*5.1. Thomist and Kalam Cosmologist Arguments for Faith Belief*

Two of the most common arguments developed in the Western theological literature for the reasonableness or truth of faith are inspired by Medieval Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary philosopher Richard Swinburne, who developed Aquinas's views. Neither Aquinas nor Swinburne claim to establish absolute certainty that they or anyone has knowledge of theistic truths that are derived from their assertions and the resulting embrace of faith. In what Swinburne calls the Thomist view, "The person of religious faith is the person who has the theoretical conviction that there is a God: a sincere belief that God exists and is the cause of the universe which then animates a range of subsidiary and reasonable conclusions that inform the religious perspective" (Swinburne 2005, p. 138). For Swinburne, the reasonableness of the belief is based on a probabilistic argument—if there is reason to think it is more probable than not that there is a God, then there is a justified belief in God.

Swinburne's disciple William Craig articulates a standard version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument—Thomistic in nature—as such:

The classic Thomistic assertions (1–3)


Numerous analytic philosophers and logicians have pointed out the misconceptions, erroneous presumptions, and inconsistencies under which cosmological arguments for the existence of God labor. A focus simply on the first premise, which need not be embraced as true in the absence of any supporting empirical evidence, illustrates the challenges. As philosopher Graham Oppy, observes:

One Kalam cosmological argument relies on the premise that it is impossible for ¯ there to be physically instantiated infinities (e.g., infinite temporal sequences, hotels with infinitely many rooms, Thomson lamps, etc.). Professor Craig claims that, even though such things are narrowly logically possible--as is shown by the (apparent) consistency of Cantorian set theory--nonetheless, they are not broadly logically (or metaphysically) possible. On the other hand, I see no reason to say that it is broadly logically impossible for there to be physically instantiated infinities. That is, I am not prepared to rule out the suggestion that it is broadly logically possible for there to be physically instantiated infinities. And that is enough to allow me to reasonably refuse to be moved by this Kalam cosmological ¯ argument. (Oppy 1995, p. 17)

In Oppy's view, the cosmological proposition presents two problems: First, there is no reason to believe it is true; but, second, if it were true, it seemingly embraces the reality of an infinite regression of causation, undercutting the claims of a first cause. The failure of the first premise renders the full argument suspect.

Aquinas lived in the 13th Century and, though deeply indebted to Aristotle, had no experience of the changing insights and perspectives of the 17th century scientific revolution that would grip the West. Independent of this fact, his conception of the divine is construed as a strictly mental, revelatory, or imaginative construction, inviting confusion about who or what is in control of God's existence (and by extension God's relevance to issues of religious belief and practice). Aquinas' argument about faith as a "justified reasonable belief", much like the Kalam argument that attempts to probabilize the existence of God, does not assert that the divine should be assumed as a fact about the world. Instead, Aquinas argues that faith is "the theoretical conviction that God exists and is "midway between knowledge and opinion" (*Summa Theologiae* 2a2ae 1, 2) (Aquinas 2006, p. 11). Aquinas further describes faith as "assent" which is understood as a mental state or inner will that if not blocked allows God to reveal the truths behind faith and of God (*Summa Theologiae*, 2a2ae, 2, 1 (Aquinas 2006, pp. 59–65)). Based on this argument, the truth about the existence and nature of God is dependent upon a person's willingness to believe, but it does not appear to establish a strictly logical foundation for that belief. It is a "believe and you will see" rather than a "see and you will believe" proposition.

The Kalam cosmological formulation and Aquinas' assessment of the power but limited nature of what it is able to claim presents a clear challenge for believers who are dependent on this belief to support their theism and derivative religious worldview. A more practical and concrete problem inevitably emerges from this situation. Individuals who assume the role of witness to, or asserter of, the truth claims of belief in God fail in nearly all important ways to meet the ethico-epistemic tests of accuracy, adroitness, and aptness introduced earlier by Sosa. Though individuals who speak as the voices of

this tradition might be sincere in their expressed beliefs, their assertions fail the tests of accuracy as established by empiricists' claims of miracles like raising individuals from the dead, bearing witness to visitations by celestial beings, assertions of divinity to human beings, and so forth. All such claims suggest a failure of the standard of "reliable testimony" that serves as a functional tool of everyday human life. The empiricist criticism against believers in God and in the religious worldview that is generated by this belief is not so much that such believers are inept or weak in their execution of accuracy, adroitness, or aptness. It is rather that by embracing their faith and beliefs, these terms cease to have any meaning in even referring to their endeavor. They are, in a real sense, functioning outside of a reality where such terms can even be used meaningfully. Abandoned, in this logic, is Aristotle's argument based on *ergon*, supplanted by subjectivist claims of the improbable that lack what could constitute verifiable or falsifiable, evidence. While the scientific method welcomes the possibility of uncertainty, and even error, faith-based claims on the part of those who "bear witness" do not so easily do so.
