archaic than language, such as glossolalic singing. Spoken language is the most important technology serving the transmission of mental content. Other systems used for the transmission of mental contents are written language and mathematics. Overall, these all are technical and cognitive skills that, on the basis of pre-adaptation (*exaptation*) phenomena, have conquered brain territories that originally evolved to compensate for other functions (Dehaene and Cohen 2007; Dehaene 1997, 2009; Fabbro 2018, 2021a).

#### **6. What Is Language's Purpose?**

According to many authors, language is a form of communication (Miller 1975, 1987). However, it is possible to communicate effectively even without language: many animal species communicate very well even without speech. Recently, Daniel Dor argued that language is a technology aimed at sharing imagination (Dor 2014, 2015, 2016). According to this perspective, the task of the speaker is to provide clues about their own mental representations, while the addressee tries to reconstruct the mental representations of the speaker through a chain of interpretative processes (Scott-Phillips 2015). In fact, for every "literal meaning" of a word or a sentence, there are infinite possible modulations of meaning (also related to pragmatic aspects). This fact determines one of the most typical characteristics of language, namely the "pervasiveness of indeterminacy" (Scott-Phillips 2015). This is a limitation given that verbal expression does not allow a direct (literal) grasp of reality; at the same time, it allows a varied range of interpretative possibilities.

Like all technologies, language is a system for achieving a purpose, namely the construction of a network of psychic individualities that exchange the contents of their imaginations. It is an unconventional type of technology, similar to money, contracts and legal systems. Since human beings are social organisms, language's invention and its development were accomplished as collective processes. Individual minds can be viewed as the "nodes" of a metaphorical Web, in which language constitutes the software that each human being downloads into their own mind and uses to help achieve an imaginative community (Barabási 2002; Dor 2015).

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836) was one of the first linguists to emphasize the central role that imagination plays within language. In his opinion, human languages are not tools for naming objects that have already been thought, but rather organs used for the formulation of thought. Similarly, Daniel Dor considers language as the "mother of all inventions" (Dor 2015). According to this perspective, it was the invention of language that really gave rise to human beings. Thus, the first and most important technological product of human beings is language. At the same time, language has changed us radically.

The unintentional invention of language has occurred repeatedly throughout human history (Fabbro 2018). Deaf and mute children in Nicaragua who spontaneously invented a new sign language were able to experience the passage of the "magical frontier of language" and compare it to their previous lives. The experience was described as inconceivable, disconcerting and astounding; what struck these children most was the realization of the abysmal loneliness of their lives prior to entering the sphere of language (Schaller 1991; Senghas et al. 2004).

The relationships between language and technology are much closer than is commonly assumed. One aspect shared by both language and technology is recursiveness. In fact, all technological tools are constituted by components that are assembled according to a hierarchical structure. Technologies are comprised of technological components that contain smaller components within them, made up of even more elementary components (such as screws, vanes, bolts, etc.). Thus, modern technology is similar to a language that is open to the creation of new structures and functions (Arthur 2009). For these reasons, we believe that it is not a coincidence that the cultural and technological explosion that followed the cognitive revolution, some 80,000 years ago, is related to the most important invention made by humankind, namely the invention of language. Finally, some interesting evolutionary psychology studies, developed by Robin Dunbar (1996, 2014), have analyzed the possible role that vocal communication and language play in strengthening social bonds and reducing stress.

#### **7. Languages as the Bedrock of Cultural Identities**

It is likely that the first language split into several others just under a few hundred years after its invention. In fact, language can arise only from other human languages. The emergence of dialects is favored by a combination of geographic isolation and of linguistic variation (at phonological, syntactical and lexical levels) naturally occurring within generations (von Humboldt 1836; Locke and Bogin 2006). Languages facilitate relationships within the members of a group, yet they also contribute to the segregation of communities (Fabbro 1999; Pagel and Mace 2004; Pagel 2009). There is evidence suggesting that languages may act as biological barriers genetically isolating populations; indeed, the tendency to prefer partners speaking the same language still prevails among human beings (Spielman et al. 1974; Cavalli-Sforza 1996; Fabbro 1996, 1999; Lieberman 2013).

The acquisition of language, both in written and spoken form, sculpts the brain in specific ways and is affected by the existence of critical periods (or sensitive periods) (Fabbro 2004). Generally, it is possible to learn a second language well only before puberty and preferably before the age of seven. After the brain structures of the implicit memory system (particularly procedural memory) involved in the acquisition of language and syntax have matured, it is generally not possible to completely acquire a second language at the first language level (Paradis 1994, 2009; Cargnelutti et al. 2019). These observations suggest that the true "territory" of a language is not geographical, but rather neurological and mental (Fabbro 2018). Moreover, perfect language acquisition is only possible within early childhood.

The use of vocal signals, learned within specific critical periods, is a rather widespread biological phenomenon: it is present in many species of passerines (canaries, finches, etc.) and in some mammals, such as dolphins and killer whales (Riesch et al. 2012). In killer whales, the development of pod-specific cultural habits (related to singing and feeding) has mediated their speciation into numerous subspecies (Riesch 2016). Cultural and genetic isolation is one of the mechanisms for producing biological diversity, and diversity is the ground on which life originates and develops.

Language's advent determined the emergence of human cultures. Human beings within each culture have developed more or less different narratives, customs and traditions. The different tribes and populations of *H. sapiens* were rather technologically and traditionally homogenous before the invention of language. Its invention generated considerable diversity in ornaments, decorations and tattoos among different language groups. However, it is likely that linguistic and cultural diversity in hunter-gatherer societies also fostered an increase in violence (Fabbro et al. 2022).

Violence is a behavior of destructive and systematic aggression, aimed primarily at the elimination of isolated individuals or groups of the same species. In the second half of the last century, some ethologists have documented the presence of destructive behaviors between different groups of chimpanzees (Wrangham and Peterson 1996; Wrangham et al. 2006; Kelly 2005). These behaviors did not seem to be driven by food scarcity, but rather competition to access larger territories and greater food and sexual resources. In humans, language differences appear to have fueled the tendency for inter-group violence, as in almost all past human cultures those who spoke foreign languages were considered "subhuman beings" liable be subjugated or killed.

In fact, one of the most characteristic abilities of human beings, even of those who have not studied phonetics or phonology, consists of the ability to recognize from the pronunciation whether an individual belongs to their linguistic community or not. This ability, which seems to develop more during adolescence, is independent of the communication of information. According to this perspective, language plays a significant role as a marker of group identities (Locke and Bogin 2006; Ritt 2017). These aspects of human socialization and communication indicate that language, like many other aspects of cognition, has both strengths and limitations, which must be properly understood and regulated (Fabbro 2021a, 2021b; Fabbro et al. 2022).

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, F.F. and C.C.; writing—original draft preparation, F.F.; writing—review and editing, F.F., A.F. and C.C.; supervision, F.F. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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